



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 16, 2024, 5:20pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on June 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The vast majority of the countries and international organizations that participated in the Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 signed a joint communique on June 16 reaffirming support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[1] The communique also reaffirmed support for Ukrainian operation and control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to ensure the safety of nuclear energy and installations, "free full, and safe" commercial navigation in the Black Sea to ensure global food security, the exchange of all prisoners of war (POWs), and the return of all "deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children" and other unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians. Over 80 countries and international organizations signed the communique, although Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa, Armenia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Brazil (which attended the summit as an "observer") were among the countries that did not endorse the communique.[2] The Ukrainian President's Office emphasized that the purpose of the summit was to facilitate "fair peace ... based on the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law," highlighting Ukraine's effort to garner support from the international community in ending the war on terms that do not violate international law by compromising Ukraine's territory integrity or sovereignty.[3] Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated on June 16 at the summit that "Russia should not be at the [negotiating] table now" and that there will only be peace in Ukraine "when Russia agrees to international principles and the UN Charter." ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in good-faith negotiations and only feigns interest in negotiations in specific instances as part of a wider informational effort to seduce the West to preemptively make concessions that would violate Ukraine's sovereignty.[4] Putin is unlikely to be interested in good faith negotiations for the foreseeable future given that he recently outlined a theory of Russian victory in Ukraine based on the assumption that Russian forces are capable of indefinite creeping advances on the battlefield to outlast Western support for Ukraine.[5]

A limited prison break and hostage situation at a Russian pretrial detention center in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, prompted Russian ultranationalist complaints highlighting Russia's failure to crack down against domestic Islamic extremism following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. Russian state media reported on June 16 that around six prisoners at Pretrial Detention Center No. 1 in Rostov-on-Don broke out of their cells and took two employees of the pretrial detention center hostage in the central courtyard.[6] Rosgvardia and Russian Federal Penitentiary Service forces later stormed the pretrial detention center and reportedly killed the detainees, freeing the hostages.[7] Russian state media claimed that the prisoners had links to the Islamic State (IS) or had been convicted of terrorism-related charges prior to the June 16 incident.[8] ISW is unable to verify the identities or affiliations of these prisoners or the extent of IS involvement in the prison break at the time of this publication.

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers largely fixated on the hostage situation in Rostov-on-Don to complain about the perceived prevalence of Islamic extremism in Russia and the Russian penal system. Russian milbloggers largely circulated the alleged identities, affiliations, and charges of each of the prisoners, as well as footage showing the prisoners with an IS flag, IS paraphernalia, and knives at the pretrial detention center.[9] The milbloggers complained that Russian authorities failed to crack down against extremist groups and used racist and xenophobic rhetoric to emphasize this point; the milbloggers complained that the pretrial detention center allowed the prisoners to have well-kept facial hair in accordance with their religious beliefs and that the prisoners had planned this attack on a Muslim holy day to coincide with the Eid al-Adha holiday on June 16.[10] The milbloggers also complained that the Russian penal system has failed to maintain security given that the prisoners managed to obtain an IS flag, weapons, and communication devices and break from their cells, and that some of the prisoners had been convicted of terrorism but had yet not been transported to penal colonies because their sentences had not yet begun.[11] Some milbloggers complained more widely that the Russian penal system has fallen apart, blaming reforms under then-President Dmitry Medvedev in the mid-2000s and Russia's failure to adequately compensate Federal Penitentiary Service employees for creating the situation.[12]

The Kremlin has attempted to posture that it has been cracking down against domestic extremism since the Crocus City Hall attack, but the June 16 attack and subsequent discussions undermine this Kremlin effort.[13] Russian opposition outlet *Baza* claimed that the prisoners had planned this attack for several months and that actors with alleged IS ties smuggled the weapons, IS flag, and communication devices to the prisoners inside the pretrial detention center.[14] Opposition outlet *Verstka* reported that the Rostov Oblast prosecutor's office has conducted monthly inspections of the detention conditions of Pretrial Detention Center No. 1 after reports that the center was overcrowded, while the Rostov Oblast Public Monitoring Group conducted three inspections in October 2022, February 2023, and November 2023 and did not find any violations.[15] Some Russian officials seem content to minimize this situation in the near-term; Rostov residents criticized Rostov Oblast Head Vasily Golubev for not responding to the hostage situation until two hours after the situation concluded, and Russian opposition outlet *Meduza* reported that Golubev's social media accounts deleted comments on his page before turning off the ability to comment altogether.[16] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin demanded a report on the initial investigation into the hostage situation on June 16.[17] The Kremlin will likely use the June 16 incident to continue posturing the need for domestic crackdowns against all definitions of extremism beyond the domestic terror threat to Russia while masking or deflecting its actual security failures to prevent the March 22 and June 16 attacks.

The Kremlin and Kremlin affiliates continue efforts to use Russia's relationship with Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) to destabilize the Balkans. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at the opening of the Russian embassy in Banja Luka on June 11 that ties between Russia and Republika Srpska are at an all-time high.[18] Lavrov claimed that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will prioritize the construction of religious and cultural institutions in Banja Luka that are critical for the strengthening of the "ties of brotherhood" between the people of Russia and Republika Srpska. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on June 16 in an interview with a Republika Srpska TV channel that Russia will support Republika Srpska's independence and that the opening of the Russian embassy in Banja Luka demonstrates the friendship and cooperation between Russia and Republika Srpska.[19] The milblogger claimed that Russia may open a Russian cultural center (Russia house – *Ruskii dom*) in Republika Srpska. Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use *Ruskii dom* to promote Russian propaganda and conduct "subversive work" abroad.[20] The same milblogger's channel claimed in April 2024 that it opened a "media school" in the Balkans and that the channel's team spent a week in Serbia and Republika Srpska giving lectures on how to operate Telegram channels and fight "misinformation." [21] Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik stated on June 7 that Republika Srpska intended to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina on an unspecified date.[22] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[23]


The *Financial Times* (FT) reported on June 16 that Russia overtook the United States as Europe's main gas supplier in May 2024, highlighting Europe's continued reliance on Russian energy.[24] *FT* reported that the US became Europe's largest gas supplier following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but that in May 2024 Russian gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Europe rose to 15 percent of total supply, while the United States provided 14 percent. *FT* did note, however, that the shift in gas and LNG imports in May was partially a result of "one-time factors," such as an outage at an American LNG export factory and a planned increase in Russian gas exports to compensate for shortcomings due to maintenance on a line sometime in June. *FT* concluded that Russia is unlikely to maintain the upper hand in the coming months, as it will be able to increase shipments of LNG to Asia via the Northern Sea Route, reducing exports to Europe, while US LNG production has stabilized after the recent one-time outage. *FT* previously reported on June 5 that Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom commissioned a report that found that Gazprom is unlikely to recover the vast majority of gas sales to Europe that it lost since 2022, highlighting that Gazprom's business with Europe has significantly decreased overall, notwithstanding this short-term decrease in US gas exports to Europe in May 2024.[25] Russia remains reliant on oil and gas revenues to support its wartime economy and increased its energy exports to China significantly over the course of 2023, likely in part to offset impacts from the loss of the European market in 2022.[26]

Key Takeaways:

- **The vast majority of the countries and international organizations that participated in the Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 signed a joint communique on June 16 reaffirming support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.**

- **A limited prison break and hostage situation at a Russian pretrial detention center in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, prompted Russian ultranationalist complaints highlighting Russia's failure to crack down against domestic Islamic extremism following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.**
- **The Kremlin and Kremlin affiliates continue efforts to use Russia's relationship with Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) to destabilize the Balkans.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Donetsk City.**
- **The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce Russian conscripts into signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), Vovchansk, and Tykhe (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on June 15 and 16.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hlyboke and within Vovchansk.[28] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Yuriy Povkh stated that elements of the Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are unsuccessfully attacking in the Kharkiv direction and that the Russian military command is trying to withdraw degraded elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA, LMD) and 83rd Separate Guards Airborne (VDV) Brigade that have become combat-ineffective due to high losses.[29] A Russian source claimed that elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade were recently deployed from Russia's Belgorod Oblast to Kharkiv Oblast.[30] Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) and the "Aida" Group (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk, and elements of the 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Hlyboke.[31]

Geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces advanced in part of the Aggregate Plant within Vovchansk on an unspecified date as Ukrainian and Russian sources continued to offer conflicting reports about the status of the Aggregate Plant on June 16. Geolocated footage of Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in the Aggregate Plant published on June 15 indicates that Russian forces held positions in the northwestern part of the Aggregate Plant as of an unspecified date.[32] It is unclear if Russian forces maintain these positions as of the time of the writing of this publication. A Ukrainian source stated on June 16 that Russian forces entered the plant around the start of fighting within Vovchansk around May 13 and that Russian forces controlled the approaches to the Aggregate Plant from the north since May 20.[33] The Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces established fire control of the approaches by at least June 1 but that Russian forces were able to reinforce the Russian grouping within the plant between June 6 and 14 in a limited capacity. The Ukrainian source noted that information about the situation around the plant is delayed. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that around 200 Russian soldiers, including dead and wounded, are currently isolated


in the Aggregate Plant after Russian forces tried to cross the Vovcha River east of the plant on an unspecified date and entered the plant after coming under Ukrainian fire.[34] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control "most" of the Aggregate Plant.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed in a since-deleted Telegram post that Russian forces did not control the plant, however.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Geolocated footage posted on June 15 indicates that Russian forces advanced to the northwestern part of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on an unspecified date.

Radius of 25 kilometers around Kharkiv (geodesic distance measurement)



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 12 that Russian forces advanced 100 meters in the Vovchansk direction and 100 meters in the Lyptsi direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 16 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced about two kilometers deep to the eastern outskirts of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[37] A Ukrainian brigade reported that Ukrainian forces advanced one kilometer in depth along a two-kilometer-wide front in the Serebryanske forest area (southwest of Kreminna).[38] Fighting continued east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Berestove; west of Svatove near Andriivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Druzhelyubivka, Hrektivka, and Nevske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on June 15 and 16.[39] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Berestove.[40]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Note: A Russian source claimed on June 16 that Russian forces advanced two kilometers and reached the eastern outskirts of Pishchane.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces increased the intensity of assaults in the Siversk direction on June 16 and unsuccessfully attacked east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 15 and 16.[41]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the forest area southwest of Bohdanivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian activity in this forest area.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting heavy strikes, including with thermobaric artillery systems, on buildings in western Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) to prepare for future assaults.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian assaults north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhovika; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 15 and 16.[44] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly continuing to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on June 16 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Novoselivka Persha and near Sokil (both northwest of Avdiivka) and on the northern and southern banks of the Karlivske Reservoir (southwest of Avdiivka).[46] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 650 meters in depth along Naberezhna Street in Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka); 500 meters in depth along a windbreak south of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka); and 1.1 kilometers deep along a 1.64-kilometer-wide front in the Netaylove-Yasnobrodivka direction (southwest to west of Avdiivka).[47] ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of any of these Russian claims, however.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian assaults north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novoselivka Persha, Ocheretyne, Vozdvyzhenka; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 15 and 16.[48]




Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 16. Geolocated footage posted on June 16 shows that Russian forces advanced to a high-rise building north of Sumy Street in central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[49] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Krasnohorivka (southwest of Donetsk City) posted footage on June 15 showing Ukrainian forces using FPV drones to repel a Russian assault comprised of two tanks in the

Krasnhorivka area on an unspecified date.[50] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, Pobieda, Kostyantynivka, and Novomykhailivka on June 15 and 16.[51] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting strikes against Maksymilianivka (west of Donetsk City) in preparation for ground attacks.[52] Elements of the Russian "Grachi" Spetsnaz Detachment and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[53]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 15 and 16.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched up to 54 unguided glide bombs at Staromayorske in the early afternoon of June 16, likely in preparation for later ground attacks near the settlement.[55] Heavy glide bomb strikes indicate that Russian forces may intensify offensive operations on this sector of the front in the coming days.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 16 that Russian forces seized Zahirne (southwest of Hulyaipole), sparking debate and some criticism from Russian milbloggers who noted that Russian forces have controlled Zahirne for some time.[56] One milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD announcement was a matter of tactical nuance and that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn

from Zahirne in 2023. However, the terrain features in the area prevented Russian forces from establishing a reliable foothold in the settlement until more recently.[57] Another milblogger used the debate to criticize the Russian MoD and new Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov for inventing success stories from the frontline in order to cover up for the lack of meaningful frontline victories.[58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 15 and 16.[59] A Russian milblogger amplified a claim from a Russian soldier reportedly fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast that some unspecified Russian units in this direction struggle with language barriers and poor training of soldiers who do not speak Russian.[60] The soldier claimed that a group of non-Russian speaking soldiers in his unit once rushed to a downed Ukrainian drone with a delayed detonation, but other Russian soldiers could not warn them to stay away due to the language barrier, causing the group serious injuries when the Ukrainian drone detonated in their hands.[61]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on June 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 16, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

The Crimean service of Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported on June 16 that Russian forces have been restoring defunct airfields in occupied Crimea, including the Kirovske, Baherove, and Zavodske airfields.[63] *Suspilne* reported that Russian forces began to move their combat aircraft between airfields after Ukrainian strikes in recent months targeted aircraft and air defense systems at other airfields in occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan movement Atesh reported on June 4 that Russian forces have already begun using Zavodske Airfield near occupied

Simferopol.[64] Ukrainian military experts told *Suspilne* that Russia does not want to completely withdraw aviation and air defense assets from occupied Crimea but that some airfields, such as Baherove, do not have the infrastructure necessary to accept all modern military aircraft.[65]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

The Ukrainian General Staff noted on June 16 that Russian forces have launched 1,050 guided glide bombs at Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure since the start of June (roughly 65 glide bombs per day).[66]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce Russian conscripts into signing military service contracts with the Russian MoD, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* reported on June 16 that the Russian command sent at least four conscripts from a military unit in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia-Alania Republic, to the Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia where the Russian military deceived the conscripts into signing military service contracts after undergoing medical examinations.[67] A representative from "Go Through the Forest," a Russian organization that helps Russian citizens avoid mobilization, told *Vazhnye Istorii* that the conscripts assumed that they had signed a documents about their medical examinations since neither the documents nor Russian military officials had mentioned the word "contract," but Russian military officials later informed the conscripts that the documents were Russian military service contracts. *Vazhnye Istorii* reported that the Russian military command rejected the conscripts' efforts to revoke their military contracts. Russian officials have assured the Russian public that Russian military conscripts will not deploy to most of occupied Ukraine or participate in combat operations in Ukraine, although the Russian military will likely continue attempts to coerce and deceive conscripts into signing contracts with the Russian military as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.[68]

Relatives of Russian mobilized personnel continue to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin about the poor treatment of their relatives within the Russian military. Russian opposition news outlet *Mobilization News* published a video appeal from relatives of mobilized personnel from the Bashkortostan Republic on June 14. The relatives claimed that the mobilized personnel underwent only two days of training before deploying to assault groups.[69] The relatives also claimed that the Russian commanders kept the mobilized personnel in basements under armed guard and prevented them from contacting family members or taking leave. The relatives asked Putin to investigate the treatment of their mobilized relatives.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Former pro-Russian Ukrainian member of parliament Viktor Medvedchuk reiterated multiple known Kremlin information operations and threateningly called on Ukraine to accept Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 14 "peace proposal" in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 16.[70] Medvedchuk claimed that Putin's "peace proposal" is the "last chance to preserve the Ukrainian state" and implied that Russian forces should seize Odesa City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine refuses Putin's proposal. Medvedchuk also reiterated boilerplate Kremlin false narratives alleging that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and that the West controls Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

[1] <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2024/06/16/joint-communique-on-a-peace-framework-summit-on-peace-in-ukraine/> ; <https://meduza.io/feature/2024/06/16/uchastniki-sammita-v-shveytsarii-no-ne-vse-podpisali-kommyunike-s-prizyvom-k-dialogu-mezhdu-vsemi-storonami-konflikta-zelenskiy-anonsiroval-sleduyuschuyu-konferentsiyu-cherez-mesyatsy-a-ne-gody>

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