China-Taiwan Weekly Update, May 23, 2025

 

 

 

 

 

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Alfred Han of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek, Yeji Chung and Alex Chou of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Nicholas Carl of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: May 22, 2025

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army. The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued its messaging to vilify and delegitimize Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te around the anniversary of his inauguration. Lai gave a speech to commemorate the anniversary on May 20. Lai emphasized national security resilience and lauded that his administration would budget 410 billion New Taiwan dollars of surplus revenue to enhance homeland security, strengthen the economy and domestic industry, and protect citizens’ livelihoods.[1] Lai has made national resilience a cornerstone of his first year in office, implementing civil society resilience drills that involved both the central government and local governments for the first time. Lai alluded to the need to counter “united front threats” but did not refer explicitly to the PRC or cross-strait relations.[2]

PRC state news agency Xinhua published an authoritative commentary article criticizing Lai the day before his speech. The article detailed Lai’s six “evil deeds” since taking office. These alleged transgressions are:

1. Escalating his “Taiwan independence” rhetoric, including introducing a “new two-state theory” and defining the PRC as a “hostile foreign power;”
2. Obstructing cross-strait exchanges, including crackdowns on Taiwanese nationals who hold PRC documents;
3. Perpetuating the “green terror” political persecution of individuals who support reunification with the PRC;
4. Presiding over “chaos in governance,” including mass recall campaigns against legislators and alleged shortages in public service provision;
5. “Selling out” Taiwan to the United States by transferring advanced semiconductor technology and refraining from responding to US tariffs;
6. “Distorting” UN Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as the Chinese representative to the United Nations, and trying to “internationalize the Taiwan issue.”[3]

PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua used similar rhetoric to criticize Lai shortly after his speech. Chen condemned the idea of Taiwanese independence and called it incompatible with peace in the Taiwan Strait. The TAO readout framed Chen’s comments as a response to “recent speeches by Taiwan leaders on cross-strait relations” rather than to Lai’s speech in particular.[4] The TAO may have prepared to condemn Lai’s speech and reframed its criticism after Lai did not mention the PRC or cross-strait relations. The rhetoric by the TAO and Xinhua is consistent with the PRC effort to portray Lai as an unacceptable leader, setting the informational conditions for future aggression against Taiwan. The PRC has consistently expressed its hostility toward Lai, including by conducting major military exercises around Taiwan after his inauguration and Taiwan’s National Day.[5] The PRC conducted an amphibious landing exercise around Taiwan in Fujian on May 20, which may be meant partly to signal continued PRC hostility toward Lai and resolve to “reunify” Taiwan but is not as aggressive as previous exercises encircling Taiwan.[6]

The PRC rhetoric co-opts existing narratives within Taiwan that Lai is governing poorly to suggest that he is unfit to rule. The Kuomintang (KMT)—the main Taiwanese opposition party—published its own list of the “ten failures” of the Lai administration and claimed that Lai is imposing “green authoritarianism”—a reference to the color of Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT list included some of the same criticisms that PRC state media published.[7]

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced a series of measures that it is taking to achieve its sweeping modernization goals. The PLA announced the establishment of new academies for the Information Support Force and Joint Logistics Support Force.[8] The PLA has previously identified its military education and training systems as a relative weakness. The PLA separately announced a naval exercise that involved using an artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted decision-making system for degaussing.[9] The PLA seeks to use AI to increase its overall efficiency and plans to use AI in future exercises and simulations especially. PLA-affiliated Xian Technological University has developed a DeepSeek AI model that simulates military scenarios and will likely support this PLA activity.[10] The PLA has lastly continued to develop its drone and unmanned capabilities. The PLA has conducted further tests of its Jiu Tian super-high altitude, long-range aerial drone, and Tong Ji unmanned oceanographic research ship.[11] The PRC has noted the widespread use of drones in Ukraine and continues to invest heavily in its drone programs.

Key Takeaways  

• Taiwan: The PRC continued its messaging to vilify and delegitimize Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te around the anniversary of his inauguration. This PRC messaging reinforces existing opposition narratives that Lai is poorly governing Taiwan and that the PRC could do a better job.
• PRC: The PLA announced a series of measures that it is taking to achieve its sweeping modernization goals. The PLA established two new military academies, is incorporating AI into its exercises, and continuing to develop its drone capabilities.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The DPP petitioned for the political opposition's proposed central government budget to undergo constitutional interpretation by the Judicial Yuan to prevent record budget cuts. The budget controversy is a major factor in the ongoing legislative recall petitions, which primarily target opposition-Kuomintang (KMT) legislators. DPP legislative caucus whip Ker Chien-ming argued that the 2025 Central Government General Budget Proposal and revisions to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures are unconstitutional—the former due to a lack of legal clarity and violating the constitutional separation of powers and the latter due to the violation of constitutional guarantees for budgetary aid in specific areas.[12] The opposition-led Legislative Yuan (LY) raised the quorum for exercising constitutional interpretation to 10 out of 15 justices and rejected all of Lai's nominees to fill the seven vacancies on the court in December 2024, effectively paralyzing the Constitutional Court.[13] The eight sitting justices have so far abided by the new amendment, so the DPP petition for constitutional interpretation may be in limbo.

Constitutional interpretation is the last institutional recourse for the DPP to reconsider the budget proposal. The Executive Yuan (EY) had previously motioned for the LY to reconsider the budget bill on the grounds that it negatively impacted Taiwanese governance, violated the constitution, and infringed on civil liberties, but the LY rejected it along party lines in March.[14] The budget plan would cut government spending by 6.6 percent—the largest amount in Taiwanese history.[15] Taiwanese President Lai said that the cuts and freezes affect more than 30 percent of the central government’s available budget.[16]

The proposed budget is one of many controversial bills that the opposition-coalition in the LY have successfully pushed, which has helped to trigger the public backlash driving the legislative recall petitions across the nation. The Central Election Commission (CEC) is now considering if the two second stage recall petitions targeting DPP legislators Lin Chun-hsien and Wang Ting-yu should continue after the Tainan District Prosecutors’ Office charged 11 suspects for recall petition fraud, nine of whom were high-level KMT officials.[17] Coalition Defense of Taiwan (CDOT)-ISW has observed no changes to Taiwan's ongoing legislative recalls since the release of our May 17, 2025 update.

 

The World Health Assembly (WHA) rejected Taiwan from participating for the ninth straight year. The PRC has continually exerted influence to block DPP-controlled Taiwan from participating in international organizations. Taiwanese diplomatic allies proposed inviting Taiwan as an observer at the annual WHA on May 19, but the proposal failed.[18] The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying that Taiwan has no basis for participating in international organizations without Beijing’s permission in accordance with the One China Principle and accused the ruling DPP of promoting separatism in violation of said principle.[19] The TAO and PRC Ambassador to the United Nations issued similar statements.[20] Taiwan was invited to the WHA as an observer during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency from 2008 to 2016. Ma was a member of the KMT party, and a cornerstone of his administration’s policy was developing closer ties with the PRC in accordance with the 1992 consensus, under which Taiwan and the PRC agree that they belong to “one China” but with differing interpretations of what “China” means.[21] The DPP's platform focuses on removing PRC influence in Taiwan, so official PRC statements regularly accuse the DPP of promoting separatism and independence. The PRC has blocked DPP-ruled Taiwan’s participation in the WHA to suppress Taiwan’s international representation and punish Taiwanese support for the DPP.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) is probing 20 Taiwanese artists and entertainers for cooperating with the PRC to spread propaganda.[22] The MAC investigation is based on President Lai’s new countermeasures countering PRC influence. MAC Vice Chairman Shen Yu-cheng said in a legislative hearing on May 15 that the MAC is concerned with PRC co-optation of Taiwanese celebrities to disseminate content that could damage national morale, especially amid national security crises.[23]

President Lai has introduced initiatives to reduce threats from PRC United Front efforts in Taiwan. The United Front is the PRC’s whole-of-government and society effort to advance Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology and interests. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to spread notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a part of that China. Lai announced in a speech in March 2025 that Taiwan would undertake 17 measures to combat PRC malign influence, including stricter oversight to prevent the PRC from pressuring artists and entertainers in ways that endanger national dignity.[24]

Multiple Taiwanese celebrities have simultaneously republished PRC propaganda or content that aligns with PRC narratives regarding Taiwan’s political status and national identity. Some of these instances have coincided with major PRC blockade exercises around Taiwan, during which the PRC intensifies its anti-Taiwanese sovereignty messaging. Taiwanese celebrities’ amplification of PRC narratives regarding national identity likely aims to erode Taiwanese perceptions of the PRC as an aggressor and reduce the public's will to resist unification.

Taiwanese celebrities have spoken out in the past year about PRC efforts to recruit them for United Front work.[25] Co-opting Taiwanese pop culture figures likely aims to primarily shape perceptions in the younger generation, who the PRC views as a crucial demographic to cultivate Chinese identity.[26]

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP government on May 19 of violating the freedom of speech of Taiwanese individuals to undermine cross-strait relations.[27] Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Act prohibits cooperation with any PRC organization that is involved in political work against Taiwan that could harm national interests.[28]

Northeast Asia

Japan

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested the PRC installation of a new offshore platform in the East China Sea. The structure is near the meridian line where Japan’s and the PRC’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ) overlap. Satellite images show that two PRC-origin ships have been operating around 345 km northwest of Okinawa Prefecture’s Kume Island since May 22.[29] Japan and the PRC reached a tentative agreement in 2008 to jointly develop natural resources in the disputed area, although the PRC claims that the agreement is non-binding.[30] The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has urged the PRC to resume negotiations for the implementation of the 2008 agreement to no avail[31] The PRC has already built 18 structures in this area, including mobile and permanent hydrocarbon platforms and oil rigs.

The PRC has not responded to Japan’s protest at the time of writing. The PRC will likely continue its construction project given recent developments in the Yellow Sea, where the PRC similarly has EEZ boundary disputes with South Korea.[32] Japan’s Ministry of Defense also detected a flotilla of five PLA Navy ships, led by a Type-075 amphibious assault ship, sailing through the Miyako Strait near Okinawa.[33] This is the third time that PLA Navy ships were spotted transiting the Miyako Strait in May 2025. The PRC’s offshore platform construction and PLA Navy’s frequent activities near Okinawa could indicate a PRC desire to incrementally expand its permanent presence and assert more control over the East China Sea.

 

A Shanghai court sentenced a Japanese national to 12 years in prison on espionage charges. PRC arrests of foreign nationals have increased significantly since 2014. The PRC and Japan did not release the details of the case. The charge was made in 2023 against a Japanese national employed by a Tokyo-based firm and residing in the PRC.[34] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian urged Japan to respect the PRC’s judicial sovereignty and tell its citizens to abide by Chinese laws when in the PRC.[35]

The number of foreign nationals arrested for allegedly spying on the PRC has increased since the PRC introduced its counter-espionage law in 2014.[36] The law was amended in 2023 to further expand the PRC law enforcement’s power to arrest foreign nationals for anything that the PRC authorities deem relevant to national security.[37] Seventeen Japanese nationals have been detained by PRC law enforcement since the law came into force. This includes a PRC-born Japanese national who was sentenced to six years in prison for activities conducted in Japan in December 2024.[38] The PRC also used the law to arrest three Philippine nationals in April 2025, allegedly in retaliation against the Philippine government’s arrest of Chinese nationals for spying.[39]

North Korea

North Korea test-launched medium-range air-to-air missiles that few other countries in the world can manufacture. North Korea also showcased other military advancements, possibly linked to Russian support. North Korean Worker’s Party General Secretary Kim Jong Un continues to drive military modernization to prepare for possible conflict with South Korea and the United States. Kim Jong Un attended an air division exercise that showcased helicopters, drones, missile defense systems, and radar installations on May 15.[40] Kim observed MiG-27 fighter jet anti-air defense, live-response simulation exercises, which launched a medium-range missile. These missiles reportedly feature radar-guided targeting and are able to engage targets smaller than conventional aircraft. Only few countries, such as the United States, the PRC, Russia, and Israel can manufacture this missile system. North Korean medium-range missiles resemble those used by the PLA.[41] The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged the possibility of Russian support for or technology transfer to aid North Korea’s missile development.[42] This suggests potential collaboration between North Korea and Russia and possibly the PRC in the development of these systems.

Kim oversaw special operations forces drills involving drones on May 13.[43] Kim previously visited a one-way attack drone test site and ordered mass production of various types in August and November 2024.[44] The North Korean drones showcased bear a strong resemblance to the Russian Lancet drones, which have an operational range of 30 to 40 kilometers.[45]

The frequency of Kim Jong Un’s visits to the new weapons system exercise and facilities has increased since North Korea dispatched troops to Russia in October 2024. Kim oversaw significant new military developments including a nuclear submarine construction facility, a new road-mobile nuclear capable transporter, and a series of missile tests in early 2025.[46] Kim’s recent visits to field exercises and his emphasis on deploying new weapons systems, such as one-way attack drones, indicate North Korea’s push to accelerate the development of capabilities based on lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine War.

Kim continues to pursue military modernization with Russian support, which could increase tensions with South Korea and the United States. He visited the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang on May 9 to commemorate Russia’s Victory Day and reaffirmed efforts to strengthen ties with Russia.[47] He also justified North Korea’s military support for Russia by saying that neglecting Ukraine could embolden South Korea to act with “reckless courage” against North Korea.[48] His statement implied that North Korea’s military cooperation and military development with Russia are specifically targeted at South Korea and the United States. The transfer of Russian military technology to North Korea is a major threat to South Korea and US forces there, as it could significantly enhance North Korea’s capabilities.

North Korea has continued to increase its economic exchanges with the PRC and Russia. North Korea’s total trade with the PRC reached nearly 222.1 million US dollars in April 2025.[49] This represents a 15-percent increase from the 193.9 million US dollars recorded in April 2024. North Korean imports from the PRC totaled approximately 186.4 million US dollars, while North Korean exports to the PRC amounted to 35.7 million. North Korea resumed constructing the New Yalu River Bridge near its border with the PRC, previously abandoned in August 2020, in February 2025.[50] Efforts to resume construction may be connected to a PRC company’s plan to establish a special economic zone (SEZ) in Sinuiju.[51] The completion of this complex, whether it is a customs facility or an SEZ, would enhance overland trade between North Korea and the PRC.

North Korea is also increasing commercial exchanges with Russia. Russia reportedly exported around 22,000 tons of agricultural products to North Korea in 2024.[52] North Korean companies are registering trademarks in Russia to enter their market. North Korea has earned between 5.5 billion to 20 billion US dollars from selling weapons to Russia since 2023, according to experts.[53] North Korea and Russia are constructing the Tumangang road bridge, which would facilitate vehicle transport and commercial exchanges.[54]

North Korea’s increasing commercial exchanges with both the PRC and Russia reflect its use of trade relations to strengthen an anti-United States bloc and bolster its economy. North Korea and the PRC showed support for Russia during the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9.[55] This cooperation showcased their alignment and defiance of US-led efforts to isolate revisionist states. North Korea is leveraging the PRC’s and Russia’s interest in deepening ties to improve its domestic economy and expand international trade, circumventing sanctions to gain access to foreign currency. The PRC is likely to enhance economic cooperation with North Korea to increase Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing, preventing Russia from becoming North Korea’s main trading partner and preserving PRC influence over North Korea.

South Korea

PRC intelligence agents targeted United States Forces Korea (USFK), as the United States seeks to expand the strategic flexibility of USFK to counter the PRC and support Taiwan The PRC agents, under the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, reportedly tried to gather information about USFK and the US-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system through a South Korean soldier from July 2023 to January 2025, according to the South Korean military.[56] The PRC agents requested intelligence related to “OPLAN 5077,” a US military plan for evacuating American civilians during a Korean Peninsula conflict, saying that “information about the US military is the most valuable.”[57]

This comes amid senior US officials increasingly calling for expanding the strategic flexibility of USFK to counter the PRC. The nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael DeSombre said that US partners should strengthen ties with Taiwan on May 15.[58] USFK Commander General Xavier Brunson said that USFK should adopt a broader role in deterring the PRC in addition to its primary mission of defending South Korea against North Korean threats due to its proximity to Beijing.[59]

The PRC is likely to increase efforts to block the expansion of the USFK role by strengthening ties with a new South Korean administration, particularly if a progressive, PRC-sympathetic president is elected on June 3. South Korea’s leading presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party (DP) urged the need to maintain good relations with both the PRC and Taiwan during a presidential debate on May 18.[60] Lee previously said that South Korea should not interfere with cross-strait issues.[61] Lee has framed his policy as “pragmatic diplomacy,” prioritizing national interest over ideological alignment. The PRC may strengthen this rhetoric that Taiwan is not relevant to South Korean interests and attempt to utilize South Korea’s growing concerns about US-imposed tariffs to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.

Southeast Asia

Cambodia

The PRC and Cambodia began their largest “Golden Dragon” combined military exercise on May 14. These exercises marked the first use of the newly renovated PRC-Cambodian military center at Ream Naval Base. PRC and Cambodian military officials said that the exercises will last until May 28, focusing primarily on counterterrorism operations and providing humanitarian assistance.[62] Royal Cambodian Air Force (RCAF) spokesperson Major General Thong Solimo said that the number of troops participating, the range of exercises, and the use of advanced equipment would all increase.[63] The PLA is reportedly deploying a number of advanced weapons and systems for the exercises, including new amphibious landing ships, reconnaissance and combat drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and robotic platforms.[64]

The exercises were launched from a combined logistics and training center at Ream Naval Base, an expansion funded by the PRC and completed in April 2025.[65] The training center at Ream has prompted concern among Southeast Asian countries, who worry that the PRC will use this location to monitor military activities in the Gulf of Thailand—an important maritime corridor surrounded by Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Cambodia is suspected to have granted the PRC “preferential access” to Ream Naval Base, though it has allowed other countries to dock there. Ream Naval Base enhances PRC access to the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the Andaman Sea.[66]

The PRC and Cambodia have always had very close economic and diplomatic ties, but the PRC has increasingly sought additional opportunities for economic and military cooperation with Cambodia. Xi Jinping visited Cambodia in April 2025, signing 37 agreements for cooperation related to advanced manufacturing and supply chain resiliency.[67] This visit occurred shortly after the United States announced global tariffs, with Cambodia facing one of the highest tariff rates. PRC and Cambodian cooperation may continue to expand in the coming years, as the PRC is seeking to exploit US foreign and economic policy decisions that impact the Indo-Pacific.

South Asia

PRC media outlets are capitalizing on the India-Pakistan conflict as an opportunity to promote narratives on PRC military effectiveness. Pakistan claimed it downed five Indian fighter jets with PRC-made J-10Cs; India refuted the downing of its jets but did confirm that Pakistan used PRC-made PL-15E missiles.[68] Reuters cited Indian officials who said that three Indian jets had been downed and later cited US officials who said that J-10s had likely downed at least two.[69] Ashok Kumar, director general of Indian Ministry of Defense-affiliated research group Centre For Joint Warfare Studies, said that the PRC had helped Pakistan adjust its satellite coverage to gain insights into India’s aerial routes.[70]

PRC media has propagated narratives highlighting the role of the PRC-made jets, including by implying the role they might play in a Taiwan contingency. PRC narratives highlighted national pride and promoted triumph over Western military systems. Xinhua cited a Newsweek article arguing that the India-Pakistan aerial dogfights exemplified the changing character of modern air warfare.[71] The Newsweek article itself stated that “the engagement also spotlights China's growing role in military technology and supply, expanding its footprint in strategic regions and adding a new layer to the US–China rivalry.”[72] Hong Kong-based, PRC-affiliated outlet Ta Kung Pao ran a similar commentary on May 9, arguing that “China is no longer a follower, but a redefiner of the rules” in military technology and that the PRC had broken the “myth” of Western military dominance.[73] Nationalist outlet Global Times ran a piece calling the J-10 the “fighter of national pride” which “transforms national pain into the driving force for strength and progress.”[74] Zhou Bo, a Tsinghua University research fellow, called the shootdown a “milestone” in a South China Morning Post article; Bo said in an interview that “The real effect is actually for the world, including Taiwanese authorities, to see how China’s defense industry has developed by leaps and bounds.”[75] Former Global Times editor Hu Xijin wrote in a Weixin (WeChat) post that “the Taiwan military should tremble even more” and that the “willingness and confidence of the United States to intervene militarily [against the PLA] will be even more shaky.”[76] Comments such as this align with PRC informational efforts to cast doubts upon the US–Taiwan relationship and undermine confidence in US efforts to defend Taiwan.

The PRC maintains close economic and security ties with Pakistan and likely views this conflict as an opportunity to observe and promote PRC-made hardware in a real-world operational environment.[77] PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi met with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Ishaq Dar on May 20, discussing security cooperation among other topics.[78] PRC media has clashed with Indian government media over its portrayal of events in the conflict, however. India blocked the X accounts of Xinhua and Global Times, PRC state-affiliated outlets, alleging that they spread disinformation on the conflict.[79] This came after the Indian embassy similarly criticized Global Times with similar charges of disinformation on May 7.[80]

Latin America

Colombia signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflecting PRC efforts to shore up its influence in Latin America amid the CK Hutchison port sale dispute. Xi Jinping met Colombian President Gustavo Petro for the China-CELAC Forum and jointly signed the agreement on May 14. The PRC and Colombia, which have maintained formal diplomatic relations for 45 years, will deepen cooperation in fields including artificial intelligence and wind energy.[81] Rhetoric on the signing emphasized “South-South cooperation,” illustrating typical PRC narratives aiming to establish the PRC as a leader of the Global South.[82]

PRC officials likely hope that Colombia’s BRI deal will solidify economic relations with other Latin American partners. Colombia embraced the BRI amid ongoing PRC efforts to halt Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison’s sale of two ports at each end of the Panama Canal. PRC officials likely interpreted the proposed port sale as a threat to PRC soft power in Latin America and are making ongoing efforts to halt the sale.[83] Panama similarly declared it would not renew its BRI agreement with the PRC, signaling an interest in moving away from PRC–Panama economic cooperation. Panama initially became the first Latin American country to sign onto the BRI in 2017, and PRC officials may fear that other countries in the region might follow in refusing to renew their respective BRI deals.[84] The PRC will likely continue its efforts to increase its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean as part of its efforts to cast itself as the leader of the “Global South” and an alternative to US soft power in the region.[85]

 

[1] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/feat/archives/2025/05/21/2003837234

[2] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/feat/archives/2025/05/21/2003837234

[3] http://www.news dot cn/tw/20250519/6cf3d3f3a72c45b69fecd35353d1fdc1/c.html

https://english.news dot cn/20250520/26e8541f935e4528a450b298dbcded67/c.html

[4] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202505/t20250520_12701793.htm

[5] https://chinapower.csis.org/china-respond-inauguration-taiwan-william-lai-joint-sword-2024a-military-exercise/

[6] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3311146/pla-conducts-amphibious-landing-drill-strait-taiwanese-leader-marks-first-year?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[7] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/05/20/2003837215

[8] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3310537/china-announces-three-new-military-academies-part-pla-modernisation-drive?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[9] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202505/1333788.shtml

[10] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3310707/chinese-team-taps-deepseek-ai-military-battle-simulation?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202505/1334151.shtml

[11] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202505/1334219.shtml; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3310879/china-extend-combat-range-uavs-jiu-tian-drone-carrier-prepares-first-mission?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[12] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202505150019

[13] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-political-drama-erupts-over-top-court-s-fate-in-last-days-of-2024; https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-Constitutional-Court-faces-ruling-on-own-fate-5-things-to-know

[14] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202503120020

https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20250312005140-260407?chdtv

[15]  https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/deep-cuts-to-government-budget-spark-widespread-recall-efforts-against-kmt-legislators-in-taiwan/

[16] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202501220233.aspx

[17] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202505190132.aspx

https://focustaiwan dot tw/society/202505080013

https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/en/news/6106303

[18] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202505200010

[19] https://www.mfa dot gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202505/t20250519_11628061.shtml

[20] http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202505/t20250519_12701595.htm

http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/bmst/202505/t20250519_12701543.htm

http://www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/speech/202505/t20250514_12700619.htm

https://paper dot people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202505/20/content_30074180.html

[21] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/former-taiwan-president-ma-on-one-china-the-1992-consensus-and-taiwans-future/

[22] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202505150147.aspx

[23] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/aipl/202505150147.aspx

[24] https://www.president dot gov.tw/News/39105

[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXndeTRH8tU

https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4707881

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnElihmXaUE

[26] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4736857

[27] www.gwytb dot gov.cn/m/fyrbt/202505/t20250519_12701579.htm

[28] https://law.moj dot gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Q0010001

[29] https://www.sankei dot com/article/20250514-NA757WBHNJAPPMC4DUPROMKBM4/

[30] https://www.mofa.go dot jp/files/000091726.pdf

[31] https://www.mofa.go dot jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01262.html

[32] https://www.aei.org/articles/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-9-2025/

[33] https://www.mod.go dot jp/js/pdf/2025/p20250516_01.pdf

[34] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/20/business/japan-executive-china-arrest-intl-hnk/index.html

[35] mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202505/t20250514_11622765.shtml

[36] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/opinion/article/2023/05/02/in-china-arrests-of-chinese-people-and-foreigners-accused-of-espionage-are-on-the-rise_6025173_23.html

[37] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/27/china-widens-already-breathtaking-scope-to-arrest-foreigners-for-espionage

[38] https://english.kyodonews dot net/news/2024/12/71c41726de6d-china-charged-japanese-woman-with-espionage-for-activities-in-japan.html

[39] scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3305122/china-detains-3-philippine-nationals-suspicion-spying

[40] https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/kim-jong-un-oversees-aerial-drills-calls-for-radical-turn-in-war-preparation/

[41] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25336790; http://bizhankook dot com/bk/article/29606 

[42] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250519004200315

[43] https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/kim-jong-un-oversees-special-forces-tank-war-preparation-drills/

[44] https://www.joongang.co dot kr/article/25292362   

[45] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2024/08/26/UURUYNV6IFE7TLOYCWF7RP2BMM/  

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-9-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2025-0; https://www.chosun dot com/politics/diplomacy-defense/2025/03/09/CBZND2M3HZCI5ARIFAEI5WZ5XE/

[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2025-0 

[48] https://www.joongang dot co.kr/article/25335036  

[49] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/05/north-korea-china-trade-holds-strong-in-april-in-sign-of-stable-economic-ties/

[50] https://www.nknews dot org/pro/north-korea-resumes-huge-china-border-bridge-project-in-sign-of-trade-boost-plan/

[51] https://www.nknews dot org/pro/chinese-company-planning-to-construct-sinuijus-first-foreign-owned-sez-this-spring/

[52] https://www.nknews dot org/2025/04/russian-expands-agriculture-exports-in-2024-to-north-korea-amid-burgeoning-ties/

[53] https://www.freiheit dot org/north-and-south-korea/new-ties-between-north-korea-and-russia; https://www.kida.re dot kr/images/skin/doc.html?fn=87ae5d08308aa40a7c26b4ac850030b6

[54] https://beyondparallel.csis dot org/tumangang-road-bridge-construction-update/

[55] https://www.wsj dot com/world/russia/russia-putin-victory-day-world-leader-gathering-7c4e1954

[56] https://www.chosun dot com/national/court_law/2025/05/13/OTWP2ZEMWZFJNPG6X47ZLFN5X4/

[57] https://www.chosun dot com/national/court_law/2025/05/13/OTWP2ZEMWZFJNPG6X47ZLFN5X4/

[58] https://www.kmib.co dot kr/article/view.asp?arcid=1747553897&code=11141400&cp=nv

[59] https://www.stripes dot com/branches/army/2025-05-16/brunson-south-korea-china-lanpac-17807125.html

[60] https://www.hankyung dot com/article/202505180484i

[61] https://www.chosun dot com/politics/politics_general/2024/03/22/RDYKOEY2XJBDZIDCOFO4EDZIVI/

[62] http://www.news dot cn/politics/20250517/719dc3aa52ae4b04b19c532e054d54f7/c.html; https://www.khmertimeskh dot com/501685606/golden-dragon-a-symbol-of-the-robust-and-unbreakable-military-cooperation-between-cambodia-and-china/

[63] https://apnews.com/article/china-cambodia-golden-dragon-military-exercise-01090258ee039fa29db09aa59a5ba91b

[64] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3309788/china-cambodia-drills-showcase-more-tech-and-troops-military-ties-grow?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

 

[65] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202504/1331488.shtml

[66] https://www.scmp dot com/week-asia/politics/article/3308814/cambodia-widens-access-china-funded-ream-naval-base-parry-lingering-suspicion

[67] https://www.khmertimeskh dot com/501671228/cambodia-and-china-sign-37-agreements-to-strengthen-bilateral-ties-during-president-xi-jinpings-visit/; https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202504/t20250419_11598441.html

[68] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3310603/chinas-pl-15-missiles-face-first-combat-test-kashmir-conflict?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[69] https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/exclusive-pakistans-chinese-made-jet-brought-down-two-indian-fighter-aircraft-us-officials-say/ar-AA1EtL99?ocid=BingNewsSerp

[70] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-18/china-gave-pakistan-satellite-support-indian-defense-group-says

[71] http://www.news dot cn/milpro/20250513/ab168c7cffdd489dbb74a0290e45b985/c.html

[72] https://www.newsweek.com/india-pakistan-massive-dogfight-shows-changing-shape-air-warfare-2070199

[73] https://www.takungpao dot com/opinion/233119/2025/0509/1084986.html

[74] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202505/1334358.shtml

[75] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/20/world/asia/china-military-jets-india-pakistan.html; https://www.scmp dot com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3310220/4-lessons-china-pakistan-j-10s-down-indian-rafale-jets

[76] https://mp.weixin dot qq.com/s/hNW4c5H5NO3oZoOgD9wNSg; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/20/world/asia/china-military-jets-india-pakistan.html

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2025-0

[78] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/wjbzhd/202505/t20250520_11629202.shtml

[79] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3310671/india-blocks-state-backed-chinese-x-accounts-spreading-pro-pakistan-disinformation?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection

[80] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3310671/india-blocks-state-backed-chinese-x-accounts-spreading-pro-pakistan-disinformation

[81] http://www.news dot cn/world/20250514/2b41bdceae5f4016909d526402ddab9e/c.html

[82][82] http://www.news dot cn/world/20250514/2b41bdceae5f4016909d526402ddab9e/c.html

[83][83] https://www.scmp dot com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3310530/beijing-cautions-hong-kongs-ck-hutchison-act-prudence-over-port-deal

[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-7-2025

[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-may-17-2025-0