Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

August 14, 2023, 6:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on August 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Berdyansk (western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[1] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) in the Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) direction. Malyar noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing to advance in Urozhaine, and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces control the northern part of the settlement.[2] Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of the “Vostok” battalion defending near Urozhaine, complained that Russian forces are not deploying additional reserves and artillery battalions to the area.[3] Khodakovsky claimed that the “Vostok” battalion is fighting for Urozhaine with all available forces but that the forces operating in the area are exhausted and suffering losses. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces lack available operational reserves that would allow them to carry out rotations or bring in additional reinforcements, and that Russian defensive lines may be brittle.[4] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in southern Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[5] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces advanced by three square kilometers in the Bakhmut direction in the past week and liberated 40 square kilometers total since Ukrainian forces began their offensive operations in this direction.[6]

Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on August 14 that Crimean occupation officials will propose amendments at a federal level to increase the liability for the spread of photos and videos showing the location and operation of Russian air defense systems, other systems, and military and strategic assets.[7] The amendments would also penalize individuals who publish images of the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes. Aksyonov’s initiative likely intends to improve Russian operational security and limit awareness of Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas in the Russian information space, and occupation officials have previously discussed similar restrictions following the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17.[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and prominent Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov both expressed concern that Russian authorities could wrongfully use such amendments to censor Russian journalists and milbloggers who report on Ukrainian strikes.[9] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian officials are unlikely to successfully prevent the publication of strike footage.[10]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed all eight Russian-launched Kalibr cruise missiles and 15 Shahed-131/136 drones.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that falling missile and drone debris caused fires in several locations in Odesa City.[12]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen. Russian opposition outlet Dossier reported on August 14 that longtime associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin Arkady Rosenburg and the Russian state-affiliated bank VTB have provided over 300 million rubles ($3.04 million) to the Convoy PMC since late 2022.[13] Dossier reported that Russian energy enterprises Promresurs and Coal Trading also gave a combined 109.5 million rubles ($1.11 million) to Convoy PMC, even though neither enterprise’s profit margins supported the donations. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov reportedly politically supports the Convoy PMC. The Convoy PMC began formal recruitment for activities in Ukraine in November 2022, and Convoy personnel signed contracts either directly with Convoy PMC or with the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District). Dossier noted that Convoy is not subordinate to the 150th Motorized Rifle Division and has its own area of responsibility in Ukraine and command structure. Convoy PMC is reportedly based out of occupied Perevalne, Crimea, and is currently operating in the Kherson direction after originally defending Russian logistics lines on the Melitopol-Dzhankoy highway.[14] Convoy PMC reportedly has 400 personnel as of summer 2023, who receive salaries of 200-300 thousand rubles ($2,030-3,045) per month.[15] Ongoing private financial and political support for the Convoy private military company (PMC) and its continued operations in Ukraine separate from the MoD command structure indicates that the MoD is unable to fully integrate irregular formations into the conventional Russian military despite its announced intent to do so.

Convoy PMC founder Konstantin Pikalov has prior affiliations with the Wagner Group and is reportedly affiliated with the Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU). Dossier reported that Pikalov is also the cofounder of the St. Petersburg Cossack Society “Convoy,” and that Pikalov attempted to break into the military services industry starting in 2014 but did not experience much success until he joined the Wagner Group in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2018.[16] Pikalov reportedly served as an advisor to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin or as part of a security detail rather than as a fighter. Dossier reported that Pikalov is affiliated with GRU agent Stanislav Poluzanov, whom he later recruited as a deputy commander in Convoy. Dossier reported that there are no records of Pikalov interacting with Prigozhin-affiliated structures after 2018, and Convoy PMC continued international security work in 2019. Dossier reported that Pikalov had little military experience prior to his involvement with the Wagner Group and that Pikalov is the opposite of Prigozhin: “manual and safe for power.”

US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14.[17] US officials announced that the package will include additional HIMARS rockets; Patriot air defense missiles; TOW anti-tank missiles; and mine-clearing equipment.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen.
• US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment.
• Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk and advanced on August 14. Geolocated footage published on August 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced near Orlianka (22km east of Kupyansk) and Mykolaivka (24km east of Kupyansk).[19] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) took control of multiple Ukrainian positions and observation posts near Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured positions and occupied the line from Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) to Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), where positional battles are ongoing.[21] One of the milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently about 7km from Kupyansk.[22] Former deputy interior minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Vitaly Kiselev similarly claimed that Russian forces are directly on the outskirts of Kupyansk, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[23] Kiselev claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to capture Kupyansk in the near future due to Ukrainian force composition and defensive preparations in the city.[24] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Petropavlivka, Synkivka, and Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[25] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Pershotravneve (21km east of Kupyansk) and Mankivka (about 15km east of Kupyansk).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are accumulating reinforcements and introducing new units into battle in the Kupyansk direction, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are increasing the density of mine-explosive barriers along the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod oblasts, possibly to disrupt further pro-Ukrainian cross border raids.[27]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kupyansk on August 14. The Russian MoD and Zybinsky claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka and the Usa forest (likely between Synkivka and Lyman Pershyi).[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations southeast of Andriivka (15km west of Svatove), and Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Andriivka.[29] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to push Ukrainian forces out of the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to advance near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove) and Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[31] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Myasozharivka (15km west of Svatove) and that this is a new Russian direction of attack.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not been able to break through Ukrainian defenses near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[33]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line but did not advance on August 14. Russian sources including the Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Novoselivske, Bilohorivka, and Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian counterattacks near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and Terny (17km west of Kreminna) have slowed Russian activity in the area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and marginally advanced on August 14. Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows that Ukrainian forces made minor advances south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) while attacking Russian positions.[36] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Klishchiivka, while others claimed that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted a failed attack near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on August 13.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced on August 14. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured lost positions in Klishchiivka while counterattacking, and some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured the entire settlement.[39] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts to recapture lost positions near Klishchiivka, west of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and near Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[40]

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in positional battles on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on August 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka, Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City), and Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City.[41] A Russian milblogger characterized fighting in the Avdiivka and Marinka directions as positional because both Russian and Ukrainian forces are focusing on other areas of the front.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 14 and reportedly advanced. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces achieved some unspecified successes south and southeast of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and in the Urozhaine direction (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[43] Malyar also reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations in the Berdyansk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[44] The “Vostok” Battalion, which is defending near Urozhaine, claimed that it is deploying personnel to the rear and second or third levels of defense, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may have advanced near Urozhaine.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attempts to advance in Urozhaine.[46] Several milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces control the northern part of Urozhaine while Russian forces continue to occupy the southern part of the settlement and that the rest of the area in and near the settlement remains contested.[47]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 14 but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions west of Staromayorske.[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces withdrew from Urozhaine and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) covered their withdrawal.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine, and Russian forces likely maintain some positions in the south of the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment and a reconnaissance company of the 247th VDV Regiment (both of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) are operating near Staromayorske and Urozhaine.[50]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14, but did not make confirmed or claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[51] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Orikhiv direction.[53]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 14 and recently made claimed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 13 that elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th Guards Mountain VDV Division) advanced in the Orikhiv direction.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions east of Robotyne.[55]

Russian sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to cross to the east bank of the Dnipro River on small boats near the Antonivsky Bridge and Kozachi Laheri.[56] Russian sources amplified footage of a Russian Su-24 bomber flying over Kherson Oblast and speculated that it was striking Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge or Kozachi Laheri.[57]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment. Russian sources claimed that Rosgvardia is reorganizing its “Oplot” battalion into a regiment and that the battalion is receiving heavy military equipment.[58] Rosgvardia also appointed Russian State Duma Deputy (and a prominent Russian ultranationalist) Zakhar Prilepin as the deputy commander for military political work of the “Oplot” regiment and awarded Prilepin the rank of lieutenant colonel.[59] Prilepin led a battalion in Donbas prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and was a celebrity in the occupied Donetsk Oblast.[60]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu opened the “Army 2023” international military-technical forum (which runs from August 14 to 20) near Moscow on August 14.[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it anticipates signing contracts worth over 433 billion rubles (about $4.4 billion) at the forum.[62] Putin claimed that 82 foreign military industrial companies exhibited their military equipment at the forum, whereas only 32 companies attended in 2022.[63] Putin claimed that Russia expects to sign agreements for the export of military equipment during the forum.[64]

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to form and deploy new volunteer formations to reinforce the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Khabarovsk Krai reportedly formed a “Maksim Passar” volunteer battalion – the krai’s third volunteer battalion.[65] Khabarovsk officials also extended the recruitment period for the “Yerofey Khabarov” volunteer battalion.

The Russian military command subordinated a Magadan Oblast-based “Kolyma” volunteer battalion to the Donetsk People’s Republic’s 1st Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) and then dissolved the battalion to reinforce existing regular military units.[66] Elements of the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion published an appeal addressing Putin and the governors of Primorsky Krai and Magadan Oblast on August 13, stating that the battalion suffered significant losses on the battlefield. The volunteers claimed that Magadan Oblast promised that the volunteers would serve together as part of the “Kolyma” battalion under an experienced and familiar commander. The volunteers also claimed that Magadan Oblast promised them three to four months of training prior to deployment to Ukraine. The volunteers complained that they were subordinated to a different commander who dismantled the unit to create reinforcements for his other units when the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion deployed to the frontlines. The reformation of the “Kolyma” volunteer battalion indicates that the Russian military command continues to leverage personnel of new irregular military formations as individual reinforcements instead of cohesive units.

Russian convicts fighting in Ukraine continue to suffer significant losses on the battlefield. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that convicts fighting as part of “Storm Z” detachments suffer “serious” losses because they are immediately committed to the first line of defense.[67] A Russian convict who guarded Russian positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast told The New York Times that only 40 convicts out of 120 from his unit survived in combat.[68] The convict noted that the hastily formed convict unit endured several weeks of bombardment, sniper attacks, and ambushes on very flat terrain, making them a very vulnerable target.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine, likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian authorities in Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, are demanding that local administration and city council representatives – presumably occupation bodies – resign their positions and that Russian authorities plan to create new local administrations that will be headed by officials "elected” in the upcoming regional elections.[69]

Russian officials and occupation officials continue to establish patronage systems in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy Complex, Housing, and Communal Services of Krasnodar Krai, Russia sent construction equipment and materials to areas in Kherson Oblast for social and residential infrastructure projects.[70]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel claimed on August 14 that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on an unspecified date in the past week, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[71] The channel noted that the topic of the meeting is unclear. If true, a Prigozhin-Lukashenko meeting would likely indicate that Prigozhin is still in Belarus.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Belarusian forces are increasing their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the Ukrainian-Belarusian international border.[72] The Resistance Center reported, citing Belarusian partisans, that Russian experts arrived in Belarus to train Belarusian forces to repel drone attacks.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.