



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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January 10, 2025, 7:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on January 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlets *Suspline* and *ArmyTV* that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military warehouse near Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast with drones and Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles.[1] The sources stated that Ukrainian forces used the drones to overwhelm and exhaust Russian air defenses in the area before launching Neptune missiles at the warehouse. The sources stated that Russian forces use reconnaissance drones from this warehouse to correct Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar stated that Russian forces downed 16 Ukrainian drones over the oblast and that the strike caused a fire at an industrial enterprise just north of Chaltyr.[2] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* assessed that the fire occurred at a plastic coating production plant in the area.[3]

The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 10 to a Trump statement about arranging a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that Putin is open to contact with international leaders and that "no conditions are required for this [contact]."[4] Peskov reiterated, however, that the Kremlin maintains its "repeatedly voiced" position on Ukraine that Putin explicitly defined in June 2024 and repeated in his December 19 Direct Line presentation.[5] Putin

demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government under the guise of "denazification," demilitarize, and cede significant swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, including areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy -- all effectively amounting to Ukraine's full capitulation.[6] No negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to these demands -- regardless of the Kremlin's "willingness" to hold talks with Western leaders.[7]


The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10. The US Treasury Department announced on January 10 that the United States imposed sanctions against Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, 183 Russian-connected vessels – many of which are part of Russia's shadow fleet – and dozens of oil traders, oilfield service providers, insurance companies, and Russian energy officials.[8] The United Kingdom announced that it also sanctioned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas on January 10.[9] Japan announced additional sanctions against Russia, including asset freeze measures against 33 organizations and 12 individuals and export bans and other measures against 53 organizations from countries including Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in order to strengthen Japan's response to North Korean support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[10]

The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about \$3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced the transfer on January 10 and stated that Ukraine will use the funds for priority expenditures.[11] The G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) Loans initiative will provide a total of \$50 billion to Ukraine from the profits of seized Russian assets, including a total of \$20 billion from the EU.[12]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10.**
- **The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged.**
- **The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10.**
- **The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about \$3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**
- **The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has**

confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.




We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 and 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced within southern Makhnovka (east of Sudzha) and advanced in southern Russkoye Porechnoye and northern Kositsa (both northeast of Sudzha).[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces encircled some Ukrainian positions near Guyevo and Kurilivka (both south of Sudzha).[14] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Pogrebki (north of Sudzha), but other Russian milbloggers refuted this claim and stated that the situation in Pogrebki is unclear.[15] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Russian milbloggers widely refuted claims that Russian forces encircled Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and entered Sudzha.[16] Russian forces continued attacking throughout the salient, including near Sudzha itself; northwest of Sudzha near Novaya Sorochina, Staraya Sorochina, Nikolayevka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy; northeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Russkoye Porechnoye; and east of Sudzha near Zamoste and Makhnovka on January 9 and 10.[17] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their main efforts on the area northwest of Sudzha from positions west of Novoivanovka, through Leonidovo and Alexandriya, and between Lebedevka and Malaya Loknya towards the Sudzha-Lgov highway.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berdin (northeast of Sudzha) and in Kruglenkoye

(northwest of Sudzha).[19] Drone elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kursk direction.[20]




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya and Vovchansk on January 9 and 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.[21] A Russian milblogger

claimed on January 10 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Vovchansk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[22] Drone operators of the "Canada" Group of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment reportedly operating north of Kharkiv City near Alisivka and Strilecha.[23]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently

marginally advanced northwest of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[24] Russian milbloggers and a source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence claimed on January 10 that Russian forces are advancing northeast of Kupyansk in eastern Dvorichna and near Zapadne.[25] The source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of their manpower advantage in the Kupyansk direction and are exclusively conducting infantry assaults.[26] The source stated that Russian forces are transporting infantry across the Oskil River for these assaults in light, inflatable watercraft but that the Oskil River is too deep to transport armored vehicles across without an established crossing. Russian forces also continued assaults north of Kupyansk near Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka on January 9 and 10.[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Zahryzove towards Bohuslavka (both northeast of Borova) and west of Nadiya and near Serhiivka (both east of Borova).[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, Zelenyi Hai, Borivska Andriivka, and Lozova; east of Borova near Pershotravneve and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka on January 9 and 10.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Ukrainian forces advanced to the center of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova) and that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack in Zahryzove.[30]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Lyman direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ivanivka and Terny and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 9 and 10.[31] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on January 10 that Russian forces advanced in the Lyman direction and that small groups of Russian infantry conduct assaults from multiple different directions at once, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to fire on the attacking soldiers.[32] The battalion commander also stated that Russian forces have stopped fielding armored vehicles in the Lyman direction due to heavy vehicle losses. Assault elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating with drone support near Terny.[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast 10 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 9 and 10 but did not advance.[34]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[35] A Russian source claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced to the third and fourth workshops of the Chasiv Yar Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[36]

Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Predtechyne on January 9 and 10.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference is preventing Russian forces from conducting constant drone aerial reconnaissance over Chasiv Yar and that constant shelling and close combat are making it difficult for Russian forces to distinguish enemy targets from friendly forces, causing friendly fire incidents in the area.[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command needs to address unspecified issues and commit more manpower to the area in order to set conditions to seize Chasiv Yar but expressed doubt that the frontline military command would be able to accomplish these goals in the near term.[39] Snipers and drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue striking targets near Chasiv Yar and drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[40]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction 10 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Murmanska and Korolenka streets in northwestern Toretsk and along Oleksandra Dovzhenka and Anharska streets in northern Toretsk.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Niu York up to Sukha Balka (both south of Toretsk) and further along Berehova Street in southern Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[42] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk, west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, and south of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on January 9 and 10.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Petrivka and providing drone support for Russian forces assaulting Toretsk and west of Krymske (northeast of


Toretsk).[44] Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Toretsk.[45]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 3rd Army Corps command post in occupied Svitlodarsk (east of Toretsk and southeast of Bakhmut) on January 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of strikes against Russian military facilities in occupied Donetsk Oblast over the past week (since about January 3).[46] Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast on January 8.[47]



Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of and in western Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces recently conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and four armored vehicles during the assault.[49] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified shelling and glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk.[50] A Ukrainian intelligence officer supporting a brigade operating near Pokrovsk stated that Russian forces are using armored vehicles to transport infantry and support infantry assaults more frequently in the area.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Baranivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), are advancing towards Tarasivka (north of Baranivka), seized a section of the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway, advanced to the outskirts of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and are advancing towards Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[52] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger suggested that Russian forces will likely attempt to seize positions along the T-04-06 Pokrovsk-Mezheva highway to complicate Ukrainian logistics before Russian forces begin to attack Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad directly.[53] Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Baranivka, Myrolyubivka, and Yelyzavetivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Novyi Trud, and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Vovkove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, and Yasenove on January 9 and 10.[54] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[55]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction 10 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kurakhove amid ongoing offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 10. Geolocated footage published on January 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the fields northeast of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are attacking towards Andriivka.[57] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking on the outskirts of Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove).[58] Russian forces also continued assaults near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, Sribne, and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne, Zelenivka, Ulakly, Kostyatynopil, and Rozlyv on January 9 and 10.[59] Elements of the


238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ulakly, and a motorized platoon of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) is reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 10 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced on the northern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka and that there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced northwest of the settlement.[61] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka, south of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Neskuchne on January 9 and 10.[62]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited positional fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 9 and 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.[63] Drone operators of the Russian “Nemets” Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian targets near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[64]



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction, including near Kozatskyi and Zabych islands (east and southwest of Kherson City, respectively) on January 9 and 10 but did not

advance.[65] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on January 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Buk-M2 air defense systems, one Zu-23-2 air defense system, and five Starlink terminals in southern Ukraine in the past day.[66]



Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on January 10 that recent Ukrainian naval drone operations may have prompted Russian forces to reduce rotary-wing aviation operations over the Black Sea.[67] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces decreased helicopter operations in the Black Sea, especially on January 9, and noted that this decrease may be due to poor weather conditions in the Black Sea, but that the weather has not been bad enough to force Russian forces to cease flying helicopters in the area altogether.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 72 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Bryansk oblasts overnight.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 33 Russian drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia and Kherson oblasts; that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that one drone flew towards Russian airspace. The Mayor of Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast, Serhiy Dedenko, reported the Russian forces struck the border settlement of Semenivka with five Shahed drones.[69] Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that debris from a downed Russian drone damaged a high-rise building in Solomyanskyi Urban Raion, Kyiv City.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet *Medizona* using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.[71] The BBC Russian Service reported that a minimum of 6,083 elite Russian military personnel, who were either members of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) or underwent lengthy training either at military universities or specialized military centers, have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.[72] The BBC Russian Service estimated that the Russian military spent millions of dollars and years training these elite personnel. ISW has previously noted that the quality of personnel within many elite Russian units has decreased over the course of the war as the Russian military command has increasingly used elite VDV and naval infantry units to conduct the same type of attritional, infantry-led assaults as regular Russian units.[73]

Russian opposition media outlet Mobilization News reported on January 10 that Russian law enforcement authorities raided the Chelyabinsk airport and unspecified commerce centers in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai over the holidays and issued military summons to migrants who entered Russia illegally and to naturalized Russian citizens.[74] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in late December 2024 stating that migrants who entered Russia illegally must apply for legal status, leave Russia, or sign a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[75] ISW previously assessed that a decision to enforce this decree would indicate that the Russian government is prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.[76]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces may not be fielding more advanced naval drones because the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) refuses to fund the development of naval drones.[77]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not covering activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian Assistant to the Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko announced on January 10 that at least 13,000 personnel will participate in the "Zapad-2025" (West-2025) military exercise with Russia, but did not announce the dates of the exercise.[78] The specific allocation of Russian and Belarusian personnel who will participate in the exercise remains unclear. The last Zapad exercises – which have historically occurred every four years – took place in September 2021, and the Russian (MoD) notably canceled the planned 'Zapad-2023' exercises scheduled for September 2023.[79]

Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on January 10 that Belarusian internet providers temporarily blocked YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and several other unspecified social media platforms on the night of January 9 to 10.[80] Residents reported that the internet disruptions began around 0130 local time and that they were able to access the sites a few hours later. Belarusian Internet providers stated that the disruptions were part of "scheduled work." Belarusian opposition outlet *Nasha Niva* noted that Belarusian authorities are likely preparing to block the internet during the upcoming presidential election on January 26.[81]

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported on January 10 that Belarus has not invited OSCE observers to the January 26 Belarusian presidential election, a clear violation of Belarus's obligations as a signatory of the 1990 Copenhagen Document.[82]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on January 10 that foreigners will be able to travel between Russia and Belarus upon receipt of a visa from one of the two countries beginning on January 11 in yet another display of deeper Union State integration.[83]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://suspilne dot media/922131-droni-sbu-i-raketa-neptun-vrazili-sklad-zbroi-v-rostovskij-oblasti-rf-dzerela/>

[2] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/1737 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/295280 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/295291

[3] <https://t.me/astrapress/72116> ; <https://t.me/astrapress/72109>

[4] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1002252>

[5] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024>

[6] <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7429519>; <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6771879>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar123024>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824> ;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122424>

[8] <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777>

[9] <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/support-for-ukraine-is-unwavering-as-uk-announces-new-sanctions-on-russian-oil-giants>

[10] https://www.mofa.go dot jp/erp/c_see/ua/pageite_000001_00740.html ;
<https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2025/01/10/japan/politics/japan-sanctions-russia/>

[11] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9321

[12] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/9321; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/10/25/g7-leaders-statement-on-extraordinary-revenue-acceleration-era-loans/>

[13] <https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877423399493849189>;
<https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1877433351805587756>; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/24478;
<https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/674>; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8075;
<https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877671344088699094>;
<https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1877664024705310837>

[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/62165

[15] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22164>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22150>;
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