



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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February 15, 2025, 6:50 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on February 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations. Zelensky stated during his address at the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Putin intends to cut Ukraine out of negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine and conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the United States.[1] ISW has previously noted that Putin has recently attempted to present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status.[2] Zelensky stated that Putin wants to embarrass Trump and have Trump attend the Russian Victory Day Parade — which highlights Russia's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War — on May 9 as a "prop." [3] Zelensky's warning aligns with a report from Russian opposition news outlet *Meduza* that the Kremlin instructed Russian state media to reduce reporting about Trump and instead portray Putin as a strong and decisive leader, as well as to frame the February 12 Putin-Trump phone call as a victory for Putin.[4] Zelensky also stated that Trump has not discussed the prospect of having other European states participate in negotiations and that Ukraine and the rest of Europe need to present a united front to Putin and Europe needs to participate in decisions about its own future.[5] The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray the US as the only other relevant actor in Ukraine besides Russia to deny Ukraine's agency in future negotiations and set conditions to convince the US to ignore Ukraine's interests, all likely to demand significant concessions in Russia's favor.[6] Zelensky also reiterated his warning that Russia will field 15 new divisions and use military exercises in Belarus to threaten NATO.[7]

Ukrainian and US officials continue to provide details on upcoming peace negotiations to end the war. Zelensky told *Newsmax* on February 15 that Russian forces at "minimum" need to withdraw to the pre-full scale invasion frontline and reiterated his commitment to ending the war in 2025.[8] US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that the US aims to engage "all parties in a peace process" within 180 days (by roughly August 2025) and noted that other European states would not "be at the table" in peace negotiations but that the US will consider their points of view.[9]

Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukraine's state-owned defense enterprise Ukroboronprom signed a joint venture agreement with French defense company Thales International SAS on February 15 to create advanced technology and provide operational support in the areas of air defense, radar, electronic warfare (EW), tactical communications, and optoelectronic systems.[10] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov met on February 15 with the heads of European defense companies KNDS France and KNDS Deutschland to discuss maintaining equipment that Ukraine's partners have transferred to Ukraine and the supply of new weapons, including self-propelled artillery systems.[11] The delegations also discussed the possibility of jointly producing 155mm artillery ammunition, repairing and modernizing Ukrainian air defense systems, and developing drone systems and artificial intelligence (AI). Umerov also met on February 15 with a delegation from Boeing Defense, Space, and Security to discuss joint drone, ammunition, and air weapons production.[12]

Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state. Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Putin whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia's full-scale invasion — claimed during an interview Kremlin newswire TASS published on February 15 that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader of Ukraine and therefore that Zelensky cannot cancel the 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin.[13] Medvedchuk claimed that the only government body that can cancel the decree in the absence of a legitimate president is the Ukrainian Constitutional Court but that the court currently does not have the necessary quorum to make decisions.[14] Medvedchuk is attempting to exploit the fact that the terms of three judges on the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ended two weeks ago (in January 2025), leaving the court with only 11 of its 18 judges and unable to hold Grand Chamber meetings, which require a quorum of 12 judges.[15] (Ukrainian officials are in the process of interviewing and ranking candidates to make the final selections.[16]) Zelensky, however, remains the legitimate president of Ukraine as he adhered to Ukrainian law and constitution and did not hold elections under martial law in 2024.[17] Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president, and Medvedchuk's claims about the Constitutional Court are just the latest variation on this theme.[18] **The platforming of the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukraine's legal inability to negotiate by a major Kremlin-controlled outlet casts serious doubts on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.**

Medvedchuk reiterated the need to address the "root causes" of the war during future peace negotiations and claimed that the way to eliminate the "root causes" is to remove the legitimate government in Ukraine, disarm the Ukrainian military, and remove Western-supplied weapons and equipment from Ukraine. Medvedchuk claimed that the only way to address these issues and guarantee Russia's security interests is if Russia "controls the territories under [Ukrainian control.]" Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine.[19] Medvedchuk claimed that Russia "has every reason" to return allegedly "historical Russian lands" that have "belonged to [Russia] for centuries" in order to allegedly "save the Ukrainian people." [20] Medvedchuk echoed Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's longstanding claims that Ukraine's neighbors, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, are hoping to annex territories in Ukraine in order to sow discord among Ukraine's European allies.[21] Medvedchuk also claimed that Russia withdrew from Kyiv during the Spring 2022 peace talks in Istanbul "as a gesture of goodwill," ignoring the fact that poor Russian logistics, heavy losses, and effective Ukrainian counterattacks stymied advances and forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv.[22]

It is notable that Kremlin newswire *TASS* published Medvedchuk's interview, particularly after the Kremlin recently reportedly issued instructions to Russian government-linked media to portray Putin as a strong leader in contrast to Trump.[23] The Kremlin almost certainly approved the publication of Medvedchuk's interview on February 15 in order to reinject the information operation targeting Zelensky's alleged illegitimacy into the information space and to reiterate Russia's long-term objectives of "denazifying," "demilitarizing," and forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO amid the reported start of limited US-Russia and US-Ukraine talks. These Kremlin informational efforts aim to shape any future negotiations and use different Kremlin-linked actors like Medvedchuk to amplify Russia's longstanding negotiating position.

Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast – in Spring and Summer 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances aimed at expanding the Russian salient south and southwest of Pokrovsk in December 2024 and January 2025, but Russian advances have slowed southwest of Pokrovsk since early February 2025.[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 14 during the Munich Security Conference that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction has improved in recent days, and the spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian activity has become less intense near Pokrovsk in recent days.[25] Russian forces have struggled to advance north of Kotlyne and west of Udachne as they appear to have come up against more concerted Ukrainian defenses in these areas.[26] Ukrainian forces have also conducted several counterattacks near Kotlyne and Pishchane (southeast of Kotlyne) aimed at threatening Russian positions in the salient.[27] One Russian milblogger expressed concern on February 15 that slowing Russian advances may allow Ukrainian forces to launch significant counterattacks in the coming weeks and risk giving Ukrainian forces the opportunity to collapse the Russian salient south of Pokrovsk.[28]

Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 11 that Russian forces suffered roughly 7,000 personnel killed in action (KIA) in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 2 that Russian forces suffered 15,000 total casualties in this direction in January 2025.[29] Russian forces have suffered significant personnel losses throughout the frontline in the past five and a half months and have likely suffered most of these losses in the Pokrovsk direction.[30] Such losses are likely negatively impacting the combat effectiveness of Russian units in the area.

A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on February 15 that Ukrainian drone operations are significantly impeding Russian activity in the Pokrovsk direction.[31] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are striking any Russian forces operating more than three kilometers north and west of Selydove (currently 11 kilometers south and 35 kilometers east of the frontline) and that Ukrainian drones are monitoring and restricting access to all roads in this direction. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones are making it "impossible" for Russian forces to conduct rotations or resupply frontline units and that Russian activity south and southwest of Pokrovsk is currently very challenging. The milblogger suggested that Ukrainian forces have created a strong layered defense comprised of minefields, conventional artillery systems, and strike and reconnaissance drones and are successfully integrating reconnaissance from drones with ground-based fire systems to improve Ukrainian strike capabilities in the area. The milblogger expressed concern that Russia is far from reaching parity with Ukrainian drone operations and noted that excessive Russian formalization efforts have stalled the development of Russia's drone capabilities.

The Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on February 15 that the Russian military command has redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk (Kostyantynivka) direction.[32] A Ukrainian source suggested on February 5 that the Russian military command was redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and elements of the 96th regiment (reportedly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit fighting in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Kostyantynivka direction.[33] ISW has not observed further reports of the redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction as of this report. Mashovets and some Russian milbloggers stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are still operating in the Kurakhove direction in recent days.[34] The Russian military command may be in the process of redeploying the 8th CAA or may intend to split the 8th CAA between the Kurakhove and Kostyantynivka directions until Russian forces eliminate the small Ukrainian salient remaining west of Kurakhove. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command's main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024, and the Russian military command could have redeployed elements of the 8th CAA to reinforce degraded Russian units in the Pokrovsk direction if Russia intended to continue prioritizing this effort in 2025.[35] The redeployment of significant Russian forces to the Kostyantynivka direction indicates that the Russian


military command may have identified attacking Kostyantynivka as its priority effort for Spring and Summer 2025.[36]

Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government. NOTE: A version of this text also appears in ISW-CTP's February 15 Iran Update. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from February 14 showing the Russian cargo vessel *Baltic Leader* and potentially the *Admiral Golovko* Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate about 250 kilometers south of the coast of southwestern Cyprus.[37] Anderson said that the *Baltic Leader* departed the port of Tartus sometime after February 4, when satellite imagery showed the vessel at the port.[38] It is unclear at this time if the *Baltic Leader* will bring evacuated Russian cargo to Russia or Libya. Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025.[39] Publicly available marine tracking data showed that two cargo vessels that departed Tartus in late January, the *Sparta* and *Sparta II*, were sailing off the coast of the Netherlands on February 15, presumably in transit to Russia.[40] Continued Russian-Syria engagement — including a recent phone call between Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Russian President Vladimir Putin — suggests that Syria seeks some relationship with Russia even as Russia withdraws its military assets from Syria.[41] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on February 14 that Russia continues to discuss its military presence in Syria with the new Syrian administration.[42]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations.**
- **Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).**
- **Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.**
- **Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka — the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025.**
- **Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area.**
- **The Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk.**
- **Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.**
- **Russian occupation authorities continue to create regional analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and government.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian


violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Fighting continued near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sverdlikovo, Kurilovka (south of Sudzha), Russkaya Konopelka (east of

Sudzha), and Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[43]



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Sverdlikovo.[44]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) and northwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy 70 percent of Sverdlikovo.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and Molniya-2 drone crews of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade and 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo and Darino (southeast of

Korenevo); and elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Russkaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka (southwest of Russkaya Konopelka).[47]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike on a Russian position near Yelizavetovka, Kursk Oblast (just west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and near the international border) on February 13.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed a fortified position of a platoon of the 28th Rifle Battalion of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and that Russian forces used the position to launch drones against Sumy Oblast.


Ukrainian forces reportedly targeted the oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast on the night of February 14 to 15. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 15 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Volgograd City and targeted Lukoil's Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City.[49] Kovalenko noted that Russian forces were trying to repel the strike and did not clarify if Ukrainian forces struck the refinery. Geolocated footage published on February 15 shows explosions in Volgograd City.[50] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a "massive" drone strike against the oblast overnight and that falling drone debris started a fire at the industrial zone in Volgograd City.[51] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* geolocated footage showing the location where a drone crashed in Volgograd City – directly opposite a Russian military housing area.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 17 drones over Volgograd Oblast overnight.[53]

Kursk Oblast authorities are investigating a local Telegram channel that criticized Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian opposition outlet *SOTA* reported on February 15 that acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein ordered an investigation into the "Sudzha Rodnaya" Telegram channel following claims from the local council overseeing refugee issues that the channel is spreading "fake news" about the situation with refugees in Kursk Oblast.[54] The "Sudzha Rodnaya" Telegram channel previously criticized Kursk Oblast authorities for issues with civilian evacuations in August 2024 at the start of Ukraine's incursion into the area and complained that authorities did not deliver promised payments to refugees.[55] Roman Alekhin, a Russian milblogger and advisor to former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, claimed that the Telegram channel does not post false information and that accusations against the channel will only increase negativity among refugees and Kursk Oblast residents towards the federal government.[56] Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Khinshtein to his post in early December 2024, following intense backlash from Kursk Oblast residents for authorities' failure to communicate with or support residents displaced by the Ukrainian incursion.[57] Kursk Oblast residents have continued to protest about poor assistance from Russian authorities for refugees.[58]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on February 14 and 15 but did not make confirmed advances.[59]




Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced about 60 meters in Vovchansk.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion and Rosgvardia's 116th "Stalnaya" Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Kharkiv Oblast.[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on February 14 and 15.[62]



Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 14 that Russian forces have seized the entirety of Dvorichna and advanced near Dvorichna and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[63]

A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on February 14 that Russian forces operating in the Kupyansk direction have a quantitative advantage in drones over Ukrainian forces in the area.[64]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, Lozova, and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Hrekivka on February 14 and 15.[66]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 15 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Nove and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka on February 14 and 15.[67]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 15 that Russian forces advanced within central Yampolivka and one kilometer southwest of the settlement.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the forest area east of Yampolivka.[69]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 14 and 15 but did not advance.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 15 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near




Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed on February 15 that Russian forces control half of southern Chasiv Yar.[72]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of low visibility on foggy days to reinforce the frontline and that Russian reinforcements in the area have little to no combat experience.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[74] Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment and 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking targets near Predtechyne, including with fiber-optic drones.[75]


Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces continued attacking in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske, southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 14 and 15.[76]



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Shcherbynivka.[77]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka, Dachenske, and Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Zaporizhzhia, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Uspenivka on February 14 and 15.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified counterattacks near Dachenske and Lysivka.[79] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian

counterattacks northwest of Pishchane have slowed, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in half of Pishchane.[80]



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Dachenske.[81]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Berezivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in central and eastern Udachne, advanced in central Pishchane and east of Vodyane Druhe into Berezivka, and are attempting to envelop Yelyzavetivka.[83]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are attacking near Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk).[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kurakhove on February 15 but did not advance. Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka and towards Oleksiivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozlyv on February 14 and 15.[85]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are advancing in northwestern Andriivka.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Dachne and up to the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynopil and the southern outskirts of Ulakly.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0518 Velyka Novosilka-Bahatyr highway and attacked into Bahatyr.[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking south of Ulakly and Kostyantynopil, elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking south of Dachne, and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are clearing Dachne and attacking west of the settlement.[89]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces continued assaults near Velyka Novosilka, west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, and northwest of Velyka Novosilka



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[91] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that the brigade destroyed a Russian tank and two armored personnel carriers in the assault.[92]


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers between Vremivka (immediately west of Velyka Novosilka) and Novosilka.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka area.[94]

Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian air defense system near Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian forces posted footage on February 14 and 15 showing Ukrainian drones striking a Russian Strela-10 short-range air defense system southeast of Velyka Novosilka.[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 15 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[96]



Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Ukrainian positions near Mala Tokmachka.[97]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Shaman" detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[98]

Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report ongoing ground fighting in the Kherson direction on February 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[99]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported Russian forces launched 70 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 33 Shahed and decoy drones over Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Donetsk oblasts and that the remaining 37 drones were lost in location. The Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration reported that Shahed drone debris damaged agricultural and residential areas on February 15 and that a likely S-300/S-400 air defense missile struck an open area on the morning of February 14.[101]

A *New York Times* (NYT) report indicates that the Russian drone strike against the protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) will likely have lasting impacts on the structure's effectiveness. The NYT, citing analysis from UK consulting company McKenzie Intelligence Services, reported that the Shahed drones use a guidance system with preset coordinates of its target and that "this would indicate the almost certain deliberate targeting" of the Chornobyl NPP by Russian forces.[102] The NYT reported that the hole in the structure over Reactor No. 4 is about 540 square feet, and Ukrainian State Emergency Head Andriy Danyk told the NYT that the hole will take months to repair and that it is unclear what Ukraine needs to do to repair the damage. Chornobyl NPP's Chief Engineer Oleksandr Tytarchuk told the NYT that Ukrainian engineers will temporarily seal the opening to prevent corrosion but that this seal will not be radiation-proof. The Ukrainian Exclusion Zone Management Agency reported that Ukrainian emergency services are still working to put out the last of the smoldering fires in the Chornobyl NPP's protective structure on February 15.[103]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian occupation authorities continue to create regional analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and government. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on February 15 the launch of the "Heroes of Luhansk Oblast" program that parallels the Russian federal "Time of Heroes" program.[104]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) highlighted Russia's "Molniya-2" aircraft-type strike and reconnaissance drone on February 15 and noted that the drone has an increased flight range of 20 to 35 kilometers and a load capacity compared to quadcopters.[105]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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