



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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**March 11, 2025, 6:45pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on March 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the United States reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.**[1] US and Ukrainian representatives met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11 for bilateral talks and agreed to the ceasefire proposal, which the United States will soon propose to Russia. The US-Ukrainian joint statement emphasized that Russia's reciprocity to this ceasefire proposal is the key to achieving peace and noted that the ceasefire can be extended if all parties agree. The joint statement noted that the United States will immediately lift its suspension on intelligence sharing and military assistance to Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine also agreed to finalize a deal on minerals as soon as possible. Ukraine reiterated in the joint statement that European partners will be involved in the peace process. The United States and Ukraine also discussed humanitarian relief to Ukraine, especially during the ceasefire, including the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa confirmed on March 11 that the United States has already resumed the flow of military assistance to Ukraine.[2] A source close to the Ukrainian government told *CNN* that the United States also fully restored intelligence sharing to Ukraine on March 11.[3]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the ceasefire would encompass a cease in combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and the

cessation of operations in the Black Sea and would begin as soon as Russia agrees to the US proposal.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded during a press conference on March 11 to a question about a deadline for Russia to respond, stating that the deadline is "as quickly as possible," that the United States will inform Russia about the ceasefire proposal through multiple diplomatic channels, and that the "ball is now in [Russia's] court." [5] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated that he will speak with his Russian counterpart in the coming days and clarified that the resumed US military assistance to Ukraine includes the provision of material authorized under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).[6] European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for the 30-day ceasefire proposal and emphasized that the onus to respond is now on Russia.[7]

Russian ultranationalist voices, including a Russian State Duma deputy, largely rejected the ceasefire proposal on March 11. Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-coopted milbloggers, rejected the ceasefire proposal because the United States and Ukraine will allegedly "abandon" peace "at the first opportunity" and the war in Ukraine is existential for Russia.[8] One milblogger claimed that accepting the ceasefire would be "pure betrayal and sabotage," and another milblogger questioned the purpose of accepting this ceasefire proposal without achieving Russia's war aims.[9] Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev stated after the publication of the joint statement that Russia should not agree to the "unacceptable" 30-day ceasefire proposal because it would allow Ukraine to rearm and regroup.[10]

The Kremlin has not officially responded to the ceasefire proposal as of this publication, and Russian state media is attempting to frame earlier official Russian statements about bilateral US-Russian negotiations as responses to the ceasefire proposal. Following the publication of the ceasefire proposal, Russian state media largely amplified a statement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova from earlier in the day on March 11 saying that Russia "does not rule out" contacts with the United States in the next few days.[11] Russian State Duma Security Committee member Mikhail Sheremet stated before the joint statement was released that Russia is interested in a settlement in Ukraine but will not allow itself to be deceived, and Russian state media only amplified Sheremet's statement after the ceasefire proposal.[12] Russian state media is likely attempting to portray the immediate Russian reaction as moderate for domestic audiences until Kremlin officials make public statements and provide a framing for broader Russian media coverage of the proposal.

**Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees — the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement.** French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 11 that France "will refuse any form of demilitarization of Ukraine" and that the "first guarantee of security remains the Ukrainian army." [13] *Reuters* reported that 34 military officials from European NATO states, EU states, Asia, and Oceania, met on March 11 in Paris to assess their militaries' capabilities to maintain Ukraine's long-term military strength and to guarantee Ukrainian security in the event of a permanent ceasefire in the war.[14] French President Emmanuel Macron stated after the meeting that Ukraine's partners must "define credible security guarantees" for Ukraine.[15] A French military official told the *Associated Press* on March 10 that the meeting would discuss a French and British plan for the creation of a multinational force that would aim to reassure Ukraine and deter

another large-scale Russian offensive.[16] The official stated that the envisaged force could include heavy weaponry and weapons stockpiles that participating militaries could deploy to help Ukraine defend itself in "hours or days" in the event of a renewed Russian attack. A strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees continues to be the strongest deterrent against another Russian invasion in the future, and Russia has been repeatedly insisting on Ukraine's "demilitarization" and disarmament in order to deny Ukraine this deterrent and allow Russia to renew attacks against Ukraine at a time of Moscow's choosing in the future.


*Bloomberg* reported on March 11 that Western security officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "no intention" of making compromises on territory, peacekeepers, or Ukrainian neutrality and that Putin is prepared to continue fighting if he doesn't achieve his objectives in his war in Ukraine.[17] The officials stated that Putin has deliberately made "maximalist" demands, knowing that Ukraine and Europe would likely find these demands unacceptable. Western security officials' reports of the Kremlin's intention to achieve its "maximalist" goals in Ukraine are consistent with Putin's and other Russian officials' public statements, even as the Kremlin has attempted to posture itself as open to negotiations and ending the war.[18]

**Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have likely begun attacking Sudzha.** Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Bondarevka (east of Sudzha), Zamostye, and Makhnovka (both southeast of Sudzha).[19] Additional geolocated footage published on March 10 and 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Zazulevka (north of Sudzha), in the southeastern outskirts of Kolmakov (southeast of Sudzha), and south of Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 11 that Russian forces seized Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha), and recent Russian gains north of Kazachya Loknya and east of Sudzha have likely forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Kazachya Loknya and Knyazhiy 2 (north of Sudzha and immediately south of Kazachya Loknya).[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolmakov and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha) and advanced east of Sverdlikovo along the 38K-030 Koronevo-Sudzha highway.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) seized Knyazhiy 1 (north of Sudzha).[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced to the outskirts of Zaoloshenka (just north of Sudzha) and that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are advancing into Sudzha itself from Mirny (east of Sudzha).[24] Russian forces continued attacking within Sudzha itself; north of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya, Yuzhny, Kubatkino, and Ivashkovsky; and near the international border in Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka.[25] Elements of the Russian "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating east of Sudzha near Mirny.[26]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov visited a command post in Kursk Oblast on March 11. Gerasimov heard reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk and other unspecified Russian commanders about Russian operations in the area.[27]

Russian forces continue conducting raids along the Sumy-Kursk oblast international border. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces, reportedly a sabotage and

reconnaissance group, recently advanced southwest of Tetkino (northwest of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast).[28] The assistant head of a Ukrainian border guards detachment stated on March 11 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are conducting operations along the international border in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[29] Ukrainian military officials stated that small Russian infantry groups are attempting to gain a foothold in unspecified areas in Sumy Oblast and that Russian forces recently intensified drone and artillery strikes against Sumy Oblast border areas.[30]



**Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and other Ukrainian forces military struck "a number of strategic objects" in Russia on the night of March 10 to 11.[31] The Ukrainian General


Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Moscow Oil Refinery's production facilities, which process 11 million tons of oil per year and provide 40 to 50 percent of Moscow City's diesel and gasoline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported explosions near an energy facility in Stalnoi Kon, Oryol Oblast that controls processes within the Druzhba oil pipeline and supplies oil to the Ust-Luga seaport in Leningrad Oblast. Moscow City and Oblast officials claimed that drone debris fell in Domodedovo and Leninsky Raion and struck civilian infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Ramenskoye and Domodedovo.[32] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that it geolocated footage reportedly filmed on the morning of March 11 showing the aftermath of drone strikes against the Oka-Tsentr oil depot in Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 343 drones overnight, including 91 over Moscow Oblast.[34] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that drones struck Moscow City, the Dyagilevo Airbase in Ryazan City, and Kursk Oblast.[35] *Astra* also stated that locals in Ryazan City reported explosions as drones reportedly struck the Dyagilevo Airbase.[36] Ryazan Oblast Governor claimed that Russian forces destroyed 22 drones over the oblast and that there was no material damage.[37]

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the US reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.**
- **Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees – the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement.**
- **Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have likely begun attacking Sudzha.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Robotyne and in Kursk Oblast.**
- **The Kremlin continues to expand social benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

## March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

*See topline text.*

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 10 and 11.[38]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Kruhlyakivka on March 10 and 11.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[40]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Lozova, Zahryzove, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Hrektivka on March 10 and 11.[41]**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 11 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer west of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[42]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman toward Zelena Dolyna and near Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Katerynivka; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, and Novolyubivka; and east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne on March 10 and 11.[43]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction posted footage on March 10 showing Russian forces conducting a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault with at least two armored vehicles in the Lyman direction.[44] The Ukrainian brigade noted that Russian forces are increasing the number of assaults in this direction.

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**


**Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 showing Russian forces conducting a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[45] Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 armored vehicles and one tank and damaged 16 armored vehicles and two tanks during the Russian attack.[46]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion (7th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[47]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Fedorivka on March 10 and 11.[48]

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 11 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued attacks near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Dyliivka, and Bila Hora on March 10 and 11.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[50]

### **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 6 and 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk) and to the Tsentralna Mine in central Toretsk.[51]


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Dachne (north of Toretsk).[52]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; southwest of Toretsk near Valentynivka, Yurivka, and Panteleymonivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dylivka; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; and east of Toretsk near Druzhba on March 10 and 11.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Toretsk.[54]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on March 11 that Russian forces have resumed infantry assaults within Toretsk after several weeks of decreased Russian activity.[55] The deputy commander added that Russian forces deployed new infantry to the area who are better trained and equipped than the convict recruits previously deployed in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 381st Artillery Regiment, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[56]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




### Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Vodyane Druhe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Pomin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Dachenske, Novotroitske, and Mykolaivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vidrozhenya (formerly Novyi Trud), Novoukrainka, and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka, Bohdanivka, and Kotlyarivka; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 10 and 11.[58] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko.[59]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces rarely use modern vehicles but sometimes use old, Soviet-era vehicles.[60] The commander stated that Russian forces are mainly using civilian vehicles and that the tempo of Russian offensive operations has decreased as Russian forces are regrouping. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces usually attack in assault groups of four to five personnel and are using civilian vehicles and motorcycles.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[62]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 11 but did not advance.**



Russian forces attacked northwest of Kurakhove near Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka and Kostyantynopil; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Rozdolne on March 10 and 11.[63]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 11 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) seized Dniproenerhiya (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 10 and 11 that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) advanced to central Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne, Dniproenerhiya, and Vesele; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 10 and 11.[66]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

**Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 showing a Russian servicemember raising a Russian flag in central Pyatykhatky (northwest of Robotyne) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[67] Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 11 that elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) seized Pyatykhatky.[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Lobkove on March 10 and 11.[70]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed that a battalion of the 247th Airborne Regiment redeployed to Pyatykhatky from near Robotyne prior to Russian forces' alleged seizure of Pyatykhatky.[71]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dniro direction on March 10 and 11 but did not advance.[72]**

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction March 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; 126 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed the ballistic missile and 79 Shahed and decoy drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts and that 35 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that

Russian drones damaged fuel, warehouses, and civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and caused damage in unspecified parts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblast.[75]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Kremlin continues to expand social benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 10 providing one-time payments of up to six million rubles (about \$70,072) to servicemembers who fought with the DNR and LNR militias since May 2014 and became disabled due to their service.[76] LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik announced on March 11 that he amended a decree entitling residents of occupied Luhansk Oblast who signed contracts with Rosgvardia between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2025 to one-time payments of 400,000 rubles (about \$4,671).[77]

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved on March 10 a Russian government proposal to hold Russia-Belarus talks to amend the 2009 bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation.[78] Russia likely aims to further leverage Belarus to evade international sanctions for defense production in support of the war in Ukraine.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] [https://x.com/MFA\\_Ukraine/status/1899523451398013397](https://x.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1899523451398013397); <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553> ; <https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/644892571521556>; <https://suspilne.org>

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<https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1899563904755180002>

[2] <https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/644892571521556>; <https://suspilne dot media/968345-ssa-vze-vidnovili-bezpekovu-dopomogu-zaaviv-zastupnik-golovi-op-palisa/>

[3] <https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1899563904755180002>

[4] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13545](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13545)

[5] <https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-rubio-and-national-security-adviser-waltz-speak-to-reporters-in-saudi-arabia/657068>

[6] <https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-rubio-and-national-security-adviser-waltz-speak-to-reporters-in-saudi-arabia/657068>

[7] <https://x.com/vonderleyen/status/1899538326438261074>;  
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