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and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel**

March 12, 2025, 8:00pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on March 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint temporary ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead of ourselves." [1] Peskov stated that Russia expects US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform the Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations. [2] Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on March 12 that its sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in private before publicly announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin time to formulate a prepared response. [3]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started. *Reuters* reported on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address [Russia's] concerns." [4] *Bloomberg* reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account." [5] A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select countries. Suspending US or other military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and assistance from Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. [6] Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire in the first place. [7]

Russian opposition outlet *Verstka* reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree. [8] The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen

Russia's negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the temporary ceasefire "must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to receive weapons and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may be intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.

Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them. The US-Ukrainian joint statement announcing the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 11 noted that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between their March 11 temporary ceasefire proposal and future peace negotiations.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 following the US-Ukrainian talks in Jeddah that the best goodwill gesture Russia can give would be to accept the ceasefire proposal and that if Russia says no, "then we'll know the impediment to peace." [10] Rubio characterized Ukraine's agreement to the ceasefire as the "kind of concession you would need to see in order to end the conflict." [11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 12 that Ukraine will use the 30-day ceasefire to prepare agreements with partners regarding a sustainable peace and long-term security guarantees.[12] The Kremlin's reported intention to make demands supporting its overall war objectives before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire violates the stated purpose of the ceasefire and the sequence of negotiations that US President Donald Trump has laid out. If the Kremlin holds the ceasefire hostage to demand preemptive concessions while continuing to pursue battlefield victories, that would strongly indicate that Russia lacks any urgency about ending the war and is uninterested in making any meaningful concessions.

Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months. Putin outlined in June 2024 — and reiterated in December 2024 — his prerequisite demands for agreeing to a ceasefire.[13] These demands include the full Ukrainian withdrawal from the territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy and Ukraine's official abandonment of its goal of joining NATO. Kremlin officials have repeatedly insisted that any peace negotiations to take into consideration the "realities on the ground," and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably claimed on February 24 that Russia would only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the "realities" of the battlefield.[14] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire *RIA Novosti* on February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the "root causes" of the war.[15] Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly claimed that any peace agreement must take into account the "root causes" of the war, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[16]

A leaked February 2025 document from a think tank close to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that outlined a possible Kremlin negotiating strategy is largely in line with the Kremlin's recent public

rhetoric and the March 12 Russian insider source reports. The *Washington Post* reported on March 12 that a European intelligence service obtained a document from a Russian think tank close to the Russian FSB's Fifth Service (which oversees operations in Ukraine among other things) written in the week before the February 18 US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[17] The document states that a peace settlement to the war in Ukraine "cannot happen before 2026," rejects the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine, and calls for recognition of Russia's sovereignty over occupied Ukraine. The document calls for the creation of a buffer zone on the international Ukrainian-Russian border, including near Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts, and a "demilitarized zone" in southern Ukraine near Odesa Oblast and occupied Crimea. The document also states that Russia needs to "completely dismantle" the current Ukrainian government and rejects a possible Ukrainian commitment to not join NATO or to hold elections that include pro-Russian parties as insufficient measures. The document rejects any US plans to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine after any future peace deal and any Ukrainian plans to maintain its current number of military personnel. The document outlines ways in which Russia can strengthen its negotiating position by exacerbating tensions between the United States and both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the EU. The document also calls for Russia to grant the United States access to Russian-controlled minerals in occupied Ukraine and for the Kremlin to focus on normalizing its relations with the United States by restoring embassy functions and appointing Alexander Darchiev as the Russian Ambassador to the United States.

The Kremlin has followed through with many of the document's suggestions in recent weeks. Kremlin officials have recently rejected the possible deployment of European peacekeepers to Ukraine, have identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul (that would have effectively disarmed Ukraine, banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons, and forced Ukraine to commit never to participate in military blocs), and have offered to sign investment deals with the United States to extract minerals in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[18] Recent Russian rhetoric has also increasingly attempted to drive wedges between the United States and Europe.[19] Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[20]

US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine. The SVR Press Bureau reported about the call on March 12 and claimed that Naryshkin and Ratcliffe agreed to maintain regular contacts to help "ensure international stability and security" and "reduce confrontation" in bilateral relations.[21]


Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Sudzha and advanced to southern Zaoleshenka (immediately northwest of Sudzha).[22] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 12 that Ukrainian forces have started withdrawing from Sudzha.[23] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) with the seizure of Sudzha and claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in the settlement.[24] Geolocated footage published on March 11

indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Basivka (west of Sudzha across the international border in Sumy Oblast).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), west of Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha), within Zaoleshenka, within southeastern Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha), west of Kurilovka, north of Guyevo (both south of Sudzha), and southwest of Zhuravka (west of Sudzha in Sumy Oblast) and west Oleksandriia (south of Sudzha in Sumy Oblast).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Zaoleshenka, Goncharovka, and Guyevo and just across the international border in Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka, Novenke, and Basivka (all west of Sudzha).[27] A Russian milblogger called for Russian forces to create a buffer zone — likely in Sumy Oblast — after Russian forces push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[28]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes against Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[29] ISW cannot independently verify these Russian claims, however. Western media reported on March 5 that the Trump administration specifically suspended intelligence sharing supporting target designation for Ukrainian HIMARS strikes, and US and Ukrainian officials confirmed on March 11 that the United States restarted intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[30]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.

Putin visited a command post in Kursk Oblast and heard reports from Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[31] Gerasimov specifically commended elements of the "Veterany" Assault Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), 11th VDV Brigade, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), and "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Detachment for conducting the operation in which Russian forces used an underground pipeline to covertly attack behind Ukrainian positions in Sudzha. Putin thanked elements of the 76th and 106th VDV divisions, 11th and 83rd VDV brigades, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval Infantry brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Brigade (Caspian Flotilla), 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), "Akhmat" Spetsnaz, and "Veterany" Assault Detachment for their efforts in Kursk Oblast. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces have yet to completely push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and stated that Russian forces must seize all of Kursk Oblast "in the shortest possible time."

This is only the second time that Putin has visited Russian forces on the frontline since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin visited the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces' headquarters in occupied Kherson Oblast and the "Vostok" Rosgvardia headquarters in occupied Luhansk Oblast in April 2023.[32] Putin wore a military uniform during his visit to the Kursk Oblast headquarters — a notable move as he wore a suit in his April 2023 visits to the frontline. Putin is likely trying to posture himself as an engaged wartime leader and to include himself among the Russian military-political leaders responsible for recent Russian advances in Kursk Oblast.[33] Putin is also likely attempting to portray himself as a strong and effective military commander ahead of US-Russian meetings, including a meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 during which the delegations will likely discuss the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.


Key Takeaways:

- **Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started.**
- **Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.**


- **Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months.**
- **US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.**
- **Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 11 and 12.[34]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on March 12 that Ukrainian forces are prepared for possible Russian redeployments from Kursk Oblast to the Kharkiv direction.[35] The spokesperson stated that Russian troops usually attempt to advance using small groups on motorcycle but may encounter difficulties using this tactic given muddy weather conditions.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 11 and 12.[36]

A Ukrainian drone regiment reported that Russian forces are concentrating near the east (left) bank of the Oskil River for future assaults on the west (right) bank during more favorable weather conditions in Spring 2025.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces were previously able to use icy weather conditions to transfer and replenish forces on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River are now using these force accumulations to increase the number of attacks in the Kupyansk direction.[38]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) and likely seized Zahryzove (immediately northeast of Bohuslavka).[39][40]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Bohuslavka, and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna, Hrektivka, on March 11 and 12.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized three square kilometers near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced west of Ivanivka, 300 meters from Novolyubivka (both northeast of Lyman) towards Nove (north of Lyman and west of Novolyubivka), and 200 meters in depth near Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[42]


Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Nove, Katerynivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Myrne; and east of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on March 11 and 12.[43]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have been increasingly striking Ukrainian frontline positions in the Lyman direction with Shahed drones since late February 2024 and are using the drones like "mini" glide bombs.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 11 and 12.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on March 11 and 12 that Russian forces seized Novomarkove (north of Chasiv Yar).[47] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers north of Novopivnichnyi Microraion in western Chasiv Yar.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Chasiv Yar, including within Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar; northwest of Chasiv Yar near Mayske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on March 11 and 12.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the "Sever-V" Volunteer Brigade and the "Dikaya Division of Donbass" (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[50] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne.[51]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along 8 Bereznia Street in southern Toretsk.[52]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to Soborna Street and towards Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in northern Toretsk.[53]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka; and north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dyllivka, and Dachne on March 11 and 12.[54] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Toretsk.[55]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction posted footage on March 12 of Russian forces conducting a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the area.[56] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and that the other two tanks retreated. An officer in the Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces have increased the intensity of their attacks in the Toretsk direction and are conducting both mechanized assaults and small infantry assaults.[57] The officer stated that Russian forces are conducting fewer glide bomb and artillery strikes but are using a "huge concentration" of all types of drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 381st Artillery Regiment, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[58] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[59]



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces "significantly" advanced between Zaporizhzhia and Oleksiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[61] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[62]


Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Dachenske, Novotroitske, and Mykolaivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vidrozhenya (formerly Novyi Trud), Novoukrainka, and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Zvirove, Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travyna), Udachne, Kotlyne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka, Bohdanivka, and Kotlyarivka; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 11 and 12.[63]

An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on March 12 that Russian forces have intensified infantry assaults in the area.[64] The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces conduct infantry assaults at night, presumably in order to better conceal themselves from Ukrainian reconnaissance.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[66] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 12 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Oleksiivka on March 11 and 12.[68]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[69] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) participated in the seizure of the settlement.[70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and northwest of Dniproenerhiya.[71]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) seized Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of March 2.[72]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne, Dniproenerhiya, and Vesele; northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozlyv; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 11 and 12.[73]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Harrison Hurwitz, Derik Durbin, Benjamin Cordola, David Schulert, Julian Reich, and Carolyn Weinstein
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|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | | |

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Pyatykhatky and five kilometers near Zherebyanky (both northwest of Robotyne).[74]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Lobkove and toward Novoandriivka on March 11 and 12.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Pyatykhatky.[76]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




- Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian Field Fortifications

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on March 11 and 12 but did not advance.[77]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction

March 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Field Fortifications |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on March 12 that Ukrainian partisans conducted successful sabotage attacks against a Russian military rail line near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on March 9 and impeded the transport of ammunition.[78] The Atesh group reported that Ukrainian partisans conducted another attack targeting unspecified Russian rail lines in occupied Crimea on March 12 and noted that it will take time for Russian authorities to restore the affected rail lines.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 133 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 98 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Rivne, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa and Kherson oblasts and that 20 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[80] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts and that Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and a civilian Barbados-flagged ship and port infrastructure in Odesa City.[81] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian ballistic missiles that struck the port of Odesa and the Barbados-flagged ship likely had cluster munition warheads.[82] Ukrainian officials reported on March 12 that Russian forces conducted a "double-tap" missile strike, likely with an Iskander-M missile, against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast following March 11 strikes on residential, administrative, and enterprise infrastructure in and near the city.[83]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Major General Aziz Nasir Zadeh in Minsk on March 12 and discussed strengthening bilateral military cooperation.[84]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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