



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:10pm ET on June 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russia will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats.

Putin stated during a meeting with the heads of foreign press organizations on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5 that Russia could begin supplying long-range weapons to unspecified adversaries of the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some Western restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia.[1] Putin rhetorically asked why Russia should not have the right to supply weapons of a similar class (compared to those the West has allowed Ukraine to use for strikes on Russian territory) to unspecified actors that will conduct strikes on Western "sensitive targets." [2] Kremlin actors routinely threaten to directly strike Western targets in an effort to use Western fears of escalation with Russia to encourage the West to self-deter its support for Ukraine, and Putin's June 5 threat is not a notable inflection in this regard.[3]

Putin may assess that select Western actors will be more concerned about Russia providing long-range strike capabilities to actors willing to attack the West than the Kremlin's tired rhetoric about direct confrontation between the West and Russia. Russia is very unlikely to directly provide scarce high-end long-range strike capabilities to other actors, however, since it uses many of these systems for large-scale strikes against Ukraine. It is also unclear what systems Putin means by weapons of a "similar class." The United Kingdom lifted restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of over 250 kilometers for strikes against military targets within Russia, which is the Western system with the longest range that Ukrainian forces are currently permitted to use for such strikes.[4] The kinds of long-range strike systems Russia could ostensibly give other actors would be limited if Putin's "proportional" threat is credible. Russia's likely unwillingness to provide long-range systems does not preclude Russian efforts to help the West's adversaries acquire long-range strike capabilities, however. Russia is reportedly providing North Korea with ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea's provision of artillery munition to Russia, for example.[5] Putin and the Kremlin have threatened escalation at every critical juncture in Western debates about support for Ukraine, and this latest threat aims to constrain the easing of remaining Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western weapons.[6] Lifting remaining

restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western weapons can allow Ukrainian forces to substantially degrade Russian operations by eliminating Russia's ability to use Russian territory as a sanctuary space to optimize its rear areas to support Russia's campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood.[7]

Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. The Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces announced on June 6 that four Russian vessels from the Northern Fleet – the *Admiral Gorshkov* frigate, the *Kazan* nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the *Academic Pashin* replenishment oiler, and the *Nikolai Chiker* rescue tug – will make an official visit to the port of Havana from June 12 to 17.[8] *Reuters* reported that a senior US official stated that the Russian vessels may also stop in Venezuela on an unspecified date in Summer 2024.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia's objective is to ensure a Russian naval presence in "operationally important areas of the far ocean zone." [10] Russian media noted that the *Admiral Gorshkov* is carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, which the Kremlin has touted as capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.[11] The Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces specifically claimed, however, that none of the vessels are carrying nuclear weapons, so the Russian port call "does not represent a threat to the region." [12] ISW is unable to verify this Cuban assertion. The Russian Navy's port calls in states in the Western hemisphere that have historically strained relationships with the US aim to highlight Russia's strong relations with these states and are likely part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to force the US to self-deter and not enact policies that offer further support to Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly used nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter during times when the West has faced key moments on critical policy decisions in how to best support Ukraine.[13] The Kremlin likely hopes that the clear allusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the inclusion of a reportedly nuclear weapons-capable ship will force the West to engage in self-deterrence. The Kremlin likely coordinated the announcement of the Russian navy's port calls in Cuba with Putin's threats to provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West, as both activities can instill fear in the West. Putin notably did not threaten escalation in Ukraine or direct confrontation between Russia and the West.

Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month. Putin inadvertently suggested that roughly 5,000 Russian personnel are killed in action in Ukraine each month, which further suggests that roughly 15,000 Russian personnel are wounded in action, assuming a standard three-to-one wounded-to-killed casualty ratio.[14] ISW cannot confirm Putin's suggested casualty rate and his apparent inadvertent admission does not serve as a clear claim about Russian casualties in Ukraine. Putin's suggested figure does align somewhat with the lower end of Ukrainian reporting about Russian casualty rates, however. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on May 2 that Russian forces suffer about 25,000 to 30,000 killed and wounded personnel per month.[15] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15, 2024, that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel per month.[16] Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, similarly claimed in mid-April 2024 that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000 new personnel each month.[17] Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment rates ahead of the expected Russian Summer 2024 offensive

effort, and it is unclear if the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has maintained the roughly 30,000 recruitment rate it reportedly had in January and April of 2024.[18]

Russian forces have notably established a more sustainable force generation apparatus in recent months for ongoing offensive operations and have intensified efforts to establish operational- and strategic-level reserves.[19] Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting in recent months that would generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.[20] This has allowed Russian forces to immediately replenish losses along the frontline and sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine but has set limits on the extent to which Russian forces can intensify offensive operations in any given direction.[21] The marginal amount of additional newly generated forces not immediately committed to the front as reinforcements has allowed Russian forces to gradually establish operational reserves.[22] Pavlyuk stated in early May 2024 that Russian forces intended to generate about 100,000 more personnel for use in offensive operations this June and July and 300,000 more personnel by the end of 2024.[23] Russia will likely fall far short of this immediate and near-term goal, even at the lower limit of reported or suggested monthly Russian casualties and the upper limit of reported monthly Russian force generation. ISW continues to assess that likely poorly trained and equipped Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale assaults in 2024 if Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.[24]

Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future. *Politico* reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium plan to send over 60 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine in Summer 2024.[25] *Politico* reported on June 5 that US, European, and Ukrainian officials and lawmakers stated that US, Danish, and Romanian F-16 pilot training facilities can only train a limited number of Ukrainian pilots, however. *Politico* reported that US Air Force Spokesperson Laurel Falls stated that the US National Guard is planning to train 12 Ukrainian pilots by the end of September 2024. The Danish training facility is reportedly training eight Ukrainian pilots, but this facility will reportedly close in November 2024, and the Romanian training facility is reportedly not yet operational. A full squadron of 20 aircraft requires 40 pilots. A former DoD official reportedly stated that if the current training constraints continue, Ukraine will only have enough pilots for a full squadron at the end of 2025. Ukraine will not be able to use all the Western-provided aircraft as effectively as possible until the necessary number of Ukrainian pilots complete training.

Select Western countries have indicated that Ukraine will be permitted to use F-16s for strikes within Russia but Ukraine's ability to operate F-16s near the international border is contingent on Ukraine's ability to destroy air defense assets in Russia.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine needs about 120–130 advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia but that Russia's biggest advantage is Western-imposed restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.[27] Ukraine may be able to set conditions to have Ukrainian aviation operate in the air domain to support Ukrainian ground operations if Ukraine is able to sufficiently destroy Russian air defense assets within Russia using Western long-range strike capabilities, obtain a sufficient cadre of pilots capable of flying F-16s, and receive a timely delivery and a sufficient number of F-16 airframes.

French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine. French media reported on June 5 and 6 that French authorities detained a man with pro-Russian beliefs and dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship at a hotel on the outskirts of Paris after the man sustained injuries from making explosives in his hotel room.[28] French media reported that French authorities assess that the man sought to attack French security assistance allocated to Ukraine and that authorities found additional explosives, materials to make explosives, small arms, money, and passports in the man's hotel room. The man reportedly fought with the Russian military for two years in an unspecified location (presumably in Ukraine) prior to this incident.[29] *NBC* reported that a source within the French National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office stated that it is "too early for us to say" whether the incident is connected to a Russian sabotage campaign, though French and other European intelligence agencies have recently warned about a projected increase in Russian sabotage operations in the coming weeks.[30] Macron plans to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 in Paris and *Reuters* reported that French officials may use the visit to announce the transfer of French military trainers to Ukraine.[31] Russian actors may be attempting to use sabotage attacks to degrade French support for Ukraine or disrupt French efforts to prepare materiel and military trainers for deployment to Ukraine. French authorities are also investigating potential Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in recent incidents likely aimed at fomenting domestic unrest and distrust of Macron.[32]

The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France. The Russian Investigative Committee announced and published footage of Russian authorities detaining an unspecified French citizen under charges of failing to provide proper documentation required by law for legally designated "foreign agents." The Russian Investigative Committee claimed in its report that the French citizen also spent "several years" on multiple trips to Russia collecting information about the Russian military that "can be used against the security of the [Russian] state" if "foreign sources" obtain this information, essentially accusing the man of espionage but not yet formally charging him with espionage-related offenses.[33] *Reuters* reported that Swiss-based nonprofit Center for Humanitarian Dialogue stated that Russian authorities arrested Laurent Vinatier, who worked as a Russia and Eurasia advisor for the center, and that French President Emmanuel Macron also confirmed Vinatier's arrest.[34]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.[35] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubov acknowledged that a fire started at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery after a drone strike.[36] Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows a fire at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov Oblast.[37] *Radio Svoboda* published satellite imagery on June 6 showing that the Ukrainian strike hit a liquified hydrocarbon gas production site.[38] *Radio Svoboda* reported that the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery has a capacity of five million tons per year, and a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the facility is mostly export oriented.[39] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in June 2022 and March 2023.[40] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on June 6 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Starooskolsky Gorodskoy Okrug.[41] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the reported Ukrainian strike on the oil depot in Starooskolsky Raion.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian

military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.^[42] Horbenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet *Ukrinform* published on June 6 that the Ukrainian military command and frontline commanders stated that the Ukrainian military needs 100,000 to 110,000 recruits in 2024. Western military aid to Ukraine is unlikely to provision and equip these forces with sufficient materiel given the current rate and limited scale at which Western military aid is arriving in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently acknowledged that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to commit reserves to ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations since the Ukrainian military is unable to sufficiently equip reserve brigades to conduct rotations for frontline units.^[43] The arrival of US and Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces on the frontline at scale will likely aid Ukrainian efforts to bring reserves closer to their intended end strength and sufficiently provision new planned brigades.

Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia. Taliban acting Minister of Labor and Social Relations Abdul Umari gave an interview to Kremlin newswire *TASS* at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 6 in which he expressed interest in expanding economic and energy ties with Russia and stated that the Taliban is "looking forward to Russia's decision to exclude [the Taliban] from the list of banned organizations [in Russia]."^[44] Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support for delisting the Taliban on May 28, ahead of the Taliban delegation's visit to Russia.^[45] Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated at a meeting with the security council secretaries of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states that Russia is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and claimed that there are unspecified "new militant training camps" in Afghanistan and unspecified terrorists are moving from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan.^[46] Shoigu's statement indicates that Russia is likely interested in cooperating with the Taliban to degrade the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), an adversary of the Taliban and the perpetrators of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.^[47]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage longstanding, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russian will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats.**
- **Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence.**
- **Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month.**

- **Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future.**
- **French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.**
- **The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France.**
- **Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.**
- **Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.**
- **Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, southeast of Kupyansk, northeast of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, south of Velyka Novosilka, and near Krynyky.**
- **Russia's continued demographic crisis will present long-term constraints on human capital within Russia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus


Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Lyptsi on June 5 but did not conduct offensive operations near Lyptsi on June 6, as of the Ukrainian General Staff's 1900 situation report.[48] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on June 5 that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with thermal imaging cameras to support night-time assaults and are conducting a high number of artillery and guided glide bomb strikes.[49] The Ukrainian servicemember also stated that Russian forces are using untrained personnel for assaults in the Kharkiv direction. Unspecified elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued fighting in the area on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 400 meters in an unspecified area in the Vovchansk direction.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near the Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk and near Starytsya and Buhruvatka (southwest of Vovchansk) on June 6.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Vovchansk on June 5 but did not conduct offensive operations on June 6, as of the Ukrainian General Staff's June 6 1900 situation report.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▬ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- ▬ Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced northwest of Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized attack, indicating that Russian forces may have also advanced further in Ivanivka itself.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also captured several Ukrainian positions about 1.5 kilometers south of Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk) and southwest of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna).[56] Russian forces also continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Myasozharivka; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna and Druzhelyubivka; west of Kreminna near Nevske; and south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 5 and 6.[57] Elements of the Russian 375th Separate Anti-tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[58]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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	Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours		Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*		Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
	Russian Ground Lines of Communication		Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory		Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
	Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24		Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory		


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 6 that Russian forces advanced 500 meters near Rozdolivka.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters in the direction of Rozdolivka (south of Siversk).[60] The Ukrainian General Staff reported fighting northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on June 5 and 6.[61]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces seized 40 percent of Paraskoviivka. A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in Paraskoviivka.

Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar on the eastern side of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal.^[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the west side of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal southeast of the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).^[63] Fighting continued north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka; west of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; near the Kanal and Novyi microraions (eastern Chasiv Yar); and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka on June 5 and 6.^[64] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and Chechen 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.^[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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A Russian source claimed on June 2 that Russian forces advanced in Kalynivka.

Geolocated footage posted on June 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Chasiv Yar.


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- Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut City Limits
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces made a confirmed advanced northwest of Avdiivka, likely within the past week, amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced on the eastern outskirts of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), likely within the past week.[66] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kalynove (north of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[67] Footage published on June 6 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault near Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), and Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated that unspecified VDV elements conducted the assault.[68] A Russian milblogger recently claimed in mid-May that drone operators of the 98th VDV Division were operating near Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[69] ISW has not observed widespread claims of elements of the 98th VDV Division operating in the Avdiivka direction, and Russian and Ukrainian sources have widely reported that elements of the 98th VDV Division are attacking near Chasiv Yar.[70] Fighting continued north of Avdiivka near Kalynove; northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Prohres, Yevhenivka, Novopokrovske, Sokil, and Novoselivka Persha; and west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka, Umanske, and Karlivka.[71]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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A Russian source claimed on June 2 that Russian forces seized half of Sokil.

Geolocated footage posted on June 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Solovyovo.

Geolocated footage posted on June 3 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Netaylove.

- Avdiivka and Pokrovsk City Limits
- ▭ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▭ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▭ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 6 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters in Novooleksandrivka. A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in Paraskoviivka. A Russian source claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced one and a half kilometers toward Karlivka. A Russian source claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced 450 meters wide and 1.32 kilometers deep east of Karlivka.


Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control up to half of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City), which is consistent with ISW's assessed Russian advances within the settlement.[73] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka.[74] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City).[75]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblast border area amid continued Russian ground attacks in the area on June 6. Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[76] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Prechystivka (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[77] Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine and Staromayorske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryyutne and Novodariivka on June 6.[78] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces became more active in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on June 6.[79] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[80]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 6, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne) on June 5 and 6.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along a 2.85-kilometer-wide front south and southeast of Robotyne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[82]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhia as of June 6, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Field Fortifications |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced 500 meters along a one-and-one-half-kilometer-wide front northeast of Robotyne.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River near Krynky, where fighting continued.[83] Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows that Russian infantry reached the northern bank of the Krynka River (a small river immediately north of Krynky on the east bank of the Dnipro River) before a Ukrainian drone struck the infantry group.[84]



Ukrainian forces struck and reportedly sunk a Russian tugboat near occupied Crimea overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR units struck a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Project 498 (also classified as Saturn or Protey) tugboat in occupied Lake Panske (a saltwater lake off Crimea's western coast connected to the Black Sea), and geolocated footage from the GUR shows Ukrainian naval drones breaking through Russian naval defenses and striking the boat.[85] The GUR reported that the Russian tugboat sunk.[86] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov credited Ukrainian Magura V5 naval drones with sinking over \$200 million's worth of Russian ships since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[87]

Russian forces have suddenly removed several Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessels from port in Novorossiysk, some of which are reportedly sailing towards Crimea as of this publication. A naval-focused open-source analyst reported on June 5 that satellite imagery collected on June 5 indicates that Russia moved at least 11 naval vessels from the port, including two Project 22160 Vasily Bukov-class patrol ships, two Project 21631 Buyan-M-class small missile ships, two Kilo-class submarines, a Project 12700 Alexandrit-class minesweeper, two Project 266M Natya-class minesweepers, a Project 1171 Tapir-class landing ship, and an unspecified number of Ropucha-class landing ships.[88] One analyst noted that the low resolution of the available makes it difficult to verify whether all the vessels at port have left but noted that it appears that even the submarines left the port.[89] Additional satellite imagery dated June 6 shows that at least 10 Russian vessels remain in the immediate Novorossiysk area, reportedly within 2.5 kilometers of the port entrance, and imagery shows that at least eight Russian vessels are sailing in formation in the Black Sea.[90] One of the analysts reported that the latter grouping is headed towards Crimea.[91] It is unclear why Russia has moved at least 18 vessels from port in Novorossiysk. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense reported that Russian forces have struggled with logistics across the Kerch Strait following a May 29 Ukrainian strike on ferries across the strait, and Russian landing vessels may be headed to the strait to act as ferries for Russian military logistics.[92] The composition of the vessels headed towards Crimea is currently unclear, however. The sudden removal of naval assets from port could also indicate that Russian authorities are concerned about Ukrainian strikes against the port.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukraine on the night of June 5 to 6. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast and 18 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down 17 of the drones over Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[93] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck a warehouse at a hypermarket in Kherson City overnight with unspecified munitions.[94]

Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces damaged a Ukrainian Su-25 aircraft at the Dolhintsevo Airfield near Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with Lancet drones on June 5.[95]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia's continued demographic crisis will present long-term constraints on human capital within Russia. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported on June 6 that Russian birth rates have faced larger-than-average declines in Russian regions closer to Ukraine, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov told the WSJ that increasing Russia's birthrate is a Russian government priority.[96] The WSJ reported that as of July 2023 920,000 Russians have left Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion and noted that Russia has failed to increase migration flows to Russia.[97] The Russian Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy noted in a report published in January 2024 that 47 percent of Russian manufacturing firms reported labor shortages, and the Gaidar Institute stated in its latest forecast report on the Russian economy published in March 2024 that labor shortages resulting from long-term population decline, partial military mobilization, and decreased immigration flows will limit opportunities for increasing Russian economic output.[98] The Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences published a report in December 2023 that projected that Russia would face a shortage of 4.8 million workers by the end of 2023.[99] The Kremlin is currently pursuing an uneven migration policy to fill certain labor requirements with migrants, although crypto-mobilization campaigns targeting migrants and appeals to anti-migrant sentiment are likely undermining this effort.[100] Continued labor shortages will place limits on Russia's ability to further mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) in the near-to-medium term and pose existential issues for long-term Russian economic viability.

Russia's demographic crisis is likely further incentivizing Russian President Vladimir Putin's attempt to subsume the Ukrainian people into Russia. Select Kremlin officials are promoting the return of "compatriots abroad" and the "reunification of Belarusians and Ukrainians" with Russia as an alternative to migration, and Russian victory in Ukraine would represent a dramatic shift in Russia's demographic situation.[101] American Enterprise Institute (AEI) political economist Nicholas Eberstadt told the WSJ that the Kremlin's most successful population program has been the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories, where roughly five million Ukrainians live and from where Russia has deported roughly 4.8 million Ukrainians to Russia.[102] A Russian victory in Ukraine would grant Russia access to millions more people whom it could impress into military service and the Russian economy as well as Ukraine's resources and industrial capacity.[103]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone producer Stratim Design Bureau stated on June 3 that Russian forces operating in Ukraine are currently testing two new drones with limited autonomous targeting capabilities.[104] Stratim Design Bureau stated that Russian forces are testing the "Rusak" quadcopter drone and the "Tyuvik" fixed-winged drone, both of which allow operators to set targets for the drones' terminal phases so that the drones can autonomously strike targets without operator guidance.[105] Stratim Design Bureau claimed that electronic warfare (EW) systems do not disrupt the drone's ability to autonomously target and that the drone's terminal phase is usually when Ukrainian EW interferes with the drones.[106] The "Rusak" drone reportedly has a payload of 2.5-to-three kilograms, a flight range of 10 kilometers, and a flight time of up to ten minutes; and the "Tyuvik" drone reportedly has a payload of up to three kilograms, a flight range of 30 kilometers, and a flight time of up to 20 minutes.[107] Stratim Design Bureau stated it will present both drones at the HeliRussia exhibition in Moscow from June 10 to 12.[108]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not published coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated a number of known Kremlin information operations during a meeting with foreign journalists on June 5.[109] Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and the West started the war in Ukraine with the 2014 Euromaidan movement and that the United States is dictating Ukrainian domestic policy and trying to remove Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from power.[110] Putin flaunted Russian nuclear doctrine as part of Kremlin efforts to use nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter, likely on Western policies involving Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory.[111] Putin also continued to use complex legal jargon to incorrectly claim that the Ukrainian Constitution and law do not permit the extension of presidential terms and that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine.[112]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Russia and Belarus continue efforts to expand bilateral cooperation through the Union State. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu discussed preparations for security agreements as part of the Security Concept of the Union State with Belarusian officials on June 6.[113] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin stated on June 6 that Russia and Belarus may sign a new security agreement as early as December 2024.[114] Galuzin also stated that Belarus and Russia are completing work to establish an information system to support mutual visa recognition.[115] Belarusian Energy Minister Viktor Karankevich stated on June 6 that Russia and Belarus are making "significant progress" towards creating a common energy market.[116]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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BABEL STREET

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*Note: Putin absurdly claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces suffer 50,000 casualties per month and that half of these are wounded in action (WIA) and the other half is killed in action (KIA). Putin then claimed that Ukrainian forces have a five-to-one "irretrievable loss" rate compared to Russian forces

(Russian and Ukrainian sources typically use "irretrievable losses" to refer to KIA losses, although select sources do use the term to refer to limited WIA losses). Putin's statements suggest that Russian forces are roughly suffering 5,000 KIA per month (25,000 Ukrainian KIA to 5,000 Russian KIA). Putin's statements are an exaggeration and there is no indication that Ukrainian losses are as high as Putin claims. Nevertheless, Putin was willing to suggest that Russian forces suffer at least a fifth of his exaggerated Ukrainian KIA claim.

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