

**Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward,
Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. Kagan**

January 24, 2025, 8:15pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue," but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is a significant impediment to peace negotiations.[1] Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022 decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree. Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022 decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[2]

Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine

and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin.[3] The context within which the decree was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian forces did not then and still do not occupy.[4] The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to "guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and [the restoration of Ukraine's] territorial integrity." [5] Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine against a third Russian invasion.[6]

However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's Western allies.[7] Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace Summit in the future.[8]

Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024.[9] Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.

Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Putin is likely using his interview with Zarubin on Russian state television to signal to Russian society that Russia is unlikely to participate in peace negotiations in the near future and that the war is unlikely to end soon. Putin is also sending this message to a subset of Russian elites who reportedly want the war to end and likely intends for this interview to silence any questions from Russian elites about Putin's timeline for the war and its resolution.[10]

Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that they are willing to negotiate *about* Ukraine with the United States or other intermediaries but have yet to demonstrate any willingness to negotiate *with* Ukraine or to compromise on Putin's demands of replacing Zelensky and his government with a pro-Russian puppet regime, destroying the Ukrainian military and rendering Ukraine unable to

defend itself from future Russian aggression, and securing a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.[11]

Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.

Putin is drawing attention to the decree to create friction between Ukraine, the United States, and other Western allies and to refocus the conversation about negotiations on supposed issues with Ukraine's negotiating position – as opposed to Putin's clear efforts to delay and avoid peace negotiations. Putin's theory of victory in Ukraine presupposes that Russia will successfully outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to inflict its demands on a weakened and abandoned Ukraine, and Putin is thus working to bring about these conditions.[12]

The West must demonstrate its enduring commitment to aiding and arming Ukraine to force Putin to reconsider his theory of victory and his demands. **Continued Western military support that enables Ukraine to resist Russian aggression now and in the future is the West's best course of action to bring Putin to the negotiating table and secure Russian concessions essential to bringing about a peace that is in America's, Europe's, and Ukraine's interests.**

Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump's equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.

Putin emphasized that Russia shares interests with the United States, particularly regarding the global economy, and suggested that he and Trump could engage in "calm, pragmatic" discussions, insinuating that the two leaders could bypass direct negotiations with Ukraine.[13] Putin's statements demonstrate his continued belief that Ukraine is only a proxy for the West and further his long-standing narrative that his war in Ukraine is a broader conflict between Russia and the West that can only be settled by great powers.[14]

Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak highlighted on January 24 that Putin aims to negotiate "the fate of Europe without Europe" and "Ukraine without Ukraine." [15] Putin's insistence on minimizing or eliminating Ukraine's role in negotiations about Ukraine's future blatantly disregards Ukraine's sovereignty and attempts to elevate Russia to the role of a global power while marginalizing some Western allies in an attempt to weaken the wider NATO alliance.

Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage war in Ukraine.

Trump stated on January 23 that oil prices are currently "high enough" that Russia can continue its war effort in Ukraine and called for Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states to "bring down the cost of oil" in order to decrease Russia's ability to wage war and bring about an "end the war." [16] Putin responded to Trump during his interview on January 24, claiming that Russia and the US are both large oil producers and consumers and that "too high prices are bad" for both the US and Russian economies.[17] Putin claimed that Russia and the United States rely on energy resources for domestic industries and that "too low prices" would undermine energy companies' investment opportunities. Putin attempted to portray the more modern and diversified US economy as operating similarly to that of Russia, which is a petrostate that heavily relies on revenues from energy exports.

Falling oil prices would decrease Russia's federal budget revenues and risk destabilizing the Russian regime's stability while also reducing Russia's share of the global oil market and economic influence on the global stage. Putin's emphasis on the need to maintain prices for the sake of energy companies' investments also demonstrates the extent to which Putin feels it necessary to cater to the elite in his inner circle who have personal interests in the energy sector. Putin's focus on his inner circle's interests contrasts with US leaders' larger focus on the general voting population and a broader array of business interests, which benefit from lower energy prices. Putin's attempt to portray lower oil prices as against US interests suggests that Putin is afraid of the harm such policies would cause Russia and is trying to persuade Trump to abandon these proposals without having to concede to Trump's insistence on meaningful negotiations to end the war.

The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the United States and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview with Russian state news outlet *TASS* on January 24 that the West failed to change the course of the war in Ukraine despite "comprehensive assistance" and a significant financial expense.[18]

Shoigu's claim is a deliberate and extreme mischaracterization of the realities on the battlefield, however. Western military assistance has consistently provided Ukraine with offensive and defensive capabilities that Ukraine would otherwise not have possessed and that allowed Ukraine to achieve significant battlefield victories. Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS during an interdiction campaign in Summer-Fall 2022 that ultimately forced Russian forces to withdraw from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[19] Ukrainian forces used Western-provided armored vehicles in the Fall 2022 counteroffensive that liberated significant swaths of Kharkiv Oblast.[20] Western initiatives to provide Ukraine with artillery shells, drones, fighter jets, air defense systems, and other weapons and equipment have allowed Ukraine to maintain its defense against Russian aggression, including denying Russian forces the ability to conduct maneuver warfare and helping Ukraine to defend against Russia's strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[21] Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles has partially deprived Russian forces of their sanctuary within Russia to prepare for further offensive operations against northern Ukraine from Russian territory.[22] US and other Western military assistance has also bought Ukraine time to develop its own DIB capabilities in support of its defensive efforts against Russia and external aggression in the long term.[23]

Ukraine remains in critical need of US and European military assistance to maintain its defense against Russian aggression and to conduct future negotiations from a position of strength. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated on January 23 that NATO allies need to significantly increase their military assistance to Ukraine to allow Ukraine to negotiate with Russia from a position of strength and deter future Russian aggression against NATO.[24] Rutte also acknowledged that Europe should bear a larger financial burden to support Ukraine's defense because European NATO members are geographically closer to Ukraine and that Europe will pay for the United States to continue sending military assistance to Ukraine.[25]

The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may

be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.[26] Shoigu told TASS on January 24 that the Union State Security Concept that Russia and Belarus signed on April 28, 1999 "has lost its relevance" and that a new Security Concept will guide Russian and Belarusian security policymaking through the framework of the Union State.[27] Shoigu described the new Union State Security Concept as a "completely new...strategic planning document" that draws from the Russian and Belarusian constitutions, the December 1999 Union State Treaty, the Russian National Security Strategy, and the Belarusian National Security Concept. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed an agreement in December 2024 to implement this new Union State Security Concept sometime in 2025.[28]

Shoigu's framing of the new Union State Security Concept suggests that the new concept may be more expansive than the original 1999 document, which would forward Russia's goal of de facto annexing Belarus through the Union State framework. Shoigu notably gave this interview two days before the January 26 Belarusian presidential election, likely to frame Belarus as an undeniable part of the Russian-dominated Union State.[29] The Kremlin will likely frame any pro-democratic protests against the upcoming Belarusian elections as part of a Western-backed hybrid war against Russia and Belarus, just as the Kremlin did in 2020.[30]

Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed 121 Ukrainian drones in total on the night of January 23 to 24, including 37 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20 over Ryazan Oblast, 17 over Kursk Oblast, 17 over Saratov Oblast, seven over Rostov Oblast, six over Moscow Oblast, six over Belgorod Oblast, three over Voronezh Oblast, two over Tula Oblast, two over Oryol Oblast, two over Lipetsk Oblast, one over occupied Crimea, and one over Moscow City.[31]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 24 that elements of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck the production facilities of the Ryazan Oil Refinery and the Ryazan oil pump station in Ryazan City.[32] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a fire at the oil refinery and noted that the Ryazan oil refinery produces fuel for military equipment, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships.[33] BBC's Russian Service reported that its sources in the SBU stated that the Ukrainian strike started fires at three tanks at the refinery and a hydrotreatment workshop for diesel and jet fuel. The sources stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the Ryazan Thermal Power Plant (TPP).[34] Geolocated footage shows a fire at the oil refinery.[35] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian forces downed 20 drones over Ryazan Oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise.[36]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 24 that the SBU, SSO, and other Ukrainian forces also struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which produces microcircuits and components for Russian weapons systems such as the Topol-M and Bulava missile systems, the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and onboard electronics in combat aircraft.[37] Kovalenko stated that the plant also produces microelectronics for Pantsir air defense systems, Iskander missiles, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones.[38] The press service of the Kremniy El Group Joint-


stock Company (JSC) announced on January 24 that the plant suspended operations after the Ukrainian drone strike.[39] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed 37 drones over Bryansk Oblast on the night of January 23 to 24.[40] Geolocated footage shows a fire near the Kremniy El plant.[41] Ukrainian forces recently struck the Kremniy El plant on the night of January 13 to 14.[42] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that Ukrainian forces also struck and damaged the Bryansk Oblast branch of the Russian Investigative Committee.[43]

Astra, citing sources in Russia's Ministry of Emergency Situations, reported on January 24 that Ukrainian drones damaged the 711th Aircraft Repair Plant in Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Oblast on the night of January 23 to 24.[44] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 24 that Russian forces downed "several" Ukrainian drones over Voronezh Oblast but reported no casualties or damage.[45]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.**
- **Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.**
- **However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.**
- **Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.**
- **Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.**
- **Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump's equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.**
- **Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage his war in Ukraine.**
- **The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.**

- The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.




We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced northwest and south of Sudzha amid continued offensive operations along the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows that Russian forces reached the northern outskirts of Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha) and advanced within southern Makhnovka (south of Sudzha).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Maryevka (northwest of Sudzha) and advanced northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, Nikolskiy, and Viktorovka and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. One milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Sudzha are attempting to reach the Malaya Loknya-Loknya River line and seize Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka as part of a broader effort to obtain fire control over Ukrainian logistics lines.[48] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Kursk Oblast salient.[49]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lytsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 23 and 24 but did not advance.[50] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kharkiv Oblast stated that the brigade repelled a roughly battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault consisting of over 30 armored vehicles and an infantry company in Kharkiv Oblast on an unspecified recent date.[51] The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces spent over a month

preparing for the assault and used relatively new tanks and armored vehicles, including refurbished T-80 tanks, rather than older equipment such as T-62 tanks.



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dvorichna, west of Zapadne (both north of Kupyansk), and up to southern Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[52] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Russia-Ukraine international border

northeast of Kupyansk near Topoli, north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on January 23 and 24.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian armored personnel carrier near Kupyansk with a fiber optic cable drone.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova) and north of Makiivka (southeast of Makiivka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[55] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on January 23 and 24.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 24 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zahryzove.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 24 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[58] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and east of Lyman near Torske on January 23 and 24.[59] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on January 24 that Russian forces are constantly attacking with small infantry teams of up to four soldiers in the area, which is resulting in costly Russian manpower losses in this direction.[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 23 and 24 but did not advance.[61] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 24 that Russian forces with armored vehicle support recently attacked near Ivano-Darivka.[62] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on January 23 that Russian forces recently conducted a motorized assault in an unspecified area of the Siversk direction comprised of at least 40 motorcycles and civilian vehicles.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 24. Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicated that Russian forces

recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 24 that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[65] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and towards Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on January 23 and 24.[66] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction published footage on January 23 showing the brigade repelling a reduced company-sized Russian mechanized assault near Chasiv Yar and destroying four armored vehicles.[67] The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 24 that Russian forces are using motorcycles and other vehicles to transport personnel in Chasiv Yar.[68] Elements of the Russian "Rodnya" Battalion are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar, and elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[69]




Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 24. Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in western Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[70] Geolocated footage published on January 8 and 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Toretsk.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 24 that Russian forces advanced in southern Toretsk.[72] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka on January 23 and 24.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 24 that fighting continues near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and that Russian forces are clearing Krymske.[74]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued fighting in the area on January 24. Geolocated footage published on January 23 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk).[75] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 24 that Russian forces seized Tymofiivka (east of Pokrovsk) in the past week (January 17 to 23), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 5.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within and south of Udachne (west of Kotlyne), in southern Nadiivka, in southern Novoandriivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk), southwest and north of Novoandriivka, up to three kilometers wide and two kilometers deep south of Ukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), one kilometer north of Vozdvyzhenka, north of Novokalynove, north of Arkhanhelske (all east of Pokrovsk), and up to the outskirts of Zelene Pole (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Promin, Vozdvyzhenka, Yelyzavetivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Sribne, and Novoyelyzavetivka; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 23 and 24.[78] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne and Kotlyne.[79] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the north and south and have started to strike the town with long-range weapons, various types of missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones.[80] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in Tymofiivka, and drone operators of the "Mantikora" detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[81]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued fighting in the area on January 24. Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered eastern Andriivka and Dachne (both west of Kurakhove) and advanced on the eastern and southern outskirts of Dachne, in the area south of Dachne, in an area 2.15 kilometers wide between Petropavlivka and Shevchenko (both northwest of Kurakhove), and northwest of Shevchenko (south of Petropavlivka).[83] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, Ulakly, and Andriivka; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Yantarne on January 23 and 24.[84] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 24 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked with armored vehicle support near Zelenivka (southwest of


Kurakhove).[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently reintensified assaults near Dachne and Andriivka.[86]

Russian forces recently advanced within Velyka Novosilka amid continued fighting in the area on January 24. Geolocated footage published January 24 shows that Russian forces, reportedly of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), recently advanced in eastern and central Velyka Novosilka along Fontanna and Yuriiia Haharina streets.[87] The Russian MoD claimed on January 24 that Russian forces bisected Velyka Novosilka and that Russian rocket and tube artillery and FPV drones were providing fire support to Russian troops.[88] Russian sources reiterated claims that Russian forces surrounded Ukrainian forces in southern Velyka Novosilka.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting assaults in Velyka Novosilka in squads averaging about 10 people.[90] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) and southwest of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[91] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka itself and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on January 23 and 24.[92]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka on January 23 and 24.[93] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 24 that GUR units destroyed a Russian 1L122 “Garmon” radar station in an unspecified location in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[94] Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mala Tokmachka, and elements of the Russian BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[95]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction and on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta on January 23 and 24.[96]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction January 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 58 Shahed and decoy drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts.[97] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 drones over Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv oblasts and that 27 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones damaged apartment buildings and homes and killed civilians in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian drone struck an unspecified target in Osnovyanskyi Raion, Kharkiv City; that a

Russian drone strike killed two civilians in Kyiv Oblast; and that falling drone debris damaged buildings in Fastivskiy Raion and Brovary, Kyiv Oblast and Pidbirtsi, Lviv Oblast.[98]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about frontline Russian commanders sending wounded servicemembers on infantry assaults instead of providing the wounded servicemembers with adequate medical care. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor defended some Russian sources for circulating footage of wounded servicemembers of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) attacking Ukrainian positions near the Serebryanske forested area in the Lyman direction following criticism from other milbloggers claiming that circulating the footage violates operational security procedures.[99] The milblogger amplified additional footage claiming to show wounded servicemembers of the 1st "Sloviansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) and the 109th Rifle Regiment (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) attacking in an unspecified frontline area, likely near Toretsk where ISW has recently observed reports of these units operating.[100] The milblogger noted that this is a widespread issue and criticized another Russian milblogger for refuting reports about the issue.[101]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

- [1] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004572> ; <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3645> ;
<https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004576> ; <https://www.interfa dot ru/business/1004575>;
<https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/24/putin-esli-by-u-trampa-v-2020-godu-ne-ukrali-pobedu-to-mozhet-i-ne-vozniklo-by-krizisa-v-ukraine> ; https://zona dot media/news/2025/01/24/ukrali_pobedu ; <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004571>
- [2] <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6282558>
- [3] <https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6792022-44249>
- [4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30>; <https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6792022-44249>
- [5] <https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/6792022-44249>
- [6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424>;
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html>
- [7] <https://ifpnews.com/zelensky-direct-talks-putin/> ;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSRp6pEDQdI> ; <https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-tells-bloomberg-us-leadership-essential-in-ukraine-peace-efforts/>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010325>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar120224>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624>;
<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024>
- [8] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/16/ukraine-war-briefing-russia-should-attend-second-peace-summit-zelenskiy-says>
- [9] <https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/09/21/russia-says-will-not-attend-ukraine-peace-summit-a86430>; <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-peace-summit/33129820.html>;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/presidential-aide-says-ukraine-ready-host-second-peace-summit-soon-2024-11-28/>; <https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-continues-preparations-for-second-global-peace-summit-foreign-ministry-says/>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024>
- [10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012325>
- [11] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425>
- [12] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2024#:~:text=war%20in%20Ukraine.-,Russian%20President%20Vladimir%20Putin's%20ocurrent%20theory%20of%20victory%20in%20Ukraine,winning%20a%20war%20of%20attrition.>
- [13] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004572> ; <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3645> ;
<https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004576> ; <https://www.interfa dot ru/business/1004575>;
<https://meduza dot io/news/2025/01/24/putin-esli-by-u-trampa-v-2020-godu-ne-ukrali-pobedu-to-mozhet-i-ne-vozniklo-by-krizisa-v-ukraine>

- [14] <https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1145004513/russia-ukraine-us-proxy-war-zelenskyy-visit>;
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62389537>;
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/26/russia-accuses-nato-of-proxy-war-in-ukraine-as-us-hosts-crucial-defence-summit>
- [15] <https://t.me/ermaka2022/5757>
- [16] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c17ewl98kgvo>
- [17] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1004576>
- [18] <https://tass dot ru/politika/22959267>
- [19] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2023>
- [20] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war>
- [21] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-west-leans-ukraine-can-win>;
- [22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024>
- [23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base>
- [24] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/23/gensek-nato-neobhidno-posylyuvaty-pidtrymku-ukrayiny-ta-zminyty-trayektoriyu-vijny/>
- [25] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/davos-nato-chief-rutte-reaffirms-need-step-up-support-ukraine-2025-01-23/>
- [26] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus>
- [27] <https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/22959227>
- [28] <https://belta dot by/society/view/bespretsedentnyj-uroven-strategicheskogo-sojuznichestva-kak-sovmestnye-programmy-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-685330-2024/>
- [29] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus>;
<https://belta dot by/society/view/dosrochnoe-golosovanie-na-vyborah-prezidenta-prodolzhaetsja-v-belarusi-691002-2025/>
- [30] <https://www.understandingwar.org/belarus-warning-updates>

[31] 20 drones over Ryazan Oblast; 17 over Kursk Oblast; 17 over Saratov Oblast; seven over Rostov Oblast; six over Moscow Oblast; six over Belgorod Oblast; three over Voronezh Oblast; two over Tula Oblast; two over Oryol Oblast; two over Lipetsk Oblast; one over Crimea; and one over Moscow City.

[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20207>

[33] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8669>; <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8671>

[34] <https://t.me/bbcrossian/75714>

[35] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/5207; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1882562540661871027;
https://t.me/supernova_plus/35653; <https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1882570453254066274>

[36] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/3804

[37] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/20207>

[38] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8672>

[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/297456; https://t.me/tass_agency/297457 ;
<https://t.me/severrealii/29314>

[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/297435

[41] https://t.me/grohot_pgr/38410; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1882567748116729904

[42] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025>

[43] <https://t.me/astrapress/73120>

[44] <https://t.me/astrapress/73137>

[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/297421

[46] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24970; https://t.me/OSHB_225/4884;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8199; https://t.me/stepova_61/771;
<https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1882735234686636245>;
<https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1882735595824590867>

[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30670; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152333;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152330; https://t.me/dva_majors/63059; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20744>

[48] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20744>

[49] <https://t.me/wargonzo/24424>

[50]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido24Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>

[51] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc>; <https://armyinform.com/ua/2025/01/24/masovana-ataka-mangaliv-na-harkivshhyni-syly-oborony-vidbyly-shturm-yakyj-rosiyany-gotuvaly-misyacz/>

[52] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30679; https://t.me/tass_agency/297424;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22873>

[53]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTtCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22873>

[54] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85008>

[55] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22873> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30683

[56]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTtCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403

[57] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22873>

[58] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30683

[59]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTtCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403

[60] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg>; <https://armyinform.com/ua/2025/01/24/taktyka-strumka-ta-vodospadu-yak-vidriznyayutsya-diyi-voroga-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/>

- [61] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34h7XtqxXyYPeuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403
- [62] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403
- [63] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/23/radyanskyj-bruht-i-zgrayi-motocykliv-nasiverskomu-napryamku-vorog-atakuye-bez-broni/>; <https://youtu.be/o8MopV5Qk-E>;
- [64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8210; <https://t.me/Orki3MsbLauda/92>
- [65] https://t.me/dva_majors/63059
- [66] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido24Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34h7XtqxXyYPeuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>
- [67] <https://t.me/official24ombr/867>; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/23/chasiv-yar-ukrayynski-zahysnyky-zirvaly-mehanizovanyj-shturm-rosijskoyi-desantury-znyshhyvshy-chotyry-bmd/>
- [68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403
- [69] <https://t.me/wargonzo/24422>; https://t.me/tass_agency/297514
- [70] <https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1882758278200909872>;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qe6kkoioyru>
- [71] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882699235705204948>;
<https://x.com/Veteransforukr1/status/1879891363677790704>;
<https://x.com/Veteransforukr1/status/1880256007965929772>;
<https://www.facebook.com/groups/gromada.best/permalink/1373808303779335/>
- [72] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30686
- [73] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido24Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido34h7XtqxXyYPeuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>
- [74] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20742>

[75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8200; <https://t.me/skarlatop/4409>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8209; <https://x.com/moklasen/status/1882791421700423931>;
<https://t.me/c/1943498801/134>

[76] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2025> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48194

[77] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61641> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85014>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61641>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61646>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22851>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20741>;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/30699; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30666; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30702;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/30689

[78]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61634>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61641>;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/20740>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20741>

[79] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20740>

[80] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/932367-vijskam-rf-ne-vdaetsa-obijti-pokrovsk-z-flangiv-recnik-osuv-hortica/>

[81] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61634>; https://t.me/dva_majors/63097

[82] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24943; <https://t.me/odshbr79/486>

[83] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61633>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61643>;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/20736>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85014>; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30705

[84]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61643>

[85] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4403

[86] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20736>

[87] <https://t.me/WarDonbass/155885>;
<https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1882785314806390957>;

<https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1882787816234692731>;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1882779632757579835>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8207?single; <https://t.me/ChDambiev/33901>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8203; https://t.me/voin_dv/12966

[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/48203

[89] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85031>; https://t.me/dva_majors/63059;
https://t.me/tass_agency/297444 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152326;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/152333; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20423;
https://t.me/mod_russia/48203

[90] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85017>

[91] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30708

[92]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>

[93]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>

[94] <https://t.me/DIUkraine/5257> ; <https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/932337-bijci-gur-mo-znisili-radiolokacijnu-stanciu-garmon-armii-rf-na-tot-zaporizkoi-oblasti/>; <https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ostannii-akord-garmoni-rozvidnyky-na-fronti-znyshchyly-rosiisku-rls-razom-z-obsluhoiu.html>

[95] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22857>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85060>

[96]
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ws8nM9g1kCurL35wq6iY4dnGbUyd6TsPd5b4VfeRw845d8b5isY2Qi1jrmVffJUgl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid024Ki6LLvsSsFsgd7ySoCYBTTCHqHuRNvV7TynpgQCpbEf7fTgk3VTw8U79hnwiW6ql>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034h7XtqxXyYPEuBiC1SGNeTANmps4g9ZWaA6zXxtT7dZXxYKgJgW9HmyykiPXxNG4l>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid027DnQUFU2CxGvnk2LREoJrTARfGyuGW4NHfezxPmyMWeEADDe8orxCWyeGfaC8yi6l> ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11985

[97] <https://t.me/kpszsu/27463>

[98] <https://t.me/synegubov/12788>; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2065;
https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4328; <https://dsns.gov dot ua/news/nadzvicaini-podiyi/kiyivshhina-trivaje-likvidaciia-naslidkiv-obstriliv>; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37376;

https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/18753; <https://t.me/andriysadovyi/2730>;
<https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/24/chotyry-rosijski-bpla-atakuvaly-lvivshhynu/>

[99] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1895

[100] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1900

[101] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1899