

**Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko,
and Frederick W. Kagan**

February 27, 2025, 6:45pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." [1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia. [2] Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists. [3] Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. [4] Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts. [5] Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that Ukraine surrender even more territory. [6] ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term. [7] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if Russia is "making maximalist demands that [Russia] know[s] can't be met," then the United States will know that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations. [8] US President Donald Trump reiterated on February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27 that the United States will "certainly try to get as much [land] as [it] can back [for Ukraine]." [9]

Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West. Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict" instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts. [10] A source who regularly participates in Kremlin meetings with major

media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe." Multiple sources reportedly told *Verstka* that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian relations.[11] Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ... from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites" – but not the Trump administration – are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible European role in negotiations.[12]

US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[13] Kremlin newswire *TASS* reported that the bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies in each state.[14] Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul.[15] Darchiev served as the Russian Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021.[16] Russian business outlet *Kommersant* reported in November 2024 that three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian Ambassador to the United States.[17] Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future." [18] The Russian State Duma reportedly held closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad.[19] *Reuters* reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.[20]

The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. *Bloomberg*, citing a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev – who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia – convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through business opportunities.[21] The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.


North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia. South Korean news outlet *JoongAng* reported on February 27, citing multiple sources familiar with the matter, that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025 — in line with a reported recent South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessment that North Korea deployed an unspecified amount of military personnel to Kursk Oblast.[22] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on February 24 that North Korean forces are gaining valuable combat experience and enhancing their weapons systems while fighting in Kursk Oblast and cooperating with Russia.[23] Budanov noted that North Korean Kn-23 ballistic missiles initially missed their targets by over 1.5 kilometers but that Russian specialists worked with North Korean specialists in unspecified "factories" to modernize and improve the missiles' precision. Budanov also emphasized that North Korean forces have learned drone warfare tactics and will likely bring this knowledge back to North Korea to improve North Korean military capabilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean Politburo member Ri Hi Yong on February 27 to discuss Russian–North Korean relations.[24] ISW assesses that Russia continues to consolidate a bloc of America's most significant adversaries even as the Kremlin pretends to seek improved ties with the United States.[25]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.**
- **Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.**
- **US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations.**
- **The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.**
- **North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

February 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Káteryňa Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Tom Thacker, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
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| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued attacking in Kursk Oblast on February 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina and north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya.[26]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 27 that Russian forces seized Nikolskoye (north of Sudzha).[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha) and advanced south of the settlement.[28]


A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in Kursk Oblast stated on February 27 that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast frequently attack in small infantry groups.[29] The commander noted that North Korean forces usually attack in group of 10 to 15 personnel, while Russian forces usually attack in smaller groups of two to three personnel. The commander added that North Korean forces previously attacked in groups of up to 50 people.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sudzha.[30] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle

Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[31] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction

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


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 26 and 27.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Stroivka, and east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novosilka and Petropavlivka on February 26 and 27.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dvorichna.[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novosilka.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka on February 26 and 27.[37]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Lozova (northeast of Borova) and east of Kopanky (east of Borova).[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[39]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman toward Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, Torske, and Kolodyazi on February 26 and 27.[40]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hyrhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 26 and 27.[42] Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions at the chalk quarry south of Bilohorivka and are counterattacking in the area.[43]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bilohorivka.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk Peoples Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near and within Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukvika, north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on February 26 and 27.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking within northern Chasiv Yar.[47]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating within Chasiv Yar; and elements of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating near Stupochky.[48]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Krymske on February 26 and 27.[49]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Toretsk.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction

February 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Field Fortifications |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travyna), Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Pishchane, Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 26 and 27.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne, Uspenivka, and Udachne.[52]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kotlyne.[53]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Nadiivka.[54]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk), northwest of Nadiivka, west of Zaporizhzhia, and toward Kotlyarivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Preobrazhenka.[55]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA, CMD), and 433rd and 506th motorized rifle regiments (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are operating along the Shevchenko-Udachne line (south and southwest of Pokrovsk).[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

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


- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne on February 26 and 27.[57]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 27 indicating that Russian forces advanced south of Andriivka and in southeastern Kostyantynopil.[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction, and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[59]



Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Pryvilne and toward Shevchenko, north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on February 26 and 27.[60]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces north of Skudne, indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[61]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are only advancing along the Mokri Yaly River where settlements are closely located but that Russian forces are struggling to advance in open terrain where they must use armored vehicles.[62]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian force advanced northeast of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novosilka, and elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novoocheretuvate (north of Velyka Novosilka) and Skudne.[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction February 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne toward Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Kamyanske, Novoandriivka, and Pyatykhatky on February 26 and 27.[65]


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Pyatykhakty and toward Lobkove (both northwest of Robotyne) and Stepove.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently struck two Russian command posts near the frontline in the Zaporizhia direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a command observation point and drone launch site of the Russian 1429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA, SMD) near Kopani (northwest of Robotyne) on February 25.[68] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a drone command post of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) in Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne) on February 26.[69]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction

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Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Dnipro direction on February 27.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian radar system in occupied Crimea with drones on February 26. Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a mobile post of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) near occupied Olenivka, Crimea on February 26, damaging a mobile radar system.[70]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 27 that Russian forces launched 166 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[71] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed 90 Shahed and other drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts and that 72 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones damaged infrastructure Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts.[72]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76338>

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/302934

- [3] <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796> ;
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<https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925> ;
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- [12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625>
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