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On June 27, 2012, the American Enterprise Institute, the Institute for the Study of War, and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution jointly conducted a one day crisis simulation that focused on the impact of spillover from the deepening civil war in Syria.
A suicide bombing in Kabul on December 6 targeted the head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), Asadullah Khalid, in an event that has rattled Afghan elites and rekindled controversy between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is on the brink of a constitutional crisis with no clear solution.
In 2007, after experiencing large losses and increased violence in Iraq, the U.S. adopted a new counterinsurgency strategy that included a troop increase and new emphasis on cooperation with Iraqis.
Key takeaway: Ukrainian strikes against Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets have changed Russian naval operating patterns, causing the BSF to move some ships away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and hampering the BSF’s ability to interfere with maritime trade in the western part of the Black Sea. Ukrainian strikes have likely caused the BSF to set conditions for a more permanent basing pattern along the eastern Black Sea coast as it transfers naval assets away from Crimea and expands a small port in de facto Russian-controlled Ochamchire, Abkhazia. Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets have successfully facilitated the use of Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor as international support for the corridor continues to increase despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and military threats against it.
The West risks handing the Kremlin another opportunity to prolong its war in Ukraine if it fails to resource Ukraine’s sustained counteroffensive. Delays and fragmented aid are exactly what allowed Russia to regroup prior to the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The West must not wait on the results of the current phase of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and, instead, help Ukraine maintain its momentum to prevent Russia from rebuilding its military strength and prolonging the war.
Key Takeaway: Ukrainian forces are celebrating the liberation of two small towns south of Bakhmut, but Ukraine’s entire effort first to defend and now to conduct counter-offensive operations around Bakhmut has been the subject of much unwarranted criticism. Ukraine's defensive and counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area since summer 2022 are an operationally sound undertaking that has fixed a large amount of Russian combat power that would otherwise have been available to reinforce Russian defenses in southern Ukraine. Elements of two of Russia’s four Airborne (VDV) divisions and three of Russia’s four VDV separate brigades are currently defending the Bakhmut area. This significant Ukrainian achievement has helped prevent Russia from creating a large mobile VDV operational reserve that could have been used to stop the main Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in Zaporizhia Oblast. Continued large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut are necessary to keep Russian forces fixed in that area, as the likely recent redeployment of a detachment of one VDV separate brigade from near Bakhmut to southern Ukraine shows how eager the Russians are to recoup the combat power that the Ukrainian counteroffensive around Bakhmut is fixing there.
Ukraine is dramatically expanding its defense industrial capacity to develop the ability over time to satisfy its military requirements with significantly reduced foreign military assistance. Ukraine is pursuing three primary lines of effort to achieve this goal: increasing its domestic defense industrial base (DIB), building bilateral and multilateral partnerships with European states, and pursuing industrial joint ventures with the United States and other international enterprises to co-produce defense materials in Ukraine and elsewhere. Ukraine will require considerable Western military assistance for several years, and its ability to reduce its dependence on such assistance depends in part on whether it can liberate strategically vital areas currently occupied by Russian forces, among other factors. But Ukraine and its Western partners are executing a realistic plan to create a sustainable basis for Ukraine to be able to defend itself over the long term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance.
Read the latest updates on the presidential election in Ukraine and how it is shaping the future of a key NATO partner.
President Putin and pro-Russia actors within Ukraine aim to trigger snap parliamentary elections to bring pro-Russian and populist parties to power and start rebuilding the client regime. ISW assesses that Russia intends to provoke clashes during a large march of Orthodox Christians to Kyiv on July 27 to cause a crisis, to try to set conditions for snap elections. Russia’s military action against Ukraine failed to reverse the political defeat dealt to Russia when the Euromaidan movement came into power in 2014. President Putin seeks to find lower profile methods of regaining control of Ukraine, including exploiting lack of political unity and decreasing public support for the current Ukrainian governing coalition. Bringing Ukraine back to Russia’s orbit is a major strategic objective for President Putin in his efforts to reassert Russia’s power globally.