



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 14, 2024, 10pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on June 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine, including the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of occupied and Ukrainian-controlled territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, in an attempt to undermine the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Putin stated during a speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on June 14 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.[1] Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which is in total 18 percent of Ukraine's territory). Russian forces currently occupy 75 percent of the total area of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and Putin is effectively demanding that Ukraine cede 40 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 25 percent of Kherson Oblast, 25 percent of Zaporizhia oblasts, and one percent of Luhansk Oblast that Russian forces do not control, including the provincial capitals Zaporizhia City and Kherson City. Putin's demands require Ukraine to surrender the strategic provincial capitals of Zaporizhia City and Kherson City for no good reason. Russian forces fled Kherson City in November 2022. Putin unconvincingly claimed that Russian forces will "immediately" enforce the ceasefire and will guarantee the "unhindered and safe" withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the four oblasts, a promise that rings particularly hollow following months of Russian war crimes against Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs), and numerous Russian violations of the Minsk Accords ceasefire between 2015 and 2022.[2] Putin demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a peaceful resolution to

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a demand which will irrevocably damage the principle of state sovereignty and the inviolability of international borders.

Putin also reiterated his previous conditions for "peace," namely that Ukraine must agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" (the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with pro-Russian proxies) and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs.[3] Putin claimed that Ukraine must come to these decisions independently and not on the orders of its "Western masters" and reiterated a series of claims insinuating that the West controls Ukraine and that Ukraine is not a sovereign country. Putin claimed that it would be "impossible" for any peace format without Russian participation to resolve the war in Ukraine and that the Western and Ukrainian policies against negotiating with Russia are "idiotic."

Putin's demands continue to reflect his long-demanded ultimatums that are based on presuppositions that deny the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukraine and that seek to seduce the West to preemptively compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Putin has put forth similar ultimatums and that Putin has no intention to stop attacking Ukraine.[5] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Russia, not Ukraine, must withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory and that Putin's ultimatums are a signal that Russia has not abandoned its military objectives in Ukraine.[6] Several prominent Russian milbloggers also stated that Putin's demands are unachievable and resemble an ultimatum to the West, and this speech rings similar to the absurd ultimatums Putin delivered to the US and NATO in December 2021 as part of a diplomatic ruse to buy time as Putin prepared to invade Ukraine and seize Kyiv.[7] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied interpretations that Putin's June 14 speech was another ultimatum.[8] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and only feigns its interest in negotiations as part of a wider informational effort intended to convince the West to preemptively make concessions that violate Ukraine's sovereignty.[9]

Russia is also attempting to sabotage the peace summit in Switzerland via cyberattacks. Swiss news agencies, citing the Swiss National Cyber Security Center's data, reported an increase in cyberattacks on June 13 against several Swiss government websites and organizations that will participate in the peace summit.[10] The Swiss National Cyber Security Center did not rule out the possibility of similar attacks during the peace summit. Swiss media reported on June 14 that a Russian hacker group claimed responsibility for distributed denial of service (DDoS) cyberattacks on Swiss internet infrastructure and threatened that there would be additional cyberattacks.[11]

Putin proposed to establish an alternative Eurasian and world security system with support from People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, likely to undermine NATO. Putin claimed that the world is witnessing the "collapse of the Euro-Atlantic security system" and claimed that Western "schemes for security and prosperity in Europe" do not work. Putin outlined a five-step proposal on instituting a new "system of bilateral and multilateral guarantees of collective security in Eurasia" and claimed that he had already tasked the Russian MFA with establishing a dialogue with all of Russia's potential participants of this new security order. Putin claimed that Xi had reportedly stated that the Russian proposal to create a Eurasian security system complements the basic principles of the PRC's "initiative in the field of global security" during Putin's recent visit to the PRC in May 2024. Putin stated that Russia will invite European and NATO countries to participate in this Eurasian security system and argued that Europe must move away from the "military presence of

external powers” - implying that Europe needs to abandon NATO and the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. Putin’s explanation of the Eurasian security system appeared to be rather vague but consistent with his long-term strategic goal of disbanding Western unity, disbanding NATO from within, and destroying the current world order. Putin continues attempts to attack and undermine NATO members despite his overtures designed to attract NATO members to join the Russian alternative for “collective Eurasian security.” Stoltenberg stated on June 14 that Russia increased its sabotage operations, cyberattacks, and other hostile actions against NATO in recent weeks.[12]

The Kremlin has frequently timed the intensification of its information operations, including negotiations, to coincide with major policy debates in the West in order to influence Western decision-making.[13] Putin's June 14 speech is aimed at misleading the international community and undermining foreign participation in the upcoming peace summit, and several Russian milbloggers noted that Putin's speech coincided with the eve of the Ukrainian-led peace summit. The purposeful intensification of Kremlin rhetoric is part of Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to self-deter and adopt policies that are in Russia's interests.[14] Putin's June 14 statements are the latest in Kremlin efforts to manipulate the West, and Putin likely timed his speech to coincide with several key events and discussions in the West. Putin likely aims to weaken Western unity in supporting Ukraine on the eve of the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit and following the June 13 Group of Seven (G7) and Ukraine Defense Contract Group meetings.[15] Putin may also be attempting to influence ongoing Western policy discussions about seizing Russian frozen assets, deploying Western training partners to Ukraine, and/or permissions for Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russian military targets further into Russian territory.[16] Putin may also be attempting to prevent further Western sanctions against Russia following the imposition of new American and British sanctions against Russia on June 13.[17]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev continued to rail against Western colonialism while ignoring Russia's imperial history and contemporary Russian imperialist aspirations to dominate Russia's neighbors in eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Putin claimed during his speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) on June 14 that the US is working to spread American ideology and "maintain its imperial status" by any means necessary.[18] Medvedev claimed in an op-ed published in the official Russian government newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* on June 14 that Russia's ruling United Russia party founded the "For the Freedom of Nations" anti-neocolonial movement to help rid the world of Western neocolonialism.[19] Medvedev claimed that the United States, France, United Kingdom (UK), and Italy are actively perpetuating the legacies of colonialism, including in countries along Russia's borders, and that the United Nations (UN) should create a database of colonial and neocolonial crimes to prosecute colonial powers. Medvedev claimed that only "fully sovereign countries" with independence in their external and internal affairs will be able to counter Western neocolonialism and that the "For the Freedom of Nations" movement is ready to work with the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to counter neocolonialism. Medvedev claimed that the "For the Freedom of Nations" movement aims to establish political, economic, and cultural ties between the supposed Russian-led "world majority" (a group of countries including post-Soviet and non-Western states that Russia intends to rally against the West as the basis for its future world order) and establish joint opposition against neocolonialism and neo-Nazism. Medvedev noted that the "For the Freedom of Nations" movement will meet in Vladivostok later in June to discuss "practical ways" to implement its vision. Putin and Medvedev notably ignored the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's

legacies of colonizing and Russifying their neighboring nations and Russia's modern campaigns to assert Russian dominance over Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Central Asia.

Medvedev also promoted Kremlin information operations that aim to exploit Moldovan identity politics in order to disrupt Moldova's European Union (EU) accession by destabilizing Moldovan society. Medvedev claimed that Moldovan President Maia Sandu's efforts to move Moldova towards EU accession are leading Moldova into "neocolonial slavery," insinuating that EU accession would have a negative impact on Moldovans and is unpopular among Moldovans.[20] Recent polls notably indicate, however, that a majority of around 56 to 64 percent of Moldovans support Moldova's EU integration.[21] Medvedev also promoted Kremlin narratives that target Moldovan-Romanian relations, claiming that Moldova will likely turn into the "northeastern outskirts of Romania" if it joins the EU and that Romanian authorities would repress and forcibly Romanianize the Moldovan population in the future.[22] Medvedev claimed that Romania "occupied" Bessarabia (a historical region in Moldova and southwestern Ukraine) from 1918-1940 and 1941-1944 but failed to mention how the Soviet Union laid claims to Bessarabia under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany and coerced Romania to cede Bessarabian territory to the Soviet Union in 1940.[23] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova similarly claimed on May 9 that the Moldovan government is replacing the Moldovan language with the Romanian language to invoke historical animus that some Moldavans harbor towards Romania with the goal of destabilizing Moldovan society.[24] Kremlin rhetoric about a unique Moldovan identity notably differs from Kremlin information operations alleging that Ukraine lacks a unique language, culture, identity, and history from Russia.[25] Kremlin narratives about Moldovan identity aim to target members of the Moldovan population who identify as Moldovan and may fear that Moldova's Western integration would lead to unification with Romania.

Putin and Medvedev's Russian information operations are the latest in the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to destabilize Moldovan society and prevent Moldova's accession to the EU.[26] Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Head Viorel Cernauteanu stated on June 13 that Moldovan authorities estimate that Russia is spending at least two million dollars per month to fund affiliates of US-sanctioned, Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor who aim to destabilize Moldova.[27] Cernauteanu stated that the Kremlin is spending part of this money to pay off the debts that Shor affiliates accrued during the Fall 2023 elections and protests. Cernauteanu also stated that the Kremlin funnels money into Moldova using "carriers" (likely referring to smugglers) who receive about \$150-\$200 for carrying large amounts of money. Cernauteanu noted that some of the smugglers are cooperating with Moldovan investigators.[28] Shor and his affiliates reportedly paid demonstrators to protest against Sandu and engaged in voter bribery during Moldova's regional elections in 2022 and 2023.[29] Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23.[30]

Medvedev also threatened Armenia on the eve of Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan's attendance at the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Grigoryan announced on June 14 that he would participate in the peace summit but did not state whether other senior Armenian officials would attend.[31] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's* Armenian service *Radio Azatutyun* reported that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) previously condemned Grigoryan's participation in a Ukrainian-initiated multilateral peace forum in Malta in October 2023.[32] Medvedev accused the US, European Union (EU), and NATO of attempting to sever the "centuries-old friendship" between Armenia and Russia and called agreements with such

Western institutions "neocolonial mousetraps" in an article published on June 14 in official Russian government outlet *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*.^[33] Medvedev insinuated that Armenian efforts to join the EU will fail and result in a similar outcome as the current situation in Ukraine. Armenia's decision to send a senior representative to a Ukrainian-initiated peace summit follows Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's announcement that Armenia "will decide when to leave" the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and accusation that Russia indirectly and Belarus directly helped Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War further highlights the deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.^[34] Russian officials have since responded to Pashinyan's statements with increasingly hostile statements.^[35] *Politico* reported on June 13, citing leaked documents, that Belarus provided Azerbaijan with artillery equipment, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones between 2018 and 2022 that Azerbaijan reportedly used in recent conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and against Armenia.^[36]

An unnamed senior US Department of Defense official reportedly said that the Biden Administration has no imminent plans to lift restrictions prohibiting Ukrainian forces from striking military targets in Russia's operational and deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons.^[37] *Politico* reported on June 13 that the senior official said that there is a "constant conversation and reassessment" of US policy restricting deeper Ukrainian strikes into Russian territory and that no decision is final, but that there is no "impending" policy change. ISW assesses that the Biden Administration's limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia's ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum.^[38] ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia's operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.^[39]


Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of June 13 to 14. Geolocated imagery collected on June 14 shows damage from a Ukrainian drone strike against the Morozovsk Airbase in Rostov Oblast and indicates that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation and an aircraft hangar at the base.^[40] Additional footage and photos show an explosion and smoke plume over the Morozovsk Airbase and Rostov-on-Don, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian air defenses destroyed 70 drones over Rostov Oblast and several drones over Voronezh and Kursk oblasts.^[41] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev stated that debris from downed Ukrainian drones damaged fuel tanks at an oil depot in the oblast.^[42]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine, including the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of occupied and Ukrainian-controlled territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, in an attempt to undermine the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.**
- **Putin proposed to establish an alternative Eurasian and world security system with support from People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, likely to undermine NATO.**

- **The Kremlin has frequently timed the intensification of its information operations, including negotiations, to coincide with major policy debates in the West in order to influence Western decision-making.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev continued to rail against Western colonialism while ignoring Russia's imperial history and contemporary Russian imperialist aspirations to dominate Russia's neighbors in eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.**
- **Medvedev also promoted Kremlin information operations that aim to exploit Moldovan identity politics in order to disrupt Moldova's European Union (EU) accession by destabilizing Moldovan society.**
- **Medvedev also threatened Armenia on the eve of Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan's attendance at the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.**
- **An unnamed senior US Department of Defense official reportedly said that the Biden Administration has no imminent plans to lift restrictions prohibiting Ukrainian forces from striking military targets in Russia's operational and deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of June 13 to 14.**
- **Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 14 that there are currently almost 700,000 Russian personnel in the "special military operation zone," which includes both occupied Ukraine and areas within Russia bordering Ukraine, during the meeting with participants of the "Time of Heroes" program.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 100 meters in an unspecified part of Vovchansk, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[43] Fighting continued attacking near Lyptsi; north of Lyptsi near Hlyboke; within Vovchansk, including near the Aggregate Plant; and east of Vovchansk near Tykhe on June 13 and 14.[44] Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his framing of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv as part of an effort to create a "buffer zone" to protect Russian border areas from Ukrainian strikes while acknowledging that Russian forces have not pushed Ukrainian forces far enough from the international border to prevent long-range strikes on Russian territory.[45] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 14 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 4,000 killed and wounded personnel in Kharkiv Oblast between May 10 and June 10.[46] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Aida" detachment are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▭ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Russian Field Fortifications
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 12 that Russian forces advanced 100 meters in the Vovchansk direction and 100 meters in the Lyptsi direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Berestove; and northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Nevske on June 13 and 14.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Synkivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[49] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Berestove.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and are attacking along the railway line in the direction of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[51] One Russian milblogger reiterated recent claims that Russian forces seized the Bilohorivka chalk quarry (northeast of Siversk).[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 13 that Russian forces also attacked near Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[53] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the Rozdolivka-Vasyukivka area (south of Siversk).[54]


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces gained a foothold in the western part of the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) and that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division seized several unspecified high-rise buildings in the area.[55] The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on June 13 that Russian forces are attacking southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka to bypass Ukrainian forces from the south and attack the Ukrainian rear.[56] The commander noted that Russian forces occasionally conduct assaults on motorcycles in the area and are no longer conducting infantry-led "meat assaults," but are working in small infantry groups with unspecified mechanized vehicle support. The commander reported that Russian forces have also intensified their drone use in the area.[57] Russian forces also continued attacks northeast of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, in eastern Chasiv Yar, and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske on June 13 and 14.[58] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are operating near Chasiv Yar.[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault amid continued offensive operations in the area on June 14. Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[60] Russian and Ukrainian forces stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed eight Russian tanks and eight BMP infantry fighting vehicles during the mechanized assault.[61] Additional geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted intense assaults in

the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka) direction on June 13 and 14.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), within Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka, north and west of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), on the eastern outskirts of Karlivka (southwest of Avdiivka), and near Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[64] Elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue operating near Novopokrovske.[65]




Russian forces recently seized Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City) during a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault west of Donetsk City amid continued attacks west and southwest of the city. Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Heorhiivka and advanced within eastern Maksymilyanivka (west of Donetsk City) during a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault.[66] Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces used 28 armored vehicles during the attack and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 13 units of Russian armored equipment.[67] Geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced within central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[68] Additional geolocated footage published on June 14 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City).[69] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are advancing within Krasnohorivka and that other unspecified Russian units are advancing within Heorhiivka (west of Marinka and Donetsk City) and on the outskirts of Maksymilyanivka (further west of Donetsk City).[70] Russian forces continued attacks southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on June 13 and 14.[71]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and Urozhaine (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 14.[72] Elements of the Russian 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Urozhaine.[73]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 13 and 14.[74]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, and on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta on June 13 and 14.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 14, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

A Ukrainian source posted satellite imagery on June 13 showing the destruction of a Russian S-400 air defense system east of Belbek Airfield in occupied Crimea following Ukrainian strikes on the night of June 11 to 12.[76] The satellite imagery shows that the Ukrainian strike destroyed a 92N6E radar, BAZ-6306 artillery tractor, and 51P6 missile launcher.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 13 to 14. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 10 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast, three Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai, one Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from Tambov Oblast, and 17 Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai.[77] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces shot down seven Kh-101/555s and all 17 Shaheds over Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad oblasts. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are launching combined missile and drone strikes in various directions and that Russian missiles constantly change altitude.[78] Yevlash reported that several Russian cruise missiles flew west toward Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast before turning around and flying east toward Starokosyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Yevlash also reported that Russians launched three groups of Shahed drones, which merged into two groups before Ukrainian forces downed them. Unspecified Russian security officials claimed that Russian forces struck Kubalkyne airbase in Mykolaiv Oblast, Dolyntseve (Kryvyi Rih) airbase in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and a Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) command center in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, but ISW has not observed any evidence of these claims.[79]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 14 that there are currently almost 700,000 Russian personnel in the "special military operation zone," which includes both occupied Ukraine and areas within Russia bordering Ukraine, during the meeting with participants of the "Time of Heroes" program.[80] Putin's 700,000 figure is notably higher than his December 2023 claim that there were 617,000 Russian personnel in occupied Ukraine and areas within Russia bordering Ukraine.[81] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that roughly 510,000 to 515,000 Russian personnel are currently deployed in occupied Ukraine.[82] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported in May 2024 that Russian forces had concentrated about 35,000 personnel in Russia, north of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and planned to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel.[83] Putin's stated number of personnel may be exaggerated or include a variety of Russian combat and non-combat forces, including irregular forces.

Putin also stated that the Russian military needs younger commanders with a "modern approach" while emphasizing the importance of experienced commanders. Putin stated that military district and force grouping commanders are on average 56 years old, army commanders are on average 50 years old, and division commanders are on average 46 years old.[84] Putin claimed that "a lot has changed both in the organization of the [Russian] Armed Forces and the promotion of promising personnel" during the war. Putin's emphasis on recruiting younger personnel is likely a reference to ongoing Russian efforts to recruit more commissioned officers via military departments at civilian universities and recent efforts to generate officers *en masse* at the expense of professionalism in the Russian Armed Forces.[85]

A South Korean defense official stated that North Korea may have sent as many as 4.8 million artillery shells to Russia. South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik stated to *Bloomberg* on June 14 that

South Korea has detected at least 10,000 shipping containers moving from North Korea to Russia, which could hold up to 4.8 million artillery shells.[86] Shin reportedly stated that North Korea has also sent dozens of ballistic missiles to Russia and that Russia sent North Korea conventional arms, such as tanks and aircraft, and technology for the deployment of spy satellites. Shin reportedly stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely try to acquire more North Korean munitions in his upcoming visit to North Korea.

Russian officials continue to recruit contract military personnel (*kontraktniki*) through the promise of large one-time payments. Russian opposition outlet *SOTA* reported on June 14 that Karachay-Cherkessia Republic Head Rashid Temrezov stated that the Karachay-Cherkessia Republic will provide *kontraktniki* with a one-time payment of 1.305 million rubles (about \$14,600), reportedly the largest one-time payment offered for signing a contract with the Russian military.[87] *SOTA* noted that St. Petersburg officials are offering a one-time payment of 1.1 million rubles (about \$12,300), and Krasnodar Krai is offering a one-time payment of one million rubles (about \$11,200) to those who sign a contract for military service in the Russian Armed Forces.[88] Such drastic increases in one-time enlistment bonuses indicate that Russian force generation efforts are heavily reliant on increasingly expensive financial incentives.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin grossly misrepresented the Kremlin's original objective of seizing Kyiv City and overthrowing the Ukrainian government in February 2022 in an effort to falsely present Ukraine as the aggressor in Russia's unprovoked war of conquest. Putin claimed during his meeting with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials on June 14 that the Kremlin did not make any political decisions to launch an assault directly on Kyiv and that the Russian offensive in Kyiv Oblast was "nothing more than an operation to force the Ukrainian regime to [reach] peace" in Donbas.[89] Russian invasion plans have shown that Russian officers were preparing to hold victory parades in Kyiv, and a Russian newswire even published a now-deleted article on February 26, 2022, declaring Russian victory over Ukraine.[90] Putin reiterated his false justification for launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by claiming that Russian forces attempted to preempt a major Ukrainian assault on occupied

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Western officials, however, preemptively debunked this false narrative in early February 2022 by exposing the Kremlin's plans to launch a series of false flag attacks in occupied Donbas ahead of the Russian full-scale invasion.[91]

Putin also reiterated the persistent Russian information operation alleging that Western officials coerced Ukraine to reject an agreement favorable to Russia during negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul in March 2022. Putin expanded on this narrative by claiming that Russia agreed that Ukraine could receive security guarantees “practically similar to those enjoyed by NATO members without formally joining the alliance” because Russia “understood” Ukraine’s concerns related to security. Putin’s claim is contradictory to Russia’s stated demands and objectives of removing the democratically elected Ukrainian government, destroying the Ukrainian military, and coercing Ukraine into abandoning its sovereign right to self-determination, which includes the right to freely join security alliances. Putin also amplified his false explanation for Russia's defeat in Kyiv Oblast, claiming that Russian forces withdrew from northern Ukraine to create favorable conditions for “negotiations” with Ukraine. Putin, however, purposefully failed to mention that Russian forces suffered devastating military equipment and personnel losses as a result of Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks during the first phase of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Putin attempted to disseminate a false narrative that Russia originally did not intend to retain control over parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts but decided to do so after staging false referendums in occupied Ukraine. Putin claimed that a high-profile foreign official, which Kremlin officials later revealed to be former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, arrived in Moscow on March 5, 2022, and claimed that the foreign official had secured political support from US, German, and French officials to mediate the end of the hostilities in Ukraine. Putin claimed that Bennett asked him why Russian forces attacked Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts if they were solely interested in intervening in Donbas, to which Putin reportedly responded that the Russian General Staff planned this operation to bypass Ukrainian fortifications around Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast. Putin claimed that he responded to Bennett by stating that Russia “did not rule out” allowing Ukraine to maintain its sovereignty over Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts under the condition that Ukrainian officials allow Russia to have a “strong land connection with Crimea.” Putin added that Russia wanted Ukraine to legally authorize Russia's use of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to access Crimea, which would force Ukraine to recognize Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea. Putin observed, however, that this decision was not final and that he ended up illegally annexing parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in response to locally held referendums, which the Kremlin staged in Fall 2022. Putin likely evoked this narrative in an attempt to falsely legitimize Russia's occupation of southeastern Ukraine.

Putin promoted several other information narratives in his speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and degrading Western support and trust in the Ukrainian government. Putin claimed that the “Ukrainian crisis” could lead to dire consequences in the world in an attempt to bully the international community into abandoning Ukraine. Putin also attempted to manipulate Ukrainian societal grievances over mobilization to falsely claim that Western officials are forcing the Ukrainian government to mobilize more men to support Western objectives to destroy Russia. Putin similarly continued to falsely portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate leader due to Zelensky’s lawful decision to cancel Ukrainian presidential elections in May 2024 during the ongoing war and martial law in Ukraine. Putin falsely claimed that the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, remains the only legitimate power in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Constitution allows a sitting president to postpone elections and remain in office past the end of his

term during martial law.[92] These narratives are part of the ongoing “Maidan-3” information operation that seeks to destabilize the Ukrainian government by triggering social tensions in Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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