



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia's illegal war of conquest in Ukraine. Ukraine's partners undertook several important steps in mid-June to cohere a common strategy and define the desired strategic outcome of the war. Over 80 Western and international officials recently established a principled position on supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of lasting peace in Ukraine in a communique adopted during the Ukraine-led Global Peace Summit on June 16.[1] Ukraine also signed security agreements with the United States and Japan for 10 years on June 13, and numerous partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and the Ramstein formats.[2] US President Joe Biden stated that the United States will continue supporting Ukraine so that Ukraine "has victory and that Russia does not prevail" when discussing the US-Ukraine security agreement.[3] Putin's strategy for winning the war relies on the Kremlin's ability to mislead the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine's international allies into ceasing support for Ukraine and abandoning key principles of international law – respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity.[4] Allied strategic clarity and commitment to enabling Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine greatly undermines Putin's center of gravity – and his ability to shape the will and decisions of allied decision makers.

Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine. Putin stated in a press conference on June 20 following his trip to North Korea and Vietnam that Russia is considering making changes to its nuclear doctrine,

claiming that Russia is aware that an unnamed “potential adversary” is working on new elements “related to lowering the threshold nuclear weapon use.”[5] Putin’s statement was likely partly in response to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s June 17 remarks that NATO members are discussing increased nuclear readiness in the face of growing threats from Russia and China, even though Stoltenberg did not discuss lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon use.[6] The Russian nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of “exceptional cases” of threats to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Putin notably defined Russia’s possible strategic defeat in Ukraine as the “end of [Russia’s] statehood” following his mention of lowering thresholds for nuclear weapon usage.[7] Putin added that a defeat on the battlefield would signify the end of the “thousand-year history” of the Russian state and that Russia is better off fighting until the end. Putin’s rhetoric deliberately aims to present Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as an existential war for Russia’s sovereignty, and Putin likely invoked the possibility of lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon use to imply that he reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if his forces are decisively defeated on the frontlines in order to deter Ukraine’s allies from reaching a common strategic objective of decisively defeating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — an outcome which is in the West’s interests.[8]

Putin’s nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine’s allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation. A Russian strategic defeat in Ukraine does not threaten Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (but it can threaten the stability of Putin’s regime). The Kremlin did not engage in nuclear escalation following Russia’s devastating defeats around Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Kherson oblasts in 2022, and these defeats certainly did not threaten Russian sovereignty or territorial integrity. Putin’s own nuclear threats have been riddled with contradictions since 2022. Putin claimed that Ukraine was not aggressive towards Russia but was threatening the occupied “Donbas republics” before Putin illegally annexed them.[9] Putin also noted in his discussion of the potential changes to the Russian nuclear doctrine that Russia does not need the ability to launch a preventative nuclear strike. Both of these statements are incompatible with the notion that Russia is fighting an existential war. Putin indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian “red line” that would result in Russian nuclear escalation after Ukrainian forces struck Belgorod Oblast with HIMARS armed with GMLRS.[10] ISW has also routinely assessed that the threat of a nuclear escalation will continue to be the core asset of Russia’s ability to manipulate the perceptions of foreign decision makers via its reflexive control campaign.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West — and will likely lose — if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.[12]

South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it would reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine. South Korea’s *Yonhap News Agency* reported that South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated that South Korea will reconsider its stance on sending aid to Ukraine following the Russian-North Korean agreement and that South Korea is “grave[ly] concerned” and condemns the agreement.[13] South Korea has notably had a long-standing policy that prevents it from directly transferring arms into active conflict zones—a policy that has forced South Korea to send artillery shells to Ukraine via indirect transfers using third party intermediary states.[14] Chang also noted that any Russian military-technical cooperation with North Korea violates a series of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and will result in unspecified corresponding retaliatory measures from South Korea. Chang stated that South Korea will

also sanction four ships, five organizations, and eight individuals involved in the transfer of weapons and oil between Russia and North Korea in response to the agreement. North Korean state outlet *Korean Central News Agency* published the full text of the agreement on June 20, which includes provisions for "immediate military and other assistance... in the event of an armed attack by any state of several states" and "joint activities to strengthen [each country's] defense capabilities... to prevent war." [15] Several Russian and South Korean sources noted that the agreement is almost identical to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance that the Soviet Union and North Korea signed in 1961. [16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam. Putin reiterated several times during the press conference that the Russian-North Korean agreement mirrors the language of a previous security agreement that both countries signed in 1961 and that the agreement is only a "reproduction" of the terms of the 1961 agreement. [17] Putin stated that South Korea has "nothing to worry about" regarding the new agreement as long as South Korea does not perpetrate acts of aggression against North Korea. Putin threatened, however, that it would be a "very big mistake" for South Korea to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine and that Russia would take unspecified actions in response to such a policy. Putin claimed that the new agreement's clause on providing mutual security assistance does not apply to the war in Ukraine because Ukraine committed acts of aggression towards the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR/LNR) before Russia illegally annexed the territories and that Russia hopes that this agreement will be a "restraining factor" that prevents the situation on the Korean peninsula from intensifying. Putin also claimed that Russia has not asked anyone to "use [their] capabilities" in Ukraine and no one has offered to help Russia in this way, insinuating that there is no threat of third parties getting militarily involved in Ukraine. Putin may have tempered his rhetoric about Russia's June 19 agreement with North Korea in order to quell South Korean concern about the agreement and lull South Korea into reassurance and away from reconsidering its policy on aiding Ukraine. ISW has previously observed that Russia at times seems to be trying to mend its relationship with South Korea to mitigate the impacts of a growing relationship with North Korea, and Putin may have followed up his visit to North Korea with such statements in an effort to appease Seoul. [18]

Putin also used the press conference to reiterate a series of known information operations feigning Russia's interest in good faith negotiations with Ukraine, including by characterizing Russia's offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast as solely defensive. Putin claimed that he expected the West to reject his June 14 demands for Ukraine's capitulation as a prerequisite for his envisioned peace negotiations and suggested that Russia has previously unsuccessfully presented these demands during "behind-the-scenes negotiations." [19] Putin claimed that "sensible politicians" will realize that Putin's demands for Ukraine to "completely withdraw" its forces from the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and officially abandon its intention to join NATO are "realistic" and acceptable conditions for peace. Putin's terms for Ukraine's capitulation violate the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and other cornerstones of international law. Putin stated that any peace negotiations predicated on Russia withdrawing its forces from occupied Ukraine will "never happen." Russian officials made similar claims about how Kherson City would "forever" remain in Russian occupation before Russian forces abandoned Kherson City in November 2022. [20] Putin reiterated his claims that Russia remains open to peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, placing the onus on Ukraine and the West for the lack of progress toward peace negotiations despite the fact that Russian officials, including Putin, continue to publicly signal that they are unwilling to participate in good faith

peace negotiations with Ukraine.[21] Putin also reiterated claims that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction to defend Belgorod Oblast from Ukrainian shelling and that Russian forces have "no goals of approaching Kharkiv [City]."

Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam's Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries.[22] ISW noted on June 19 that Putin appears to be pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union that could form the basis of an alternative to the West and the current world order.[23]

Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited. Russian sources widely amplified footage of the first-ever FAB-3000 M-54 strike against a reported Ukrainian deployment point in Lyptsi, Kharkiv Oblast, on June 20, noting that the bomb caused substantial destruction even though it landed 10 meters away from its intended target.[24] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu first announced the serial production of FAB-3000 M-54s, dumb-bomb variants weighing over 3,000 kilograms that can be converted into guided glide bombs with the addition of the UMPC modification, during a visit to Nizhny Novgorod Oblast in March 2024.[25] Russian sources previously praised the production of FAB-3000s but noted that their weight and general dimensions would make them very difficult for most Russian tactical aircraft to deliver.[26] The fact that Russian forces have figured out how to launch FAB-3000s is a significant development and will increase the destructive potential of Russia's ongoing glide bomb attacks against Ukrainian forces and infrastructure. Russian forces have already increased guided and unguided glide bomb use against Ukraine, particularly in Kharkiv Oblast, to devastating effect, and should Russian forces be able to launch massive barrages of FAB-3000s (or even heavier guided glide bombs) they will be able to cause even more widespread damage to Ukrainian frontline positions and critical infrastructure.[27] Russian milbloggers noted that the June 20 strike was not particularly accurate, but the destruction radius of the FAB-3000 will compensate for its lack of accuracy, especially if Russian forces are able to use them at scale uncontested as the Russian Air Forces has with 500-kilogram glide bombs.[28]

The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 20 that the US is going to "reprioritize" the export of Patriot missiles so that the missiles "rolling off the production line" will go straight to Ukraine.[29] Kirby characterized the decision as "difficult but necessary" to ensure that hundreds of Patriot and NASAM munitions produced for the next 16 months would go to Ukraine, regardless of which country ordered them. Kirby stated that Ukraine will receive the first shipments of Patriot missiles by the end of Summer 2024 and that other countries that ordered Patriot missiles will receive them on a "delayed timeline." Kirby stated that other countries impacted by the delay were "broadly supportive" of the decision to prioritize Ukraine's air defense needs.[30] The Romanian Supreme National Defense Council announced on June 20 that Romania will donate one Patriot system to Ukraine due to Russia's large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy and civil infrastructure.[31] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba have

recently emphasized Ukraine's need for more Patriot systems.[32] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.[33]

US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory. *Politico* reported on June 20 that anonymous US government officials reiterated that the United States permits Ukrainian forces to strike Russian forces where Russian forces attack into Ukraine across the international border, likely meaning the international border near Ukraine's Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[34] This report does not signify a change in US policy. The report makes clearer the contours of current US policy: **Ukrainian forces may use HIMARS armed with GMLRS to strike Russian forces preparing to or actively attacking Ukraine, but likely may not strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts.** The *Politico* report acknowledged that Ukrainian and European officials have urged the Biden Administration to further loosen its restrictions and allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia.[35] US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia's operational rear and deep rear, and US policy still forbids Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.[36] The Biden Administration's partial removal of Russian sanctuary is a step in the right direction but is by itself inadequate and unable to disrupt Russian operations at scale. ISW assesses that the West maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia's operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.[37]

The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 20 that he gained access to a 2024 training manual for Russian airborne (VDV) troops, entitled "Combat use of an assault company (group) in an offensive." [38] Mashovets stated that the training manual is meant to integrate battlefield experiences from the war in Ukraine into VDV training doctrine and noted that the tactical solution to contemporary frontline challenges that the manual offers is the creation of dedicated VDV assault detachments, usually at the company level, pulled from units at the brigade-, regiment-, and battalion-level.[39] According to the manual, the assault groups should seize Ukrainian strong points and individual firing points, as well as fortified terrain features, and ideally operate within a larger "assault detachment" or "assault battalion." [40] Mashovets emphasized that Russian high command expects for these company-sized assault groups have a standard service life of two days maximum, as this is the timeframe in which the Russian high command has calculated that the assault group will completely expend its combat capabilities during attritional combat operations.

The concept of dedicated assault companies pulled from existing regiments, brigades, and battalions is not a novelty for Russian forces in Ukraine, and indeed has become the prevalent tactic of attack along most of the frontline for over a year, apart from occasional (mostly unsuccessful) mechanized assaults. ISW first began reporting on the creation of such specialized assault detachments within non-VDV Russian forces in February 2023 and observed the use of such assault-focused detachments in infantry-heavy frontal assaults leading to high levels of attrition throughout the course of 2023.[41] The fact that

VDV forces are now relying on the same frontal assault tactic as ordinary Russian infantry and mechanized forces is notable, and further suggests that the VDV and other formations that were previously considered "elite" within the Russian military prior to 2022 have lost those distinctions due to the way that the Russian command writ large is prosecuting the war.[42] The codification of the assault group into VDV training doctrine further supports ISW's long-standing assessment that the way that Russia is fighting in Ukraine has blurred previously relevant distinctions among various services, largely reducing all frontline troops to understrength and low-quality motorized rifle units.[43] A prominent Russian commentator, who previously served as an instructor for a "Storm-Z" assault unit (which notably used similar tactics to those outlined in the VDV training manual), criticized Russia's reliance on attritional infantry-led frontal assaults on June 20, noting that this practice maintains constant pressure on Ukrainian defenders but does not achieve operationally significant results.[44] The current style of Russian assaults in Ukraine, however, corresponds with Russian President Vladimir Putin's recently articulated theory of Russian victory in Ukraine, which suggests that all Russian forces need to do is gradually achieve creeping advances while keeping tension on Ukraine and its partners in order to win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[45]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister. Belousov visited the military camp of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, residential buildings for military personnel, the Okeansky military sanatorium, and a branch of the Nakhimov Naval School in Vladivostok on June 20.[46] Belousov issued instructions concerning multiple construction projects at these facilities and stated that the rehabilitation of Russian servicemembers and the allotment of housing to Russian servicemembers' families are priorities of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Belousov repeatedly emphasized the need to complete these construction projects before the set deadlines and even threatened the director of a construction company that was touring the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade's military camp with Belousov with criminal liability should the construction company not complete the project on time.[47] Belousov also notably spoke about Russian servicemembers' possible return home from the war in Ukraine for the first time, stating twice on his tour that unspecified Russian soldiers will start to return home and that Russian authorities need to make sure that everything is "worthy" and "ready" for the soldiers.[48] The Russian decree on partial mobilization does not allow for the termination of mobilized Russian servicemembers' contracts before the end of Russia's "special military operation" in Ukraine, however, and it is unclear if Belousov was speaking about the return of soldiers in near or longer term, or purely theoretically.[49] The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly congratulated and awarded the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade over the course of the war in Ukraine, despite the fact that the unit has suffered significant losses and has had to reconstitute multiple times.[50] The Russian MoD may be paying special attention to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade's military and social facilities in Vladivostok in order to appease the soldiers and their families who may be angered by the unit's heavy losses. Belousov's strict orders about the timely fulfillment of military construction projects may also be part of efforts to create the appearance that Belousov is spearheading an anti-corruption campaign in the Russian MoD.[51]

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20. Ukrainian outlet *RBK-Ukraine* reported on June 20 that sources stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes against the Tambovnefteprodukt fuel and lubricants warehouse in Tambov Oblast and the Lukoil-Yugnefteprodukt "Enemaska" oil depot in the Adygea Republic.[52] Geolocated footage shows fires at the oil depot in Platonovka, Tambov Oblast and the oil refinery in Enem, Adygea Republic.[53] Tambov Oblast Head Maskim Egorov acknowledged


that a Ukrainian drone caused an oil tank at the Platonovka oil depot to catch fire.[54] Adygea Republic Head Murat Kumpilov stated that a Ukrainian drone strike started a fire at the Enem oil depot.[55] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that a drone fell on a house in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have been targeting the Slavyansk Eko oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban.[56] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Afipsky oil refinery near Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai.[57] The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that information about a fire at the Afipsky refinery is not reliable.[58] ISW cannot independently verify that the Ukrainian strike on the Afipsky refinery, and the Afipsky and Enem oil refineries are notably fewer than 10 kilometers apart from each other. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed six drones over the Adygea Republic and three drones over Krasnodar Krai but did not mention activity over Tambov Oblast.[59]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia's illegal war of conquest in Ukraine.**
- **Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine.**
- **Putin's nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine's allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation.**
- **South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it will reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.**
- **Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam's Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries.**
- **Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited.**
- **The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine.**
- **US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory.**

- **The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops.**
- **Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.**
- **Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued Russian and Ukrainian attacks north and northeast of the city on June 20. Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook several positions northeast of Vovchansk and advanced along Soborna Street within northern Vovchansk.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted strikes against Ukrainian positions along Hohol and Olesya Dosvitna streets in central Vovchansk and ISW has not observed recent evidence of enduring Russian positions within this area of central Vovchansk, suggesting that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area despite previous Russian claims.[61] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized two buildings on the grounds of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[62] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions roughly 300 meters from the Vovcha River in an unspecified area of Vovchansk.[63] A different Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.55 kilometers towards Tykhe (immediately east of Vovchansk) and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Tykhe, supporting previous Russian reports that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the settlement.[64] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported that Russian attacks have been less intense near Vovchansk since the morning of June 20.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City), including near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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- ⊙ Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Russian Field Fortifications
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced up to 1.55 kilometers deep in the Tykhe direction. A Russian source claimed on June 17 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters in the Vovchansk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 19 and 20 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and Kruhlyakivka; southwest of Svatove near Serhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske, Hrekivka, and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on the evening of June 19 and throughout the day on June 20.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.13 kilometers deep along a 2-kilometer-wide front west of Ploshchanka (north of Kreminna) and up to 300 meters deep within a forested area near Torske, but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of these claims.[68] Elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction, and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction (west of Svatove).[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers wide and 1.13 kilometers deep west of Ploshanka. A Russian source claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer southwest of Rozdolivka. A Russian source claimed on June 16 that Russian forces advanced two kilometers and reached the eastern outskirts of Pishchane.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized attack in the Siversk direction and reportedly made marginal advances elsewhere in the area as of June 20. Ukraine's State Border Guard Service published geolocated footage on June 20 of Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized attack comprised of one tank and two BMP amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[70] A Russian milblogger similarly reported that Russian forces attacked near Vyimka, and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to one kilometer southwest of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk and southwest of Vyimka).[71] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing further northward in Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[72] ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in these areas, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske and near Rozdolivka on June 19 and 20.[73]

Russian forces recently advanced up to the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal north of Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that Russian forces have advanced to the bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal in central Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) in the area where the canal runs underground.[74] If Russian forces are able to properly exploit this advance, they may be able to attack into Chasiv Yar from the north and threaten Ukrainian positions in central Chasiv Yar without having to conduct an opposed crossing of the canalized terrain in order to enter the settlement. Russian forces have not yet been able to cross the canal where it runs above ground in the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar). Russian milbloggers similarly reported Russian gains near the canal in Kalynivka.[75] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on June 20 that Russian forces have resumed infantry-heavy frontal assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction after having recently suffered high losses during unsuccessful mechanized assaults.[76] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in the Kanal and Novyi microraions (easternmost Chasiv Yar); northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 19 and 20.[77] Elements of the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly fighting near Chasiv Yar.[78]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and west of Horlivka) on June 19 and 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers deep on the eastern outskirts of Pivnichne (east of Toretsk), and some milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Niu-York (south of Toretsk).[79] The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces continued offensive operations on this part of the front east of Pivnichne and near Niu-York and Shumy (southeast of Toretsk) on June 19 and 20.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on June 20 shows that Russian forces made marginal gains on the southern bank of the Samoyilova Gully northeast of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka), which is generally consistent with Russian claims of Russian advances near this gully area north of Sokil.[81] Additional geolocated footage published on June 19 shows that Russian forces advanced on the northern bank of the Karlivske Reservoir (southwest of Avdiivka), and milbloggers similarly reported Russian gains in the reservoir area on June 20.[82] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced on the outskirts of Karlivka and west of Netaylove (both south of the Karlivske Reservoir and southwest of Avdiivka) as well as near


Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[83] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are using fewer armored vehicles in attacks west of Avdiivka than they previously did and are now relying on small light infantry groups using ATVs or motorcycles to simplify their movement along forest belt and windbreak areas.[84] Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Oleksandropil, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Vozdvyzhenka, and Novoselivka Persha; and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 19 and 20.[85]



Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on June 19 indicates that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently marginally advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces on motorcycles advanced in the area.[86] Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Donetsk City within Krasnohorivka and near Heorhiivka and Maksymilyanivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on June 19 and 20.[87] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[88]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Urozhaine and Vremivka (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 20.[89]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian sources claimed on June 19 that Russian forces advanced to Pivnichne.

Geolocated footage posted on June 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sokil.

Geolocated footage posted on June 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Netaylove.

Geolocated footage posted on June 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Solodke.


- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers deep east of Pivnichne. A Russian source claimed on June 20 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer southwest of Rozdolivka.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Mala Tokmachka (northwest of Robotyne) on June 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[90]



Positional engagements continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on June 19 and 20.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian servicemember operating in the Kherson direction stated that Russian forces are having issues due to effective Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).[92] Elements of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Oleshky.[93]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 20, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against mainly Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of June 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian

forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft over the Caspian Sea; three Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-59 cruise missiles from the airspace above the Sea of Azov; and 27 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all four Kh-101/555 missiles, one Kh-59 missile, and all 27 Shahed drones and noted that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that the overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian energy facilities that are critical to the operation of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).[95] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian drones damaged equipment at energy facilities in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that Ukrenergo is increasing restrictions on energy consumption as a result.[96] Ukraine's largest private energy operator DTEK reported that the Russian strikes seriously damaged equipment at an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant and that this is the seventh massive Russian strike on DTEK's thermal power plants in the last three months.[97] DTEK reported that Russian strikes damaged high-voltage power grids in Brovaryi Raion, Kyiv Oblast.[98] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak stated that Russian forces struck the Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol raions.[99] Vinnytsia Oblast Military Administration Head Serhii Borzov stated that debris from a downed Shahed drone damaged critical infrastructure in Vinnystia Oblast.[100]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.[101] One milblogger claimed that he had recently returned from a trip to Belgorod Oblast and occupied Avdiivka and observed that the Russian military command does not offer real incentives for its subordinates to fight and selectively enforces punishments.[102] Another milblogger responded to the post and claimed that interviews with Russian servicemen often reveal their lack of understanding of Russia's objectives.[103] The milblogger claimed that Russian servicemen often offer differing interpretations of Russia's war goals, which include "denazification," victory over NATO, and "liberation" of Donbas. The milblogger noted that some Russian servicemen are fighting without a reason outside of just responding to Ukrainian forces on the battlefield and noted that the Russian MoD needs to raise a new generation of frontline commanders. The first milblogger later added that many Russian frontline servicemen do not get promoted because they do not know how to advocate for themselves and that the Russian military encourages meekness and obedience as opposed to efficacy.[104]

Russian Sevmash shipbuilding enterprise General Director Andrei Puchkov announced on June 20 that the Project 11442M heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser *Admiral Nakhimov* will undergo testing at sea in November 2024 after undergoing modernization procedures at Sevmash.[105] Puchkov added that Sevmash is replacing unspecified outdated military systems and complexes with modern weapons and military equipment which will correspond with the characteristics of the fourth-generation ship. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseev additionally stated on June 19 that Russia is preparing to construct fifth-generation submarines, including strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Fleet-2024 International Naval Show in St. Petersburg reportedly featured the "Orkan," "Vizier," and "BEK-1000" unmanned naval drones for the first time.[106] The "Orkan" is reportedly the most compact drone, the "Vizier" reportedly has a maximum speed of 45 knots and range of up to 270 miles, and the "BEK-1000" can reportedly carry a payload up to one ton.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

The Russian government is continuing to deflect responsibility for well-documented Russian violations of international law regarding Russia's treatment of Ukrainian children via Russian diplomatic platforms. Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova stated at a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conference on June 20 that the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant against her is preventing the processes of reunifying children with their families because the warrant is scaring parents from seeking help.[107] Lvova-Belova added that Western and Ukrainian "fake information" is directly interfering with the process of "reuniting children with families in Ukraine and Russia." Lvova-Belova was directly implicated in the forced deportations of Ukrainian children to Russia by the ICC in March 2023.[108]

The Russian and Belarusian ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) published a report on June 20 accusing the West of imposing the Western-led "rules-based order" to commit human rights violations, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin information operation to undermine and misrepresent international law and undermine Western-led human rights and humanitarian norms.[109] The report claimed that the Western "rules-based order" is in opposition to international law and accused the West of using the premise of human rights violations to "escalate confrontation and put pressure on sovereign states." The Russian government's recently announced intent to suspend Russia's participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), however, is a sufficient indicator that the Kremlin is not interested in actual discussions about safeguarding human rights and is using this narrative to discredit international law and deflect from its own human rights violations.[110]

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) resurrected the narrative about a claimed political power strife between former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as part of ongoing efforts to erode confidence in the Ukrainian government and portray Ukrainian leadership as illegitimate.[111] The SVR claimed on June 20 that

the United States considers Zaluzhnyi to be the “most suitable” candidate to replace Zelensky and that the West is preparing to “write off” Zelensky. The SVR absurdly claimed that the West benefits from Zelensky’s “illegitimacy” because it forces Zelensky to be completely dependent on the West.[112] The SVR’s statements are a continuation of the Russian “Maidan-3” information campaign aimed at portraying the Zelensky government as illegitimate because Ukraine lawfully suspended the May 20 presidential elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and martial law.

The Russian government is continuing to charge Ukrainian military commanders with crimes in absentia as part of its ongoing efforts to enforce Russian federal law outside of Russia's jurisdiction and insinuate that Ukraine should not exist as an independent state. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) placed former Ukrainian Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Mykhailo Zabrodskyi on Russia's wanted list for an unspecified criminal infraction on June 20.[113] The Kremlin's prosecution of Ukrainian military personnel continues to highlight Russia's enduring belief that the Ukrainian state does not and should not exist as a political entity separate from Russia.[114]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 20 that Belarusian MoD Department of International Military Cooperation Head and Deputy Defense Minister for International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko met with Saudi Arabian defense officials in Belarus to discuss bilateral military cooperation.[115]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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