

# Iran Update



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**November 17, 2024 Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET**

*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.*

*We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.*

**The IDF killed the head of Hezbollah's media office, Mohammad Afif, in central Beirut on November 17.**<sup>[1]</sup> The IDF conducted a strike targeting Afif in a residential building in Ras al Nabaa, a neighborhood in central Beirut.<sup>[2]</sup> Hezbollah confirmed Afif's death.<sup>[3]</sup> Afif was reportedly visiting a Syrian Ba'ath Party in Lebanon branch office at the time of the strike, according to the office's head.<sup>[4]</sup> The Lebanese Health Ministry reported the strike killed one and injured three others.<sup>[5]</sup>

**Afif's killing is a continuation of the IDF's campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah's command-and-control.** The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah's strategic- and operational-level military leadership.<sup>[6]</sup> Afif had served as Hezbollah's spokesperson since 2014 and facilitated Hezbollah's news coverage and media relations.<sup>[7]</sup> Afif managed Hezbollah's attack claims and documentation related to attack claims and coordinated Hezbollah's messaging with Lebanese media.<sup>[8]</sup> Afif played a role in Hezbollah's October 19 drone attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's house in Caesarea.<sup>[9]</sup> He was a close adviser to Nasrallah and had become the highest-ranking Hezbollah official to hold public conferences in Beirut over the past month.<sup>[10]</sup> Afif's killing is likely intended to further disrupt Hezbollah's command-and-control structures and its attempts to rehabilitate those structures by having other officials step into previous commanders' roles.

**The IDF's ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes.** Israeli operations in Lebanon have done this by reducing the threat of anti-tank fire and other munitions to northern Israeli towns. Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year.<sup>[11]</sup> The IDF's re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-

tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.[12] An unspecified IDF official told Israeli Army Radio that civilian movement in the north is "free" because of the "IDF's control of Lebanese territory." The IDF has disrupted Hezbollah's ability to conduct direct fire—including anti-tank fire—and observed indirect attacks targeting northern Israel by seizing key terrain north of the border. Hezbollah's rate of anti-tank fire attacks has significantly dropped since the IDF began ground operations on October 1, suggesting that Israeli operations successfully pushed Hezbollah fighters back from the immediate border and disrupted Hezbollah's ability to conduct these attacks.[13] Hezbollah may still be able to conduct attacks with direct line-of-sight into Israel from further back from the Israel-Lebanon border, however. Israeli forces are currently operating in "second-line" Lebanese villages to prevent additional attacks from longer range.

Re-opening northern roads is a part of the IDF's efforts to prepare for the return of northern residents to their homes.[14] The IDF also plans to soon withdraw IDF soldiers based in northern towns and return them to IDF outposts and bases.[15] This is consistent with recent comments from unspecified senior IDF officers that said that the IDF was considering returning displaced civilians to the north even without a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah.[16]

**Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16.**[17] UNIFIL reported that an armed group prevented a patrol of French and Finnish peacekeepers from conducting a patrol in Bedias, Tyre District. The patrol continued along its planned route into the village of Maarakeh. UNIFIL said that "likely non-state actors" fired upon the patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon. Some patrol vehicles had bullet impacts but no peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL said it is unacceptable that peacekeepers are routinely targeted while conducting UN Security Council-mandated tasks. UNIFIL stated that it is the responsibility of Lebanese authorities to ensure that UNIFIL peacekeepers can carry out their mandated tasks without fear or threats.

**The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war.** An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 17 that the IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year.[18] The IDF has activated multiple reserve brigades several times since October 7, with at least one brigade serving for more than 200 days out of the year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused "burnout" among IDF reservists.[19] This has caused a decrease in the number of reservists reporting for duty. These changes to the IDF's policies regarding reserve call-ups presumably seek to address this burnout and make a longer war more sustainable for the force.

**Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas' political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.**[20] Qatar previously ordered Hamas' political leadership to relocate from Doha, according to US officials and Israeli media.[21] The United States reportedly pressured Qatar to expel Hamas' political leadership after the group rejected the latest ceasefire-hostage agreement proposed by international mediators.[22]

## Key Takeaways:

- **Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon:** The IDF strike that killed Hezbollah media chief Mohammad Afif is a continuation of the IDF's campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah's command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah's strategic- and operational-level military leadership.
- **Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon:** The IDF's ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes. The IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year. The IDF's re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.
- **UNIFIL:** Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16. UNIFIL said that "likely non-state actors" fired upon a patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon.
- **IDF Reserve Policies:** The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war. The IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused "burnout" among IDF reservists.
- **Hamas Moves to Turkey:** Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas' political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.

# Key Takeaways in the October 7 War

As of November 17, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



## Gaza Strip:

### Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
- Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

**The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 showed that the IDF slightly expanded its clearing operations in eastern Jabalia refugee camp. The IDF also conducted controlled demolitions of civilian infrastructure west of Beit Lahiya.<sup>[23]</sup> Palestinian militias claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces west of Beit Lahiya on November

17.[24] The IDF reported on November 17 that two IDF soldiers from the 900th Infantry Brigade died in the northern Gaza Strip.[25] A Palestinian sniper shot and killed one of the soldiers in Beit Lahiya.[26]

**The IDF conducted an airstrike that reportedly killed at least 70 Palestinian civilians in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17, according to “medics and residents” speaking to Reuters.[27]** Reuters reported that the IDF airstrike struck a multi-story residential building in Beit Lahiya.[28] The IDF reportedly conducted overnight artillery shelling in Beit Lahiya before the airstrike, according to a resident.[29] The IDF also issued evacuation orders for Gazans to evacuate Beit Lahiya and relocate to western Gaza City.[30]

**The IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar visited Jabalia and conducted a situational assessment of the IDF’s ground and air campaigns in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17.[31]** Bar emphasized the importance of coordination between the IDF air and ground forces to achieve operational success in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The commander of the IDF 162nd Division, Brigadier General Itzhak Cohen, said during Bar’s visit that airpower is important to the IDF’s operation in Jabalia.[33]


**The IDF 99th Division likely conducted clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 17.** A Palestinian journalist reported the movement of Israeli vehicles and artillery fire in northeastern areas of Bureij refugee camp.[34]

**The IDF conducted an airstrike that killed five Palestinians escorting an aid convoy in Qizan al Najjar, in the southern Gaza Strip on November 17.[35]** These Palestinians were responsible for monitoring aid trucks entering Rafah to avoid theft by criminal groups, according to a Palestinian journalist.[36] It is not clear if these escorts were affiliated with any armed or criminal groups themselves.

**Hamas claimed responsibility for the rocket attack targeting Sderot in southern Israel on November 16.[37]** The IDF intercepted two rockets targeting Sderot on November 16.[38]

# Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip


As of November 17, 2024, 2:00 PM ET



\* ISW-CTP's "Reported Israeli Clearing Operations" layer uses the US military's doctrinal definition of clearing which is an operation that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area." Clearing operations frequently take weeks and sometimes months to complete

# Israeli-Announced Evacuation Zones in the Gaza Strip

As of November 17, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



**Ultra-Orthodox Israelis protested against the IDF after it issued 1,000 draft orders on November 17.**[39] Ultra-orthodox Israelis blocked the Route 4 highway near Bnei Brak in central Israel.[40] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz recently announced that the IDF will send conscription orders to 1,000 ultra-Orthodox beginning on November 17 and will gradually send the remaining 6,000 orders over the next six weeks.[41]

## West Bank

### Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

## **Northern Israel and Lebanon**

### **Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:**

- End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
- Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

**Israeli forces likely advanced towards Khiam on November 16.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks south of al Wazzani, indicating that Israeli armor operated in the area. Commercially available satellite imagery also showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks west of Ain Arab, indicating that Israeli armor advanced into the area from south of al Wazzani. This advance is consistent with Hezbollah-affiliated reports of an IDF advance towards Khiam.[42] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces advanced along two axes towards the southern and eastern outskirts of Khiam on November 16, including by advancing from Wazzani towards Ain Arab.[43] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF fired artillery and conducted at least seven airstrikes in the Khiam area in conjunction with the IDF's advance.[44]

The IDF issued a new closed military zone in Metula and Kfar Yuval, northern Israel, on November 16.[45] Metula and Kfar Yuval are the closest Israeli towns to Khiam. Hezbollah claimed it fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon north of Kfar Yuval on November 16.[46]


Hezbollah claimed six rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel south of Khiam and on the city's eastern outskirts.[47] Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah also fired small arms and anti-tank missiles targeting Israeli personnel and armor advancing towards Wata al Khiam.[48] Hezbollah previously claimed its highest rate of attacks during the IDF's first advance into Khiam around October 28, although Hezbollah does not provide evidence for these claims.[49]

**The IDF likely advanced east from Markaba towards Tallousseh, southeastern Lebanon.** Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 shows flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in eastern Tallousseh, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated in the area. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Markaba on November 16.[50]

**The IDF 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) continued operations in southcentral Lebanon.** Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 17 showed that the 228th Infantry Brigade destroyed underground infrastructure and weapons depots on a hillside in southwestern Aitaroun.[51] The IDF reported that the 228th Infantry Brigade located weapons, ammunition, and a motorcycle




within the underground shaft that the IDF said "was prepared for an invasion" into Israel.[52]



**Hezbollah conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces operating near Chama, southwestern Lebanon, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 16.** Hezbollah claimed it fired machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Chama.[53] Small arms and RPGs are relatively shorter-range munitions than Hezbollah has typically employed in its defense of southern Lebanon.[54] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces on the southwestern outskirts of Chama. Israeli forces advanced to Chama on November 15.[55]


## Reported Israeli Operations in the Western Sector As of November 17, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET



**The IDF Artillery Corps crossed the border and began operating in southern Lebanon for the first time since the beginning of Israel’s ground campaign in Lebanon in late September.[56]** The IDF announced that elements of the 282nd Artillery Brigade crossed the border with its self-propelled M-109 self-propelled guns to increase its artillery range and provide better support for ground forces in the area.[57] The IDF operates the M-109A5, which has a range of 22 kilometers.[58] IDF artillery had been operating from northern Israel.[59] The IDF added that the 282nd Artillery Brigade has shelled thousands of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon from northern Israel, including weapon depots, command centers, and rocket launching sites, and killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, since the start of their offensive.[60]



The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 15 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on November 17.[61] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River. The spokesperson said that the IDF will act “forcefully” against Hezbollah activities in the areas of these specified towns.



The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah senior leadership and infrastructure in Beirut since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 16. Lebanese media reported that IDF struck at least 11 sites in Beirut's southern suburbs, including in Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, Hadath, and al Chiyah.[62] The IDF Arabic spokesperson issued several evacuation warnings to Dahiyeh residents before the strikes.[63] The IDF also conducted an airstrike targeting an electronics

store in Mar Elias, south of Hamra in central Beirut.[64] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah's operations in the south.[65] Israeli Army Radio reported that this unnamed commander assumed a senior leadership role after a previous leader was killed.[66] The IDF has not acknowledged the attack or the target as of this writing.


The IDF said it has struck about 50 Hezbollah targets in Dahiyeh over the past week, including 15 munitions warehouses and over 20 headquarters.[67] The IDF said it struck a house yesterday that had previously belonged to former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and had been used since by Hezbollah fighters.[68]

**The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Tyre, southern Lebanon on November 17.[69]** The IDF said that many of the assets attacked belong to the Aziz unit, which is responsible for firing rockets from southwestern Lebanon into Israeli territory and other attacks.[70] The IDF said it took steps to reduce civilian harm, including calling on Lebanese civilians to evacuate the area.[71]

**The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) said that two LAF soldiers were killed in an Israeli airstrike on an LAF position in al Mari-Hasbaya, east of Khiam, on November 17.[72]** The LAF announced the soldier's deaths on X (Twitter) and said that Israel targeted an LAF position, injuring at least two others.[73] Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati said that 36 LAF soldiers have been killed by Israeli airstrikes since the beginning of the IDF air campaign.[74]

# Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon

As of November 17, 2024 at 2:00 PM ET




*This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 16 to 2:00pm ET on November 17. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.*

**Iranian-backed actors, including Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 16.[75]** Hezbollah launched rockets targeting IDF personnel along the Lebanon-Israel border.[76] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting IDF troops and infrastructure in northern Israel in two separate attacks on November 17.[77] The IDF identified one barrage of at least fifteen rockets launched from Lebanon on November 17.[78] The IDF stated some rockets were intercepted and some fell in open areas. Hezbollah rockets slightly injured one Israeli in the upper Galilee region on November 17.[79]

**Hezbollah published a graphic depicting a circle of fire around Haifa, Israel, with the caption “vortex of Hell” in Hebrew and Arabic on November 17.[80]** This is likely part of a



Hezbollah media campaign to message that it still maintains the capability to seriously threaten Israeli strike targets as Israeli ground operations threaten Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles. Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel.[81] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and attacks have decreased by half in the past week.[82] Hezbollah launched only one attack targeting the Haifa area on November 17.[83]



**Iran and the Axis of Resistance**

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified “military target” in northern Israel since CTP-

**ISW's last data cutoff on November 16.[84]** The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam, which claims to be affiliated with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, separately claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat, Israel, on November 17.[85] The IDF intercepted a drone that crossed into Israeli territory "from the east" on November 17.[86] The drone triggered sirens in towns southeast of Tel Aviv.[87] Footage posted to X (Twitter) showed a cloud of smoke over an antenna farm near Rehovot, central Israel, apparently following the drone interception.[88]

**The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in Tel Aviv, Israel, for the first time on November 17.[89]** This marks this group's sixth attack on Israel and its first attack on Tel Aviv since it began claiming attacks on October 25.[90]

**Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani in Iran on November 17.[91]** Amani sustained injuries during the September 17 Israeli attack targeting pagers used by Hezbollah members.[92] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry previously announced that Amani will return to his post in Lebanon after recovering from his injuries. The ministry expects him to recover in the near future.

**Iranian hardline Parliamentarians are increasingly calling for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to establish Iranian deterrence with Israel.** Hardline Parliamentarian Behnam Saeedi and Parliament's National Security Commission member stated in an interview with Iranian media that any possible change to Iran's defense doctrine will "revise and strengthen" Iranian defense abilities.[93] Saeedi stated that the development of Iranian defense capabilities, including missile, air, and sea capabilities, is "necessary" to establish tools of deterrence.[94] Hardline Parliamentarian representing Tehran Province Mahmoud Nabavian stated that Iran must "equip itself with all the weapons" its adversaries, including Israel and the United States, possess.[95] This is likely an implicit reference to nuclear weapons. These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks will similarly fail to restore deterrence. These statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[96]

**Iranian officials continue to meet with Syrian leaders to discuss Iranian-Syrian cooperation. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Syrian officials in Damascus on November 17 at the invitation of the Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas.[97]** Nasir Zadeh and Abbas discussed regional developments and the Axis of Resistance.[98] Nasir Zadeh discussed expanding Iranian-Syrian cooperation on regional "counterterrorism" efforts with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[99] Nasir Zadeh separately met with Syrian Arab Army Chief of Staff Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim and attended a reception at the Syrian Defense Ministry.[100]

Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi launched an unspecified number of drones at “military and vital targets” in the Tel Aviv area and Ashkelon in Israel on November 17.<sup>[101]</sup> The IDF said that they were unaware of any drones launched from Yemen on November 17.<sup>[102]</sup> Sarea separately claimed responsibility for a ballistic missile attack on Eilat. CTP-ISW reported on this attack on November 16.<sup>[103]</sup>

## Yemen map



*The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP)*



at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262828110520543>; <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-beirut-kills-hezbollah-media-relations-chief-security-sources-say-2024-11-17/>

[2] <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-beirut-kills-hezbollah-media-relations-chief-security-sources-say-2024-11-17/>;  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/17/israel-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/#link-EA3FFFBXLBHI7LKQTPV5VRRQWE>

[3] <https://t.me/mmirleb/9190>

[4] <https://t.me/damascusv011/25041>

[5] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/17/israel-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/#link-EA3FFFBXLBHI7LKQTPV5VRRQWE>

[6] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16583>; <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262835769581610>

[7] <https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1435857/who-was-mohammad-afif-nabulsi.html>;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/iran-update-november-11-2024>

[8] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262835769581610>;  
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262842912440481>

[9] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262839439356289>

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[11] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16565>; [https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog\\_entry/idf-said-to-remove-roadblocks-near-northern-border-ahead-of-possible-return-of-displaced-residents/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-said-to-remove-roadblocks-near-northern-border-ahead-of-possible-return-of-displaced-residents/)

- [12] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16565>
- [13] See author for data.
- [14] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16565>
- [15] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16565>
- [16] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-10-2024>
- [17] [UNIFIL statement \(17 November 2024\) | UNIFIL](#)
- [18] <https://t.me/moriahdoron/16575>
- [19] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024> ;  
[https://x.com/Doron\\_Kadosh/status/1857060779947672005](https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1857060779947672005)
- [20] [https://x.com/kann\\_news/status/1858210305811054897](https://x.com/kann_news/status/1858210305811054897)
- [21] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024>
- [22] <https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1855000587437228038> ; <https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/822251/>
- [23] <https://t.me/hamza20300/311444>
- [24] <https://t.me/sarayaps/18814> ; <https://t.me/sarayaps/18816> ; [https://t.me/elaqsa\\_1965/7888](https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7888)
- [25] <https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/ANC171120242983475>
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- [31] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858211613624389700>
- [32] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858211617273508223>
- [33] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858211626547077531>
- [34] <https://t.me/hamza20300/311350>
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