Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update June 11, 2025

 

 

 

 

Kateryna Stepanenko, Tetiana Trach, Olivia Gibson, and Jessica Sobieski

June 11, 2025, 1 pm 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm EDT on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the next Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Spokesperson Oleh Aleksandrov told Politico in an interview published on June 5 that Chinese manufacturers are providing Russian developers with hardware, electronics, navigation, optical, and telemetry systems, engines, microcircuits, processor modules, antenna field systems, and control boards.[1] Aleksandrov stated that Chinese manufacturers evade sanctions and export controls by changing company names and using shell companies. Aleksandrov added that Russia has a critical dependency on Chinese components to produce tactical and long-range drones and that Russia boosted its long-range drone production from 15,000 drones in 2024 to over 30,000 drones in 2025 and small tactical drone production to two million drones per year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also implied that the PRC placed restrictions on Ukrainian and European drone procurement but did not impose the same restrictions on Russia.[2]

Russian developers are increasingly relying on Chinese components to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities into Russian drones and expand the use of AI/ML drones on the frontlines in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) War&Sanctions project reported on June 9 that Russian forces are actively using V2U strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Sumy direction.[3] The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones can autonomously search and select targets using AI and that these drones are based on the Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer and a central processor with an American NVIDIA Jetson Orin module. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones only have one GPS module, which the GUR assessed indicated that Russian forces gave up on using satellite navigation due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness. The War&Sanctions project added that V2Us are likely using "computer vision" for navigation, which allows the drone to compare the image obtained from the drones' cameras and pre-loaded photos of the area. The War&Sanctions project noted that Russian drone operators can control the V2U drones as first-person-view (FPV) drones via LTE connection and that an installed modem-router allows the drone to work with Ukrainian mobile operator SIM cards. The War&Sanctions project reported that the base of the modem is of Chinese origin despite Russian markings. The War&Sanctions project added that Russian developers assembled V2U drones mainly with Chinese-made components such as the engine, GPS module, servos, solid-state drive, rangefinder, speed controllers, and batteries. ISW recently assessed that Russia has been increasingly scaling up the development of drones with machine vision in Spring 2025 and increased their use on the battlefield in May 2025.[4]

Russian developers also rely on Chinese manufacturers to extend the range of Russian fiber-optic drones. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on June 5 reportedly showing a Chinese-made, 50-kilometers-long fiber-optic coil that will enable Russian forces to fly these drones at a longer range.[5] The coil reportedly weighs 3.8 kilograms. Russian forces have been increasingly using fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, particularly in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.[6]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.
• The Kremlin appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the ongoing centralization effort.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda efforts.
• Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine outside of St. Petersburg.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial Intelligence (AI) Development Center.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia is belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones.

Significant Russian Military Exercises

• Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory rhetoric against the Baltic States.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Assessed Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization and undermining regime stability)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is continuing to lure and coerce Ukrainian men into signing military service contracts in occupied Ukraine in order to expand Russian combat manpower. Ukraine's Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksiy Kharchenko reported on June 5 that the Russian MoD will train 300 young people in military-political specialties at a military training center in occupied Luhansk City in 2025. Kharchenko reported that the Russian MoD plans to train an additional 700 people by 2027.[7]  Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation reported on June 7 that Russian occupation officials are threatening to expel Ukrainian students with student loan debt unless they sign military service contracts with the Russian MoD.[8] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 6 that Donetsk Oblast occupation administration decreased one-time payments upon conclusion of military contracts from 800,000 rubles ($10,194) to 400,000 rubles ($5,097).[9] Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration reported on June 7 that residents in occupied Kherson Oblast could receive 800,000 rubles ($10,194) in a one-time enlistment payment upon conclusion of a military contract with the Russian MoD.[10]

The Russian MoD reportedly recruited and mobilized over 73,000 men from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts into the Russian military as of early 2023. Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) estimated on June 4, using a leaked Russian database of deserters, that the Russian MoD recruited 48,900 people from Donetsk Oblast and 24,100 people from Luhansk Oblast as of early 2023.[11] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported in July 2023 that Russia recruited around 60,000 people from occupied Ukrainian territories.[12] The Russian General Staff's Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate reported in May 2023 that Russia mobilized 79,800 people from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[13] IStories noted that the real number of recruits and mobilized personnel from occupied Ukrainian territories is likely higher than 73,000 because Russian enlistment offices may not have immediately distributed personal numbers to the recruits. Such recruits would not have been included in the leaked documents.

Russian Force Centralization (Assessed Russian objective: Centralize the state's control over informal volunteer-based units that emerged in early 2022 after the Kremlin failed to declare general mobilization)

The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years, likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps. The Wagner Group's press service announced that Wagner personnel are returning to Russia after completing their mission in Mali.[14] A Russian milblogger published footage on June 7 showing a column of military equipment reportedly belonging to the Africa Corps in transit in Mali.[15] ISW previously reported that the Russian MoD intensified recruitment into the Africa Corps since February 2025, likely in an effort to replace the remaining Wagner Group personnel in Africa with personnel firmly under the Russian state’s administrative control.[16] A Russian insider source claimed on May 14 that Russian authorities informed Wagner Group mercenaries stationed in Africa that their deployments would end in June-July 2025.[17]

The Kremlin appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the ongoing centralization effort. The insider source claimed on June 8 that Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko finances and oversees the Africa Corps, despite the Russian MoD's administrative control over the Africa Corps.[18] Timchenko reportedly has a close relationship with Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and both are trying to regain Russian President Vladimir Putin's favor.[19] The insider source characterized Africa Corps as Timchenko's "personal army" and that former convict Konstantin Mirzayants commands the Africa Corps.[20] The insider source claimed that Timchenko and Mirzayants successfully pushed out Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Andrei Averyanov from the Africa Corps leadership and successfully infiltrated the GRU's Special Activities Service.[21] Mirzayants reportedly successfully accused Averyanov of failing to replace the Wagner Group and lured personnel of the GRU's Special Activities Service in Africa in an attempt to undermine Averyanov. ISW observed reports in April 2024 that the Kremlin became convinced that Averyanov failed to meet the Kremlin’s deadlines to develop the Russian MoD-controlled Africa Corps, and it is possible that the Kremlin is once again delegating the management of its private military companies (PMCs) to loyal billionaires who can effectively manage military organizations.[22] The insider source noted that the Kremlin previously entrusted Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in a similar manner and speculated that the Kremlin may be repeating its mistakes that resulted in a mutiny in June 2023.[23] The Kremlin intensified its force centralization effort in the aftermath of the Wagner mutiny.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring (Assessed Russian objective: Restructure the Russian military to maintain the war in Ukraine while preparing for a potential large-scale conventional war with NATO)

The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 7 that Rosgvardia will strengthen security at Russian infrastructure facilities and arm employees of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Okhrana" unit with anti-drone small arms, according to a corresponding draft order obtained by a TASS correspondent.[24]  Russian state media outlet Parliamentary Gazeta claimed on June 7 that Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov published a draft order on June 6 that included a list of weapons that Rosgvardia is authorized to issue to "Okhrana" units.[25] The draft order specified two amendments to the Rosgvardia order, which regulates the types of weapons, ammunition, and standards for "Okhrana" units. The first amendment specified that Rosgvardia must supply "Okhrana" units with the regular two boxes of machine gun belts (each belt containing 200 rounds) as well as three additional pre-loaded magazines. The second amendment stated that Rosgvardia may issue the "Okhrana" units" combat hand-held small arms" (pistols, submachine guns, machine guns, carbines) and cartridges for them, likely to expand the units' firepower and enhance their ability to down drones. Rosgvardia may be seizing on Ukraine's "Spiderweb Operation" to increase its authority in Russia. Rosgvardia similarly argued that Rosgvardia personnel should receive military equipment in the aftermath of the Wagner Group's mutiny in Summer 2023.[26]

The Russian MoD announced the construction of additional military towns for newly formed Russian units as part of Russia's effort to expand its military. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Major General Pavel Fradkov held a meeting on June 6 to discuss the construction of new military camps to accommodate the newly forming military units.[27] The Russian MoD developed and approved a schedule of basic preparation measures for the construction of the new military facilities. Putin notably ordered in September 2024 for the Russian MoD to increase Russia's military to 2.38 million people, of which 1.5 million would be active servicemen.[28] The construction of military towns is likely part of the Kremlin's preparations to sustain a larger military.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society (Assessed Russian objective: Mitigate the risk of veterans emerging as a political group in a way that could erode the stability of the Russian state)

Russian occupation authorities are introducing initiatives to reintegrate Russian veterans and their families into society and Russia’s labor market. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev announced on June 9 that the Russian "Work of Russia" personnel center, together with the Defenders of Fatherland State Fund, organized a trip for Russian veterans to a family carpentry workshop in an effort to have veterans socialize.[29] Razvozhayev claimed that occupation officials are offering veterans to participate in the local affiliate of the "Time of Heroes" program, the "Sevastopol — City of Heroes" program, and to open their own businesses by claiming a 200,000-ruble ($2,549) government subsidy.[30] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin claimed on June 9 that 100 Russian veterans passed to the next stage of the local "SVOi Geroi" — a play on Russia’s use of the euphemism “SVO” to avoid calling the war in Ukraine a war and the Russian word "svoi" (which means “our own”) heroes.[31] Pushilin claimed that the "SVOi Geroi" program is a regional version of the federal "Time of Heroes" program. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo established on May 30 an interdepartmental commission to provide state support to Russian veterans and their families to fulfill Putin's 2023 order on the establishment of the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund.[32] Saldo reported that Kherson Oblast occupation first deputy governor Pavel Shuvalkin will oversee the commission. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik discussed the occupation administration's efforts to rehabilitate and integrate Russian veterans into society during a meeting with LNR Commissioner for Human Rights Anna Soroka on June 5.[33]

Militarization of Society and Youth (Assessed Russian objective: Condition Russian society and youth for military service and raise societal support for Russian war efforts)

Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda efforts. Russian opposition outlet Verstka, citing an article published by Lieutenant Colonel Denis Dmitriev, a senior lecturer at Saratov University's Department of Military Pedagogy and Psychology, reported on June 6 that Russian officials have ordered Rosgvardia instructors to show Rosgvardia cadets "agitation and propaganda" programs. Dmitriev argued that cadets' exposure to state propaganda will facilitate the development of the future officers' ability to master "methods of counterpropaganda and special propaganda."[34] Verstka noted that the Rosgvardia instructors are recommending the cadets watch Russian state TV programs such as "Evening with Vladimir Solovyov," "60 Minutes with Yevgeny Popov and Olga Skabeeva," "Svoya Pravda with Roman Babayan," "Pravno Znat with Dmitry Kulikov," "Besogon with Nikita Mikhalkov," and "Vremya Pokazhet." Verstka stated, according to the article, that Russian state media channels broadcast feature elements of "agitation, propaganda, counter propaganda, and special propaganda." Dmitriev specified that counter propaganda and special propaganda "allow for the distortion of real facts for the sake of solving both situational and long-term propaganda tasks" and are "effective psychological weapons" for "brainwashing." Dmitriev also noted that Russian authorities had largely moved away from utilizing counter propaganda and special propaganda prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but that Russian authorities are realizing their relevance in the context of Russia's war in Ukraine and in the context of US-Russia and NATO-Russia relations. Dmitriev stated that propaganda can have a stabilizing and mobilizing effect on the population when Russian authorities declare a state of emergency or martial law. The Kremlin may be trying to reestablish its propaganda apparatus in an effort to prepare Russian society for a long-term war effort in Ukraine and a possible confrontation against NATO.

Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine outside St. Petersburg. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s northwestern Russia service Sever Realii reported on June 7 that the Committee for State Control, Use, and Protection of Monuments in St. Petersburg approved a plan on May 24 to construct the Church of the Holy Great Martyr George Victorious in Pushkin, Leningrad Oblast, that will commemorate the Russian veterans, colloquially referred to as the "Warrior Temple."[35] Sever Realii reported that residents are categorically opposed to the structure's location due to concerns over proximity to residential buildings and disruptions from the church bells. ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly using state-controlled religious institutions to militarize Russian society.

Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia's defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)

The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial Intelligence (AI) Development Center. The Russian Government stated that the AI Development Center aims to systematize the implementation of AI technology in Russia and will coordinate with government agencies, federal subjects, and businesses to facilitate AI integration.[36] Russian Deputy Prime Minister and the Russian Government's Chief of Staff Dmitry Grigorenko will oversee the center's functions. Grigorenko stated that Russia launched a national “Artificial Intelligence” initiative within the federal “Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State” project in 2025, under which separate Russian regional and federal bodies led separate AI development programs. Grigorenko stated that the new center would coordinate programmatic work and would provide a common vision for AI development in Russia. Grigorenko stated that the center will impose legal restrictions on Russian AI developers to ensure the safety and continuous success of AI initiatives. ISW previously reported that the Kremlin is increasingly trying to centralize its control over AI innovations, likely in an effort to integrate these innovations into Russian military-use drones.[37]

Russia is expanding production of long-range drones to sustain Russia's strike campaign against Ukraine's rear. A source at Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet Mezha that Russia produces 170 long-range Shahed drones and Shahed decoys daily.[38] The GUR's Press Service told Forbes Ukraine on June 9 that Russia manufactures over 5,000 long-range drones per month and produces around 2,700 Shahed 136/ Geran-2 drones per month.[39] The GUR's Press Service stated that Russia also produces around 2,500 Gerbera decoy drones per month. The GUR previously estimated that Russia produced 500 Shaheds per month as of August 2024.[40]

Russian federal subjects are continuing to set up tactical drone development and production facilities across Russia. Russian milbloggers and local outlets claimed that the regional Kamchatka Krai government is expanding local drone production and that Kamchatka Krai Governor Vladimir Solodov visited the "Krylya Kamchatki" ("The Wings of Kamchatka") drone development center on May 27.[41]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia is belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones. Radio Svoboda, citing an OSINT analyst, reported on June 8 that satellite images collected between January and early June 2025 show evidence of construction at the Kirovske Air Base and at military bases in Sevastopol, Hvardiiske, and Saky — all in occupied Crimea.[42] The satellite imagery shows that Russia is building similar defensive structures at military bases in Yeysk, Krymsk, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk in Krasnodar Krai; at the Khanskaya Air Base in the Republic of Adygea; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Akhtubinsk, Astrakhan Oblast; Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Oblast; Kursk City, Kursk Oblast; Lipetsk City, Lipetsk Oblast; and at the strategic aviation base in Engels, Saratov Oblast. A Russian milblogger specified that Russian forces are building defensive structures for Russian aircraft at the Khalino Air Base, Kursk Oblast, and indirectly criticized the Russian MoD for failing to build these defensive structures before Ukrainian "Operation Spiderweb" drone strikes on June 1.[43] Russian milbloggers called on the Russian MoD to rapidly develop interceptor capabilities and create mobile air defense groups to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes into Russia's rear.[44]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to rapidly adapt electronic warfare (EW) systems, resulting in Russian forces sometimes suppressing a small percentage of Ukrainian FPV drones.[45] A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian engineering amplified screenshots from Russian drone operators who reported on their success rates in disabling FPV drones with EW. Russian drone operators claimed that between May 30 and June 6, they observed 50 FPV drones and that Russian EW systems downed nine drones. Russian drone operators claimed that between May 28 and May 30, they observed around 70 FPV drones, of which Russian EW systems only suppressed nine. The milblogger stated that these screenshots indicate that the Russian EW systems suppress a small percentage of Ukrainian FPV drones, despite that the same systems and tactics recently were able to suppress 90 percent of Ukrainian FPV drones. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces modernized their EW systems a few weeks ago, and these systems are now proving ineffective. The milblogger argued that Russian forces cannot rely on simply adjusting their EW systems and need to procure new EW systems, and that Russian forces lack the necessary funding and logistics to maintain parity in the offensive-defense technological adaptation cycle.

Russian developers reportedly modified Russian Lancet drones into a new loitering munition that has improved strike capabilities in an effort to target Ukrainian drones in the Black Sea. A Russian milblogger amplified footage on June 9 reportedly showing Russian forces strike a Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicle (USV) in the Black Sea using the “Klin” loitering munition.[46] The milblogger claimed that Klin loitering munition is likely a modification of the Russian Lancet loitering munition with an airburst warhead. The milblogger claimed that Klin's warhead increases strike effectiveness against naval and infantry targets.[47]

Russian developers are continuing to adapt innovations to improve UAVs and unmanned ground systems (UGVs) resistance to EW interference. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported on June 4 that Russian forces reportedly installed transmitters on top of civilian high-rise buildings in southern Ukraine to communicate with and control Russian drones via local internet connection. Beskrestnov stated that these transmitters allow Russian forces to control FPV drones via any internet connection and that Russian forces have installed these transmitters in the Kherson operational direction.[48] Beskrestnov published footage on June 5 showing a Russian UGV operated via a fiber-optic cable that carried a fiber-optic UAV.[49] Fiber-optic drones are immune to EW interference, and Beskrestnov hypothesized that Russian forces may have developed this UGV to attack from afar. Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced that its affiliate Rosel has created new equipment for satellite-free navigation systems for aircraft, helicopters, and drones that is impervious to EW systems.[50] Rostec claimed that Russian forces can use this equipment in areas with unreliable satellite connections and in areas suppressed by EW. Rostec added that the equipment passed flight tests and is ready for serial production and that this equipment is an improved modification of existing systems.

Russian state space agency Roscomos announced on June 3 that Russia will deploy more than a hundred satellites in orbit to control drones. Roscosmos Head Dmitry Bakanov stated that Russia seeks to deploy 102 satellites and one spacecraft to control unmanned aerial systems (UAS).[51] Bakanov stated that Russia will launch 886 Rassvet broadband Internet satellites and 114 Earth remote sensing devices, and Russian milbloggers interpreted Bakanov's statements as part of the Kremlin's efforts to develop analogs to US-made satellite internet constellations.[52]

Russian developers continued efforts to develop a mothership drone that can launch several FPV drones at once. Beskrestnov reported on June 4 that Russian forces began to use a Molniya drone that is able to carry FPV drones, but noted that Molniya cannot be classified as a full-fledged drone mothership.[53] Beskrestnov explained that Molniya is designed for a single mission and likely does not have the necessary integrated networking relay on board. Beskrestnov noted that the Molniya drone can attack a target while bringing additional drones that Russian drone operators control separately.

Russian developers are testing new anti-drone measures, such as drone interceptors. A Russian milblogger posted footage on June 4 purportedly showing Russian forces testing a new Russian interceptor drone, which reportedly intercepted an aircraft-type UAV that flew at a speed of 120 kilometers per hour.[54] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on June 9 that Ukraine does not have information that Russia is using laser weapons against Ukraine, but noted that there is a possibility of future laser weapons use.[55] Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces tested laser air defense systems to shoot down Ukrainian drones.[56]

Significant Russian Military Exercises (Assessed Russian objective: Build force capabilities, improve interoperability among Russian military units, exchange combat experience, and achieve informational objectives by publicly projecting Russian military capabilities.)

Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory rhetoric against the Baltic States.[57] The Russian MoD announced on June 6 that the Russian Baltic Fleet, Northern Fleet, and Aerospace Forces (VKS) of the Moscow Military District (MMD) and Leningrad Military District (LMD) continued to participate in a training exercise involving 20 warships, boats, and support vessels.[58] The Russian MoD reported that the 20 vessels include four Kalibr cruise missile carriers, Admiral Flota Kasatov frigate of the Northern Fleet (which carries Zircon hypersonic missiles), and Naro-Fominsk, Serpukhov, and Zeleny Dol corvettes. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces practiced using Bal and Bastion coastal missile systems, performed deployment tasks on the Baltic Sea coast, and practiced electronic missile launches against mock enemy ships. Russian naval crews also participated in practice missile strikes against simulated enemy ships. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are focusing on improving interoperability between elements of the Russian Navy and VKS involved in joint navigation, the prevention of ship seizures, and other defensive joint operations. Russian forces also reportedly carried out anti-terrorist naval drills. Russian forces began exercises in the Baltic Sea's waters and airspace on May 27, and these exercises involve up to 20 warships, boats, and support vessels, 3,000 Russian servicemen, roughly 25 aircraft and helicopters, and up to 70 pieces of military and specialized equipment. The Kremlin has recently intensified its rhetoric against the Baltic countries.[59]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.politico.eu/article/china-russia-lethal-drone-war-race-ukraine-war-invasion-manufacture-putin-tech/

[2] https://www.politico.eu/article/china-russia-lethal-drone-war-race-ukraine-war-invasion-manufacture-putin-tech/

[3] https://war-sanctions.gur.gov dot ua/page-uav-v2u; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/warsanctions-rozpakovka-novoho-rosiiskoho-udarnoho-bpla-v2u-zi-shtuchnym-intelektom.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/6098; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/z-kytajskymy-komponentamy-u-gur-rozpovily-pro-novyj-rosijskyj-bpla-zi-shtuchnym-intelektom/ ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27065 

[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/battlefield-ai-revolution-not-here-yet-status-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone

[5] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5712; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/videos/1411632229859612 

[6] https://tsn dot ua/ato/pryroda-sered-viyny-na-fronti-pomityly-hnizdo-z-neochikuvanykh-materialiv-2843507.html

[7] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/27268

[8] https://t.me/CenterCounteringDisinformation/14498 ; https://t.me/sprotyv_official/7072

[9] https://t.me/andriyshTime/38382 

[10] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/31272

[11] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/stories/2025/06/04/skolko-zhitelei-dnr-i-lnr-otpravili-na-voinu/index.html

[12] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-ukrainy-rosiia-prymusovo-mobilizuvala-blyzko-60-000-cholovikiv-andrii-cherniak.html

[13] https://web dot archive.org/web/20230525144447/https://voenkom.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/495317/

[14] https://t.me/readovkanews/97282 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/36824 ; https://t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/639; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93011 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167436 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64900; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1905   

[15] https://t.me/milinfolive/149963

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025

[17] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1183

[18] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1945

[19] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1945

[20] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1906

[21] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1906

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024

[23] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1906

[24] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24163877

[25] https://www.pnp dot ru/social/okhranniki-budut-sbivat-bespilotniki-iz-pulemetov.html

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2023

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/53501

[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-russian-army-grow-by-180000-soldiers-become-15-million-strong-2024-09-16/

[29] https://t.me/razvozhaev/12334?single

[30] https://t.me/razvozhaev/12334?single

[31] https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6677

[32] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/31217

[33] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3795

[34] https://verstka dot media/v-uchebnyh-zavedeniyah-rosgvardii-predlozhili-pokazyvat-kursantam-vecher-s-vladimirom-solovyovym-i-besogon; https://rosguard dot gov.ru/uploads/2025/01/akad_vestnik_42024_vysokokach_pechat.pdf

[35] https://www.severreal dot org/a/syuzhet-zameshannyy-na-patriotizme-zhiteli-pushkina-protiv-tserkvi-uchastnikam-svo-/33434120.html ; https://t.me/severrealii/30661

[36] http://government dot ru/news/55306/

[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[38] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/

[39] https://forbes dot ua/news/rosiya-viroblyae-2700-shakhediv-na-misyats-mayzhe-stilki-zh-imitatoriv-gur-09062025-30369

[40] https://forbes dot ua/war-in-ukraine/rosiya-viroblyae-vid-130-dalekobiynikh-raket-ta-ponad-500-droniv-na-misyats-forbes-ukraine-diznavsya-detali-17092024-23667?

[41] https://kamchatka dot aif.ru/society/gubernator-vladimir-solodov-posetil-centr-krylya-kamchatki; https://t.me/anna_news/80675; https://t.me/zarussia_1/30719; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167169

[42] https://t.me/radiosvoboda/81742; https://x.com/DefMon3/status/1931424847168467092; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1037477-rf-pocala-buduvati-ukritta-dla-litakiv-na-vijskovih-bazah-u-krimu-suputnikovi-znimki/; https://t.me/idelrealii/41422

[43] https://t.me/milinfolive/150070  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167758  

[44] https://t.me/sashakots/53528 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/21322 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/46047    

[45] https://t.me/Military_engineer/1181; https://t.me/wargonzo/26986

[46] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/06/09/rossiyskie-voennye-nachali-primenyat-klin-v-chernom-more/; https://t.me/milinfolive/150089 

[47] https://t.me/milinfolive/150089

[48] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5710; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/videos/683642244722169/ 

[49] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5714; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid033URHYm3rgL1KfZEuyxr7u8ZJPh6g5xWKGXBFSYjzWCxC5wqAkDmC9Sk24waxuTNul     

[50] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/06/05/v-rossii-sozdali-zaschischennuyu-ot-reb-bessputnikovuyu-navigatsiyu-dlya-dronov/; https://rostec dot ru/media/news/rostekh-sozdal-bessputnikovuyu-navigatsiyu-dlya-bpla-zashchishchennuyu-ot-reb-i-khakerov/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167525

[51] https://ria dot ru/20250603/bpla-2020713593.html ; https://t.me/sotaproject/98710  

[52] https://t.me/sashakots/54079 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29638    

[53] https://t.me/serhii_flash/5711

[54] https://t.me/morpexROKOT/4304

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/09/u-povitryanyh-sylah-rozpovily-chy-zastosovuye-vorog-lazernu-zbroyu-proty-nashyh-droniv/

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025

[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/53484

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/53484

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025