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German outlet BILD stated on December 14 that unspecified intelligence findings and sources indicate that Russia plans to occupy Ukrainian territory beyond the four (illegally) annexed Ukrainian oblasts throughout 2024-2026. BILD stated that Russia plans to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and up to the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast by the end of 2024.
Al Qaeda–linked militants are increasing their rate of attack in central Mali, likely to coerce civilians into submission to strengthen support zones and gain more resources to help the group isolate Malian forces in the area. Malian security forces and their Kremlin-funded Wagner Group auxiliaries will likely fail to protect civilians from the attacks because Malian forces cannot effectively contest insurgents in central Mali as they continue to give priority to fighting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. UN forces that helped secure roads in the region are also no longer around to mitigate security gaps after withdrawing in early December. The insurgents will likely use strengthened support zones in central Mali to besiege major population centers and attack isolated security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso to delegitimize both countries’ governments.
Russian President Vladimir Putin displayed notable confidence in publicly discussing Russia’s war on Ukraine during a joint event combining his annual press conference and “Direct Line” forum on December 14 but did not clearly define his envisioned end state for the full-scale invasion he launched on February 24, 2022. The “Direct Line” is an annual highly staged forum in which Putin answers pre-selected questions from the Russian public. Putin notably skipped the “Direct Line” in 2022, the first time he did not hold it since 2012. Putin routinely abstained from discussing the war in depth at high profile events throughout 2022, suggesting that he was uncertain about his ability to shape the Russian information space on this topic. Putin used the December 14, 2023, event to discuss his objectives in Ukraine, specific operational and tactical situations along the front, and specific concerns from Russian military personnel and volunteers in a much more public and prolonged fashion than in his previous statements about the war since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s willingness to center large portions of the event on the war in Ukraine suggests an increased confidence in his ability to address the Russian public on the subject, which may be indicative of his own personal confidence in Russia’s prospects in Ukraine following the relatively successful Russian defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and perceived wavering Western support for Ukraine. Putin did not offer a new approach to the war, describe how Russia intends to achieve victory in Ukraine or specify what a Russian victory would look like. Many of Putin’s statements on December 14 are similar to the boilerplate claims about the Russian war in Ukraine that he made during a speech at a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium meeting almost a year ago, for example.
Israeli forces are engaged in intense fighting around Shujaiya and Zaytoun neighborhoods of Gaza city. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip that they are facing challenging terrain in these areas. These remarks are unsurprising in part because Shujaiya is one of the most densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces searched on December 13 a school compound that Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion used. Israeli forces also cleared nearby tunnels.
DPP presidential candidate Lai Ching-te made significant gains in the polls while support for KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih plateaued. A December 10 Taiwan News Poll of Polls showed that in a weighted average of polls from the past ten days, Lai had 38.06% support, Hou had 31.27%, and Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je had 18.48%. These numbers show a nearly 5 percentage point jump from 33.2% for Lai since the December 5 Poll of Polls, a 2% rise from 29.3% for Hou since then, and a 3.5% drop from 22.0% for Ko. This is the first time Lai has surpassed 35% support since the Poll of Polls’ first data point on September 1. It is also Ko’s worst performance in the Poll of Polls since October 16. The Poll of Polls normally aggregates polls from the previous 15 days.
The United States has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think. A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean. The Ukrainian military with Western support has destroyed nearly 90% of the Russian army that invaded in February 2022 according to US intelligence sources, but the Russians have replaced those manpower losses and are ramping up their industrial base to make good their material losses at a rate much faster than their pre-war capacity had permitted.
Hamas conducted a complex, multi-part ambush targeting an Israeli patrol and quick reaction force (QRF) in Shujaiya’s kasbah on December 12. Hamas ambushed an Israeli fireteam entering a three-building complex during Israeli clearing operations in Shujaiya. Hamas fighters detonated an IED and fired small arms at the Israeli fireteam during the initial ambush. Israeli forces nearby lost contact with the Israeli fireteam inside the building and launched a QRF to rescue the fireteam. One Israeli force moved north of the three-building complex, while another moved south. Hamas fighters continued to attack the QRF by setting off IEDs and throwing grenades at Israeli forces. Israel recovered the bodies of the Israeli fireteam, but five additional Israeli soldiers died during the rescue operation including a battalion commander, three company commanders, and the “head of the Golani Brigade’s forward command team.”
The Kremlin appears to be returning to expansionist rhetoric last observed before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an effort to resurface its claims that Ukraine is part of historically Russian territory and discuss the borders Russian leaders regard as appropriate for a rump Ukrainian state. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev misrepresented US President Joe Biden’s response to a media question about whether the United States’ policy is to win the war or help Ukraine to defend itself during a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on December 12. Biden stated that the United States wants to see Ukraine win and that “winning means Ukraine is a sovereign, independent nation […] that can afford to defend itself today and deter further aggression.” Medvedev misrepresented Biden’s statements to suggest that the United States would be content if Ukraine simply existed as a country but does not care what Ukraine’s borders look like. Medvedev claimed that Ukraine can still technically be a sovereign country if the whole country remains within the borders of Lviv Oblast, for example. Medvedev also falsely claimed that Biden implied that the United States only supports Ukraine in defending itself but will not help Kyiv launch counteroffensives to liberate more of its land and people. Medvedev added that Ukraine could hypothetically “defend itself” as a rump state within the borders of Lviv Oblast.
Palestinian militias are attempting to resist Israeli advances north and east of Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that it detonated multiple claymore-type, anti-personnel mines targeting ten Israeli soldiers east of Khan Younis. The militia also claimed that it inflicted five casualties during a small arms clash with Israeli forces along the Israeli forward line of advance in al Qarara, north of Khan Younis . The al Qassem Brigades separately mortared Israeli soldiers advancing north and east of Khan Younis. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed that it conducted four mortar and rocket attacks on Israeli forces advancing into Khan Younis. Al Quds Brigades fighters fired tandem-charge rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israeli armored personnel carrier east of Khan Younis. The National Resistance Brigade—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—used mortars against Israeli forces advancing east of Khan Younis. Residents published footage of audible small arms fire east of Khan Younis on December 12. The BBC reported on December 11 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had captured most of the four main towns east of Khan Younis.
US intelligence reportedly assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in fall 2023 and through the upcoming winter aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine instead of achieving any immediate operational objectives. The US intelligence community reportedly shared a declassified intelligence assessment with Congress on December 12 wherein US intelligence assessed that Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine aim to weaken Western support for Ukraine but have only resulted in heavy Russian losses and no operationally significant Russian battlefield gains. This assessment of high Russian losses and lack of operationally significant Russian gains is consistent with ISW’s assessment. US National Security Council Spokesperson Andrienne Watson reportedly stated that Russian forces have suffered more than 13,000 casualties and lost 220 combat vehicles along the Avdiivka-Novopavlivka axis (Avdiivka direction through western Donetsk Oblast) since launching offensive operations in October 2023. Watson added that Russia appears to believe that a military “deadlock” through the winter will drain Western support for Ukraine and give Russian forces the advantage despite high Russian losses and persistent Russian shortages of trained personnel, munitions, and equipment. ISW has assessed that Russian forces have been trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine since at least mid-November 2023 and have now likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative.[4]