

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2025

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February 14, 2025, 6:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on February 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14. Vance stated during a press conference following the meeting that the United States remains committed to ending the war and achieving a "durable, lasting peace" in Ukraine and not the "kind of peace that's going to have Eastern Europe in conflict just a couple years down the road." [1] Vance noted the importance of dialogue between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, and declined to speculate on possible conditions of a future peace agreement in order to "preserve the optionality" for the delegations. Vance and Zelensky both noted that the conversation was productive and Zelensky thanked the United States for continued military support. [2] Zelensky stated that the United States and Ukraine are preparing a plan to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression and finish the war in a just and lasting peace that provides tangible security guarantees for Ukraine. US President Donald Trump told reporters on February 14 that Ukraine would have a seat at the table during future peace negotiations with Russia to end the war. [3]

Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met with US Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg in Munich and discussed ongoing efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. [4] Zelensky also met with a bipartisan delegation of US senators to discuss ongoing US military support for Ukraine, economic cooperation, and the future joint development of critical minerals and rare earth materials in Ukraine. [5] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, British Deputy Defense Minister

Luke Pollard, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and other European officials reiterated Europe's support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity amid ongoing discussions about future peace negotiations with Russia.[6]

The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call. Russian opposition news outlet *Meduza* reported on February 14 that the Kremlin instructed Russian state-run and pro-government media outlets to frame Trump and Putin's February 12 call as Putin's "initiative and victory" and to use Trump's name less frequently in coverage of the call and other events.[7] *Meduza* reported that the Kremlin is concerned that the Russian public might see Trump as a more "proactive and decisive" leader than Putin and wants Russian media to emphasize that Putin alone is responsible for the outcome of negotiations between him and Trump. An unnamed political strategist in the Russian Presidential Administration told *Meduza* that the Kremlin does not want the Russian public to perceive Trump as a "strong leader capable of changing the situation" and Putin as a passive or weak leader in comparison. The political strategist added that the Kremlin also instructed the Russian media to manage the public's expectations about negotiations to not create "false, overly optimistic expectations." The Russian information space has previously portrayed Trump as a pragmatic leader with whom Russia could work, but the Kremlin may be attempting to negatively shift the Russian public's perception of Trump in order to emphasize Putin's strength and agency amid reports of possible future peace negotiations and bilateral negotiations.

Russian officials and information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12 Trump-Putin call. Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified this information operation in January 2024 and most recently questioned Zelensky's legitimacy during a televised interview on January 28, and other Russian officials had amplified this information operation as of February 10.[8] It remains unclear how long Russian officials and information space actors will refrain from amplifying this information operation, however. It would be a significant concession if Putin and other Russian officials recognized Zelensky's legitimacy as Ukraine's president after repeatedly questioning the legitimacy of all Ukrainian leaders since 2014.

A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14. Geolocated footage published on February 14 shows a drone striking the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure, built in 2016 to enclose the original temporary shelter structure of Chernobyl's Reactor No. 4, which exploded in April 1986.[9] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that emergency services put out the initial fires from the drone strike and began dismantling parts of the NSC to identify and put out remaining smoldering fires.[10] Images published on February 14 show a surface-level hole in the initial layer of the NSC.[11] Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the strike did not pierce the NSC completely and that radiation levels within and outside the NSC remain normal.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the damage to the NSC as "significant" and asserted that the drone was flying at an altitude of only 85 meters to avoid Ukrainian radar detection.[13] The NSC has a height of roughly 108 meters.[14] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published images of the

site showing the wreckage of a black drone labeled "Geran-2" – a common Russian name for the Iranian Shahed-136 drone – and noted that the drone had a "high-explosive" warhead.[15] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that Russian forces purposefully fly drones over the Chornobyl NPP and constantly experiment with Shahed drone altitudes to fly as low as possible, likely to avoid detection and downing by Ukrainian air defenses.[16]


Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko called on the IAEA to intensify international measures to stop Russian strikes on nuclear facilities following the Chornobyl strike.[17] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha had an urgent meeting with IAEA Secretary General Rafael Mariano Grossi to discuss the impacts of the Chornobyl strike.[18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied that Russian forces conducted the strike, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Ukrainian forces of conducting the strike.[19] The Kremlin has periodically conducted information operations aimed at portraying Ukraine as endangering the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP), but continued Russian military operations threatening Ukrainian NPPs highlight that Russia is the actual danger to Ukrainian NPPs.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's eastern flank in 2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned during the Munich Security Conference on February 14 that Russia is preparing upwards of 100,000 to 150,000 troops organized into 15 divisions to "aggravate the situation in the Belarus direction." [21] Zelensky suggested that Russia may intend to attack into Ukraine, Poland, or possibly the Baltic countries. It remains unclear whether Zelensky is referring to active Russian military personnel or Russian efforts to recruit additional forces, as former Russian Defense Minister and Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced in March 2024 that Russia aimed to form 14 new military divisions in the coming years.[22]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14.**
- **The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call.**
- **Russian officials and information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12 Trump-Putin call.**
- **A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's eastern flank in 2026.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, Kurakhove, and Pokrovsk.**
- **Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to coerce Russian mobilized and conscripted personnel into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and

specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast on February 14. Russian milbloggers claimed on February 14 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack south of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking between Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and that unspecified Russian VDV (airborne) units are attempting to recapture Sverdlikovo.[24]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in a forested area north of Kositsa (northeast of Sudzha).[25]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha).[26]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 14 that Russian forces have seized most or all of Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[27]

A Ukrainian source stated on February 14 that Ukrainian forces destroyed roughly a company's worth of North Korean forces during a recent Russian-North Korean assault in Kursk Oblast.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[29] Russian drone operators of the "Anvar

Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), the "Arctic" Battalion of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 11th VDV Brigade, and the 83rd VDV Brigade's "Tiger" detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[30] Drone operators of the "Kamerton" detachment of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kositsa.[31]



Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 13 to 14. Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters reported on February 13 that Russian air defense systems struck a target over Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and that falling debris caused a fire in a field on the outskirts of the city.[32] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* published footage on February 13 of drones flying over the city and claimed that Ukrainian drones struck Slavyansk-on-

Kuban.[33] Ukrainian forces have previously struck the Slavyansk-on-Kuban oil refinery several times, most recently on February 8.[34]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on February 9 and geolocated on February 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along Shchorsa Street in eastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[35]


The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that the intensity of fighting has decreased near Lypsti (north of Kharkiv City), in part due to poor weather conditions.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Vovchansk February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kupyansk on February 14 but did not advance. Russian forces continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 13 and 14.[37]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced through Ukraine's defensive lines near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and are consolidating positions on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Artillery Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Borova on February 14 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Hrekiivka, and Makiivka on February 13 and 14.[40]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forested area up to five kilometers wide and 2.5 kilometers in depth southwest of Makiivka.[41]


Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman. Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Lyman near Novosadove, Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, and Novolyubivka on February 13 and 14.[42]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Yampolivka.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are participating in Russian advances near Yampolivka.[44]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further in the northwestern outskirts of Yampolivka than geolocated footage indicates and east of Kolodyazi.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[46]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 13 and 14 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar on February 13 and 14 but did not advance.[48]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Leonidivka on February 13 and 14 but did not advance.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 1st "Sloviansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Toretsk.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Novoukrainka, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Nadiivka, Bohdanivka, Zaporizhzhia, Preobrazhenka, and Uspenivka on February 13 and 14.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pishchane.[52]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Yelyzavetivka, within central Pishchane, and northeast of Nadiivka.[53]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Zelene Pole, and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) participated in seizing the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka, northeast of Zelene Pole, in Zaporizhzhia, and in eastern Udachne.[55]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during the Munich Security Conference that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction has improved in recent days but did not provide further details.[56] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian activity in this direction has become less intense in recent days but noted that the Pokrovsk direction remains one of the most active areas of the frontline.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[58]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Kostyantynopil; southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka; and northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka on February 13 and 14.[59] The Russian MoD claimed on February 14 that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) seized Dachne, but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 6.[60]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Zelenivka.[61]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the C-050450 highway south of Rozlyv (west of Kurakhove).[62]


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Andriivka, but another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within western Andriivka.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Slovyanka (northeast of Kurakhove), west of Dachne, and further northeast of Zelenivka than geolocated footage indicates.[64]



Russian forces attacked west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Burlatske on February 13 and 14 but did not advance.[65]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vremivka (just west of Velyka Novosilka).[66]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novocheretuvate (north of Velyka Novosilka).[67] Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[68]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction but did not advance on February 14. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 14 that positional fighting continues in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on February 14 that Russian forces seized two unspecified Ukrainian forces' strongholds near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[70]



Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Dniipro direction on February 14.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction February 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 133 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk and Bryansk cities.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts and that 58 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone strikes caused damage in Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.[72]

See topline text for reporting about strikes against the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to coerce Russian mobilized and conscripted personnel into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian State Duma Deputy Maxim Ivanov told Yekaterinburg-based Russian news outlet *EANews* on February 7 that his constituents in Sverdlovsk Oblast notified him that Russian military commanders are forcing mobilized Sverdlovsk Oblast personnel to sign long-term military service contracts with the Russian MoD that would classify them as professional contract servicemembers (*kontraktniki*).[73] Ivanov claimed that Russian military commanders want to increase the number of *kontraktniki* in their units but noted that commanders are sending any mobilized personnel serving in specialist roles, including artillery, communications, engineering support, and electronic warfare (EW) who refuse to sign a long-term contract to fight in infantry assault units. Ivanov stated that he appealed directly to Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov about this issue.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor expressed concern that senior Russian MoD officials are not acknowledging this issue and claimed that commanders in the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are sending mobilized personnel to fight in infantry assault units on the frontline if they refuse to sign MoD contracts.[74] Another Russian source claimed that the Russian Military Prosecutor's Office investigated this issue and found instances where the Russian military command had forged the signatures of conscripts in the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), including its 80th Tank Regiment, 6th Tank Regiment, and 239th Tank Regiment, and military unit 31612 (reportedly a company within the "140th Regiment" or the 429th District Training Center) but that the commands of these units refused to release the conscripts from their contracts.[75] Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on February 12 that Russian commanders are forcing personnel mobilized in 2022 to sign contracts with the MoD, but that it is unclear if the MoD will honor the end dates provided in these contracts.[76]

Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosgvardia to prepare proposals by June 1 to develop a network of military educational institutions, likely to support long-term force generation and military restructuring efforts.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Ukrainian source reported on February 13 that Russian forces began fielding the "KOP-2" electronic warfare (EW) detection and suppression system.[78] The Ukrainian source reported that the "KOP-2" system can detect and suppress drones operating on multiple frequencies using multiple antennas and that the system is composed of Chinese components.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-nato-war-negotiations-02-14-25-intl#cm7525y4s001q3j6mickrfi8r>

[2] <https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-nato-war-negotiations-02-14-25-intl#cm751lscx00193j6mpwha2d6v>

[3] <https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-ukraine-would-be-involved-peace-talks-with-russia-2025-02-13/>

[4] <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/andrij-yermak-proviv-zustrich-zispecpredstavnikom-prezident-96041>

[5] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13320

[6] <https://suspilne.media/948623-ce-pomilka-pistorius-pro-postupki-ssa-sodo-ukraini/> ; <https://suspilne.media/948347-top-posadovec-mo-britanii-rozpoviv-pro-perspektivu-vidpravki-mirotvorciv-v-ukrainu/> ; <https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/1890078896919560474> ; <https://www.dw.com/en/msc-failed-ukraine-would-weaken-us-eu-warns/live-71599568>

[7] <https://meduza.io/feature/2025/02/14/sozvon-putina-i-trampa-kazhetsya-otlichnym-informatsionnym-povodom-dlya-prokremlevskih-smi> ; <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/02/14/we-don-t-talk-about-trump>

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925> ; <https://tass.ru/politika/22996325> ; <https://ria.ru/20250210/nebenzya-1998326032.html> ; <https://ldpr.ru/event/413379>

- [9] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/25623; <https://x.com/sternenko/status/1890299523882479707>;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1890306174097973574
- [10] https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1319; <https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/948603-udar-rf-po-cornobilskij-aes-ukritta-rozbiraut-dla-viavlenna-oseredkiv-tlinna/>
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