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March 10, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on March 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. *Reuters* reported on March 9 that two US officials stated that the US is planning to use the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part to determine whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end the war."^[1] One US official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and "I refuse to compromise on anything" at the upcoming talks. The other US official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are interested not just in peace, but in a *realistic* [emphasis added] peace." The *Financial Times* reported on March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine will propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat operations in the Black Sea.^[2] Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported on March 10 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian delegation's position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW) exchange.^[3] The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to implement quickly" and to "control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March 5, and Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward and do not require extended negotiations or a complex monitoring process.^[4] A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of complex front line characterized by multiple "gray zones" where the lines of opposing forces are blurred would be extremely difficult to negotiate and monitor. Zelensky has also indicated several times — including in his February 28 *Fox News* interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace.^[5]

Russian officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war.^[6] Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and the Russian World [*Russkiy Mir*]," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov similarly defined the alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the Kremlin's rhetoric on this topic has not changed in the over two months, even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks

in February 2024.[7] Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and constant reiteration of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.[8]

Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that US and Russian diplomats voted the same way for the first time in three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United Nations (UN) resolution on February 24.[9] This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[10] Lavrov claimed that the "ultraliberal ruling elites of the West," support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did not mention the United States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived ideological wedge between the United States and Europe. Lavrov's use of the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's February 27 claim that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun.[11] Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 10 that the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts" and has tasked non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump.[12] The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the UK's hosting of a virtual meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth countries to support a ceasefire agreement.[13] Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump administration statements and actions to divide the United States and Europe and will likely continue such efforts to secure maximum concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to fracture the US-Europe relationship to Russia's benefit.[14]

Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[15] Elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly attacking near Martynovka.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Agronom and Kolmakov (both east of Sudzha), Mikhailovka (northeast of Sudzha), and Bogdanovka (north of Sudzha).[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in Mirny (east of Sudzha) and Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[18] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are also attacking the outskirts of Sudzha, north of Sudzha near Ivashkovskiy, east of Sudzha near Dmitryukov, and south of Sudzha near Melovoi and Guyevo.[19] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and up to two battalions of North Korean forces are reportedly attacking south of Sudzha near Kurilovka and Guyevo.[20]


Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the international border. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 10 that Ukraine is reinforcing its force grouping in Kursk and Sumy oblasts with additional drone and electronic warfare (EW) units and that Ukrainian forces are successfully countering the threat of Russian encirclement in Kursk Oblast and along the international border.[21] Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that Ukrainian forces are working to repel Russian attacks in the direction of Novenke and Zhuravka (both northeast of Sumy City) and noted that Russian forces are trying to cut Ukraine's main ground line of communication (GLOC) along the Sumy City-Sudzha H-07 highway.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novenke, Zhuravka, and Basivka (also northeast of Sumy City).[23] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are operating in Zhuravka.[24] Demchenko stated that Russian forces do not currently have the capacity to conduct a significant cross border operation into other areas of northern Ukraine.[25]

Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov signed a memorandum of understanding with German defense manufacturer Diehl Defense on March 9 to triple the supply of IRIS-T air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine and establish longer-term industrial projects that will strengthen Ukraine's air defense.[26] Director of the Procurement Policy Department of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) Hlib Kanevsky reported on March 10 that the MoD plans to purchase approximately 4.5 million first-person view (FPV) drones from domestic producers in 2025 — the projected limit of Ukrainian domestic drone production for 2025.[27] The MoD announced that it will allocate an estimated 102 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (approximately \$2.4 billion) to this initiative. Ukrainian Armor LLC CEO Vladyslav Belbas announced on March 10 that the company is on track to produce at least 50 percent more Novator armored vehicles in 2025 compared to 2024 and that the company aims to provide Ukrainian forces with several hundred armored vehicles.[28] Belbas noted that the company delivered over 100 armored vehicles to Ukrainian forces as of August 2024.[29]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered.**
- **Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.**
- **Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days.**

- **Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.**



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of March 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ryazan oil refinery, which provides fuel for the Russian military, causing an explosion.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ryazan oil refinery produces fuel for Russian jet engines. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses downed drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of March 8 to 9.[31]

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery, which provides fuel via a pipeline and railways line to Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[32] Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery is one of the 10 largest oil refineries in Russia and has a refining capacity

of 8.8 million tons of oil per year.[33] A source in Ukraine's special services told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* that Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces fuel for supersonic aircraft jet engines.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones over Samara Oblast on the night of March 9 to 10.[35]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 10.[36]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated that Russian forces conduct infantry assaults in the area because Ukrainian drones have created a "red zone" behind the frontline where Russian forces cannot operate armored vehicles.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced 7.87 square kilometers northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, but Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov refused to comment on this claim and noted that the frontline remains "dynamic."^[38] A Russian milblogger responded to the Ukrainian source's claim and indicated that Ukrainian forces could have advanced in the contested "grey zone" near Synkivka because the Russian defensive line is brittle and understaffed.^[39]

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 9 and 10.[40]

Trehubov reported on March 10 that some Russian infantry groups managed to cross the Oskil River but are struggling to establish a bridgehead on its west (right) bank before the river melts.[41] Trehubov noted that Russian forces have been attempting to cross to the west bank when it is frozen. Trehubov assessed that Russian forces will need to use boats to transport manpower to the west bank of Oskil River once ice on the river melts, which will further complicate Russia's efforts to establish a bridgehead.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations the Borova direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on March 9 and 10.[43]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Borova direction reported on March 10 that Russian forces have intensified air strikes, aerial reconnaissance, and drone strikes in the area since March 3 after the weather improved.[44]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces recently advanced to the fields southwest of Zhuravka (northeast of Lyman, formerly Nevske).[45]

Russian forces reportedly intensified attacks in the Lyman direction and attacked northeast of Lyman near Torske, Nove, Novomykhailivka, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Novolyubivka, Myrne, Balka Zhuravka (formerly Nevske), and Ivanivka on March 9 and 10.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and in the direction of Serebryanka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on March 9 and 10. [48]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Grouping of Forces reported on March 10 that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attacking with armored vehicles including tanks in the Siversk direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 10 but did not advance.


Russian forces continued attacks near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, south of Chasiv Yar towards Stupochky and Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on March 9 and 10.[50]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets speculated on March 10 that Russia may replace the commander of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division because Russian forces failed to seize Chasiv Yar by March 1, 2025.[51] Zaporozhets noted that this information is unconfirmed.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction March 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tobolenka Street in western Toretsk.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 10 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Krymske (north of Toretsk).[54]


Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Krymske, and Druzhba; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka on March 9 and 10.[55]

Zaporozhets stated on March 10 that Russia has transferred elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) from the Kurakhove direction and unspecified Russian units from the Pokrovsk direction to Toretsk.[56] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction also stated that Russian forces transferred unspecified units from the Pokrovsk direction to Toretsk.[57] ISW has not previously observed claims of Russian forces redeploying from the Pokrovsk to Toretsk direction and has not observed indications of such a redeployment as of this report. The officer stated that fighting is intensifying in the Toretsk direction and that Russian forces are using more light and armored vehicles in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Toretsk.[58]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction March 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk) and in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).^[59]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to Moskovska Street in southern Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[60] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on March 10 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north and northeast of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).^[61]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 9 that Russian forces advanced east of Shevchenko.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained lost positions in Shevchenko and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the northern and northeastern outskirts of the settlement.[63] A Russian source claimed that reports that Ukrainian forces occupy almost half of Shevchenko are inaccurate.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vidrozhenya (formerly Novyi Trud), and Zelene; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Novooleksandrivka on March 9 and 10.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Nova Poltavka, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), Oleksandropil, Pishchane, Shevchenko, Udachne, and Kotlyne.[66]

A senior Ukrainian officer in an artillery battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on March 10 that Russian forces have not been using heavy equipment recently, possibly due to armor shortages, and that Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian advances near Kotlyne.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are sometimes using armored vehicles near Udachne and Kotlyne.[68] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating more drones in the Pokrovsk direction and are preventing Russian forces from transporting reinforcements and ammunition to the front and that Russian forces are exhausted due to several months of continuous assaults.[69]

Deputy Chairperson of the State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots Viktor Vodolatsky claimed that Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the southern side of the Pokrovsk direction in an unspecified area, while a Russian source claimed to Kremlin newswire *TASS* that Russian forces have "practically" come "very close" to the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast[70][71] ISW has only observed geolocated footage confirming that Russian forces are roughly 3.5 kilometers from the administrative border.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[72] Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Shevchenko.[73] Drone operators of the 1st Slovyansk Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakove direction on March 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced west and southwest of Kostyantynopil and near Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove) and Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).^[75]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Andriivka, west of Kurakhove near Ulakly and Kostyantynopil, and southwest of Kostyantynopil near Rozlyv on March 9 and 10.^[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Bahatyr and Rozlyv.^[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and elements of the 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil, and elements of the 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Rozlyv. ^[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 10 but did not advance.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction March 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Vesele; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 9 and 10.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[80]


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on March 10.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole.^[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 10 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 10 that Russian forces are advancing towards Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne).[82]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Nesteryanka, and Pyatykhatky and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on March 9 and 10.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia

direction.[84] Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[85] Drone operators of the Russian "Gepard" Battalion (71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka.[86][87]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Dnipro direction in Kherson Oblast on March 9 and 10 but did not advance.[88]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 176 Shahed and decoy drones from the

directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed 130 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts and that 42 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kyiv oblasts.[90]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.[91] Putin called to extend the "Defenders of the Fatherland" Foundation's fund to family members of Russian servicemembers who are missing in action (MIA) in the war in Ukraine; to support combat veterans' entrepreneurial activities and increase funding for state social assistance programs; to classify participants of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as combat veterans; and to consider extending social support to the brothers and sisters of deceased Russian servicemembers if the siblings are under 18 years old and to unadopted children of the deceased servicemember. Putin also signed a decree on March 10 creating a commission in the State Council to support combat veterans and their families.[92] Russian Presidential Aide and Secretary of the State Council Alexei Dyumin stated that the new commission will coordinate federal and regional government efforts to support Russian veterans.[93] A Russian insider source claimed that the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation does not have unlimited resources so expanding its functions will require increased state funding.[94] The insider source claimed that the proposal about supporting veterans' entrepreneurship is aimed at increasing Russia's economic development but will require subsidies, preferential lending programs, business training, and tax breaks. The insider source noted that there is an imbalance among Russian federal subjects, with some regions providing veterans with significant benefits, while others offer minimal aid. The source claimed that Kremlin attempts to unify support measures across Russia will put extra burdens on the budgets of the federal subjects.

Russian federal subjects continue to increase financial incentives to Russian military personnel to boost recruitment. Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor Kobzev stated on March 10 that the oblast increased its one-time payment to people who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) by a factor of 2.5 to one million rubles (about \$11,400).[95]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The All-Russian People's Front's "Kulibin Club" claimed on March 7 that engineers created the Q10 drone with artificial intelligence (AI) that makes the drone responsive to the operator's commands, reduces the drone's energy consumption, and stabilizes the drone's flight.[96] Russian forces on the frontlines are reportedly testing 30 Q10 drones.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities continue to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian banking system. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on March 10 that occupation authorities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast will launch the Zaporizhia Oblast Resident Card, a project of Russia's Mir payment system.[97]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-assess-ukraines-peace-stance-saudi-arabia-meeting-2025-03-09/>

[2] <https://www.ft.com/content/842692b9-ffa3-422d-9343-0d7cd0b2392d>

[3] <https://suspilne dot media/967193-u-sauidivskij-aravii-ukraina-proponuvatime-rezim-tisi-u-nebita-na-mori-dzerelo/>

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