

# Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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March 6, 2024, 5:20pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note:** The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on March 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

**Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.**<sup>[1]</sup> Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will aim to stabilize the frontline while degrading Russian forces in order to rotate frontline Ukrainian units to training grounds in the rear for replenishment and restoration.<sup>[2]</sup> Pavlyuk stated that this will allow Ukraine to create a grouping of forces that will conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions (possibly but not necessarily counteroffensive operations) in 2024.<sup>[3]</sup> Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces are concentrating offensive efforts near Avdiivka, in the direction of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut), and in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces are trying to maintain a relatively high tempo of offensive operations along the frontline in order to retain the theater-wide initiative.<sup>[4]</sup> Pavlyuk stated that Russian forces are currently suffering significant losses and assessed that Ukrainian forces will stabilize the frontline in the near future.<sup>[5]</sup> A Ukrainian effort to contest the initiative in 2024 is operationally sound. Russia will be able to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine as long as it retains the theater-wide initiative, which may allow Russia to force Ukraine to expend materiel and manpower in reactive defensive operations, denying Ukraine the ability to amass the materiel necessary for future counteroffensive operations.<sup>[6]</sup> ISW continues to assess that it would be unwise for Ukraine to cede the advantage of the theater-wide initiative to Russia for longer than is necessary.<sup>[7]</sup>

**Continued delays in Western security assistance will likely postpone Ukrainian efforts to regain the theater-wide initiative, however.** Materiel shortages are forcing Ukrainian forces to husband materiel and uncertainty about future assistance is likely constraining Ukrainian operational planning.<sup>[8]</sup> Delays in crucial assistance will force Ukraine to make difficult decisions about how to allocate resources between future operationally significant counteroffensive operations and ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations against Russian attackers who currently hold the initiative.<sup>[9]</sup> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently stated that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct counteroffensive operations in 2024 but stressed that Ukraine's primary objective remains the defense of Ukrainian territory.<sup>[10]</sup> Zelensky has also stated that Russia is preparing a new

offensive effort that will start in late May or summer 2024, which would likely further postpone opportunities for Ukraine to prepare and launch counteroffensive operations.[11] Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have proven capable of preventing even marginal Russian gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts and are capable of heavily degrading attacking Russian forces.[12] Western security assistance is crucial for both Ukraine's ability to concentrate material and manpower for future counteroffensive operations as well as its ability to degrade Russian offensive efforts sufficiently enough so that Ukraine can seize the theater wide initiative.

**Russian forces conducted a relatively larger series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6 and on March 6, including strikes on Odesa City during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's visit with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.** The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March 5 to 6 Russian forces launched five S-300 missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast and 42 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Crimea, Kursk Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai.[13] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 38 Shahed drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Vinnytsia, and Sumy oblasts.[14] Russian forces later targeted port infrastructure in Odesa City on March 6 with an unspecified number of missiles during Zelensky's and Mitsotakis' visit to the Odesa Port.[15] Western media reported that a Russian missile struck within several hundred meters of a convoy transporting Zelensky and Mitsotakis.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces launched a high-precision missile strike on a hanger in the Odesa Port where Ukrainian forces were preparing naval drones for operations.[17]

**Kremlin officials continue to invoke nuclear threats as part of ongoing Russian information operations aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine and deterring Western aid to Ukraine.** Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov reiterated on March 6 that Russia will only use nuclear weapons if "something" threatens Russia's existence — a longstanding Russian nuclear weapon usage talking point.[18] Peskov also accused the West of "routinizing" the topic of nuclear war, which Peskov called "extremely dangerous" and "irresponsible," despite the fact that it is, in fact, Russian officials, who most frequently openly threaten employing nuclear weapons. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded to Finnish President Alexander Stubb's recent statement about NATO membership providing Finland a nuclear deterrent by claiming that American nuclear facilities in northern Europe would be "legitimate targets" for Russia in a hypothetical direct conflict between Russia and NATO.[19] Zakharova threatened that the security of countries who received nuclear weapons from the US will "clearly suffer." Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko stated that Russian needs to reassess and denounce international agreements that do not serve Russia's national interests, specifically unspecified international agreements signed by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet and Russian leaders.[20] Matviyenko's statement suggests a Russian interest in denouncing a wide variety of international agreements, potentially including nuclear proliferation and security agreements. ISW has recently observed several Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, engaged in nuclear saber rattling but continues to assess that Russian nuclear use in Ukraine and beyond remains highly unlikely.[21]

**International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and nuclear non-proliferation issues on March 6 in Sochi, Russia.[22]** Grossi stated that he had an “important exchange” with Putin about the “nuclear safety and security” of the ZNPP, which Russian forces have controlled for over two years.[23] The Kremlin and Russian state-run news outlets highlighted Grossi’s visit to Russia, likely as part of an ongoing effort to portray Russia as a responsible operator of the ZNPP and to prompt international recognition for the Russian occupation of the ZNPP and occupied Ukraine.[24]

**Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the governor of pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on March 6 and emphasized Russia’s support for Gagauzia.** Putin and Gutsul met on the sidelines of the World Youth Festival in Sochi and discussed “complex regional and geopolitical issues,” which Gutsul claimed Gagauzia is at the “epicenter of.”[25] Gutsul informed Putin about the “lawless actions” of Moldovan authorities and claimed that Moldova is systematically “taking away [Gagauzia’s] powers, limiting the budget, violating legal rights, [and] provoking instability and destabilization in Gagauzia and throughout [Moldova].”[26] Gutsul claimed that Putin “promised to support Gagauzia and the Gagauz people in defending [their] legitimate rights, powers, and positions in the international arena.” Gutsul also met with various Russian officials and agreed to intensify economic and cultural ties with Krasnodar Krai and Penza and Pskov oblasts on the sidelines of the World Youth Forum.[27] Gutsul recently met with Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko, who emphasized Russia’s support for Gagauzia against perceived Moldovan “oppression.”[28] Gutsul’s trip to Russia follows the February 28 Congress of Deputies in pro-Russian Moldova breakaway region Transnistria, which requested “*zashchita*” (defense/protection) from Russia in response to alleged increasing pressure from Moldova.[29] Putin did not respond to the February 28 Transnistrian request, but the Transnistrian requests still afford the Kremlin a wide range of possible courses of action (COAs) at a later time.[30] It is unclear why Putin would choose to meet with Gutsul and engage with Gagauzian authorities after declining to respond to Transnistria’s request for defense/protection. The Kremlin’s recent high-level interactions with Gagauzian authorities after a previous rhetorical focus on Transnistria supports ISW assessment that the Kremlin desires to use both of Moldova’s pro-Russian regions to justify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova’s EU accession negotiations and the Moldovan presidential election later in 2024.[31]

**Moldova suspended the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 6.[32]** Twenty-two NATO members and Warsaw Pact states signed the CFE Treaty in 1990, and it was ratified in 1992 after the fall of the Soviet Union.[33] The CFE was meant to set equal limits on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters between NATO and Warsaw Pact states in order to counterbalance the Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional weapons systems in the final years of the Cold War.[34] Moldovan officials stated that Moldova is suspending the CFE Treaty because there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” in the international security environment since the original signing of the treaty.[35] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov responded to the Moldovan decision and claimed that it is against Russian interests, despite the fact that Russia itself withdrew

from the treaty in 2023.[36] Russian officials' negative response to Moldova's decision further suggests that the Kremlin desires to maintain influence over Moldova using a variety of avenues.

**The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a drone strike on a mining and processing plant in Kursk Oblast on March 6.** Ukrainian outlet *Ukrainska Pravda* reported on March 6 that unspecified GUR sources stated that GUR conducted a drone strike on the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant in Zheleznogorsk, Kursk Oblast.[37] Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit claimed that a Ukrainian drone struck a fuel depot in Zheleznogorsk causing a fire and that another Ukrainian drone struck the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant.[38] *Ukrainska Pravda* reported that the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing plants is one of the largest iron ore mining enterprises in Russia. The US has sanctioned the Mikhailovsky Mining and Processing Plant's holding company, Metalloinvest.[39]

**Armenia appears to be taking limited measures to reduce its bilateral security cooperation with Russia outside of its reduced participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).** Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan stated on March 6 that Armenia officially informed Russia that "only Armenian border guards" should perform duties at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan.[40] *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's* Armenian service *Radio Azatutyun* reported that Russian border guards have been serving at the Zvartnots Airport since the signing of a 1992 Armenian-Russian agreement which regulates Russian forces in Armenia but does not specifically mention a Russian presence at Zvartnots Airport.[41]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on March 6 that Ukraine will try to seize the initiative and conduct unspecified counteroffensive actions in 2024.**
- **Russian forces conducted a relatively larger series of drone and missile strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6 and on March 6, including strikes on Odesa City during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's visit with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.**
- **Kremlin officials continue to invoke nuclear threats as part of ongoing Russian information operations aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine and deterring Western aid to Ukraine.**
- **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the security of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and nuclear non-proliferation issues on March 6 in Sochi, Russia.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the governor of pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region Gagauzia, Yevgenia Gutsul, on March 6 and emphasized Russia's support for Gagauzia.**

- **Moldova suspended the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on March 6.**
- **The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly conducted a drone strike on a mining and processing plant in Kursk Oblast on March 6.**
- **Armenia appears to be taking limited measures to reduce its bilateral security cooperation with Russia outside of its reduced participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).**
- **Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**
- **The Russian legal system continues efforts to use the Russian criminal justice system to augment Russia's recruitment base.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of March 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

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**Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**


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**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk amid continued positional fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 6. Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Russian infantry recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Synkivka.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced several hundred meters in depth near Terny (west of Kreminna) and seized several unspecified Ukrainian strongpoints, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[43] Positional fighting continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Tabaivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Verkhokamianske.[44] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that Russian forces have concentrated roughly 100,000 personnel in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions and that roughly 40,000 of those Russian personnel are combat personnel.[45] Synehubov added that Russian forces are currently conducting mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions with MT-LB armored fighting vehicles instead of with tanks.[46]



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of March 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




## **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 6. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced in the




direction of Bohdanivka-Kalynivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and Ivanivske-Stupochky (west of Bakhmut).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified forest area north of Bohdanivka (west of Bakhmut) and marginally advanced near Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances in either of these areas.[48] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continues near Spirne (northeast of Bakhmut); near Ivanivske; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Bila Hora.[49] Elements of the Russian 331st and newly-formed 299th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are operating north and south of Bohdanivka and elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are operating near Ivanivske.[50]



Positional engagements continued near Avdiivka on March 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements continued

northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi, Orlivka, and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske.[51] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control around half of Tonenke and Pervomaiske and most of Orlivka, while another milblogger claimed that Russian forces control two thirds of Tonenke and half of Orlivka.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces control the eastern half of Berdychi.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are interfering with Russian drone operations near Lastochkyne (northwest of Bakhmut) and claimed that Russian forces need to create drone and EW coordination centers.[54] The milblogger also claimed that Russian assaults have “slowed down” west of Avdiivka as retreating Ukrainian forces consolidate on new defensive lines. The milblogger claimed that the increasing degradation of Russian forces in the area is exposing issues with planning and coordination between Russian military command and frontline units.[55] The Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Press Service reported that Ukrainian forces have established a second line of defensive fortifications in the Avdiivka direction, equipped with asphalt support points for higher and more secure trench walls, anti-tank trenches, concrete bunkers, dragon’s teeth, and other fortifications.[56] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces have also equipped fortifications with unspecified protection against Russian shelling and drone strikes.[57]


# Assessed Control of Terrain near Avdiivka as of March 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 6. Geolocated footage published on March 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[58] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Heolohichna, Lermontova, and Zhalyznichna streets in the southern outskirts of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) and achieved unspecified success north of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[60] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional fighting continued near Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Pobieda, Novomykhailivka.[61] Elements of the




Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Heorhiivka.[62]



The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area on March 6.[63]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in Western Donetsk Oblast as of March 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



## **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast amid continued positional engagements on March 6. Geolocated footage published on March 5 and 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Robotyne and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[64] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and Verbove.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction do not have a sufficient number of drones and that Russian forces operating near Robotyne lack adequate counter-battery and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.[66] Elements of the Russian 71st Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and 39th Separate Covering

Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction.[67]



Limited positional engagements continued near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on March 6.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces intensified shelling and loitering munition strikes on Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[69]



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of March 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged roughly one third of Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[70] Pletenchuk stated that Ukrainian forces have struck 27 vessels, and that 15 of these struck Russian vessels are under repair. Pletenchuk stated that the BSF maintains a "fairly serious" presence in the Black Sea including 10 missile carriers, three submarines, two missile boats, and several patrol and guard ships. Pletenchuk reported that the BSF has five large amphibious landing ships in service, four of which are undergoing repair.

## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

*See topline text.*

## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Russian legal system continues efforts to use the Russian criminal justice system to augment Russia's recruitment base. Russian outlet *Kommersant* reported on March 6 that the Russian State Duma will consider a new bill that proposes a mechanism that will exempt individuals from criminal punishment if they sign a military contract during "a military operation."<sup>[71]</sup> The legal mechanism reportedly applies to suspects under investigation for lower-level crimes and current convicts and will allow cases against the individuals to be suspended if they complete the term of their military contract. An investigation by Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* similarly details the role that some Russian courts play in sending convicts to the frontline and found that some Russian courts have been offering convicts deferments on their sentences and an expungement of their criminal records if they sign contracts with the Russian military and go to the front.<sup>[72]</sup> *Verstka* noted that courts can grant such sentencing deferments through Article 398 of the Russian Criminal Code, a previously scarcely-used provision that allows deferment of sentences in "exceptional cases" that Russian courts have been using much more frequently since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<sup>[73]</sup> Courts are reportedly granting sentencing deferments to those convicted of lower-level crimes such as drunk driving or failure to pay child support, but *Verstka* noted that not all courts apply this practice evenly, as some judges believe that mobilization should not be a way out of serving time for committing a crime. *Verstka* stated that courts that do grant sentencing deferments either grant them for six months or until the end of a service contract. Russian human rights organization "Rus Sidyashchaya" (Russia Behind Bars) reported that the Russian Penal Executive Inspectorate actively advertises this as an option for convicts.<sup>[74]</sup>

A group of Indian nationals alleged that Russian authorities coerced them to join the Russian military and sent them to fight in Ukraine with two weeks of training.<sup>[75]</sup> Social media footage posted on March 6 shows a group of seven individuals in military uniform claiming that they visited Russia from India for New Years on tourist visas and then went to visit Belarus, where Belarusian officials detained them for not having visas and then transferred them to Russian authorities. The Indian nationals stated that Russian authorities told them that if they did not sign service contracts, they would face 10 years imprisonment. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian authorities likely did not forcibly mobilize the men, and rather that they joined the Russian military voluntarily and changed their minds upon experiencing combat.<sup>[76]</sup> The Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently stated that India is aware of several Indian nationals serving in the Russian army and trying to secure the "early discharge" of 20 Indian nationals who were reportedly working as support staff for Russian forces.<sup>[77]</sup>

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the Almaz-Antey defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise on March 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage showing Shoigu inspecting Almaz-Antey, where Almaz-Antey Director General Gennady Mendersky spoke about the

enterprise's efforts to create and test various anti-drone platforms. [78] Shoigu also visited the Avangard Moscow Machine-Building Plant and inspected anti-aircraft missile production.

**Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 6 that Russia is developing a new and advanced version of the “Bulat” drone detector.[79] TASS reported that St. Petersburg-based drone suppression company 3mx has developed a fourth version of the “Bulat” drone detector that has an expanded frequency range and can link 30 individual sensors.[80] 3mx reported that they will begin delivering the “Bulat” detectors to the combat zone in Ukraine in May 2024.

**Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)**

**Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.*

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

**Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

**Russian Information Operations and Narratives**

*See topline text.*

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)**

Belarus continues to develop bilateral security ties with Middle Eastern partner states. Belarusian Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Kubrakov and representatives of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Belarusian police force visited the World Police Summit in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on March 6.[81] Kubrakov and the Belarusian delegation learned about the practices of UAE law enforcement in the field of domestic security and presented Belarus' own experience in this sphere.

Belarusian Deputy Head of the Department of International Cooperation Colonel Dmitry Ryabikhin also met with Qatari Department for Work with Military Attachés Head Colonel Nasser Ali al-Thani at the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX-24) on March 6 to discuss issues of bilateral Qatari-Belarusian military cooperation.[82]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] <https://suspilne dot media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/> ;  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvr1YsqU>

[2] <https://suspilne dot media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/>

[3] <https://suspilne dot media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/> ;  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvr1YsqU>

[4] <https://suspilne dot media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/>

[5] <https://suspilne dot media/700028-komanduvac-suhoputnih-vijsk-zavdanna-ukraini-stvoriti-udarne-ugrupuvanna-j-u-2024-roci-provesti-kontrudarni-dii/>

[6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924>

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar121823> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2024>

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324>

[10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022324>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024>

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021324> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030723> ;  
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