



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros**

**January 19, 2025, 3:30 pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.


**Note:** The data cut-off for this product was 11:00 am ET on January 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.[1] Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since February 2023.[2]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.**
- **Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.**



*We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian*


***violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

**Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

Russian forces recently advanced south of Sudzha amid ongoing activity in the northwestern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Viktorovka (northwest of Sudzha).[4] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Sudzha are regrouping near Staraya and Novaya Sorochina and are attacking near Nikolayeva and Viktorovka.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations near Malaya Loknya and Vikotrovka (both northwest of Sudzha).[6] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Novoivanovka (northwest of Sudzha); elements of the Chechen "Kashtan" Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in Berdin (northeast of Sudzha); and elements of the 83rd and 11th VDV brigades and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in other unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[7]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

#### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 18 and 19 but did not advance.[8] Elements of the Russian 11th Army Corps [AC] (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[9]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced along the Russia-Ukraine international border northeast of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 19. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged recent claims that Russian forces attacked near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk along the Russia-Ukraine international border), indicating that a Russian milblogger's claim that Russian forces advanced north of Topoli (southeast of Stroivka) is accurate.[10] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[11] Russian forces attacked northeast

of Kupyansk along the Russia-Ukraine international border near Stroivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 18 and 19.[12]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces advanced from Vyshneve to Zelenyi Hai (both northeast of Borova), however ISW has not observed evidence of this claim.[13] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, Lozova, and Zeleny Hai; east of Borova near Nadiya, Pershotravneve, and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novoserhiivka on January 18 and 19.[14] Borova Military Administration Head Oleksandr Tertyshny reported on January 19 that Russian forces have conducted fewer strikes on Borova, including with KABs and MLRS systems, over the past one to two months but that ground activity has intensified north and east of the settlement during this time.[15]

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman amid continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 and 19 indicates that Russian forces seized Ivanivka and Terny (both northeast of Lyman) and advanced further west of Ivanivka and south of Terny.[16] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 18 that Ukrainian forces recently successfully counterattacked and advanced in an unspecified area of the Lyman direction.[17] Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Terny, Novosadove, Novolyubivka, and Kolodyazi and towards Zelena Dolyna; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebyranske forest on January 18 and 19.[18] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kolodyazi.[19]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on January 18 and 19 but did not advance.[20]

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[21] Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that

Russian forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraiions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar.[23] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19.[24] Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.[25] Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98<sup>th</sup> VDV Division and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself.[26]




## Assessed Control of Terrain in Chasiv Yar January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in southern Shcherbynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[27] Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northward on the territory of the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and northwestward along Stepana Razina Street in western Toretsk.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces seized half of the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk, advanced near Tsentralna Mine in central Toretsk, and advanced and are clearing Ukrainian forces in Krymske (north of Toretsk).[29] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacking within Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dylivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka.[30]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 19 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces seized Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), although other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a significant portion of the settlement but continue to fight in the northern section of the settlement.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating southwest of Pokrovsk seized Mine No. 2 near Kotlyne and advanced 800 meters and consolidated positions in northern Upsenivka, entered Novoandriivka and are advancing toward Sribne (all southwest of Kotlyne).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized a quarter of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk and Kotlyne), but ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of Russian advances into the settlement.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 19 that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) while another Russian

milblogger asserted that Russian forces seized the town sometime between January 12 and 18.[34] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Vozdvyzhenka as of January 2.[35] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction and are attempting to advance through vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines west of Pokrovsk.[36] Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Baranivka, Tarasivka, and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, Yelyzavetivka, Oleksandropil, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Kotlyne, Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Nadiivka, and Novotroitske; and south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Shevchenko on January 18 and 19.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces hold positions the northern and eastern sections of Uspenivka and noted that Russian forces' rate of advance in Uspenivka mirrors advances near Nadiivka, Novoandriivka, and Sribne, as Russian forces are taking several days to seize small settlements comprised of two to three streets.[38] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian forces with glide bombs near Kotlyne and that fighting is ongoing to the west along the Novoukrainka-Lysivka-Sukhyi Yar line (south and southeast of Pokrovsk) and for the heights near Zelene and Dachenske.[39] Elements of the Russian 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) reportedly continue to operate near Yelyzavetivka and south of Zelene Pole respectively.[40]

Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Sary Terny (northwest of Kurakhove).[41] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka and Petropavlivka and towards Kostyantynopil and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne and Ulakly; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne on January 18 and 19.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dachne and Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[43] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne and drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Ulakly (west of Kurakhove).[44] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove).[45]




## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced farther in eastern Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Velyka Novosilka.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka.[47] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. A Ukrainian source reported on January 18 that Russian forces recently conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault comprised of 13 vehicles from Shakhtarske (northeast of Velyka Novosilka) towards Velyka Novosilka, and recent Russian advances in eastern Velyka Novosilka may be a result of this mechanized assault.[48] Russian forces continued offensive operations in Velyka Novosilka on January 18 and 19.[49] Russian sources claimed on January 19 that Russian forces are attacking and slowly advancing in southern, eastern, and western Velyka Novosilka.[50] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on January 19 that Russian forces




are taking advantage of unfavorable weather conditions in the Novopavilvka direction (north of Velyka Novosilka) to conduct offensive operations and pressure Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka from the north.[51]



### Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on January 18 and 19 but did not advance.[52]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 18 and 19 but did not advance.[53]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction January 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 19 that Russian forces launched 61 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from Bryansk and Oryol oblasts and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[54] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 43 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts, that 15 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that Ukrainian forces were continuing to engage Russian drones as of 0900 local time. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on January 18 that a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile struck Vysoky (just southwest of Kharkiv City) and damaged buildings, houses, and cars in the area.[55]

Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on January 19 that at least 12 Russian Shahed-type drones entered Belarusian airspace during a Russian drone strike on Ukraine on the night of January 18 to 19.[56]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin reported on January 19 that the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) is recruiting specialists and unskilled men and women from across Russia to participate in combat operations in Ukraine.[57] The post follows recent Russian promotional activities highlighting the recruitment of Russian women to various combat units in the Russian Armed Forces.[58]

A Russian milblogger suggested that the Russian government may continue to import new military equipment from Iran following the signing of the Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Russia might sell Iran advanced Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-57 fighter jets and S-300 air defense systems in exchange for advanced Iranian stealth strike and reconnaissance drones, Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, and long-range rotary mounted .50 caliber “Moharram” machine guns.[59] The milblogger postulated that the eventual arrival of Iranian “Moharram” machine guns might help Russian forces counter Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea.

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET



---

[1] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jKEFQYW9FPUSkvqHVzbhN3kbEUxoqfijnpuecYhZRGK7pNxm3pHQ2Q7MNVVRzW5Cl>

[2] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023> ; ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020924> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-5-2024>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02jKEFQYW9FPUSkvqHVzbhN3kbEUxoqfijnpuecYhZRGK7pNxm3pHQ2Q7MNVVRzW5Cl>

[3] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1880821826466775411>; [https://t.me/fpv\\_tacteam/36](https://t.me/fpv_tacteam/36)

[4] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22605>

[5] [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/20207](https://t.me/rusich_army/20207)

[6] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22613> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20644>

[7] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/296756](https://t.me/tass_agency/296756) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84742> ; [https://t.me/Operativ\\_luga\\_channel/105218](https://t.me/Operativ_luga_channel/105218) ; [https://x.com/666\\_mancer/status/1880891906680553608](https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1880891906680553608) ; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/12868](https://t.me/voin_dv/12868) ; [https://t.me/sudoplatov\\_official/3946](https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/3946)

[8] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[9] <https://t.me/opersvodki/24781>

[10] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2025>

[11] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22599>

[12] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0tw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[13] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22599>

[14] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/>

[pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl](https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl); <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[15] <https://www.facebook.com/PosBorova/videos/1670765137123345/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/928491-za-ostanni-misac-dva-bulo-mense-udariv-po-borovij-ale-na-pivnoci-ta-shodi-gromadi-boi-stali-zorstokisimi-tertisnij/>

[16] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8154](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8154); <https://t.me/bigcatsinfo/4035>;  
<https://t.me/assaultregiment33/363>; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8162](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8162);  
[https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8163](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8163);  
<https://t.me/assaultregiment33/373>; <https://t.me/assaultregiment33/372>;  
[https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8159](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8159); <https://t.me/Zabolocini>

[17] <https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA> ; <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/928277-ukrainski-vijska-uspisno-kontratakuvali-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-hortica/>

[18] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[19] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18599>

[20] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[21] <https://x.com/budeshta/status/1880681328045383879>; <https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/335>

[22] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8158](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8158); <https://t.me/kateniata56rubak/201>; <https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1880934738992697776> ;

[23] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61523> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22604> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20645> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151825](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151825)

[24] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[25] [https://suspilne dot media/donbas/915321-armia-rf-bila-pokrovska-boi-za-toreck-casiv-ar-v-rajoni-velikoi-novosilki-kurahovogo-front-na-donbasi-19-sicna/?anchor=live\\_1737233142&utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne dot media/donbas/915321-armia-rf-bila-pokrovska-boi-za-toreck-casiv-ar-v-rajoni-velikoi-novosilki-kurahovogo-front-na-donbasi-19-sicna/?anchor=live_1737233142&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps) ; <https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA>

[26] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22584> ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/92063> ; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/12871](https://t.me/voin_dv/12871) ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22604>

[27] <https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1881031040430698869> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vL6bVkdG7IM>

[28] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1880789374461526081> ;  
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1880940351000842461> ;  
[https://x.com/front\\_ukrainian/status/1880914182503371070](https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1880914182503371070) ; [https://t.me/ombr\\_28/1710](https://t.me/ombr_28/1710)

[29] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20647> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22610> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151831](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151831)

[30] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[31] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22611> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151841](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151841) ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20646> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31486>

[32] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20639>

[33] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20640>

[34] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/48026](https://t.me/mod_russia/48026) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84749>

[35] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2025>

[36] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/19/vorog-namagayetsya-obijty-pokrovsk-iz-zahidnoyistorony-shhob-zahopyty-misto-detali-vid-syl-oborony/>

[37] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84744> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84746> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/18782> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/18785> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61512>

[38] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61524>

[39] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61520>

[40] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20641>

[41] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8164](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8164) ; [https://t.me/MOLOT\\_4\\_46/28](https://t.me/MOLOT_4_46/28)

[42] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/>

pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[43] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61510>

[44] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151790](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151790); <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61517> ;  
[https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151797](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151797)

[45] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/12866](https://t.me/voin_dv/12866); [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/12870](https://t.me/voin_dv/12870)

[46] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8157](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8157); [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/4204](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4204)

[47] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151821](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151821)

[48] <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21109>

[49] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09bPNEBrWWWGcPuCvT46nSty9AKVchYqRVYcs9d58e2uwMmbunrY15PanfrmfAzJPI>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[50] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/296732](https://t.me/tass_agency/296732); <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84740>;  
<https://t.me/wargonzo/24343>

[51] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/4200](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4200)

[52] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidotw5LEzb6noB3uDkKbMUJe24XTJdyPGtXZzu64Rkyr2XEHiYMQCbSKEpECB98QAwMl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidogyhapFmzaBpRNdZkfqtmpU1pyja6k3tkzvTbwkDzDMhGjyE5BiLMTsZVbddv7RsWl>

[54] <https://t.me/kpszsu/27159>

[55] <https://t.me/synegubov/12730>

[56] [https://t.me/Hajun\\_BY/8342](https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8342)

[57] [https://t.me/rogozin\\_do/6662](https://t.me/rogozin_do/6662)

[58] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2024>

[59] <https://t.me/sashakots/51363>



