

Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan


January 13, 2025, 5:30pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on January 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway.[1] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) recently advanced to and cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways.[2] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk).[3] Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area[4] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne, and the Russian military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway.[5]

Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD) with the seizure of the settlement.[6] Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske,

Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 12 and 13.[7]



Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may

intend to make further advances north of the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north (rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting costly urban combat operations to take the towns.


Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry. Leningrad-based media outlet *47news*, which is affiliated with Russian state censor Roskomnadzor, reported on January 13 that Gazprom's Deputy CEO, Elena Ilyukhina, sent a proposal to the company's CEO, Alexei Miller, on December 23 arguing that Gazprom's central office in St. Petersburg should cut its staff by 40 percent from 4,100 to 2,500.[8] Ilyukhina's proposal to shrink Gazprom's workforce is likely an effort to address economic strains due to the reduction of Russian gas exports to Europe since 2022 and Ukraine's recent refusal to renew a contract to transport Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine.[9] Gazprom official representative Sergei Kupriyanov confirmed the authenticity of the proposal on January 13 during an interview with Kremlin newswire *TASS* but declined to comment further.[10]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.**
- **Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.**
- **Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.**
- **South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

13 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Kruglenkoye; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[11] Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 13 that they recently repelled a North Korean infantry assault in Kursk Oblast that lasted from morning until night.[12]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction 13 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST




The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the Russkaya compressor station in Gai-Kodzor, Krasnodar Krai, which is a part of the Russian-Turkish Turk Stream gas pipeline, on January 11.[13] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces shot down all nine drones and that falling drone fragments damaged a building and equipment at a gas metering station, but that the strike did not disrupt the station's operations. ISW has not observed independent reporting about the purported strike.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kharkiv City amid continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 12 and 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area on the northeastern outskirts of Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces also made unspecified advances within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[15] Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the international border north of Kharkiv City near Kozacha Lopan and near Vovchansk on January 12 and 13.[16] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on January 13 that Russian forces are not fielding armored vehicles or buggies for assaults due to the threat of Ukrainian drones.[17] The commander reported that Russian forces conduct assaults by sending poorly-trained, "disposable" soldiers to assault Ukrainian positions after which better trained soldiers follow. The commander added that Russian forces have roughly halved their tempo of operations in the Kharkiv direction in recent days.


**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction
13 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST**



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 13 but did not advance. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) significantly expanded their bridgehead along the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northwest of Kupyansk), hold positions in half of Dvorichna, and are likely attempting to advance along the Dvorichna-Kupyansk P-79 road toward Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near

Dvorichna, Zapadne, and Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 12 and 13.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction noted on January 13 that Russian forces are attempting to leverage inclement weather conditions to cross the Oskil River on small boats and rafts and are accumulating forces in the direction of Dvorichna and Masyutivka (south of Dvorichna).[20] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating along the Kupyansk-Lyman line stated that Russian forces are using artillery, air, and drone strikes to support ground activity against Ukrainian defenses in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions.[21] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are currently not using vehicles during assaults due to softened terrain and are using up to 30 to 40 first person-view (FPV) drones to strike a single target in this area. Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[22]



Russian forces recently advanced amid continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 13. Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[23] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zeleny Hai, and Pishchane; east of Borova near Pershotravne and Kopanky and in the direction of Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Novoserhiivka, and Tverdokhlibove on January 12 and 13.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing Ukrainian forces from Zahryzove (northeast of Borova) and Zeleny Hai, and that Russian forces established an unspecified crossing over the Oskil River between Kruhlyakivka and Senkove (both northeast of Borova).[25]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 13 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 13 that Russian forces marginally advanced toward Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are attempting to create a bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Zherebets River.[27] Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Terny and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 12 and 13.[28] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction reported that Russian forces typically use vehicles to transport personnel past Ukrainian forces' first line of defense and then deploy infantrymen to reinforce the dismounted units and attempt to consolidate forward Russian positions.[29] The commander observed that Russian forces are not fielding FPV drones in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) but are occasionally using reconnaissance drones. The commander assessed that there is a 1:1 artillery ratio in the brigade's AoR in the Lyman direction.[30] Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized half of Pivichnyi Microraion and the fourth workshop of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar and that elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Division (98th VDV Division) seized the main part of the Refractory Plant.[33] The milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC) cleared most of the □Stupky-Holubovsky□i forest (south of Chasiv Yar). ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however.[34] Russian forces conducted offensive operations within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on January 12 and 13[35] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted infantry-led and mechanized counterattacks in Chasiv Yar.[36]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast 13 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on January 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized most of Toretsk and pushed Ukrainian forces to the northern outskirts of Toretsk and speculated that Russian forces will soon seize the remainder of Toretsk.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy about 94 percent of Toretsk, although ISW assesses that Russian forces have occupied 81.4 percent of the settlement as of January 13.[38] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) have seized most of central Toretsk but that Ukrainian forces still hold part of Toretsk and Krymske (northeast of Toretsk).[39] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 12 and 13.[40] Mashovets reported that elements of the

Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating in the Nelipivka-Leonidivka direction (south of Toretsk).[41] Drone operators of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade reportedly continue operating near Toretsk.[42]


See topline for updates in the Pokrovsk direction.



Geolocated footage published on January 12 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian occupied building in southeastern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) likely shows Ukrainian forces striking a command post of the Russian 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Central Military District [CMD]).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on a 2nd CAA command post in Novohrodivka.[44]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dachne (west of Kurakhove).[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Yantarne (southwest of Kurakhove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[46] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Slovyanka, Petropavlivka, and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Yantarne on January 12 and 13.[47] Elements of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Kurakhove-Dachne-Dalne area.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are attempting to advance along the Sukhi Yaly River north of Kostyantynolske (southwest of Kurakhove) and that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD), 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating near Yantarne.[50]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction 13 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 13. Geolocated footage published on January 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces operating north of Velyka Novosilka advanced to the east (left) bank of the Mokri Yaly River southwest of Novyi Komar and that Russian forces likely seized Neskuchne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[51] Some Russian sources claimed on January 12 and 13 that Russian forces have not yet seized Neskuchne and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Neskuchne, however.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 Russian forces are one kilometer from the final Ukrainian logistics lines near Velyka Novosilka.[53] Mashovets stated on January 13 that Russian forces have nearly completed their envelopment of Vremivka and Velyka Novosilka from the north, south, and southeast and forecast that Russian forces may conduct a "decisive" operation to seize the settlements in the coming days.[54] Russian forces continued attacking west of Velyka Novosilka near Vremivka

and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Neskuchne on January 12 and 13.[55] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) continue fighting for the Velyka Novosilka – Uspenivka road between Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka) and Vremivka and that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) with support from elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, LMD) are fighting near Novyi Komar.[56]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 12 and 13 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that Russian forces

usually conduct reconnaissance-in-force operations in small groups in western Zaporizhia Oblast.^[57] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on January 11 that Ukrainian forces successfully struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system on an unknown date in the past week (roughly between January 4 to 11) in the Zaporizhia direction.^[58] Drone operators of the Russian "Nemets" Group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.^[59]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 12 and 13 but did not make any advances.^[60]



A Russian milblogger claimed on January 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kerch Strait Bridge with 43 drones overnight on January 10 to 11 but that Russian forces downed all the drones.[61] The milblogger asserted that the drones attempted to strike the Kerch Strait Bridge.[62] The Crimea-based Ukrainian "Atesh" partisan organization reported on January 13 that Russian forces recently deployed additional S-400 air defense systems and radar systems to the Hvardiske Airfield in Simferopol, occupied Crimea.[63]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of on January 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed and other strike and decoy

drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Oryol and Bryansk oblasts.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 78 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Donetsk oblasts; that 31 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that debris from downed drones damaged enterprises, homes, and state buildings in Sumy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that debris from downed Russian drones also damaged a children's health center in Sumy City, a critical infrastructure facility in Putyvl'skyi Hromada, Sumy Oblast, and a medical facility in Kyiv Oblast.[65]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded. The NIS reportedly announced at a closed-door meeting on January 13 that roughly 300 North Koreans were killed in action (KIA) and roughly 2,700 wounded in action (WIA) in Russia.[66] The NIS reportedly attributed the high casualty rate to the way Russian forces utilize North Korean forces and conduct assaults without fire support, which coheres with ISW's previous assessments and observations about North Korean tactics and communication issues with Russian forces.[67]

Russian authorities are reportedly walking back a promise to allocate federal budget funds to protect certain deep rear areas from Ukrainian strikes. Russian news organization *Vedomosti* reported on January 13, citing its sources close to the Russian Ministry of Transport, that Russian authorities will not fund anti-drone measures from the federal budget for Category 1 airports within Russia, including airports in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi, Kazan, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, Yekaterinburg, and Novosibirsk.[68] *Vedomosti* reported in September 2024 citing sources familiar with the matter that Russian authorities planned to allocate over 11 billion rubles (about \$107 million) to equip 31 major Russian airports with anti-drone measures by 2028 as part of a national effort to develop infrastructure and security regarding drone usage.[69] ISW has recently assessed that Russia is struggling with the increasingly high costs of maintaining its war effort against Ukraine, and reducing funding for air defenses to protect areas far from the battlefield may be part of a Kremlin effort to limit some of these costs.[70]

Russian authorities continue increasing social service benefits to Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine likely as part of efforts to increase military recruitment. The Russian Government announced on January 13 that it began allocating grants on January 1 of up to seven million rubles (about \$68,126) to Russian veterans to start their own agricultural and livestock enterprises.[71]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian milbloggers claimed on January 12 and 13 that Russian forces started fielding a North Korean analogue to Russian "Tor" air defense systems. Russian milbloggers amplified an image allegedly showing the North Korean air defense system, which the milbloggers did not name, in an unspecified location in Ukraine or Russia.[72] One milblogger claimed that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck a North Korean-provided air defense system due to misidentifying it as an enemy target.[73]

ISW is unable to confirm these claims.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[3] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488>

[4] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2488> ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2489> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525>

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