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March 18, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on March 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.[1] Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18.[2] The Kremlin's official readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war.[3] Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials' calls for the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.[4]

Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran.[5] Putin claimed that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.[6]

ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.[7] ISW also

continues to assess that Putin's demands for the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence remain unchanged.[8] The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire." [9] It is unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in language between the two readouts of the call.

The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed" Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline.[10] The White House stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement.[11] The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode." [12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal.[13] Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.

Putin continues to hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine. Putin rejected a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea but agreed to participate in negotiations on such an agreement, which Putin will likely use to delay or spoil negotiations for a permanent peace agreement.[14] Putin also did not accept the US-Ukrainian temporary frontline ceasefire and continued to cite concerns that call back to his pre-war demands amounting to Ukraine's total capitulation and regime change. The Kremlin readout stated that Putin and Trump discussed the development of bilateral economic and energy cooperation, though White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that future US-Russian relations would include "enormous economic deals...only when peace has been achieved." [15]

Putin spoke at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Congress before his call with Trump on March 18 and claimed that some Western companies that left Russia following the February 2022 full-scale invasion now seek to return or are taking steps to return to Russia and that Russia will consider this return through the lens of prioritizing Russian businesses.[16] Putin ordered the Russian Cabinet of Ministers to create a procedure for Western businesses to return to Russia.[17] Putin is likely

attempting to bypass the Trump administration's stated conditions of concluding economic deals after achieving peace in Ukraine by extracting concessions for sanctions relief or other economic concessions in preliminary talks for a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, as other Kremlin officials have attempted in recent weeks.[18]


Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area, likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to make battlefield gains. Geolocated footage published on March 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Stepove (east of Kamyanske).[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Shcherbaky (east of Kamyanske), north of Pyatykhatky (southeast of Kamyanske), and toward Lobkove (southeast of Kamyanske).[20] Russian forces continued attacking near Mali Shcherbaky (east of Kamyanske), Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Lobkove on March 18.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 247th and 108th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are responsible for recent Russian advances along the Shcherbaky-Stepove-Pyatykhatky line.[22]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 17 that Russian forces have become more active in the Zaporizhia direction and are taking advantage of improving weather.[23] Voloshyn noted that mud is drying out, and trees are regaining their foliage, so Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions by attacking in assault groups of five to seven people. Voloshyn also noted that the number of first-person view (FPV) drones that Russian forces use per day has increased in March 2025 by about 50 drones to about 400 to 420 drones per day.

Russian forces are likely intensifying offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast to push towards Zaporizhzhia City amid continued Kremlin demands that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia Oblast to Russia.[24] Russian forces are also likely trying to draw and fix Ukrainian forces to additional areas of the frontline to allow Russian forces to prioritize certain efforts and make grinding gains across the theater as the weather improves and Russia protracts negotiations.

Ukrainian officials warned in November 2024 about a possible intensification of Russian activity in the Zaporizhia direction, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late February 2025 that Russian forces intensified activity northwest of Robotyne, especially near Pyatykhakty and Kamyanske.[25] Russian forces have only attempted occasional localized offensive operations west of Orikhiv since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 7 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast forced the Russian military command to redeploy forces from southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, preventing Russian forces from launching the attack on Zaporizhzhia City they had been planning.[27]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 18, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.**
- **Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.**
- **Putin continues to hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.**

- **Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area, likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to make battlefield gains.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.**
- **The Russian military is reportedly increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are

assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced across the international border in Sumy Oblast as part of continued ground operations to push Ukrainian forces from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Basivka (near the international border in Sumy Oblast and west of Sudzha).[28]

Russian forces attacked west of Sudzha near Gogolevka, south of Sudzha near Guyevo, and near the international border in Sumy Oblast near Basivka on March 18.[29] Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 18 that Russian forces are conducting small infantry assaults toward Zuravka, Novenke, and Basivka (all near the international border in Sumy Oblast and west of Sudzha).[30] Demchenko added that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating north of Sumy Oblast and may attempt to attack other areas along the international border into Sumy Oblast.

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kursk direction published footage on March 17 of the brigade conducting a HIMARS strike on a repair facility of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) - presumably in Kursk Oblast.[31]

Russian sources claimed on March 18 that Ukrainian forces attacked along the Sumy-Belgorod Oblast border southeast of the remaining Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked with tank, armored vehicle, and mine-clearing vehicle support from Sumy Oblast toward Demidovka, Grafovka, and Prilesye (northwest of Belgorod City) and that Russian forces repelled the attack.[32] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the 14H-472 road southwest of Demidovka before Russian forces repelled the attack.[33]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 17 and 18.[34] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk), northwest of Dvorichna, and northeast of Krasne Pershe (both northeast of Kupyansk).[36]


Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Kupyansk toward Mala Shapkivka and Doroshivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Kamyanka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 17 and 18.[37]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces continue attempts to transfer manpower and build pontoon crossings to the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.[38] The commander stated that Russian forces would likely leverage foggy weather during spring to try to cross the river.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, Kruhlyakivka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka on March 17 and 18.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 18, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in a forested area west of Balka Zhuravka (formerly Nevske, northeast of Lyman).[40]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 18 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Balka Zhuravka, and Zarichne and toward Olhivka, Novomykhailivka, Zelene Dolnya, Katerynivka, and Nove on March 17 and 18.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[43]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on March 17 and 18.[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along Chekhova Street in western Chasiv Yar.[45]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Dylivika, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on March 17 and 18.[46]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk and to a building in Tsentralna Mine in western Toretsk.[47] Geolocated footage published on March 18 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Novobakhmutivka (south of Toretsk) and north and northeast of Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[48]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Leonidivka on March 17 and 18.[49]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 18 that Russian forces conducted 450 assaults in the Toretsk direction in the first half of March 2025 and only 340 assaults in the first half of February.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ivanopillya (northwest of Toretsk).[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction March 18, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Bohdanivka and advanced in eastern Udachne and within central Pishchane (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[52]

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Oleksandropil, Tarasivka, Zelene Pole, Yelyzavetivka, Sryvydonivka, Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Preobrazhenka, Kotlyarivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Sribе, and Zaporizhzhia on March 17 and 18.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pishchane.[54]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces published footage on March 18 of Russian forces repelling a reduced-company-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces have reduced the amount of infantry involved in assaults in the Pokrovsk direction and that Russian forces are conducting these assaults on bicycles, electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly fighting near Tarasivka.[57]



Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within central Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[58]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 18 shows that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Kostyantynopil.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove) and northwest of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[60]

Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and southwest of Kurakhove near Pryvilne and in the direction of Rozlyv on March 17 and 18.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking targets near Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[62]



Russian forces continued assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[63]


Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Velyka Novosilka in the directions of Vesele, Pryvilne, and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on March 17 and 18.[64]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced-platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the direction of Vesele.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast


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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

See topline for updates about the Zaporizhia direction.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on March 18 but did not advance.[67]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 137 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts and that 64 drones were "lost," likely due

to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones caused damage in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Cherkasy oblasts.[69]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military is reportedly increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 18 that Russia is expanding the number of information and psychological operations units, particularly within the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD).[70] The Russian military is reportedly training the new units at the Military Academy of the Russian General Staff in Moscow City and the Mozhaisky Military-Space Academy in St. Petersburg. Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russia is increasing its information and psychological operation units in order to intensify its informational war against Ukraine, Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and Asia.[71]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>

- [2] <https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/18/politics/trump-putin-ceasefire-russia-ukraine-war/index.html>
- [3] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>;
<https://x.com/PressSec/status/1902049487457071248>
- [4] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2025>; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989213/;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025>
- [5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2023>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2024>;
<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025>
- [6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>
- [7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025>
- [8] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2025>
- [9] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>;
<https://x.com/PressSec/status/1902049487457071248>
- [10] <https://www.president dot gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553>
- [11] <https://x.com/PressSec/status/1902049487457071248>
- [12] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>
- [13] <https://suspilne dot media/973811-zelenskij-ukraina-gotova-na-embargo-sodo-udariv-po-energeticnij-infrastrukturi/>; <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-talks-putin-ukraine-ceasefire-good-chance-success/story?id=119890671>

- [14] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>
- [15] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76477>;
<https://x.com/PressSec/status/1902049487457071248>
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<https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725>
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https://t.me/dva_majors/67006 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/33609>
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