



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 12, 2024, 7:45pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower in the long run. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted one S-300 air defense battery and two S-400 air defense batteries near occupied Belbek and Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on June 11 to 12.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes destroyed at least two S-300/S-400 Russian air defense radar systems and caused secondary ammunition detonations, and that the Ukrainian military is clarifying battle damage. Geolocated imagery published on June 12 shows damaged and destroyed Russian S-300 assets north of occupied Yevpatoria and a destroyed Russian S-400 radar system south of occupied Dzhankoy, supporting the Ukrainian General Staff's June 10 report about strikes against Russian air defense assets in these areas.[2] Some Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in the June 11 to 12 strike, although ISW is unable to confirm which systems Ukrainian forces used.[3] Founder of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) "Kraken" Regiment Kostyantyn Nemichev confirmed on June 12 that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy four Russian S-300 systems in Belgorod Oblast on an unspecified date, and Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* referred to Nemichev's statements as the first official Ukrainian confirmation of strikes against a Russian S-300 battery in Belgorod Oblast on June 1 or 2.[4] Ukrainian forces' destruction of the Russian air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast reportedly prompted the Russian command to deploy air defense assets from Crimea to Belgorod Oblast in early June 2024, reportedly degrading Russian air defense coverage around Crimea.[5] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov also clarified on June 12 that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8 damaged two Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft instead of just one aircraft as previously reported.[6] S-300/S-400 air defense systems and Su-57 fighters are significant Russian air defense and aviation assets that deny Ukraine the ability to fly aircraft near the front and support Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces may seek to actively degrade Russian air defenses *before* Ukraine receives a significant number of aircraft in order to set conditions for Ukraine's future use of manned fixed-wing airpower closer to frontline areas. Ukrainian forces may be attempting to degrade Russian air defenses ahead of anticipated F-16 fighter jet deliveries to Ukraine, which reportedly will begin in small quantities in summer and fall 2024. Ukrainian forces may be able to eventually work towards a concept of operations that combines fixed-wing airpower to support ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number of fighter jets, Western partners train enough trained pilots, and if Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.

Western officials have indicated that Ukraine will continue to face material and training constraints, which will likely prevent Ukraine from leveraging fixed-wing airpower at scale in 2024. Ukrainian and Western officials have previously indicated that it will take significant time to adequately train enough Ukrainian pilots and equip Ukrainian forces with the roughly at least 150 F-16s necessary to gain the air superiority necessary to support ground operations.[7] Ukrainian officials have also identified their envisioned use of F-16s and other fixed-wing aircraft to constrain Russian aviation operations, and Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash noted that only two F-16 squadrons, roughly 18 aircraft, would be enough to significantly impact the situation in the Ukrainian airspace.[8] These restraints should not fundamentally constrain Ukraine's ability to leverage airpower at scale in the long run, however, should Ukraine's Western partners lean into supporting Ukraine's air domain and deep strike capabilities.

Russian Northern Fleet naval vessels arrived at Havana Harbor, Cuba, on June 12 for their planned five-day-long port call. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the Northern Fleet detachment — including the *Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov* Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, *Kazan* nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the *Academic Pashin* replenishment oiler, and the *Nikolai Chiker* rescue tug — arrived in Havana after the *Kazan* and *Admiral Gorshkov* completed planned high-precision missile exercises.[9] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the *Admiral Gorshkov* will be open for public viewing until June 15, and the port call will end on June 17.[10] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also notably met with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla in Moscow on June 12 against the backdrop of the port call to discuss Russian-Cuban relations and foreign policy alignment.[11] ISW previously assessed that the Russian port call in Havana is likely part of a larger Russian effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis to encourage US self-deterrence.[12] The presence of the nuclear-capable *Kazan* submarine so close to US territorial waters in a port that holds fraught historical memory for the US is likely specifically intended to instill fear in the US and the West in order to force self-deterrence and weaken the West's resistance to Russia. Both US and Cuban officials have emphasized that this port call does not pose a tangible threat to the US.[13]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia "will leave" and "will decide when to leave" the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in a question-and-answer session with the Armenian National Assembly on June 12 amid Armenia's continued efforts to distance itself from security and political relations with Russia.[14] Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan clarified that Pashinyan did not state that Armenia is leaving the CSTO but that Armenia "will decide when [Armenia] will leave the CSTO, and [Armenia] will not go back." [15] Western and Russian media outlets largely portrayed Pashinyan's statement as confirmation that Armenia will leave the CSTO.[16] Pashinyan also reiterated at the

National Assembly's question-and-answer session that the CSTO failed to fulfill its obligations to Armenia and that CSTO member states "are planning" a war against Armenia with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and directly accused Belarus in May 2024 of helping Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.[17] Pashinyan acknowledged in February 2024 that Armenia had "essentially" frozen its participation in the CSTO because the CSTO "failed to fulfill its obligations in the field of security" to Armenia, particularly in 2021 and 2022.[18] Armenia has also appeared to be attempting to reduce its bilateral security relations with Russia, and Pashinyan stated in March 2024 that Russian border guards will leave the Yerevan International Airport by August 1, 2024.[19] Armenia's withdrawal from the CSTO would largely formalize a de facto status quo given that that Armenia has effectively abstained from participation in the CSTO since Pashinyan and Armenian representatives failed to attend several consecutive CSTO events starting mid-to-late 2023.[20] Armenia's formal withdrawal from the CSTO would be a more significant blow to Russia, as Russia has leveraged the CSTO to undermine former Soviet states' sovereignty and project power across the former Soviet Union.[21]

Georgian opposition-leaning outlet *Mtavari* reported that the Georgian government is planning to resume diplomatic relations with Russia. There has been no official confirmation of *Mtavari's* report as of this publication. *Mtavari* reported on June 11 that unspecified sources stated that the ruling Georgian Dream party is preparing to restore diplomatic relations with Russia and that the Georgian and Russian governments are currently selecting employees for the Georgian embassy in Moscow.[22] *Mtavari* stated that the Georgian Dream party denied this information and called it "groundless." The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also claimed to Kremlin newswire *TASS* on June 12 that Georgian opposition sources are spreading false information about the matter.[23] ISW continues to assess that Georgian Dream actors likely intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[24]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower in the long run.**
- **Russian Northern Fleet naval vessels arrived at Havana Harbor, Cuba, on June 12 for their planned five-day long port call.**
- **Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia "will leave" and "will decide when to leave" the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in a question-and-answer session with the Armenian National Assembly on June 12 amid Armenia's continued efforts to distance itself from security and political relations with Russia.**
- **Georgian opposition-leaning outlet *Mtavari* reported that the Georgian government is planning to resume diplomatic relations with Russia.**

- Russian forces made confirmed advances near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian defense company officials in a list of recent recipients of labor awards during a "Russia Day" speech on June 11, indicating Putin's continued emphasis on strengthening the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 12, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of

these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on June 12 that the number of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups operating in the Sumy direction has decreased and that there is now "almost no" activity from these groups in Sumy Oblast.[25] Other Ukrainian officials recently denied that Russian forces seized any territory in Sumy Oblast following Russian claims of a limited cross-border raid into Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast, on June 10.[26] ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming Russian activity or gains in Ryzhivka since June 10 and assesses that Russian forces failed to establish an enduring presence in the settlement.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Vovchansk amid continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on June 12. Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows that a small Russian infantry group supported by an armored vehicle marginally advanced south of Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky Street in northeastern Vovchansk.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured another building in northeastern Vovchansk in the Aggregate Plant area, advancing 200 meters deep within the city, and that Russian forces also advanced east of Vovchansk.[28] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces lost several infantry fighting vehicles and MT-LB amphibious armored

fighting vehicles while attempting to enter the Aggregate Plant grounds.^[29] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Tykhe (east of Vovchansk), Lyptsi, and Hlyboke (both north of Kharkiv City) on June 11 and 12.^[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting counterattacks near Hlyboke.^[31]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 12, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 12 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 11 and 12 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; northwest of Svatove near Berestove and Myasozharivka; northwest of Kreminna near Druzhelyubivka, Hrektivka, and Nevske; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area.^[32] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.^[33]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on June 12 that the disincorporated settlement of Tymkivka (east of Kupyansk), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed Russian forces captured on June 11, has not existed since Soviet times and emphasized that Ukrainian forces still control the area that used to be Tymkivka.^[34] Voloshyn suggested that the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces captured Tymkivka for purely informational effect because the Russian military command is counting on the fact that the average Russian does not know where Tymkivka is on a map, much less that it does not exist as a populated area.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 12, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 12. Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently

advanced southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[36] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and are trying to push towards Siversk from two directions.[37] Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Siversk near Rozdolivka and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on June 12.[38] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Rozdolivka and Vasyukivka (both south of Siversk).[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on June 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 11 and 12.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[41] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are trying to seize Chasiv Yar, Klishchiivka, and Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and that fighting continues in these areas.[42] The United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 12 that Russian forces have likely made a limited "break-in" in eastern Chasiv Yar, likely referring to recent confirmed Russian advances in an industrial area of the Kanal Microraion.[43] The UK MoD stated that Russian forces likely remain on the east side of the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal and have not yet traversed the water feature, as ISW previously assessed.[44] The UK MoD stated that Russian forces are clearing the eastern suburb of Chasiv Yar with dismounted infantry and suffering high casualties.[45] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating within the Kanal Microraion.[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) began assault operations southward along the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal from the Ivanivske area as well as near Klishchiivka. Elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[47]


Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 12, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 12. Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka), with one Russian source claiming that Russian forces advanced up to 1.54 kilometers wide and 1.05 kilometers deep within and north of Novopokrovske and up to 2.5 kilometers wide and up to 500 meters deep north and east of Novopokrovske.[49] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control more than 70 percent of Novopokrovske but that part of the settlement is a contested "gray zone." [50] One Russian source claimed that Russian forces only entered Novopokrovske and that fighting is ongoing in the center of the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced along the

pond north of Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka) and 700 meters deep east of Sokil.[52] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the heights south of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and seized the dam northwest of the settlement.[53] Another Russian milblogger, however, claimed that information that Russian forces advanced to the dam northwest of Novooleksandrivka is unclear.[54] Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novopokrovske, Novoselivka Persha, and Sokil and southwest of Avdiivka near Karlivka on June 11 and 12.[55] Syrskyi stated that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts in the Pokrovske (Avdiivka) and Kurakhove (west and southwest of Donetsk City) directions, where Russian forces have concentrated the largest number of assault units from eight “shock” brigades.[56] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 137th, 74th, and 55th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 41st CAA, CMD), the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC), reinforced with unspecified regiments and battalions from the territorial troops and the mobilization reserve, are operating northwest of Avdiivka.[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 12, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka on June 11 and 12.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Krasnohorivka and north of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[59] Elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City), and elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating near




Russian force continued ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia oblast border area on June 12 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have finished clearing operations in Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Fighting continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske on June 11 and 12.[62]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows that Russian forces made a marginal gain in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but that Ukrainian forces regained some positions after conducting a counterattack.[63] The footage shows Russian forces advanced along a windbreak north of Myrne (northeast of Robotyne), after which Ukrainian forces counterattacked and regained some limited tactical positions along the windbreak. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 11 and 12.[64] Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) reportedly continue operating in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[65]



Limited positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on June 11 and 12, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[66]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 11 to 12. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise

missiles from Saratov Oblast; one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea; one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile from Tambov Oblast; and 24 Shahed 136/131 drones from Yeysk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] Ukrainian air defense shot down all missiles and drones with the exception of the Iskander-M.[68] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 12 reportedly of a Russian Iskander-M strike on a Ukrainian airfield in Poltava Oblast.[69] The Kyiv City and Oblast administrations noted that Ukrainian air defense activated over Kyiv City in response to the cruise missile launches, and Ukrainian sources later reported a fire in a residential area due to falling debris from the strike.[70]

Russian forces additionally conducted a ballistic missile strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, during the day on June 12. Ukrainian sources reported that the strike damaged administrative and residential infrastructure, killing and wounding civilians.[71]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian defense company officials in a list of recent recipients of labor awards during a "Russia Day" speech on June 11, indicating Putin's continued emphasis on strengthening the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[72] Putin gave "Hero of Labor" awards to the General Director of Russian shipbuilding corporation Sevmash, Mikhail Budnichenko, and the Chief Designer of Russian aerospace company Raduga, Yeltugan Syzdykov, in May 2024.[73] Putin specifically claimed that Sevmash's production of nuclear missile carriers strengthens Russia's nuclear triad and that Raduga's advanced missile designs strengthen Russia's defense capabilities.

Russian forces reportedly continue to suffer from poor-quality supplies and uniforms. Former Russian Airborne (VDV) Commander and State Duma Deputy Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov compared the Russian military to a "partisan squad" due to its poor quality of uniforms and the fact that military personnel must spend their own money on better-quality uniforms and supplies on June 11.[74] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger agreed with Shamanov and claimed that some Russian commanders are not interested in solving the problems of their subordinates.[75] Russian milbloggers have often lamented the poor quality and limited amount of supplies on the frontline and have advocated for the government transfer of seized civilian vehicles, firearms, and boats to Russian forces.[76]

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Tharaka Balasuriya stated that Russia and Sri Lanka agreed that Russia would stop recruiting Sri Lankan citizens into the Russian military after a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on June 11.[77] *France24* reported that Sri Lankan defense officials told *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) that 22 Sri Lankan citizens who joined the Russian military escaped and returned to Sri Lanka.[78] Sri Lankan Defense Ministry Spokesperson Nalin Herath told AFP that Russia has "duped" many Sri Lankans into serving in the Russian military, and *France24* interviewed a Sri Lankan citizen whom the Russian military impressed after they arrived in Russia for a promised driving job.[79] ISW has recently observed reports that the Russian military is increasingly using recruits from Serbia, Cuba, and African countries in combat operations in Ukraine.[80]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reiterated his call for Russia to seize the entirety of Ukraine in celebration of Russia Day on June 12. Medvedev published an animated map on his Russian-language Telegram account that claims the entirety of Ukraine as Russian rather than just the current parts of Ukraine that Russia illegally occupies, or the regions of Ukraine that Putin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022.[81] Medvedev has periodically explicitly and implicitly called for Russia to completely eliminate Ukrainian statehood by seizing the entirety of Ukraine.[82] Medvedev has frequently made statements that are more extreme than the Kremlin's current rhetorical lines but which set conditions for the Kremlin to later publicly adopt similarly-extreme views.[83] Medvedev's choice to publish this expansionist map on his Russian-language Telegram account suggests that he intended to posture to a domestic Russian audience to garner support for the war effort.

Russian authorities denied any wrongdoing of a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence.[84] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on June 12 that Danish authorities have not presented any evidence of the accused woman's guilt and accused Danish intelligence services of attacking Russia.[85] The *Danish Broadcasting Corporation* (DR) notably published an investigation on June 11 that used leaked documents that connect the accused woman to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) officers and Russia's ongoing attempts to use its narrative of protecting Russian-speaking "compatriots abroad" through soft power centers.[86] Russian authorities will likely continue to use this arrest and any future arrests to continue this narrative of so-called "compatriots" facing persecution from NATO member states. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger amplified a call on June 11 for Russian authorities to investigate organizations connected to "compatriots abroad," claiming that most so-called "compatriots," particularly in Australia, do not "broadcast their position to the outside world" because they "do not care about the fate of their own people" and are "useless." [87] Kremlin outreach to its "compatriots abroad" and attempts to expand the Russian sphere of influence are a critical component of the Kremlin's hybrid toolkit against the West.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1]

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[2] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024>;

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[3] https://t.me/grey_zone/23298; https://t.me/infomil_live/7195

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024>;

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