

**Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,  
and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

**January 30, 2025, 6:00pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on January 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.** The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia's favor.[1] Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian government.[2] ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's future negotiating positions.[3] TASS' decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.

**Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.[4]** Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations.[5] This position suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called "root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning [of] a number of provisions on which NATO's existence and functioning are based." [6] Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss the possibility of "reducing the level of [NATO's] military presence," presumably along Russia's borders, but noted that this is unlikely to happen.

Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders.[7] Putin issued a series of demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things.[8] The *Financial Times* (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations.[9] **Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.**

**Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.** Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more broadly.[10] Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness" and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even including elements of [a] bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.[11]

**People's Republic of China (PRC)–based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.** *RFE/RL*, citing its own Ukrainian bureau's investigative unit Schemes, reported on January 30 that at least two dozen PRC-based firms "untouched" by Western sanctions are directly supplying Russia with gallium, germanium, and antimony — key elements used in Russian drones and missiles.[12] Schemes found that PRC-based firms send these materials to Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies including Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec, which supplies nearly 80 percent of the Kremlin's weaponry used in Ukraine. At least a third of these suppliers are reportedly linked to the PRC government, which has repeatedly denied aiding Russia's war. Schemes also noted that the Russian subsidiary of a Japanese company imported antimony from the PRC and supplied silicon wafers to Russian military microelectronics manufacturers. ISW has previously noted that PRC companies are directly and indirectly supplying Russia with drones, machine tools, and microelectronic products that Russia uses to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions used in Ukraine.[13]

**The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.**[14] The resolution called for unwavering European support to Ukraine and noted that sustainable peace negotiations can only be achieved from a position of Ukrainian strength. The resolution stated that negotiations regarding an end to the war in Ukraine can only be conducted with direct Ukrainian involvement and if Russia abandons its "imperial ambitions." The resolution also condemned Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and commended Ukraine's progress towards European Union (EU) membership. Zelensky has previously highlighted that sustainable and just peace in Ukraine should be achieved through enhanced military support to Ukraine, especially given Russia's reluctance to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued maximalist and imperialist ambitions.[15]


**The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.** A US defense official told *CNN* and three sources with knowledge of the transfer told US outlet *Axios* on January 28 that the US military transferred roughly 90 decommissioned Patriot missiles from storage facilities in Israel to Poland.[16] The Patriot missiles are expected to be transferred to Ukraine on an unspecified date.

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Kremlin newswire *TASS* published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.**
- **Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.**
- **Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.**
- **People's Republic of China (PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.**
- **The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.**
- **The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.**

- **Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further into northern Sumy Oblast along the international border as part of their ongoing efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Zhuravka (north of Sumy City along the international border) and to fields west of the settlement, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[17] ISW previously geolocated footage on January 10 indicating that Russian forces crossed the international border and advanced west of Zhuravka and a Russian milblogger previously claimed that Russian forces crossed into Sumy Oblast in an effort to bypass Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha) from the south.[18]

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 30 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Zhuravka along the Ukrainian-Russian international border, to fields northeast of Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), along the Ivnitsa River towards the 38H-071 highway (northeast of Malaya Loknya), and in unspecified locations in northern Sudzha Raion.[19] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Makhnovka.[20] Drone

operators of the Russian 1434th "Akmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sudzha direction; drone operators of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian soldiers in the Kursk direction; drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha); and likely elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Sverdlikovo.[21]



Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil pumping station in Bryansk Oblast on the night of January 29, but the extent of damage to the station remains unclear. Russian opposition outlet *Astra* and *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's* northwestern Russia service *Sever Realii* reported on January 29 that residents reported that Ukrainian drones struck the “Novozybkov” oil pumping station and posted footage showing a fire near Novozybkov.[22] Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows a fire at the Transneft-owned Novozybkov oil pumping station near Druzhba, Bryansk Oblast, which is part of the “Druzhba” pipeline supplying Russian oil from Russia to various locations throughout Europe.[23] Russian and Ukrainian sources posted footage on January 29 and 30 showing a fire at the Novozybkov oil pumping station and stated that Ukrainian drones attacked the oil pumping station.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used two HIMARS missiles to strike a Transneft-Druzhba oil pipeline and that Russian authorities reported a Ukrainian drone strike in Bryansk Oblast and a fire in Novozybkov.[25]


### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

#### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City amid ongoing Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 30. Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26] Russian forces continued assaults near Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City along the Russia-Ukraine international border) on January 29 and 30.[27]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

## January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





# Assessed Control of Terrain in Vovchansk January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022		Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
	Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 30 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on January 29 and 30.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk and along the Russia-Ukraine international border).[29] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are advancing to the northern outskirts of Kupyansk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 30 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zahryzove, Kolisnykivka, and Novoosynove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Makiivka, Nevske, and Novoyehorivka on January 29 and 30.[31] Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction, and elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade ([GRU]) are reportedly operating near Hrekiivka.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 30 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, Terny, and Novolyubivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on January 29 and 30.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted a surprise attack and advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman).[34]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

## January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




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 GEOSPATIAL FUND

- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 29 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian forces marginally advanced in Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[35] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured the eastern section of Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[36] Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on January 29 and 30.[37]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on January 30. Geolocated footage published on January 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Dniprovska Street in central Chasiv Yar.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar); along Vysokovoltna Street in southwestern Chasiv Yar; in a forested area south of Chasiv Yar; reached the outskirts of the Shevchenko and Tsekh No. 2 microraiions (both in southwest Chasiv Yar); captured a majority of Pivnichnyi Microraion in northern Chasiv Yar; and occupied positions on top of the waste heap on the western edge of the Block-9 mine (south of Chasiv Yar).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forested area west of Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar.[40] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on January 29 and 30.[41] Likely elements of the Russian “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar; drone operators and other elements of the 98<sup>th</sup> Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Chasiv Yar including west of Novyi Microraion; snipers of the 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Shevchenko Microraion; elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in northern Chasiv Yar; drone operators of the “Sever-V” Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Chasiv Yar direction; elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) and Chechen Akhmat forces are reportedly operating near Mykolaivka (south of Chasiv Yar); and elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[42]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Chasiv Yar


## January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued offensive operations on January 30. Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the industrial area in northern Toretsk.[43] Russian forces continued ground attacks in Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 29 and 30.[44] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 30 that Ukrainian forces recaptured lost positions near Krymske (north of Toretsk).[45] The Ukrainian spokesperson reported that Ukrainian strikes are constraining Russian forces' ability to operate armored vehicles near Toretsk and regularly destroying the equipment as Russian forces approach Ukrainian positions. The Ukrainian spokesperson added that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian forces operating in smaller assault units comprised of three or four troops and are conducting assaults in multiple waves of these small teams. Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) and drone operators of the Russian "Radical Wake" of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Toretsk.[46]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk

## January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST






Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian offensive operations in the area on January 30. Geolocated footage published on January 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced west of Novoandriivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also counterattacked near Nadiivka (north of Novoandriivka).[48] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade reported that Russian forces are exclusively conducting infantry assaults with limited vehicle support and that Ukrainian drones continue to be the most effective weapon to repel Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and in the forested areas south of Uspenivka and are slowly advancing north from Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[50] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Malynivka, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrozhennya (formerly Novyi Trud) and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoukrainka, Udachne, Kotlyarivka, and Yasenove on January 29 and 30.[51] Drone operators of the Russian 1195th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

## January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations on January 30. Geolocated footage published on January 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced in a field up to the eastern outskirts of Andriivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 30 that Russian forces also advanced further into southern Dachne (west of Kurakhove), toward Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) from Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove), and southwest of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[54] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Shevchenko; west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Kostyantynopil, and Ulakly; and southwest of Kurakhove towards Bahatyr on January 29 and 30.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian forces are outflanking Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[56] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the area reported on January 30 that Russian forces are constantly conducting ground assaults and attempting to sever Ukrainian logistics in the Kurakhove direction.[57] The deputy commander noted that heavy fog continues to inhibit drone operations in this direction. Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne, and artillery elements of the Russian 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking targets near Rozlyv.[58]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Mitchell Belcher, Tom Thacker, Harrison Hurwitz, and David Schulert  
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
- |  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
|  Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours                      |  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine             |  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
|  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 |  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
|  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory                |  |   |

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka area on January 30 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian forces are advancing to the north and northwest of Velyka Novosilka.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novoocheretuvate, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 29 and 30.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian forces quickly regrouped following their purported seizure of Velyka Novosilka and conducted simultaneous attacks in the Velyka Novosilka direction near Rozdolne and in the Kurakhove direction near Andriivka.[61]




**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

Russian forces continued attacks in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on January 30 amid Russian claims that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Robotyne. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 29 that Russian forces advanced up to Tsentralna Street in Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne and south of Zaporizhzhia City) and in the adjacent dam area, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[62] Drone operators of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[63]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Dnipro direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 30.[64] Geolocated footage published on January 29 indicates that Russian forces recently seized the Velykyi Sokolin Island (southeast of Kherson City).[65]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction January 30, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 30 that Russian forces downed five Ukrainian drones targeting occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]

### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 81 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk and Oryol Oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] Ukrainian forces downed 37 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian Shahed drones struck a residential building in Sumy City, killing at least six people, and that Russian drones also damaged industrial enterprises and residential areas in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Poltava oblasts.[68]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russia continues recruiting prisoners to fight against Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 30 that Russia plans to recruit 126,000 personnel from detainees in prisons or pretrial detention centers, under criminal investigation, or have outstanding loans, and that Russia needs to recruit at least 280,000 personnel in 2025 to maintain its replacement rate.[69]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited the All-Russian Research Institution of Aviation Materials on January 30 and inspected technological innovations aimed at 3D printing unspecified weapons and parts for military, aviation, and space equipment.[70]

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) approved joint military training exercises for 2025. The CSTO Council of Defense Ministers and Committee of Security Council Secretaries approved the CSTO's 2025 joint military-political and strategic events on January 30 during a meeting at the CSTO Crisis Response Center in Moscow.[71] The CSTO will hold a Strategic Command and staff training of the Joint Staff, the Secretariat, and interested ministries and departments of CSTO in March; a joint exercise with the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) "Interaction-2025," special exercises involving reconnaissance forces and means "Search-2025," and logistics exercises "Echelon-2025" in September in Belarus; an operational training session with command and staff involving units of the



Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region (CRDF) "Frontier-2025" in October in Kyrgyzstan; and a joint exercise of the CSTO Peacekeeping Forces "Indestructible Brotherhood-2025" and a special joint exercise "Barrier-2025" in October in Tajikistan that will focus on counterterrorism training. The counterterrorism training in Tajikistan is a strong indicator that the CSTO is working to reinvigorate counterterrorism efforts following the March 22, 2024, Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow, which was executed by Tajik nationals affiliated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP).[72]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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