

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2024

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April 10, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on April 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian military's effective use of drones on the battlefield cannot fully mitigate Ukraine's theater-wide shortage of critical munitions. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with German outlet *BILD* published on April 10 that Ukraine is successfully domestically producing drones, but that drones cannot replace air defense systems, long-range missile systems, or artillery.[1] Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated ongoing artillery ammunition shortages by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, although artillery systems can deliver much more powerful strikes than loitering munitions and drone-dropped munitions. An unnamed NATO official told *Foreign Policy* in an article published on April 9 that Ukrainian forces have used FPV drones to "destroy" over two-thirds of the total number of Russian tanks that the Ukrainians have "destroyed" in recent months.[2] Ukrainian FPV drone pilots reportedly target a Russian tank's "open hatch, the engine or ammunition stored in the turret." [3] Ukrainian FPV drones are likely able to temporarily render armored vehicles *hors de combat* during a combat operation, but current FPV drones with relatively light payloads are unlikely to destroy armored vehicles rendering them irretrievable and irreparable very often. Electronic warfare systems and increased armor on armored vehicles can also make it difficult for FPV drones to strike a specific target location on the vehicle, although technological and tactical competition can create periodic windows of opportunity for offense or defense to gain an advantage.[4] *Reuters* reported on March 26 that Ukrainian FPV drone pilots acknowledged that they would be unable to hold the frontline without artillery and infantry.[5] Ukrainian forces have managed partially to repel an increased tempo of Russian mechanized assaults in recent weeks despite ammunition shortages.[6] Ukraine's ability to repel mechanized assaults with FPV drones is a partial mitigation, however, continued shortages of artillery deprive Ukrainian forces of the ability to destroy armored vehicles rapidly and in large numbers.

US European Command (EUCOM) Commander General Christopher Cavoli warned on April 10 that Russian forces currently have a five-to-one artillery advantage along the frontline – a statement consistent with Ukrainian officials’ reports – but that Russian forces could have a 10-to-1 artillery advantage “in a matter of weeks” if the United States continues to delay the provision of military aid to Ukraine.[7] Zelensky and senior Ukrainian military officials have recently warned that delays in Western military assistance have forced Ukraine to cede the battlefield initiative to Russia and that the Ukrainian military cannot plan a successful counteroffensive or defensive effort without knowing when and what kind of aid Ukraine will receive. ISW continues to assess that delays in Western military assistance have forced the Ukrainian military to husband materiel and that Ukrainian forces must make difficult decisions prioritizing certain aspects of its defense at the cost of lives and lost territory as well as at the expense of contesting the initiative to constrain Russian military capabilities or planning for future counteroffensive operations.[8]

Zelensky stated that there are no mitigations for insufficient air defense systems and indicated that Russian strikes are forcing Ukraine to reallocate already scarce air defense assets to defend Kharkiv City. Zelensky told *BILD* that drones cannot replace air defenses and that Ukraine needs air defenses to survive.[9] Russian forces have recently intensified their strike campaign against Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have recently warned that if Russian forces sustain the current high tempo of this campaign, then Ukraine will likely lack the air defense missile stocks necessary to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure.[10] Zelensky discussed plans with Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk on April 10 to redeploy Ukrainian air defenses to protect Kharkiv City, against which Russian forces have recently intensified missile, drone, and glide bomb strikes.[11] The Russian strike campaign has pressured Ukraine to prioritize protecting strategic objects, population centers, and energy infrastructure in deep rear areas over the frontline and near rear areas such as Kharkiv City.[12] This further reorganization of Ukrainian air defenses to protect Kharkiv City will presumably draw from Ukraine’s existing arsenal of missiles and launchers, which will stretch Ukraine’s already limited air defense capabilities and provide Russian forces with the opportunity to further exploit weakened air defenses elsewhere. As ISW has recently assessed, degraded and thin Ukrainian air defenses would afford Russian aviation prolonged security to operate on the frontline, significantly increase devastating glide bomb strikes at scale, and possibly even permit routine large-scale Russian aviation operations against near rear Ukrainian logistics and cities.[13]

US emergency efforts to bolster Ukraine’s existing air defense capabilities remain insufficient to protect Ukraine against Russian strikes. The US Department of Defense (DoD) approved the possible sale of equipment worth \$138 million on April 9 to repair and modernize Ukraine’s HAWK air defense systems due to Ukraine’s “urgent need” to defend against Russian airstrikes but acknowledged that the possible transfer would “not alter the basic military balance” in Ukraine absent additional aid.[14] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba recently emphasized that Patriots can shoot down Russian ballistic missiles that Ukraine’s Soviet systems cannot, and Zelensky recently stated that Ukraine will need an additional 25 Patriot air defense systems, likely meaning launchers, to extend full air defense coverage to all of Ukraine’s territory.[15] NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and US European Command Commander General Christopher Cavoli warned on April 10 that Ukraine will run out of missiles for the launchers it already has “in fairly short order” if the United States does not continue to support Ukraine and stressed that the US failure to provide Ukraine with additional military assistance has generated battlefield effects that favor Russia.[16]

Zelensky warned about the threat of a potential future Russian ground offensive operation targeting Kharkiv City, which would force Ukraine to reallocate some of its already-strained manpower and materiel capabilities away from other currently active and critical sectors of the front. Zelensky told *BILD* that he cannot rule out the possibility of a major Russian offensive operation on Kharkiv City and noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to seize Kharkiv City since the beginning of the full-scale invasion because Kharkiv City is a major Ukrainian city and has symbolic meaning for both Russia and Ukraine.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces are doing everything possible to prevent Russia from seizing Kharkiv City. Zelensky recently told *CBS* that Ukrainian forces are also constructing fortifications and defensive positions near Sumy City in response to a reported significant buildup of Russian forces in neighboring Bryansk Oblast.[18] A Russian ground operation against Kharkiv in the very near future is unlikely, but Russian efforts to create strategic reserves and reposition forces in the theater could allow Russian forces to launch an offensive toward the city in the summer.[19]

The threat of a Russian offensive operation targeting Kharkiv or Sumy city appears to be forcing the Ukrainian military to redistribute its limited manpower and materiel to the construction of defensive fortifications in those areas and an active Russian operation to seize these cities would only further exacerbate this dynamic. The Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine, and Russia's ability to conduct opportunistic offensive operations in almost any area of the frontline will continue to strain Ukraine's already stretched resources, regardless of any one operation's success in actually seizing a targeted city or settlement.[20] The Russian forces are able to allocate significant resources in hopes of achieving operationally significant breakthroughs in frontline areas of their choosing and can exploit areas of the front previously made vulnerable by Ukrainian manpower and materiel transfers. Russian forces are currently concentrating significant resources near Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka and continue to make slow, grinding advances in those areas, largely due to Ukrainian manpower challenges and delays in US and Western aid.[21] Ukrainian forces will likely not be able to contest the theater-wide initiative and more proactively allocate their resources without continuing to address their manpower issues and receiving additional Western aid.

The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada considered and adopted provisions from Ukraine's draft mobilization law on April 10 as part of an ongoing effort to increase the sustainability of Ukrainian mobilization over the long term. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada National Security and Defense Committee adopted the second reading of the draft mobilization law on April 9 and submitted it to the wider Verkhovna Rada for consideration, which began on April 10.[22] Ukrainian officials reported that the Verkhovna Rada adopted a provision from the law allowing for the mobilization of Ukrainian convicts and a provision amending Ukraine's criminal code to increase penalties for mobilization evasion.[23] Ukrainian officials reportedly removed an existing provision from the draft law that would have stipulated the end of active military service for mobilized personnel after 36 months of service.[24] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated on April 10 that Ukrainian officials will consider issues regarding the conclusion of military service of individuals and rotations of military personnel in a separate draft law.[25] Ukrainian efforts to establish a more sustainable mobilization apparatus will support the Ukrainian military's ability to restore and reconstitute existing units and create new units. ISW continues to assess that Western-provided materiel continues to be the greatest deciding factor for the Ukrainian military's ability to restore and augment its combat power, however.

Russian officials continue to indicate that they are not interested in any meaningful negotiations on the war in Ukraine amid Switzerland’s announcement that it will host a global peace summit on the war on June 15 and 16.[26] Swiss officials stated that Switzerland will send invitations for the summit to representatives of over 100 countries and that the summit will include discussions of various peace proposals, including Ukraine’s Peace Formula and China’s vague 12-point peace plan.[27] The Russian Embassy in Switzerland reiterated previous Russian statements that Russia would reject any invitation to the summit and that any discussions about Ukraine without Russia are pointless.[28] Russian officials have repeatedly falsely blamed Ukraine and the West for the lack of peace negotiations, despite numerous public Russian statements suggesting or explicitly stating that Russia is not interested in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[29] The Kremlin continues efforts to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity and fundamentally weaken NATO and has shown no legitimate indication that it is open to reconsidering these objectives.[30]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov attempted to downplay tension in Armenian-Russian relations amid Armenia’s continued efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia. Peskov claimed on April 10 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will meet in the near future to discuss “existing questions” about Armenian-Russian relations.[31] Peskov asserted that Armenia is Russia’s ally and that Russia engages with Armenia on the assumption that Russia and Armenia can resolve all problems through dialogue.[32] Pashinyan stated on April 10 that Armenian-Russian relations are “not experiencing their best time” and that Armenia has “not made a single wrong step” in this relationship.[33] Pashinyan stated that Armenian-Russian relations are transitioning from a “historical” nature to “real” relations, likely a reference to growing dissatisfaction at Russia’s inability and unwillingness to support Armenian interests in Nagorno-Karabakh and increasing Armenian interest in deepening cooperation with the West.[34] Pashinyan stated that Armenia is still considering whether it will participate in the May 8 Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit and did not mention if he would attend Putin’s presidential inauguration on May 5.[35] Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan announced on April 9 that he would not attend the Council of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting on April 12 in Minsk, although Kremlin newswire TASS claimed that Armenia would send a deputy minister.[36] Armenian Minister of High-Technology Industry Mkhitar Hayrapetyan stated that Armenia is considering terminating an agreement with Russia that allows Russia to broadcast Russian state television programs in Armenia following the March 29 announcement that Armenia blocked two of Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s shows.[37]


Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed that Russia has no economic reason to import foreign labor, a direct contradiction of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent efforts to justify Russia’s current migration laws to his xenophobic ultra-nationalist constituency. Bastrykin claimed during a speech at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on April 10 that Russia has no economic reason to import migrant workers, particularly workers from Central Asian countries.[38] Bastrykin stated that an Uzbek government official once asked Bastrykin why Russia takes in so many migrants and allows migrants to apply for Russian citizenship, particularly young migrants whom Bastrykin insinuated were dangerous. Bastrykin claimed that there is “no way” Russia can overcome the reported trend of increased migrant crime in Russia and claimed that migrants in Russia are unwilling to assimilate into Russian culture and society. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) published a “criminogenic index” in January 2024 that detailed which migrant groups are more predisposed to criminal activity and indicated that the number of crimes committed by migrants in Russia has increased annually since

2019.[39] Bastrykin reiterated a sentiment that he claimed to see on social media – that migrants who are Russian citizens should sign military service contracts and fight in Ukraine while migrants who are unwilling to fight in Ukraine should return to their native countries.[40] Russian milbloggers and some State Duma members have previously justified Russia’s ongoing coercive crypto-mobilization effort, which disproportionately targets migrants, by claiming that migrants who receive Russian citizenship must fight in Ukraine to “earn” their Russian citizenship and that migrants who fight in Ukraine will receive Russian citizenship.[41] Putin stated on April 4 that Russia’s future labor shortage is “absolutely certain” and that Russia will either have to import labor from abroad or increase its existing labor productivity.[42] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is unlikely to approve anti-migrant policies that could worsen Russia’s labor shortages and degrade Russia’s crypto-mobilization efforts despite xenophobic demands from Russian ultranationalists to drastically reduce – if not eliminate – migration to Russia.[43] Bastrykin’s contradiction of Putin further illustrates that the Kremlin’s attempts to appeal to ultranationalist anti-migrant fervor may continue to generate inconsistencies and contradictions with the Kremlin’s migration policy and rhetoric.

Key Takeaways:

- **The Ukrainian military’s effective use of drones on the battlefield cannot fully mitigate Ukraine’s theater-wide shortage of critical munitions.**
- **Zelensky stated that there are no mitigations for insufficient air defense systems and indicated that Russian strikes are forcing Ukraine to reallocate already scarce air defense assets to defend Kharkiv City.**
- **Zelensky warned about the threat of a potential future Russian ground offensive operation targeting Kharkiv City, which would force Ukraine to reallocate some of its already-strained manpower and materiel capabilities away from other currently active and critical sectors of the front.**
- **The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada considered and adopted provisions from Ukraine’s draft mobilization law on April 10 as part of an ongoing effort to increase the sustainability of Ukrainian mobilization over the long term.**
- **Russian officials continue to indicate that they are not interested in any meaningful negotiations on the war in Ukraine amid Switzerland’s announcement that it will host a global peace summit on the war on June 15 and 16.**
- **Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov attempted to downplay tension in Armenian-Russian relations amid Armenia’s continued efforts to distance itself from political and security relations with Russia.**
- **Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed that Russia has no economic reason to import foreign labor, a direct contradiction of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent efforts to justify Russia’s current migration laws to his xenophobic ultra-nationalist constituency.**
- **Russian forces recently captured Ivanivske, a settlement east of Chasiv Yar, and advanced near Avdiivka.**
- **Eight Russian senators and 16 State Duma deputies submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma that would likely allow Russian authorities to deploy Russian Federal Penitentiaries Service (FSIN) employees to Ukraine, amid reports that Russia is intensifying its crypto-mobilization efforts.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional fighting continued southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka and Ivanivka; west of Svatove near Andriivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[44] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) have nearly completed regrouping from the Lyman direction to the Kupyansk direction, where he said that elements of the majority of the 47th Tank Division’s units appear to be deployed and that elements of the division’s 26th Tank Regiment and 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment have established positions between Pershotravneve and Yahidne (east to southeast of Kupyansk).[45] Mashovets also stated that elements of the 47th Tank Division had reinforced elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Western Military District) in the Synkivka-Petropavlivka direction (both northeast of Kupyansk).[46] Open-source geolocation organization GeoConfirmed reported on April 10 that geolocated footage and satellite imagery indicate that Russian forces lost – presumably both disabled and destroyed – between 102 and 107 armored vehicles near Terny between December 10, 2023 and April 10, 2024, including nine vehicles in December, 26 in January, 24 in February, 36 in March, and two to seven vehicles in the first 10 days of April.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian state media reported on April 10 that Ukrainian shelling killed Russian MoD Western Grouping of Forces press service officer Yevgeny Polovodov and wounded two others accompanying him near Kreminna.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: ISW will be orientating activity in the immediate Bakhmut area around Chasiv Yar for the foreseeable future as ISW assesses that the seizure of Chasiv Yar is the current Russian operational objective in the area.

Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut on April 10, but there were no confirmed changes in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 9 that Russian forces advanced roughly two kilometers in depth towards Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[49] Positional fighting occurred east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on April 10.[50] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating north of Vesele (southeast of Siversk), and elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Soledar-Siversk direction.[51]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces have seized all of Ivanivske as of April 10 and continued offensive efforts east of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced further west of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar) along the T0504 (Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar) highway and suggests that Russian forces likely seized all of Ivanivske.[52] The Ukrainian source that posted the footage claimed that Russian forces made the gains during a recent roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.[53] ISW observed Russian forces conducting a similarly sized mechanized attack in the area on April 4, but it is unclear if Russian forces made the advances during the assaults on April 4 or during other more recent mechanized assaults.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 9 that Russian forces advanced near eastern Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and that Ukrainian forces withdrew from positions northeast of Kalynivka (immediately north of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has


not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[55] Positional fighting continued northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; near Chasiv Yar and the Novyi district (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[56] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR AC) are operating in the Bakhmut direction, elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near the Kanal micro-district (easternmost Chasiv Yar), and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka.[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on April 10. Geolocated footage published on April 10 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains northeast of Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka), advanced a kilometer in depth and 720 meters in width southeast of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), and approached the northern outskirts of Netyalove (southwest of Avdiivka).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces


drove Ukrainian forces from positions in Semenivka (west of Avdiivka) and controlled up to 45 percent of the settlement.[60] ISW has not observed confirmation of any of these Russian claims. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, and Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Vodyane.[61] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently transferred elements of the understrength 27th Motorized Rifle Division (formerly 2nd LNR AC's 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade) to the Berdychi area and elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) to the Novokalynove area.[62]



Russian forces reportedly continued to conduct roughly company-sized mechanized assaults west of Donetsk City on April 10 and reportedly advanced in the area, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults near


Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) with 15 armored vehicles, including BMPs and T-72 tanks, on April 8 to 9 and continued at least company-sized assaults in the area with “dozens” of armored vehicles on April 10.[63] The Ukrainian officer stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Russian armored vehicles in the area during the April 8 to 9 assaults.[64] Russian mibloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Krasnohorivka and are currently engaged in fighting near the Krasnohorivka brick factory.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 280 meters in depth and 550 meters in width south of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[66] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka, Pobieda, and Vodyane.[67] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[68] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division’s 10th Tank Regiment and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]); elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]); and elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on April 4. Positional fighting occurred south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and southeast of Vuhledar near Mykilske.[70] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[71]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on April 10. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[72] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.[73] Elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction (western Zaporizhzhia Oblast).[74]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Pyatykhatky and Robotyne as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory	Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24	Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory	Russian Field Fortifications
Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*	Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives	Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on April 6 that Russian forces advanced 1000 meters toward the T-803 highway.

Russian officials demanded that international organizations acknowledge Russian accusations that Ukrainian forces are conducting strikes targeting the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on April 10 that Ukrainian forces are systematically attacking the ZNPP and that international organizations need to recognize the situation around the ZNPP.[75] The Russian Permanent Mission to International Organizations in Vienna issued a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), claiming that the IAEA should condemn Ukraine for unspecified damage to the ZNPP.[76] Russian authorities have repeatedly attempted to use Russia's physical control over the ZNPP to force international organizations, including the IAEA, to meet with Russian occupation officials to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and by extension Russia's occupation of sovereign Ukrainian land.[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of April 10, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian forces reportedly recently struck several Russian frontline command posts amid continued positional fighting in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian ground attacks against Ukrainian positions near Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[78] A Russian Telegram channel claiming to be an employee of an unspecified branch of Russian special services claimed on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone command post of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near Kakhovka on April 5.[79] The Telegram channel also stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against the command post of an unspecified Russian unit, likely another element of the Russian 49th CAA, near Olhyne on April 6, killing three Russian servicemen, wounding another serviceman, and damaging two Russian vehicles.

ISW has not observed footage of the claimed strikes and cannot independently verify the Telegram channel's claims.



A Russian military helicopter reportedly crashed on the western coast of occupied Crimea on April 10. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that a Russian Ka-27

helicopter crashed in occupied Crimea but did not attribute responsibility for the crash.[80] Pletenchuk noted that it is unlikely that the crash was solely caused by technical issues, although the Russian MoD later claimed that a Mi-24 helicopter crashed near Crimea's western coast due to unspecified technical issues.[81] A Russian milblogger suggested that Russian air defense systems near occupied Crimea may have downed the helicopter in a friendly fire incident.[82] ISW has not observed footage of the crash and cannot independently verify claims about the crash at this time.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against targets in Ukraine on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 guided air missiles targeting Odesa Oblast on the evening of April 9 and 17 Shahed-136/131 drones, two Iskander-K cruise missiles, and one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea on the night of April 9 to 10.[83] Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups destroyed both Kh-59 missiles over Odesa City on the evening of April 9 and 14 Shahed drones over Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts on the night of April 9 to 10. Ukrainian Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed an unspecified winged Russian missile over Zaporizhia Oblast during the day on April 10.[84] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian forces targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast with an unspecified number of Shahed drones and ballistic missiles.[85] Kiper stated that Russian forces struck Ukrainian critical and transport infrastructure and damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian missiles struck at least one railway bridge and an unspecified infrastructure facility near Odesa City.[87]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Eight Russian senators and 16 State Duma deputies submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma that would likely allow Russian authorities to deploy Russian Federal Penitentiaries Service (FSIN) employees to Ukraine, amid reports that Russia is intensifying its crypto-mobilization efforts. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's* northwestern Russia service *Sever Realii* reported on April 10 that the Russian senators and Duma deputies, including Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group Chairperson and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak, authored a bill that would allow the Russian government to send FSIN employees on "business trips to other locations" without the employee's consent.[88] The bill would also allow the Russian government to "transfer" FSIN employees to other "detachments" and assign them "additional duties." *Sever Realii* reported on April 1 that FSIN Director Arkady Gostev stated that 156 of the 1,600 former FSIN employees who have fought in Ukraine (presumably since the start of the war in February 2022) have died.[89]

Russian outlet *Izvestia* reported on April 9 that the Russian MoD is subordinating the newly formed 49th Separate Air Assault (VDV) Brigade to the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]). Sources in the Russian MoD told *Izvestia* that the 49th Separate VDV Brigade will receive BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to help it penetrate Ukrainian defensive lines.[90] ISW reported in January that Russian forces were reportedly forming air assault brigades within combined arms ground formations as part of ongoing large-scale military reforms and observed elements of the 49th Separate VDV Brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction as part of the 58th CAA.[91]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone developer Simbirsk Design Bureau claimed on April 4 that it is producing 300 “Piranha” first-person view (FPV) drones per day.[92] Simbirsk Design Bureau claimed that it localized the production of Piranha drones to two sites in Ulyanovsk Oblast. The Piranha drone can reportedly carry a payload of up to five kilograms and is equipped with a rotating thermal imaging camera.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are increasingly using Krasnopol laser-guided artillery munitions because of increased production of the munition and because Russian forces have increased the number of reconnaissance drones on the battlefield.[93] ISW previously observed reports in fall 2023 that Russia was increasing the production of Krasnopol artillery munitions and attempting to reduce its laser detection time.[94]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials seized on administrative disputes between Ukraine and the European Union (EU) over custody of Ukrainian children abroad to distract from Russia’s systematic forced deportations of Ukrainian children. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly claimed that Ukrainians are asking Russia to assist in regaining custody of Ukrainian children whom EU countries have taken custody of due to EU laws and that Ukrainian embassies are refusing to help the parents.[95] Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinetz recently stated that EU country social services have increasingly taken custody of Ukrainian children due to differences between EU legislation and Ukrainian legislation about proper parental guardian documentation.[96] Lyubinetz reported that Ukraine is appealing many of these cases to EU countries.

Pro-Kremlin Russian milbloggers are attempting to set conditions to justify the Russian military’s use of chemical weapons throughout the frontline. The milbloggers accused Ukrainian forces of either using or preparing to use chemical weapons near Klishchiivka, Donetsk Oblast (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[97] Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are waiting for Russian advances towards Chasiv Yar to employ the weapons, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces have already done so.[98] ISW has observed no indications that Ukrainian forces are using chemical weapons in the Chasiv Yar area. Ukrainian officials, Western media, and even Russian sources have reported on consistent Russian chemical weapon use across the theater.[99] Russian forces have very likely also been using chemical weapons near Chasiv Yar during this time, and these Russian milblogger claims are likely an effort to distract from and even justify Russian chemical weapons use. A prominent

Kremlin-awarded milblogger even suggested that the alleged Ukrainian use of chemical weapons benefits Russian forces as it permits Russian forces to conduct “mirror actions,” presumably meaning using their own chemical weapons.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian and Belarusian state media reported on April 10 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will meet in Moscow for bilateral negotiations on April 11 and 12.[100]

Belarusian state news outlet *Belta* reported on April 10 that Russia and Belarus have initiated four new projects to domestically develop and produce precision machine tools to help address Russian and Belarusian overreliance on Western-produced, sanctioned precision machine tools.[101]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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