



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 25, 2024, 7pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine. The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber II (the chamber in charge of the ICC's Ukraine-related investigations and prosecutions) announced on June 25 that it had issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for "the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects" in Ukraine.[1] The ICC noted that there is reasonable evidence to believe that both Shoigu and Gerasimov bear individual responsibility for the war crimes of causing incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects and the crime of inhumane acts, both of which are violations of the Rome Statute. The ICC also emphasized that even in the case of Russian forces targeting "installations that may have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time," the incidental civilian harm was excessively weighed against the expected military advantage—contrary to the international legal principle of proportionality.[2] The ICC concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Shoigu's and Gerasimov's military decision-making intentionally inflicted serious bodily harm and suffering on Ukraine's civilian population.

The ECHR's Grand Chamber also ruled on June 25 that Russia has committed various human rights violations in Crimea since the beginning of its illegal occupation of the peninsula in February 2014.[3] The ECHR found that Russian officials and forces in Crimea committed numerous violations of the European Convention of Human Rights, including violations of the right to life, prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment, right to liberty and security, right to no punishment without law, right to respect for private and family life, right to freedom of religion, right to freedom of expression,

right to freedom of assembly, right to property, right to education, and right to freedom of movement, among other human rights violations. The ECHR's ruling emphasized that the evidence that the Ukrainian government has provided to the court amounts to "a pattern or system of violations" perpetrated by Russia in Crimea. The decision is the first in which any international legal body has recognized Russia's widescale and systemic violation of human rights spanning over a decade in occupied Crimea.[4]

Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering "coercive measures," likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil met on June 11 during the BRICS summit and signed the MOU, which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) described as an intent to develop a joint strategy combating "unilateral coercive measures" through informational channels and diplomatic means. Both Venezuela and Russia offered oddly limited details regarding the specifics of the MOU.[5] The Venezuelan MFA announced the MOU on its social media accounts on June 11 but deleted the announcement from its official website, and the Russian MFA reported on the original Lavrov-Gil meeting on June 11 but did not announce the MOU until June 25.[6] The MOU itself is also vague; the Russian MFA's readout of the MOU does not define "unilateral coercive measures." [7] This Russian-Venezuelan MOU and Russian posturing in South America follows a Russian naval port call to and military exercises near Havana, Cuba on June 12-17, after which the Russian navy was rumored to stop in Venezuela.[8] The Kremlin has recently indicated its interest in expanding cooperation with Venezuela, and the Kremlin likely intends for this new MOU to forward Russian narratives about a new multipolar world in a country that does not identify with the Russian World (*Russkiy Mir*) or alternative "Eurasian security architecture" rhetorical lines.[9]

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast on June 25 and recently conducted strikes on Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast with unspecified weapons. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 25 that it struck a field ammunition depot in Olkovatka, Voronezh Oblast, and geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a smoke plume near Olkovatka.[10] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that an unspecified source stated that GUR conducted the strike with two drones and that the drones struck two ammunition warehouses that held over 3,000 shells.[11] *Radio Liberty* published satellite imagery from June 25 showing at least two fires at the Olkhovatka ammunition depot.[12] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that unspecified explosives detonated far from civilian buildings in Olkhovatsky Raion after Ukrainian forces conducted strikes on two unspecified cities.[13]

The Ukrainian National Guard reported on June 25 that Ukrainian forces struck two Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems in the Kharkiv direction on unspecified dates.[14] The Ukrainian National Guard posted photos of the aftermath of the strikes, which were geolocated to near Dubovoe (just south of Belgorod City) and Borisovka (west of Belgorod City).[15] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Pantsir system in Dubovoe on June 22.[16] It is unclear what munitions Ukrainian forces used to strike the Pantsir systems, however. A Ukrainian OSINT Telegram account geolocated the position of the Pantsir system near Dubovoe in January 2024 after footage appeared of the air defense system repelling a Ukrainian missile strike — suggesting that Russian forces have not moved the Pantsir system in the past six months.[17]

Russia imposed countersanctions against 81 European Union (EU)-based news outlets on June 25 following EU sanctions against four Russian state-affiliated news outlets on June 24.[18] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that it had blocked access to EU-based media outlets, including: Germany's *Der Spiegel* and *Die Welt*; Denmark's *Berlingske*; Spain's *El Mundo*, *El Pais*, and EFE; Italy's *La Repubblica*; Poland's *Belsat*; France's *Le Monde*, *Radio France*, and *Agence France-Presse* (AFP); Estonia's EER and *Delfi*; and more general sites including *Politico*'s European service, *Svoboda Satellite Package*, and *EU Observer*.[19] The Russian MFA noted that these sanctions are specifically in response to the EU blocking Kremlin-affiliated news sites *RIA Novosti*, *Rossiskaya Gazeta*, and *Izvestia*, but did not mention the new EU sanctions against the *Voice of Europe* — the joint venture of Kremlin-affiliate Artem Marchevsky and former pro-Russian Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk.[20]

Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov ordered investigations into the personal records of senior Dagestani officials following the June 23 likely Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in Dagestan, indicating that the Kremlin may be intensifying efforts to address Islamist extremist threats in the North Caucasus as it attempts to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy. Melikov stated in a June 25 address to the People's Assembly of Dagestan that he ordered an audit of the personal files of "everyone who holds leadership positions in Dagestan, including deputies of the People's Assembly." [21] Melikov dismissed Dagestan's Sergokalinsky district head Magomed Omarov on June 24 after Russian sources reported that that two of his sons were identified as two of the Makhachkala attackers whom Russian law enforcement killed during the attack.[22] Russian security services reported on June 25 that they detained Omarov and Russian law enforcement reported that Omarov may face charges of aiding terrorists.[23] A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin is "reconsidering its approach" to preventing extremism in the North Caucasus and "raising more questions" about Melikov who has yet to curb the "growing radical sentiment among [Dagestan's] youth" following the June 23 Dagestan terrorist attacks.[24] ISW assessed that the Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity.[25] Russian milbloggers widely criticized local officials who they claimed are aware of rising extremism and also criticized Dagestani youth policy for its alleged endorsement of youth mixed martial arts fight clubs, which they claim breeds extremist ideology.[26] Russian milbloggers' outrage at Dagestani authorities is a tacit admission that they are not interested in amplifying the Kremlin's efforts to link the June 23 Dagestan terrorist attacks to external actors such as Ukraine or the West.

The European Union (EU) officially started accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova on June 25.[27] Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib also noted that the EU Council has approved the draft for a joint EU-Ukraine security agreement in addition to opening accession negotiations.[28]


Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya on June 20 in Vilnius amid deteriorating Armenian-Belarusian relations.[29] Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ani Badalyan published images of the meeting on X (formerly Twitter) on June 20.[30] Tsikhanouskaya's press service reported that she and Mirzoyan discussed cooperation between "Belarus' democratic forces" and Armenia's government, parliament and civil society." [31] Tsikhanouskaya also stated that the people of Armenia and Belarus "deserve a free, democratic, and European future." [32] The Armenian

MFA's decision to publicize Mirzoyan's meeting with Tsikhanouskaya is a public indication of Armenian outrage at Belarusian actions. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan directly accused Belarus of helping Azerbaijan prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War on May 22 after Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated during his May 2024 state visit to Azerbaijan that he and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev conversed before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and concluded that Azerbaijan could be victorious.[33] *Politico* reported on June 13, citing leaked documents, that Belarus provided Azerbaijan with artillery equipment, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones between 2018 and 2022, which Azerbaijan reportedly used in recent conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and against Armenia.[34]

Key Takeaways:

- **Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.**
- **Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering "coercive measures," likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast on June 25 and recently conducted strikes on Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast with unspecified weapons.**
- **Russia imposed countersanctions against 81 European Union (EU)-based news outlets on June 25 following EU sanctions against four Russian state-affiliated news outlets on June 24.**
- **Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov ordered investigations into the personal records of senior Dagestani officials following the June 23 likely Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in Dagestan, indicating that the Kremlin may be intensifying efforts to address Islamist extremist threats in the North Caucasus as it attempts to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy.**
- **Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya on June 20 in Vilnius amid deteriorating Armenian-Belarusian relations**
- **Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Avdiivka.**
- **A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) will begin training unspecified Russian military personnel on October 1, 2024.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 25. Geolocated footage published on June 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along Soborna Street in central Vovchansk.[35] Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on June 25.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted the fifth strike using a FAB-3000 glide bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) against Ukrainian forces in Vovchansk, although ISW cannot independently confirm that Russian forces used a FAB-3000 in the strike.[37]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Povkh stated on June 23 that the Russian military intends to transfer elements of the "9th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 51st Army" to the Kharkiv direction.[38] Povkh stated that Russian forces have transferred Russian units from Kherson Oblast and other unspecified directions to the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn similarly reported on June 25 that Russian forces intend to transfer elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the "9th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 51st Army" to the Kharkiv direction to compensate for heavy Russian losses.[39] ISW recently observed reports that the Russian military transferred elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) from west and southwest of Donetsk City to the Kharkiv direction but has not observed any reporting on the Russian "51st Army." [40] The Ukrainian officials' statements suggest that the Russian military may have subordinated the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the possibly resurrected Second World War-era "51st Army." The Russian military is currently undergoing large-scale reforms, however, including the creation of new combined arms army level formations, and Ukrainian sources' references to a "51st Army" may constitute an early indicator that Russia has formed another combined arms army for deployment to Ukraine.[41]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Andriivka; northwest of Svatove near Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 24 and 25.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced westward to Stelmakhivka and began fighting within the settlement, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[43]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Siversk during a platoon-sized mechanized assault. Geolocated footage published on June 24 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a platoon-sized mechanized assault comprised of four armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) south of Spirne (southeast of Siversk) during which Russian forces marginally advanced.[44] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are fighting and advancing within Rozdolivka (south of Siversk), and ISW observed geolocated confirmation that Russian forces had entered the southeastern part of the settlement as of June 23.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 24 and 25.[46] Elements of the 2nd Separate Air Assault (VDV) Battalion of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) continue operating in and around Rozdolivka.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 25 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported continued fighting north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka and Klishchiivka on June 24 and 25.[48] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue operating in Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar), while elements of the "Sever-V" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka.[49]


Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 25 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Pivnichne after seizing Shumy (both southeast of Toretsk), although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have reached Pivnichne.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Pivnichne and Pivdenne (just south of Pivnichne) on June 24 and launched 11 guided glide bombs at Toretsk on June 25.[51]

Russian forces recently made marginal advances northwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage posted on June 24 shows that Russian forces advanced in a field area just north of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[52] Russian milbloggers amplified geolocated images on June 25 that also confirm that Russian forces hold positions along the O0544 Ocheretyne-Pokrovsk road just northwest of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Yasnobrodivka (west of Avdiivka) and have partially encircled Ukrainian forces in the area.[54] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting north of Avdiivka near Oleksandropil; northwest of Avdiivka near Yevhenivka, Novooleksandrivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Sokil, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and southeast of Avdiivka near Karlivka, Nevelske, and the Karlivske Reservoir.[55]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Donetsk City on June 25, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwards along Tolstoy, Hryhorii Skovoroda, and Lomonosov streets in eastern Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), [56] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov posted footage on June 25 of Ukrainian forces reportedly repelling a Russian mechanized attack in the Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City) direction on an unspecified date and noted that Ukrainian troops destroyed up

to seven units of Russian heavy equipment during the attack.[57] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in Krasnohorivka and near Heorhiivka (both west of Donetsk City) and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostayntynivka and Paraskoviivka on June 24 and 25.[58] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue operating near Krasnohorivka.[59]

Limited positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on June 25.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing west of Staromayorske and moving towards central Urozhaine along Sadova and Stepova streets, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian gains here.[61]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- +— Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 24 that Russian forces advanced 6.03 kilometers wide and 2.08 kilometers deep north of Volodymyrivka. A Russian source claimed on June 23 that Russian forces sized 50 percent of Rozdolivka. A Ukrainian source claimed on June 23 that Russian forces advanced along a 3.5 kilometer wide and 2.3 kilometer deep frontline near Shumy.


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 25, but there were no changes to the frontline.[62]



Fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on June 25, but there were no changes to the frontline.[63]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 25, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleschuk stated on June 25 that Ukrainian air defense forces have shot down nearly 86 percent of all the Shahed drones that Russian

forces have launched at Ukraine since January 1, 2024.[64] Oleschuk noted that of the 2,277 Shaheds that Russia has launched, Ukraine has shot down 1,953, mostly due to the efforts of Ukrainian mobile fire groups.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) will begin training unspecified Russian military personnel on October 1, 2024.[65] DOSAAF has been involved in Russian military recruitment efforts and will likely become more involved in military training.[66] The milblogger also suggested that the Russian brigades and regiments will start forming motorcycle units up to the platoon echelon. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military has already created an experimental motorcycle platoon in the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC] and stated that the platoon uses motorcycles in combat operations, to deliver materiel to the frontline, and to evacuate wounded personnel.

The Russian military continues to advertise Russian military service with promises of large payments and the suspension of debts, loans, and criminal charges. A Russian milblogger posted a Russian military recruitment advertisement advertising a 1.3 million ruble (about \$14,700) one-time payment, a 210,000 ruble (about \$2,400) monthly salary, the suspension of judicial proceedings on debts and loans, and the possibility of expunging a criminal record.[67] Russian Federation Council approved a law on December 23, 2022, that suspends legal proceedings against mobilized servicemen and volunteers who participate in the war, and President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23, 2024, that releases individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.[68]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets provided additional detail on June 25 regarding the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces' use of assault companies, which he initially introduced on June 20 by discussing a VDV training manual he reportedly has analyzed.[69] Mashovets stated that a "classic" VDV assault company usually consists of five assault platoons.[70] Mashovets noted that a classic VDV assault company consists of one assault platoon, one fire support platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, and a drone platoon that utilizes quadcopters and first-person view (FPV) drones.[71] Mashovets stated that each platoon consists of roughly 19 personnel, except for the fire support platoon that is staffed with roughly 29 personnel. Mashovets stated that Russian VDV forces often attack in groups of one or two platoons, but rarely use all five due to difficult combat conditions and high personnel turnover rates due to Russian losses.[72]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec announced on June 25 that it delivered a new batch of Malva 152mm self-propelled guns mounted on wheeled chassis to the Russian armed forces.[73] Rostec claimed that the wheeled chassis are more maneuverable than tracked artillery mounts and are cheaper to maintain. Rostec reported that the Malva self-propelled gun has a capacity of at least 30 rounds and has a "simultaneous fire attack mode" that allows it to fire several shells on different trajectories simultaneously.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia or relocate them deeper into occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on June 24 that St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov presented Russian passports to ten 14-year-old children from occupied Kherson Oblast in St. Petersburg, emphasizing that Russian authorities are forcibly passportizing the Ukrainian children they deport.[74] Russian Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov reportedly claimed that Russian authorities will take about 1,000 children from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to the "Red Carnation" children's camp in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast in Summer 2024.[75] The EU-sanctioned Artek Children's Camp in occupied Crimea is reportedly supervising the modernization of the "Red Carnation" camp.[76] The Kadiivka, Luhansk Oblast occupation municipal administration claimed on June 23 that the "Helping Hand" charity, the Russian Civic Chamber, and Moscow City government organized the deportation of 25 disabled children and their parents from occupied Kadiivka to Moscow under the guise of cultural trips.[77] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) sources claimed on June 24 that Russian authorities took 115 Ukrainian children from occupied Krasnodon to the "Parus" camp in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, and plan to take more than 900 Krasnodon children to Yevpatoria in Summer 2024.[78] Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated on June 24 that Russian authorities are deporting Ukrainian children to Chechnya and the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic under the guise of vacations.[79] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 25 that Russian authorities plan to deport more than 12,000 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia under the guise of vacations in the Summer of 2024.[80] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on June 25 that Ukrainian authorities have returned about 800 of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.[81]

The Kremlin continues efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian economy and industry. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo on June 25 and stated the occupation administration's priorities are to organize gas supply to residential and industrial sectors, restore energy supplies, and construct housing and industry.[82] Saldo claimed that the occupation administration is developing a program with Russian-state owned gas company Gazprom and Chornomornaftogaz, a subsidiary of Ukrainian state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz that Russian authorities seized in 2014, to bring gas pipelines to occupied Kherson Oblast.

Russian authorities continue to force Ukrainian children to undergo patriotic education. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 22 that Russian authorities have forced over 10,000 children in occupied Donetsk Oblast to join the "Young Republic" (*Molodaya Respublika*) organization.[83] The

"Young Republic" is reportedly aimed at the patriotic education of Ukrainian children, and the Ukrainian Resistance Center compared it to the Soviet-era Komsomol.[84]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials continue efforts to blame Ukraine for a war crime that did not occur in order to discredit Ukraine to its partners, disregarding the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s own report on the incident.[85] Senior Russian officials, including Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, all attempted to blame the Ukraine and the United States for an ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, on June 23 that Russian authorities reported injured more than 150 civilians.[86] Nebenzya also stated that he will discuss the Sevastopol strike at the next UN Security Council meeting, likely in a continued pattern of Russian attempts to weaponize international organizations for information operations aimed at villainizing Ukraine.[87] These Russian officials are attempting to frame the ATACMS strike as a deliberate targeting of civilians in occupied Crimea despite the Russian MoD's reporting that Russian air defenses partially intercepted the missile, knocking the missile off its intended flight path and causing the casualties.[88]

The Russian Investigative Committee released on June 25 the "results" of its investigation into the downing of a Russian Il-76 transport plane in January 2024, likely timing this announcement to amplify the information operation discrediting Ukraine and the US.[89] The Investigative Committee claimed that Ukraine shot down an Il-76 allegedly transporting Ukrainian prisoners-of-war with US-provided Patriot air defense missiles. Russia has not provided evidence of the presence of Ukrainian POWs on the Il-76 flight in January, and Ukrainian officials have previously noted that many POWs on the alleged flight log had been exchanged prior to the crash.[90]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian National Assembly members to discuss Union State integration and bilateral cooperation during his visit to Minsk, Belarus on June 25.[91] Lavrov stated that Russia and Belarus have created 28 Union State programs and identified 31 Union State priority areas.[92] Lavrov emphasized the role of international organizations, accusing the United Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of degradation and reporting that the first act during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in July 2024 will be to admit Belarus as a full member.[93]

Lukashenko met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Peking University Community Party Secretary Hai Ping in Minsk on June 25 to discuss educational, biotechnological, chemical, and technological cooperation as well as drone manufacturing with the PRC.[94] Lukashenko stated that Belarus and the PRC intend to establish a center for fundamental research through this partnership.[95]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western

reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[88] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024>; https://t.me/mod_russia/40203;
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