



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

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with William Runkel**

February 2, 2025, 3:45 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.


Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:20 am ET on February 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a former boarding school dormitory holding 84 local Russian civilians preparing to evacuate and four Ukrainian police officers.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike wounded four people and killed four.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force warned that Russian sources are attempting to blame Ukraine for the strike.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and senior Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike from Sumy Oblast against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha.[4] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike.[5] Russian opposition outlet *Agentstvo* reported that Russian state-run TV stations *Channel One (Perviy Kanal)* and *NTV* claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha but also reported Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] ISW is unable to independently verify the details of the strike at this time.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022 and that Ukraine has repatriated 1,189 children

with support from humanitarian organizations and Qatar, South Africa, and the Vatican.[7] Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have killed Ukrainian parents, kidnapped their children, and transported the children to "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea. Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have also separated children from their families in illegal filtration camps. Ukraine's Regional Human Rights Center identified 13 such "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea alone. Russian authorities reportedly use the camps in occupied Crimea to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children before further deporting them to Russia for adoption. Herasymchuk warned that Russian authorities are increasingly attempting to mobilize Ukrainian teenage boys into the Russian military - a violation of the Geneva Convention.[8] ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[9] The United Nation's Genocide Convention Article 2 defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[10]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.**
- **Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

- **Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.**


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 2 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) attacked Kositsa from Russkoye Porechnoye (both northeast of Sudzha) and that Russian forces attacked south of Sudzha near Kurilovka, Plekhovo, and Guyevo and northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo.[11] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Novoivanovka (northwest of Sudzha).[12]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 2.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 2 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novomylnsk and Kalynove (both northeast of Kupyansk).[13] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[14] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border near Topoli; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Hlushkivka, and Stepova Novoselivka on February 1 and 2.[15] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian

brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are not conducting mechanized assaults after Ukrainian forces repelled the previous two mechanized assaults and that Russian forces are conducting assaults with infantry, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and cars.[16]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[17] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Makiivka, and Novomykhailivka on February 1 and 2.[18]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske on February 1 and 2 but did not advance.[19] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 2 that Russian forces attacked near Yampolivka with armored vehicle support and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two armored personnel carriers.[20]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Hryhorivka.[22] Russian forces attacked north of Siversk in the direction of Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 1 and 2.[23] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 2 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Verkhokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two armored fighting vehicles and a buggy.[24]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on February 1 and 2.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[26]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[27] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and east of Toretsk near Krymske on February 1 and 2.[28] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults including armored vehicles, buggies, and scooters about one to two times per week. The officer stated that Russian forces often attack one settlement with three to six

infantry fighting vehicles while attacking a nearby settlement with three to 10 buggies and two to three motorcycles.[29]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska railway line northeast of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in northern Baranivka, to southwestern Berezivka (both east of Pokrovsk), south of Nadiivka, to southeastern Sribne, and towards Preobrazhenka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[31] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and south west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyarivka, Yelyzavetivka, Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and


Sribne on February 1 and 2.[32] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novoyelyzavetivka and Novoserhiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards central Uspenivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern part of the settlement.[34] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces suffered more than 15,000 casualties, of which about 7,000 were killed in action, in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[35] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[36]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 2 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Dachne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have occupied roughly one third of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove), but ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy less than one percent of the settlement.[38] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozdolne on February 1 and 2.[39] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kurakhove direction, and elements of the 68th Tank Regiment and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 2. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Rivnopil, in southern Novodarivka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[41] Russian forces continued attacking near Novopil and Novosilka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on February 1 and 2.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Polohy direction on February 2. Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[43]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 2 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Nesteryanka on February 1 and 2.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces operating in the Zaporizhia direction collect spare parts from Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones to use in Russian FPV drones.[45] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th

Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[46]



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on February 1 and 2 but did not advance.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 55 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa oblasts; that 13 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that drones struck Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Slobidskyi Raion, Kharkiv City causing a fire at a production facility and warehouse, and that Russian drones damaged a house and an infrastructure facility in Sumy Oblast.[49]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 2 that Russian forces launched almost 50 missiles, roughly 660 strike drones, and more than 760 guided glide bombs against Ukraine between January 24 and February 2.[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 2 that Russian occupation authorities forcibly mobilized around 300 Ukrainian civilians from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to the Russian military between October 31 and December 31, 2024.[51] The GUR, citing the Ukrainian "I Want to Live" hotline, reported that Russian authorities deployed 30 Ukrainian civilians from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to an unspecified military unit in occupied Crimea in Fall 2024. The GUR noted that the mobilized Ukrainian civilians face systematic abuse and poor living conditions. Article 51 of the Geneva Convention explicitly prevents an occupying power from compelling the population it occupies to serve in the occupying power's military, including via "pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary recruitment." [52]

A Russian milblogger continued to complain about Russian command failures within the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Moscow Military District) that led to the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) premature announcement of the seizure of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that Russian military personnel operating near Novoyehrovika reported that one company in the 20th CAA's 3rd Motorized Rifle Division had only 30 personnel left following recent assaults and lacked ammunition and that the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division's 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment suffered heavy losses in "stupid" assaults.[54] The milblogger claimed that Russian military authorities postponed efforts to resolve systemic problems within the Russian military leadership following Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces are reportedly using ground control systems (GCSs) that can control "swarms" of drones. The Hermes Design Bureau, a subsidiary of the Kaisant anti-drone systems manufacturer, stated on January 31 that it developed a GCS that can operate a "swarm" of unlimited drones using a single remote control.[55] Russian forces are reportedly using the system in Ukraine to operate drones on different frequencies in order to combat electronic warfare (EW).

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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- [1] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1885779119180238928> ; <https://t.me/kpszsus/27952> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08UQyHqJREveuqWs9yWbR9LAcexAmxYhSwNBTAAdnexavm2iTTuYQbuVu9tpJDnFvl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T1G1RFmCR1bKbRhVyv3XziBCmp5tVxBCBBftdNFJeFBoYkLkD8DYy7vAD1d42xcHl>
- [2] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T1G1RFmCR1bKbRhVyv3XziBCmp5tVxBCBBftdNFJeFBoYkLkD8DYy7vAD1d42xcHl>
- [3] <https://t.me/kpszsus/27952>
- [4] https://t.me/mod_russia/48463 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298679 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298681 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/51447 ; <https://t.me/ombudsmanrf/6088>
- [5] https://t.me/dva_majors/63602 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20498 ; <https://t.me/designersmil/10114> ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/21432 ; <https://t.me/Mikle1On/33786> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20875> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20873> ; <https://t.me/iamsniper/10531> ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12391 ; <https://t.me/vrogov/19005> ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16837 ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/22338>
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- [9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied>
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[11] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23296> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31832> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20885> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23277>

[12] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85522> ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5461

[13] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30809 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30806

[14] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61854> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30806

[15] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[16] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04XONrDJWsc>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/02/02/yidut-na-vsomu-shho-ruhayetsya-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-specyfyku-rosijskyh-atak-nakupyanskomu-napryamku/>

[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8275 ; <https://t.me/skarlatop/4471>

[18] <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24351> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

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[20] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[21] ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8273 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4817

[22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>

[23] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61856>

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