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January 7, 2025, 6:40 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.


Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on January 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[2] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7.[3] Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time.[4] Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District [CMD], to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024.[5] Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.[6]

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in

the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel.[7] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location.[8] Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.



Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian forces may intend to consolidate their positions in northwestern Toretsk and central Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk) to advance along the T-05-16 highway towards Kostyantynivka through Nelipivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillia and the fields around these settlements in an effort to

threaten the southern tip of Ukraine's Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk fortress belt, which forms the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defense. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage further advances northwest of Toretsk and south of Chasiv Yar towards Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shulytne to collapse the Ukrainian pocket in this area and level the frontline west and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Such advances would complicate Ukraine's ability to counterattack into Russia's near rear southeast of Chasiv Yar, including towards Klishchiivka, and would allow Russian forces to deploy additional artillery systems within range of Kostyantynivka and operate first-person-view (FPV) drones within range of the town. Russian forces may also attempt to advance west and northwest of Niu York and Leonidivka towards the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway and H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway to pressure Kostyantynivka further from the south and create a more stable southern flank for a push on Kostyantynivka. Russian forces will likely be able to accomplish more rapid advances in the fields and small settlements north and west of Toretsk than they have been able to make in their grinding advances in urban Toretsk. Russian units in this area may attempt to replicate the short, tactically significant mechanized assaults that Russian forces conducted in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 if they have adequate armored vehicle reserves for this sector.[9]

Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk. Russian forces may attempt to leverage gains within Toretsk and in the Toretsk-Shcherbynivka-Niu York area with recent Russian gains east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk. Russian advances east of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk may be part of an ongoing effort to make opportunistic gains that seize any territory, regardless of that territory's relative insignificance.

Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months. Russian forces achieved their most rapid rates of advance while operating in the fields and small settlements in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions in Fall 2024 but have struggled to make rapid advances in urban areas including Toretsk.[10] Russian forces have spent the last six months advancing roughly 12 kilometers through Toretsk and have been fighting through Chasiv Yar since April 2024.[11] Russian forces have, in contrast, advanced roughly 18 kilometers west of Selydove since Russian forces seized the settlement in late October 2024 and roughly 20 kilometers north and northwest of Vuhledar since Russian forces seized the settlement in early October 2024.[12] Russian positions in northwestern Toretsk are currently 12 kilometers from the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, and Russian forces would likely attempt to advance directly along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Russian forces could possibly be able to threaten significant Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka within the coming two or three months but only if they are able to achieve a rate of advance in the open areas northwest of Toretsk similar to the rate at which they have advanced in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions. The Russian force grouping in Toretsk is likely smaller than the groupings in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions, however, likely does not have prioritized access to Russian reserves, and may not be capable of committing enough troops and materiel to the frontline to accomplish these rates of advance.

Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas. Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]), including its 132nd and 9th motorized rifle brigades and 80th "Sparta" Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, have been the main forces conducting offensive operations in Toretsk.[13] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in mid-December 2024 that elements of the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are also operating in Toretsk, but ISW has not observed Russian reporting of this brigade operating in the area.[14] The Russian military command may decide to continue offensive operations in the Toretsk direction with the 51st CAA forces that are currently deployed in the area, which would likely result in slower, gradual advances as these limited forces are likely degraded after six months of urban combat.

The Russian military command could choose to redeploy forces from other sectors of the front to the Toretsk direction. The Russian military command could redeploy forces from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions to the Toretsk direction in the future. The Russian military command has been prioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions recently and would likely not redeploy forces from these areas to the Toretsk direction until Russian forces had achieved their objectives in these areas. Russian forces' priority objective in the Pokrovsk direction remains unclear at this time, however, as Russian forces appear to be advancing east and southwest of Pokrovsk in order to envelop the town while also advancing westward from the area south of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[15] Russian forces in the Kurakhove direction are currently focused on eliminating the Ukrainian pocket near the Sukhi Yaly River but may also prioritize continued advances westward towards the border area in the future.[16] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that the Russian military command recently withdrew elements of the 5th and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) from combat operations near Kurakhove in order to rest and reconstitute and will redeploy these forces to an unspecified frontline area at a future date.[17] The Russian military command will likely choose to recommit the 5th and 110th brigades to a priority sector of the front, which could be Toretsk if the command chooses to make that a priority.

The Russian military command may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove direction but deprioritize offensive operations in another sector of the front, such as the Kupyansk or Borova directions, in order to redeploy forces to the Toretsk direction. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations at varying intensities along the entire front as part of efforts to pin down Ukrainian forces and maintain the strategic initiative.[18] The Russian military command may prefer to maintain this continuous pressure on Ukrainian forces throughout the frontline over redeploying forces to the Toretsk direction, although the Russian offensive operations towards Kostyantynivka from the Toretsk area may offer Russian forces the opportunity to make the most operationally significant advances along the frontline. ISW is not prepared to offer a forecast of how the Russians will weigh the effort near Toretsk at this time.


The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report if the strike killed or wounded Russian personnel. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a strike,

reportedly with HIMARS, against a different 810th Naval Infantry Brigade command post near Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 25, killing the brigade's deputy commander and other staff officers.[20]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.**
- **Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.**
- **Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.**
- **Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.**
- **Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.**
- **The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.**
- **The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)


- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently regained positions in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 7. Geolocated footage published on January 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Kruglenkoye, east of Leonidovo (both northwest of Sudzha), west of Staraya Sorochina, and northwest of Russkoye Porechnoye (both north of Sudzha).[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Staraya Sorochina, Russkoye Porechnoye, Kositsa, Novosotnitsky, Berdin (all northeast of Sudzha), and Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[22] Russian mobloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Sudzha in western Bondarevka; northeast of Sudzha in northern Nikolayevka, northeast and northwest of Martynovka, and southeast of Zelenyi Shlyakh; north of Sudzha in northern Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, in Malaya Loknya, and in southeastern Novaya Sorochina; northwest of Sudzha northwest of Sverdlikovo; and south of Sudzha in northern and southern Kurilovka and northeast of Kurilovka.[23] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting an unprecedented number of aviation sorties in the Kursk direction.[24] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and "Burevestnik" Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya; elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], SMD) are reportedly operating near Bolshoye Soldatskoye; elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) and "Volki" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Russkoye Porechnoye; elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Berdin; and elements of the Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group and "Kashtan" detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin and Novosotnitsky.[25]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in their main salient in Kursk Oblast amid limited offensive operations in the area on January 7. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces hold positions in a contested "gray zone" near Berdin.[27] A Russian source claimed on January 7 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Pogrebki.[28] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Sudzha-Bolshoye Soldatskoye direction, towards Berdin, and near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye.[29]


Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) stated on January 7 that Ukrainian forces killed 13 North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast.[30]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on January 6 and 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[31] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on January 7 that Russian forces are conducting up to five assaults each day near Vovchansk and that Russian forces have slightly increased their use of glide bombs in the area.[32]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 7 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Topoli, Petropavlivka, Dvorichna, and Synkivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi on January 6 and 7.[33] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 7 that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk) and raised a flag in the settlement.[34] ISW observed geolocated evidence in early December indicating that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[35] The commander also stated that rain, fog, and strong winds are preventing Russian and Ukrainian forces from using drones in the area.[36] The commander added that Ukrainian forces repelled four Russian mechanized assaults of unspecified echelons in the Kupyansk direction from January 1 to January 7. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that small groups of Russian forces are using thermal imaging-blocking cloaks at night to gain a foothold in forested areas and are sometimes trying to reach Ukrainian positions under the cover of fog.[37]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Borova amid continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 7. Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows indicates that Russian forces, reportedly including elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), advanced along the C-210517 road northwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova) during a reduced company-sized mechanized assault.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 and 7 that Russian forces advanced three kilometers from Lozova and seized positions toward Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) and are advancing near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[39] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka on January 6 and 7.[40] A commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Borova direction stated on January 7 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Lozova, Zahryzove, and

Kolisnykivka.[41] Trehubov stated that small groups of Russian personnel are attempting to reach the Oskil River in the Borova direction.[42] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Borova direction also stated that Russian forces lost almost 100 armored vehicles and suffered significant casualties during recent attempts to enter Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 and 7 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Novodsadove and west of Ivanivka (all northeast of Lyman).[44] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Terny, Ivanivka, and Yampolivka and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 6 and 7.[45] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[46]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) on January 6 and 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces conducted offensive operations within Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bondarne and Vasyukivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on January 6 and 7.[48] Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near and within Chasiv Yar.[49]

See topline text for reports of Russian activity in the Toretsk direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 7. Geolocated footage published on January 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within eastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), north of Vovkove (southwest of Pokrovsk), and northwest of Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk).[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made additional gains northwest of Vovkove, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[51] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Zelene, and Novyi Trud; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoyelyzavetivka, Ukrainka, Yasenove, Kotlyne, and Pishchane on January 6 and 7.[52] Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[53]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are still defending on the western outskirts of Kurakhove and maintain positions in the Kurakhivska Thermal Power Plant (TPP).[54] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are attempting to level Kurakhove to the ground. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces have concentrated their largest force grouping in the Kurakhove direction and are constantly replenishing frontline units to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations.[55] The spokesperson stated that recently deployed Russian troops often undergo fewer than two weeks of training before deploying to the frontline near Kurakhove. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using fewer armored vehicles in this direction than they used in late 2024. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 and 7 that Russian forces seized


Shevchenko (west of Kurakhove) and advanced in fields west of Petropavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and two kilometers west of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are advancing towards Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and recently seized Ukrainian positions near Dachne along the Vovcha River (west of Kurakhove) after temporarily resting and reconstituting for an unspecified period of time.[57] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Petropavlivka, Sribne, and Slovyanka; west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Dachne, and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopolske, Sukhi Yar, Yantarne, and Zelenivka on January 6 and 7.[58] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction, and artillerymen of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in western Kurakhove.[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kurakhove Direction 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and northwest of Velyka Novosilka towards Pryvilne on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[60]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to advance in small infantry groups toward Vasylivka (west of Robotyne and southeast of Kamyanske).[62] Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[63]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on January 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.[64] Elements of the Russian 81st Artillery Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) and 127th Reconnaissance Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction 7 January 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Ukraine's Southern Defense Force reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Osa air defense systems in unspecified areas in southern Ukraine.[66] Geolocated footage published by the Ukrainian Navy on January 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed Russian air defense systems, including at least one Pantsir-S1 system, near occupied Pryvillya, Kherson Oblast.[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 38 Shahed drones and other drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk Oblast.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 28 drones over Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy,

Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts; that 10 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that three drones returned to Russian airspace as of 0900 local time.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 7 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot downed six Russian cruise missiles during a single sortie on December 13.[69]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments. The Time of Heroes program announced on December 31 that over 15,000 Russian military veterans have applied for the second cohort of the program since November 2024 and that the application window is open until January 25.[70]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABEL STREET

[1] <https://t.me/voron100/110>; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8043;
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