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February 4, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on February 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.[1] Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyivska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident.[2] Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power.[3] Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024.[4] Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.[5] Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine's energy procurement), told *Politico* in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers.[6] Another Ukrainian energy expert told *Politico* that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.[7]

Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage."^[8] Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline.^[9] Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel.^[10] These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.

The Russian military may be struggling to recruit enough new military personnel, however. ISW observed reports in late 2024 and January 2025 that the Russian military's monthly recruitment rate is likely equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one.^[11] ISW also observed reports that select Russian federal subjects are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.^[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed a draft amendment on February 3 to reclassify some illnesses, diseases, and disorders for conscripts and those signing military service contracts. The Russian MoD proposed reclassifying syphilis, hypertension, central nervous system atrophy disorders, skin diseases, schizophrenia, psychotic disorders, affective disorders, and other health problems as more minor ailments that do not disqualify someone from service.^[13] *Radio Svoboda*, citing the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors, reported that the Russian MoD's proposal would make it more difficult for conscripts to obtain military service exemptions for health reasons and would complicate dismissal procedures for mobilized personnel and servicemembers who signed a military service contract.^[14]

Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claim that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time. Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed in an interview with Russian state news wire *RIA Novosti* published on February 4 that Kharkiv Oblast is "strategically" and politically significant for Russia.^[15] Ganchev claimed that he was "certain" that Russian forces would seize all of Kharkiv Oblast because Russia needed a "sanitary zone" to protect Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts from Ukrainian shelling. Ganchev called on Russian forces to drive Ukrainian forces "as far west as possible." Ganchev claimed that occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast had a plan in August 2022 to hold a "referendum" on Russia's annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but that the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in early September 2022 prevented the referendum. Ganchev claimed that if it were not for the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Kharkiv Oblast would have become the "fifth oblast to join Russia on September 30." Russian forces currently occupy parts of northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, but Russia has not attempted to illegally annex Kharkiv Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably did not include Kharkiv Oblast in his June 2024

demands that Ukraine cede Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even territories that Russian forces do not occupy in these regions.[16]

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus.[17] Data from *MarineTraffic.com* showed that the Russian *Sparta* and *Sparta II* cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4.[18] OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing the *Sparta* and *Sparta II*, as well as potentially the *Alexander Otrakovsky* Ropucha-class landing ship, the *Admiral Golovko* Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the *Admiral Grigorovich* Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.[19] Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025.[20] The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported.[21] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the *Sparta* and *Sparta II* at Tartus.[22] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the *Sparta II* turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet." [23]

Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria. The Ukrainian Resistance Center posted video evidence showing that it had gained access to the "Mosaik" system, an internal system that Russia reportedly uses to track Russian ship routes and cargo.[24] Data from the "Mosaik" system shows that the *Sparta IV* traveled between Tartus, Syria, and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai via the Dardanelles and Bosphorus in April 2023. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Oboronlogistika logistics company owns the *Sparta*, *Sparta II*, and *Sparta IV* cargo ships.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian vessels stopped traveling between Russia and Syria via the Black Sea in Spring 2024, likely due to the threat of Ukrainian naval drone strikes in the Black Sea.[26] Russian ships instead reportedly started traveling from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea to Syria via the Atlantic Ocean despite the fact that this route is several times longer than the Black Sea route. The appearance of Russian vessels in the Mediterranean Sea on February 4 is consistent with reports that Russian ships are now traveling between Syria and Russia via the Atlantic.

Russia has also reportedly used vessels belonging to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that it gained access to correspondence between an unspecified branch of the Russian Administration of Sea Ports and the *Sparta*'s captain in which Russian authorities asked the *Sparta* and *Sparta II* to monitor


Latvian patrol ships in the Baltic Sea off the western coast of Latvia in April 2023.[27] NATO notably conducted its Aurora 23 exercise near Sweden in April and May 2024.[28]

Key Takeaways:

- **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities**
- **Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.**
- **Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.**
- **A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.**
- **Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.**
- **Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.**
- **A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacks northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo, north of Sudzha near Nikolayevka, and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[29] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Sudzha near Nikolayevka-Darino and Sverdlikovo and south of Sudzha near Makhnovka and Kurilovka.[30]


Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Staraya Sorochina, Novaya Sorochina (both northwest of Sudzha), Russkoye Porechnoye, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (both north of Sudzha) and pushed Ukrainian forces from the northern outskirts of Sverdlikovo.[31]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are taking a "temporary operational pause" in the Kursk direction.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces' efforts to seize Makhnovka throughout January 2025 ceased due to a combination of Ukrainian drone operations and poor weather conditions and that Russian forces ultimately withdrew from the settlement. The milblogger assessed that fighting for Makhnovka will likely resume when the ground either freezes again or completely dries out. Another milblogger also claimed that Russian forces failed to secure a foothold near Makhnovka.[33]

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed recent reports that North Korean forces have not been conducting combat operations in Kursk Oblast since mid-January 2025.[34] The NIS assessed that North Korean forces have likely withdrawn from combat due to high casualties. The *New York Times* (NYT) recently reported that North Korean forces were no longer participating in combat operations in Kursk Oblast, and a senior US defense official told the NYT that additional North Korean forces would arrive in Russia "within the next two months" (roughly mid-March 2025).[35] North Korean forces' pause in participating in combat operations may have influenced the alleged Russian "temporary operational pause" in Kursk Oblast.

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division), assault elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[36]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike against an unspecified Russian command post near Novoivanovka (northwest of Sudzha) on February 3.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike inflicted significant casualties. The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported Ukrainian strikes on command posts of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], SMD) near Lgov, Belaya, and Rylsk, Kursk Oblast on December 25, 2024, and January 7 and 31, 2025, respectively.[38]




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kharkiv direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 3 and 4.[39] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi.[40]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that Russian forces are conducting constant artillery, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), guided glide bomb, and drone strikes against Ukrainian positions and are concentrated in northern Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River.[41]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 4. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on February 3 and 4.[42]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[43]

Kharkiv Oblast occupation governor Vitaly Ganchev claimed on February 4 that Russia's potential seizure of Dvorichna and Zapadne will allow Russian forces to advance towards Kupyansk and towards

Velykyi Burluk (northwest of Kupyansk) and Vovchansk (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[44] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources have also recently indicated that Russian forces may intend to leverage advances near Dvorichna and Vovchansk to advance on Velykyi Burluk from the northwest and southeast.[45]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating near Dvorichna and Novomylnsk (both north of Kupyansk).[46] Elements of the Russian 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[47]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, and Lozova and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on February 3 and 4.[48]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st Tank Regiment and the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (all of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) are attacking near Kolisnykivka and Zahryzove.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating in the Makiivka-Hrekivka direction (southeast of Borova).[50] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating near Lozova.[51]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Novolyubivka, Ivanivka, and Terny and east of Lyman near Dibrova on February 3 and 4.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces periodically conduct reconnaissance-in-force missions near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Torske (east of Lyman).[53]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced northwest, west, and southwest of Ivanivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[54]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 3 that Russian forces have lost an unspecified number of armored vehicles and are increasingly relying on civilian vehicles.[55]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating in the Terny-Yampolivka and Ivanivka-Kolodyazi direction.[56] [57]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 3 and 4.[58]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[59]

A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 4 of Russian forces purportedly conducting a drone strike against a Ukrainian railway bridge near Siversk.[60]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating southeast of Siversk.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on February 3 and 4.[62]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[64] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopivnichnyi Microraion (western Chasiv Yar).[65] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near Predtechyne.[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk, on the northern outskirts of Toretsk, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 3 and 4.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 4 but did not make confirmed advances. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on February 4 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyarivka, Yelyzavetivka, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Sribne; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on February 3 and 4.[69] Ukraine-based open-source


intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight noted on February 3 that Russian forces have been attacking into Zvirove and that Zvirove's urban area is connected to Pokrovsk's urban area.[70]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kotlyne, northeast of Udachne, and northwest of Vodyane Druhe.[72] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on February 4 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction and prefer to use swift and maneuverable vehicles, including buggies and motorcycles.[73] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction similarly noted that Russian forces transport infantry for assaults using civilian cars and motorcycles.[74] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are launching dozens of FPV drones and conduct 10 to 20 small infantry assaults per day in the area but noted that the overall tempo of Russian offensive operations has decreased.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Atlant" Battalion of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[75] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating south of Pokrovsk and that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating along the Vozdvyzhenka-Baranivka line (east of Pokrovsk).[76]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 4 but did not advance. Trehubov stated on February 4 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Bahatyr (west of Kostyantynopil) that consisted of two Russian columns of tanks and armored fighting vehicles.[77] Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv, Zelenivka, Yantarne, and Rozdolne on February 3 and 4.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Dachne.[79]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in central Dachne and advanced in Andriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[80]

A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces are increasingly using fiber-optic FPV drones west of Kurakhove.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that central Dachne is a contested "gray zone." [82]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are operating in Andriivka, that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Zelenivka, and that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Dachne.[83] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[84]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on February 4 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka itself, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on February 3 and 4.[85] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 4 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault near Velyka Novosilka and destroyed two tanks and two armored personnel carriers.[86]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to two kilometers deep and 1.5 kilometers wide north and west of Velyka Novosilka.[87] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novyi Komar.[88]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Zaporizhia direction on February 4 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) and Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne) on February 3 and 4.[89]


Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Myrne (northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in the Orikhiv direction.[91]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Huliaipole Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction immediately east of Kherson City near Antonivka and Prydnipravske on February 3 and 4 but did not advance.[92]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missile over the Sea of Azov on the night of February 3 to 4.[93] ISW has not observed independent confirmation of this claim.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction February 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 3 to 4 and a missile strike on February 4. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 65 Shahed and decoy drones from Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts on the night of February 3 to 4.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 37 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Cherkasy oblasts and that 28 drones were "locally lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Sumy oblasts.[95] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that Russian forces launched a ballistic

missile, likely an Iskander-M ballistic missile, against Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast on the morning of February 4, damaging part of a city council building and killing five civilians.[96]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.[97] The milblogger complained that Russian field commanders in the Siversk direction continue creating false reports that exaggerate or falsely represent Russian successes. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command changed the commander of the 3rd Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and the commanders of the 3rd CAA's 7th, 85th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades due to a recent scandal about false reports of Russian advances.[98] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command did not change the leadership of the 3rd CAA's 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which the milblogger claimed continues to conduct "suicidal," attritional, infantry-led assaults with poorly-trained and poorly-supplied personnel.[99]

Russian authorities continue to militarize the Russian government through the "Time of Heroes" veterans' program. The Time of Heroes program announced on February 4 that one of its participants, veteran Nikolai Sergienko, became the Novgorod Oblast Deputy Minister of Construction.[100] Russian news outlet *Vedomosti* reported on February 4 that authorities are considering appointing Time of Heroes participant and veteran Boris Dudko as the Director of the Department of State Policy in the Sphere of Upbringing, Supplementary Education and Children's Recreation within the Ministry of Education.[101]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate military equipment and weapons for Russian forces to use in Ukraine. The Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly tested the "Erika" radio communications system on the frontline and a soldier within the brigade claimed that this system could become the basis for brigade-level communications and digital management systems.[102] The soldier requested that Ural Plant, the manufacturer of the Erika system, configure the system for lower radio frequencies to better evade Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, however. A soldier in the Russian "Tyen" ("Shadow") Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), which is reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, claimed that his detachment received the first all-terrain vehicle (ATV) assembled from Russian-produced Lada passenger car components.[103]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak announced on February 3 that Ukraine returned 12 Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-held territory from Russian-occupied

Ukraine.[104] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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