

**Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,  
Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. Kagan**

**January 11, 2025, 5:15pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on January 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.** Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on January 11 that elements of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) captured a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast on January 9 and that Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces recently captured a second North Korean soldier in the area on an unspecified date.[1] The SBU stated that Ukrainian authorities are working with South Korean intelligence to communicate with the POWs as they do not speak English, Russian, or Ukrainian. One of the POWs was carrying a Russian military registration card from the Tuva Republic that Russian authorities reportedly issued him in Fall 2024. The POW told Ukrainian authorities that he had undergone coordination training with Russian forces for only one week before deploying to combat and that he thought he was going to a training exercise in Russia, not to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that usually Russian or North Korean forces kill wounded North Korean personnel in order to conceal their participation in the war.[2]

**North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war.** The *Washington Post* reported on January 11 that North Koreans fighting in Kursk Oblast are attacking in large groups with support from Russian artillery and drones, unlike Russian forces who usually move in smaller groups.[3] North Korean soldiers are also reportedly ignoring Ukrainian drones and continuing to move forward despite drone

strikes on personnel. The *Washington Post* reported that Russian forces are following behind North Korean advances in order to "stabilize the gains," but a Ukrainian soldier operating in Kursk Oblast reported that communications issues between Russian and North Korean forces may be slowing Russian efforts to consolidate new positions. The Ukrainian soldier stated that North Korean forces launched an assault consisting of 400 to 500 personnel in December 2024, during which North Korean forces outnumbered Ukrainian forces six-to-one. Ammunition shortages reportedly forced the Ukrainian forces to withdraw after eight hours of fighting — suggesting that North Korean forces are heavily relying on a superior number of personnel to advance despite poor tactics. The soldier stated that Ukrainian forces had inflicted significant losses on Russia's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), possibly pushing the Russian military command to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast sooner than planned. Western officials have recently noted that North Korean forces are suffering high casualties, including at least one instance of roughly 1,000 casualties in Kursk Oblast in only one week in late December 2024.[4] Zelensky reported on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a third of the reported 12,000 total North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast — and stated that North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka, Kursk Oblast on January 3 and 4 alone.[5] ISW continues to assess that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russian forces will likely be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in highly attritional infantry-led assaults in similar or greater sizes than it conducts with most Russian personnel.[6] North Korean forces' inability or refusal to learn to effectively counter drones will also affect the lessons they can learn from the war.

**Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine.** The *Financial Times* (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who has discussed this topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw from deployments in Eastern Europe in any such talks by "chang[ing] the rules" of the international system to ensure that there are "no threats to Russia," a callback to his December 2021 ultimatum to the United States ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Putin demanded in 2021 that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; ban any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; ban deployments of intermediate-range missiles in areas that could reach Russian or NATO state territory; and ban the United States from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[8] Putin notably used and intensified this narrative in 2021 to shape the information space and justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine ahead of his February 2022 full-scale invasion even though the prospect of imminent NATO membership for Ukraine did not drive him to invade Ukraine as he claimed.[9] NATO did not undertake any meaningful actions to expand in Eastern Europe or advance Ukraine's future NATO membership between the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which promised Ukraine and Georgia eventual NATO membership, and 2022.[10] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine and aim to roll NATO back. The Kremlin likely seeks to resurrect this narrative in an attempt to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's maximalist demands

that would weaken NATO under the guise of "compromise" in any future peace negotiations regarding the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on January 10 that the Kremlin is ready to hold talks with Trump without any "preconditions," but ISW continues to assess that no negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to his pre-war demands for full Ukrainian capitulation and the weakening of NATO.[11]

**Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.** Russian opposition media outlet *Astra* reported on January 11 that authorities at the Tanevo plant at the Tatarstan Oil Refinery Complex in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan evacuated the facility due to the risk of drone strikes and that locals reported smoke coming from the plant.[12] Russian sources published footage on January 11 purportedly showing a fire near the facility, but one source later claimed that there was no fire and that authorities conducted evacuations as part of exercises.[13] Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov's press service refuted reports of a fire, claiming that footage shows a glow after the facility switched to using an intense flare as part of planned changes to the facility's equipment operations.[14] Russian authorities issued a drone threat warning in the Republic of Tatarstan and stopped operations at the Nizhnekamsk Airport, citing unspecified safety concerns.[15]

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.**
- **North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.**
- **Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)


- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the main salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on January 11. Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[16] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 3.25 kilometers deep in Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[17] Another milblogger claimed that it is too early to assess that Russian forces seized Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) as Ukrainian forces partially regained positions in the northern part of the settlement.[18] Russian sources claimed that fighting continued north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Russkoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Pogrebki; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Makhnovka and near Pogrebki.[20] Russian sources noted that weather conditions in Kursk Oblast are improving for drone operations but that the ground is still muddy, so a new phase of Russian offensive operations may begin soon when the ground freezes again.[21] Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Russkoye Porechnoye, and elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Pogrebki.[22]

The *Washington Post* reported on January 11 that a Ukrainian soldier operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces attacked from different directions simultaneously and advanced in some areas after Ukrainian forces recently intensified their offensive operations in the Kursk Oblast salient.[23] The soldier stated that Russian forces also crossed the international border into Ukraine in a "few" unspecified areas, but that Ukrainian forces retook these positions.

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on January 10 and 11.[24] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Starytsya and Vovchansk.[25] A service member of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on January 11 that Russian forces marginally withdrew in Vovchansk and that Ukrainian forces are holding defensive positions north of the Vovcha

River.[26] The service member stated that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small groups of two to three personnel with artillery and first-person view (FPV) drone support.



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed on January 11 that Russian forces advanced north of Kupyansk in Dvorichna and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[27] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claimed advance, however. Russian forces attacked north of


Kupyansk near Holubivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on January 10 and 11.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[29] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zahryzove, Pishchane, and Zelenyi Hai; east of Borova near Pershotravneve and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Hrekivka on January 10 and 11.[30] 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Nadiya (east of Borova).[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Terny, east of Lyman near Zarichne, and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on January 10 and 11.[32] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 488th and 283rd motorized rifle regiments (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman) but have been unable to break through to Kolodyazi (southwest of Ivanivka).[33]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka (both northeast of Siversk) on January 10 and 11 but did not advance.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 11 that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka.[35] ISW assesses that this advance occurred more than 24 hours ago.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 11 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 11 that Russian forces advanced along Dobroliubova Street in northwestern Chasiv Yar.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora,

Stupochky, and Predtechyne on January 10 and 11.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 11 that Russian forces occupy about 20 percent of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar but that it is difficult to advance as Ukrainian forces have equipped their defense positions.[38] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are bypassing the Refractory Plant, occupying the Pivnichnyi Microraiion (northern Chasiv Yar) and the railway station to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Another Russian milblogger claimed on January 11 that Russian forces continue attacks in southern Chasiv Yar in order to bypass the central part of the settlement in an attempt to encircle it.[39] Elements of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar; elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC), and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[40]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 11 but did not advance. Russian security agencies claimed on January 11 that Russian forces cleared Toretsk and that only isolated pockets of Ukrainian forces remain in the settlement.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced in southern Petrivka.[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dyllivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 10 and 11.[43] Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Toretsk and elements of the 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating in northwestern Toretsk.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), seized Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized the settlement as of December 15.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the "Siberskiye Medvedi" (Siberian Bears) Battalion of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the seizure of Shevchenko.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Baranivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[47] Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Novoyelyzavetivka, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 10 and 11.[48] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 11 that Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and recently deployed reconstituted elements of an unspecified motorized rifle regiment, motorized rifle brigade, and Spetsnaz unit to the area.[49] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 10 that Russian forces are attacking in small mobile groups of up to 10 personnel on all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and off-road vehicles instead of with heavy armored vehicles due to poor weather conditions and difficult terrain.[50] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces usually conduct assaults during the day and conduct reconnaissance at night. An intelligence officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 10 that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Pokrovsk and destroyed roughly 90 percent of Pokrovsk's energy infrastructure and 70 percent of its civilian buildings by the end of 2024.[51] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA, CMD) and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk); 239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 87th Rifle Regiment (reportedly all of the 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating near Uspenivka and Solone (both southwest of Pokrovsk); and elements of the 6th and 80th tank regiments, 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st, CAA, CMD) are operating along the Yasenove-Petropavlivka line (south of Pokrovsk).[52]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operation in the Kurakhove direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 11 that Russian forces advanced west of Slovyanka (northwest of Kurakhove) and east of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[53] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. [54] Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Dachne and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka, Rozlyv, Yantarne, and Kostyantynopil on January 10 and 11.[55] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ulakly (west of Kurakhove).[56] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle regiments (51st CAA) are operating in the Kurakhove-Dachne-Andriivka area (west of Kurakhove).[57] Mashovets stated that elements of


the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA, SMD), whose main forces are currently operating in the Kurakhove direction, are resting and reconstituting in the rear.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 10 and 11 that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), supported by elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA), seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and are threatening to form a tactical encirclement around Ukrainian forces in the area, but some milbloggers called this claim premature.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized heights west of Neskuchne and that elements of the 5th CAA advanced along windbreaks and a ravine towards Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[59] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian forces on the Vremivka-Novoselivka road and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 50th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, LMD) conducted unsuccessful assaults north of Velyka Novosilka in the Novyi Komar-Novoocheretuvate direction and on the eastern and southern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[60] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka on January 10 and 11.[61] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults in the Velyka Novosilka direction because poor weather makes it difficult to field armored vehicles and operate strike and reconnaissance drones.[62] A Ukrainian battalion commander reported that Russian forces are more actively operating fiber-optic drones in the Velyka Novosilka direction and that some of these drones have ranges of 15 to 20 kilometers but do not usually carry large payloads.[63] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 3rd Battalion of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[64]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




### **Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 11 that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in southern Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne) on January 10.[66]




## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.[67] Drone operators of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[68]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction 11 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shaheds, along with other strike and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Bryansk oblasts.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 47 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 27 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[70] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak reported on January 11 that Russian forces damaged farm and residential buildings in Samarivskiy Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71] Chernihiv Oblast authorities reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Prylutskiy

Raion, Chernihiv Oblast likely with a Shahed drone.[72] Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian Shaheds damaged civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City.[73]

**Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia as part of a systematic campaign to eliminate the Ukrainian national identity. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin stated on January 11 that 400 Ukrainian schoolchildren in occupied Donetsk Oblast returned to the oblast following an excursion to Moscow under a cultural education scheme organized by the Kremlin-sponsored "Movement of the First" youth organization.[74] Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lyubynets stated on January 11 that Russian and occupation authorities deported 3,310 Ukrainian children from occupied Kherson Oblast to camps in remote regions of Russia, including Vologda and Tula oblasts, to Russify and militarize them under health, recreation, and cultural education schemes in Summer 2024.[75] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 10 that Ukraine organized the return of 449 Ukrainian children to Ukraine from occupied Ukraine and Russia in 2024.[76]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

---

[1] <https://t.me/SBUkr/13742>; [https://t.me/ukr\\_sof/1369](https://t.me/ukr_sof/1369)

[2] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/12949](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12949)

- [3] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/11/ukraine-russia-kursk-counterattack/>
- [4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024>
- [5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2024>
- [6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar121424>
- [7] <https://www.ft.com/content/f85a62b5-3627-44f5-9368-ef5ad779a44a>
- [8] [https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru](https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=ru)
- [9] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end>
- [10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end>; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm);  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Ukraine%20Indicators%20Update.pdf>
- [11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025>
- [12] <https://t.me/astrapress/72216>
- [13] <https://t.me/breakingmash/60794?single> ; <https://t.me/bazabazon/34258>
- [14] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/22856921>
- [15] <https://t.me/bazabazon/34258> ; <https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7430182> ;  
<https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1002394>
- [16] <https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/a4366349-4fb4-41a6-16a5-08dd0945b046>;  
<https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877824726141157601>;  
<https://x.com/moklasen/status/1877823231412899882>; <https://t.me/marmuletik/32469>
- [17] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84262>
- [18] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31266>
- [19] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/62246](https://t.me/dva_majors/62246); <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84262> ;  
[https://t.me/rusich\\_army/20023](https://t.me/rusich_army/20023)
- [20] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20458>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22227>
- [21] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20458>; [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/20023](https://t.me/rusich_army/20023)
- [22] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31274>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22227>

- [23] <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/11/ukraine-russia-kursk-counterattack/>
- [24] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>;  
<https://t.me/otukharkiv/3527>
- [25] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295483](https://t.me/tass_agency/295483); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295472](https://t.me/tass_agency/295472)
- [26] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/922759-vorog-trohi-vidijsov-57-ombr-pro-situaciu-na-pivnoci-harkivskoi-oblasti/>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/11/vorog-trohy-vidijshov-rechnyk-pro-sytuaciyu-u-vovchansku/>
- [27] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295486](https://t.me/tass_agency/295486)
- [28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>
- [29] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22217>
- [30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>
- [31] [https://t.me/z\\_arhiv/30467](https://t.me/z_arhiv/30467)
- [32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>
- [33] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2485>
- [34] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>
- [35] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2485>
- [36] [https://t.me/z\\_arhiv/30461](https://t.me/z_arhiv/30461)
- [37] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>
- [38] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/151008](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/151008)
- [39] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20457>
- [40] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31273>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22193>;  
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22193>; [https://t.me/RKadyrov\\_95/5413](https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5413);  
<https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2485>
- [41] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295498](https://t.me/tass_agency/295498)
- [42] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84241>
- [43] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20455>
- [44] [https://t.me/z\\_arhiv/30457](https://t.me/z_arhiv/30457); [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13248](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13248)

[45] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/47791](https://t.me/mod_russia/47791) ; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295528](https://t.me/tass_agency/295528) ;  
[https://t.me/tass\\_agency/295547](https://t.me/tass_agency/295547) ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/47792](https://t.me/mod_russia/47792) ;  
[https://t.me/mod\\_russia/47797](https://t.me/mod_russia/47797) ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024>

[46] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/150991](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150991)

[47] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61337> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61336> ;  
[https://t.me/z\\_arhiv/30476](https://t.me/z_arhiv/30476)

[48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>

[49] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/11/z-pershogo-razu-ne-zrozumily-rosiyany-znovu-perekynuly-u-rajon-myrnograda-svizhi-syly/>

[50] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/10/vid-bronemashyn-do-kvadroczykliv-yak-pogoda-zminyuye-taktyku-rosiyan/>

[51] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/01/10/vshhent-rosijski-vijskovi-rujnuyut-czyvilnu-infrastrukturu-pokrovska-za-dopomogyu-kabiv/>

[52] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2483> ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2484>

[53] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61349> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61345>

[54] [https://suspilne.media/922527-zelenskij-pogovoriv-telefonom-iz-bajdenom-britania-ta-ssa-vveli-masstabni-sankcii-proti-rf-1053-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live\\_1736584785&utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne.media/922527-zelenskij-pogovoriv-telefonom-iz-bajdenom-britania-ta-ssa-vveli-masstabni-sankcii-proti-rf-1053-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1736584785&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps)

[55] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>

[56] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61336> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61345> ;  
[https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13249](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13249)

[57] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2483>

[58] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31267>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31266>;  
<https://t.me/wargonzo/24198>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61350>;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/20468>; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/12710](https://t.me/voin_dv/12710); [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/150998](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/150998);  
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84242>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/22220>;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/20448>

[59] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61350>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20448>

[60] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2485>

[61] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19904>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/62246](https://t.me/dva_majors/62246);

[https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/4032](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4032); <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2485>;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/20448>

[62] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/11/shturmuyuchy-posadky-rosiyany-perestupayut-cherез-tila-poperednykiv-rechnyk-pro-sytuacziyu-na-vremivskomu-napryamku/>

[63] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/01/10/na-vremivskomu-napryamku-vorozhi-drony-na-optovolokni-zalitayut-glyboko-u-nash-tyl/>

[64] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84279>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/84290>

[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19906> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>

[66] <https://t.me/rybar/67059>

[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/19915>

[68] <https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/42935>

[69] <https://t.me/kpszsus/26645>

[70] <https://t.me/kpszsus/26645>

[71] <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/18703>

[72] <https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/922615-na-cernigivsini-poskodzenij-zitlovij-budinok-cerez-vlucanna-rosijskogo-bezpilotnika/>

[73] [https://t.me/ivan\\_fedorov\\_zp/15095](https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/15095) ; [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/37393](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/37393) ;  
<https://t.me/bbcruussian/75184>

[74] <https://t.me/PushilinDenis/5641>

[75] [https://t.me/dmytro\\_lubinetzs/7661](https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7661)

[76] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/12944](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12944); <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/10/volodymyr-zelenskiy-ukrayina-povernula-dodomu-449-vykradenyh-ditej-u-2024-roczj/>