

Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel

March 2, 2025, 7:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on March 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about the US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to "finally sell out all of Ukraine," including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.[1] Peskov claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago" that they wanted to join Russia so "no one will ever sell off these territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of Ukraine. Russian state television evening news program *Vesti* claimed on February 24 that the United States is "blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that "there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.[3] The milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling the benefits of his country for nothing" should he sign the deal.

Kremlin officials are also trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding a mineral deal by making competing offers. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.[4] Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in occupied Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to economic cooperation with the United States, that the first stage of cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is key for a "more resilient global economy." [5]

Russian state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin statements in order to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive wedges between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state media outlets *TASS* and *RIA Novosti* amplified on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on February 24 to vote alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war.[6] Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide with [Russia's] vision," but *TASS*, *RIA Novosti*, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.[7] Russian state media headlines on March 2 deliberately misrepresented Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to the February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.[8]

The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining and misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the Kremlin views the deal as an impediment to accomplishing Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.[9] The mineral deal, even one that does not include text about an American security guarantees for Ukraine, will represent a long-term US economic investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.[10] Any agreement that ties the United States to an independent and sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating and conquering Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards pushing the United States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning Ukraine altogether. Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine — which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual advances in exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the assumption that Russia can outlast and overcome US and European security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize its economy and population to support its defense.[11] Putin is likely attempting to undermine the US-Ukrainian mineral deal in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia will be able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions from Ukraine during future negotiations before Russia's own wartime economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede Russia ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.[12]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a continuation of European leaders' supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine to "war against [Russia]."[13] Lavrov claimed that the West brought Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping forces as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe wants to continue

the war in Ukraine through these peacekeeping forces whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the war.[14] Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root causes" of the war.[15] Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[16] The Kremlin has recently attempted to use this phrase to justify its calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the ongoing discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine in the future to make yet another argument for Russia's longstanding demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate US-European divisions and falsely portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.[17] The Kremlin is likely attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor in future peace negotiations and other talks.[18]

European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The United Kingdom (UK) hosted leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hakan Fidan, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council Antonio Costa.[19] UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the UK and France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their commitment to develop a "coalition of the willing" that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.[20] Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine: keeping military aid flowing while the war continues and increasing economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds Ukraine's sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the negotiating table; and committing European leaders to aim to deter any future invasion of Ukraine.[21] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the defense summit was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that "European unity is at an extremely high level." [22] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is working with Europe to create a "reliable basis of cooperation" with the United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security. Zelensky met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the summit to discuss the development of a joint action plan to end the war in Ukraine.[23] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also met with UK Defense Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing weapons with profits from frozen Russian assets, and the UK's role in the Ramstein format.[24]


European countries announced additional military assistance packages for Ukraine before and during the summit. The UK announced on March 1 a loan worth 2.6 billion pounds (roughly \$3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense backed by profits from frozen Russian assets.[25] The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive later next week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons production.[26] Starmer announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly \$2

billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to purchase 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.[27] The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 1 that it will allocate 20 million euros (roughly \$20.7 million) to purchasing Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons production facility in Lithuania.[28]

Key Takeaways:

- **Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives.**
- **The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty.**
- **Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine.**
- **European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)


- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Russian forces seized Nikolskiy and advanced near Novaya Sorochina and Malaya Loknya (all northwest of Sudzha).^[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not fully seized Lebedevka.^[30]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked northwest of Sudzha near Staraya Sorochina, Malaya Loknya, Lebedevka, and Viktorovka; northeast of Sudzha near Russkoye Porechnoye and Martynovka; southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Agronom; south of Sudzha near Makhnovka; and southwest of Sudzha near Kurilovka.[31]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[32] Artillery elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (southwest of Sudzha).[33] Elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD])

are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya.[34]

Russian sources continued to claim on March 2 that Russian forces are operating in northern Sumy Oblast near the international border.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 2 that Russian forces seized Zhuravka and advanced to Novenke (both along the international border in Sumy Oblast).[35]

Russian milbloggers claimed on March 2 that Russian forces attacked towards Novenke and Basivka (immediately east of Zhuravka).[36]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka (west of Sudzha).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 2.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction
March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




A Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lypsti.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 2 but did not advance.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove on March 1 and 2.[39]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are taking advantage of freezing soil and bodies of water in order to deploy more equipment and aircraft in the Kupyansk direction as compared to previous weeks.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Makiivka on March 1 and 2.[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Makiivka.[42]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and toward Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Katerynivka on March 1 and 2.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Siversk direction on March 2.

A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Siversk direction reported on March 1 that the battalion repelled a four-pronged, company-sized Russian motorized assault near Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk) on an unspecified date.^[45] The battalion did not specify whether the Russian assault was mechanized.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 2 but did not make confirmed advances.


Russian forces continued ground attacks in Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Oleksandro-Shulytne on March 2.^[46]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are concentrating personnel in northern Chasiv Yar for additional offensive operations and that improved weather conditions are allowing both Russian and Ukrainian forces to increase drone operations.^[47] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are decreasingly shelling Chasiv Yar, suggesting that Russian forces may be preparing for larger attacks in the future in different areas of the settlement.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne.^[48] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division continue operating near Chasiv Yar.^[49]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Toretsk.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 1 and 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced within northern and central Toretsk, respectively.[50]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne, and Dylivka on March 1 and 2.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, chiefly elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]), are defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in Toretsk.[52] The milblogger claimed that sustained and successful Ukrainian counterattacks may force Russian forces to commit additional

manpower to the Toretsk direction. ISW has recently observed reports that the Russian military command is transferring elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) to the Toretsk direction, likely for offensive efforts in Spring-Summer 2025, and some of these elements may have to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Toretsk instead.[53] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are only intermittently advancing in central Toretsk but that Russian positions in the area are fragmented.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia forces advanced one kilometer south of Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]

Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Nova Poltavka; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Malynivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; south of Pokrovsk near Pishchane; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, and Kotlyarivka on March 1 and 2.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk), Tarasivka, Malynivka, and Nova Poltavka.[57]


Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces recently pushed Russian forces from Pishchane and Kotlyne and that Russian forces are attempting to retake these settlements.[58] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are suffering significant losses in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems are interfering with Russian glide bomb navigation systems. Trehubov stated that Russian forces are leveraging frozen ground conditions and water features to use more heavy equipment and armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, but that Russian forces are still struggling to advance in these areas. A Ukrainian military observer also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are better integrating drone and artillery systems with ground operations in the Pokrovsk direction and that improved integration is contributing to improved Ukrainian defensive operations in the area.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian rear).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove near Oleksiivka, Andriivka, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Rozlyv on March 1 and 2.[61] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction posted footage on March 1 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area of this direction.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.



Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 2 that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) recently seized Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[63]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Pryvilne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and advanced 4.5 kilometers towards Shevchenko (northwest of Pryvilne).[\[64\]](#)

Russian forces continued assaults north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Pryvilne on March 1 and 2.[\[65\]](#) A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole (just west of Pryvilne).[\[66\]](#)

Mashovets estimated that the Russian force grouping in the Velyka Novosilka direction is comprised of no more than 50,000 troops, 280 tanks, 630 armored vehicles, 360 tube artillery systems, 85 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and a unit of missile forces equipped with 6-8 missile launchers.[\[67\]](#) Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command is currently holding elements of at least the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) in reserve in this direction.[\[68\]](#)

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed on March 2 that Russian forces advanced six kilometers in the Orikhiv direction and advanced towards Shcherbaky and near Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[\[69\]](#)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne toward Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Pyatykhatky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 1 and 2.[\[70\]](#)

[\[71\]](#)

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv (north of Robotyne) and Stepanohirsk (northwest of Robotyne) directions.[\[72\]](#)

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction March 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on March 1 and 2 but did not advance.[73]

A Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that both Russian and Ukrainian forces attacked near the floodplains of the Dnipro River Delta.[74]

Russian authorities continue efforts to leverage international organizations to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territory. Russian state atomic

energy corporation Rosatom claimed on March 1 that a group of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observers recently arrived at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a delayed rotation and that the group traveled through "Russian territory" (occupied Ukrainian territory) to get to the ZNPP for the first time.[75] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the group's travel through occupied Ukraine as a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and stated that Russian forces have recently purposefully prevented the IAEA from conducting a personnel rotation via Ukrainian-controlled territory.[76] Ukrainian authorities reported in early February 2025 that Russian forces disrupted a scheduled rotation of IAEA observers to the ZNPP several times.[77]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Odesa Oblast on March 1 targeting port infrastructure and civilian shipping. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces hit Odesa City with an unspecified ballistic missile on March 1, damaging port infrastructure, a Panama-flagged civilian container ship, and a Sierra Leone-flagged vessel transporting over 21,000 tons of corn and soybeans for export.[78] Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister for the Reconstruction of Ukraine Oleksiy Kuleba noted on March 2 that this is the 29th civilian ship that has sustained damage from Russian strikes, presumably since the start of the full-scale invasion.[79]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 79 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of March 1 to 2.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 63 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts and that 16 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[81]

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian force shot down six Kh-101 cruise missiles and 665 Shahed drones between February 24 and March 2.[82]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3704> ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23219787>

[2] https://smotrim dot ru/brand/58500?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=vesti2-mixed2&utm_campaign=vesti-smotrim

[3] <https://t.me/rybar/68243>

[4] <http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76331>

[5] <https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/24/europe/putin-russia-us-cooperation-economy-rare-earths-intl-latam/index.html>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771>; <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3727>

https://t.me/tass_agency/303433; <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3726> ; <https://ria dot ru/20250302/peskov-2002549094.html>

[7] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771>; <https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3727>

[8] <https://ria dot ru/20250302/peskov-2002549094.html>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23283771>;

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024>

[10] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scott-bessent-treasury-secretary-face-the-nation-03-02-2025/>

[11] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024>

[12] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>

[13] https://t.me/MID_Russia/53182; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2000799/;
<https://archive.ph/g6YNP>

[14] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23284439>

[15] https://t.me/tass_agency/303463

- [16] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025>
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