



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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June 6, 2025, 8pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia's current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025.[1] Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists.[2] The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.



Palisa's map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa's map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government's formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[3]

It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine's defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.[4]

Palisa's assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a "buffer zone" along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish

a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025.[5] The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine's international partners continue supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast's administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia's withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia's ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.[6]

A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia's manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia's reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.[7]

The Russian military command's purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia's formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces intend to seize the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, which includes the rest of unoccupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts; and half of Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Palisa's map suggests that Russian forces also intend to seize parts of southern Ukraine west of the Dnipro River, including most of Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russian forces will have to seize nine currently unoccupied oblast capitals – Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Poltava cities – with an estimated pre-war population of over 5.6 million people.[8] Russia has not captured an oblast capital city since March 2022, when Russian forces seized Kherson City and subsequently lost it eight months later. This goal would require Russian forces to advance over 300 kilometers from the furthest point of the international border to Kyiv City within the next 18 months.

Russia's purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space. Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded that Russia create a "buffer zone" along the international border in northern Ukraine to defend Russian cities in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes and ground operations.[9] Kremlin officials also routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of "Novorossiya" – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – to justify ever-expanding Russian territorial ambitions in eastern and southern Ukraine.[10] Russian officials have previously characterized Kharkiv and Odesa cities as "Russian" cities.[11] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement in the near future.[12]

Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated in April 2025 that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River to Russia is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority." [13] Saldo called for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts – a call for Russia to not only gain control over parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy but to control parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev recently reiterated his previous calls for Russia to occupy most of Ukraine as a buffer zone – apart from a relatively small area of Volyn and Lviv oblasts along Poland's border – and leave Ukraine as a rump state, which underscores the extent of long-term Russian territorial objectives in Ukraine. [14] Palisa's map does not suggest whether Russia may have military plans to seize additional territory of Ukraine beyond 2026, but it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be satisfied with seizing slightly more than half of Ukraine if Russian forces could fulfill their purported 2026 plans.


The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces' inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin's theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance. [15] Russian forces have thus far failed to restore operational maneuver on the battlefield in Ukraine and conduct the kind of rapid, mechanized maneuver necessary to make operationally significant breakthroughs of Ukrainian defensive lines, and have not done so since 2022. [16] Western sources estimated that Russia has suffered almost one million casualties and lost well over 10,000 tanks and armored vehicles over the last three years of war. [17] Russian forces would also be pursuing complicated offensive operations in the face of mined gray zones, Ukrainian defensive lines, Ukrainian drones, and populated Ukrainian towns and cities along a thousand-kilometer-long frontline. Any operational plan that would require the Russian command to spread its limited offensive capabilities along the entire frontline to make significant advances from Odesa to Chernihiv oblasts would likely exacerbate Russian combat power shortage issues and undermine the Russian military's ability to achieve its objectives. [18]

Russian forces would only be able to achieve these reported operational objectives if the situation along the frontline changes dramatically in the near future, such as Russia suddenly restoring operational maneuver or the sudden collapse of Ukrainian defensive lines. ISW previously assessed that delays in Western aid provision to Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provided Russian forces with sufficient leverage to regain the battlefield initiative and make operationally significant gains, and that the Kremlin is currently engaged in an effort aimed at convincing the West that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that the West should abandon supporting Ukraine. [19] Russia's only real hope of winning its war in Ukraine is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine, and Putin is therefore seeking to prevent the future supply of Western military aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western aid remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and is crucial for ensuring a just and enduring peace in Ukraine and long-term security in Europe. [20] **Russia is very unlikely to seize half of Ukraine if the international coalition continues supporting Ukraine.**

Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on June 6 that Russian forces launched 452 projectiles, including 407 Shahed and mock drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts; 36 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M cruise missiles from occupied Dzhankoy, Crimea; and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from airspace over the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 406 drones and missiles, including 199 Shahed and decoy drones, of which 169 were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW); four Iskander-M/KN-23 missiles, and an additional two of these missiles were lost and did not reach their targets; 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and two Iskander-K cruise missiles.

Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit 19 locations, including civilian infrastructure, high-rise buildings, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Lviv, Ternopil, Chernihiv, and Kremenchuk cities and elsewhere in Kyiv, Volyn, Sumy, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that these Russian strikes injured at least 49 civilians and killed at least three.[23] The Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported that Russian strikes against Kyiv City alone killed at least three and injured 22.[24] Russian forces notably conducted their largest strike series of the war with 479 total drones and missiles less than a week prior, on the night of May 31 to June 1.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue efforts to innovate and expand their air defense umbrella to counter Russian strike packages. Ukrainian Deputy Strategic Industries Minister Anna Hvozdiar reported that Ukrainian forces are testing drones to intercept other strike drones and that Ukrainian forces have downed over 160 Shahed drones over Kyiv Oblast since February 2024 using these interceptors.[26] Russian forces have recently been adapting their strike packages and drone strike packages to effectively penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella and inflict maximum damage, and attempting to combat Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.[27]



Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast and at Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast, damaging at least three fuel and lubricant tanks at Engels and causing a fire and secondary explosions in the area.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it is still clarifying the damage at Dyagilevo Air Base but that there are reports of a large fire in the area. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko published footage showing fires at an oil depot in Engels and the Dyagilevo Air Base.[29] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Engels and caused a fire.[30] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Progress Plant in Michurinsk, Tambov Oblast, which produces stabilization and control systems for missile, artillery, and aviation systems.[31] Kovalenko also implied that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified Russian military facility in Bryansk Oblast.[32] A geolocated image shows a large fire with possibly secondary detonations at the Bryansk International airport near Oktyabrskoye.[33] Russian opposition media, citing sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services, reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Mi-8 combat helicopter and damaged a Mi-35 combat helicopter parked at the Bryansk airport.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 174 drones over Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight, including an unspecified number of drones in Bryansk, Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk oblasts.[35]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian military command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast.[36]

Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic

stability. The Russian Central Bank announced on June 6 that it had lowered its key interest rate from a 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent.[37]

ISW has observed reports of rising tensions between Kremlin officials and the Central Bank, namely between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina, over Russia's compounding economic constraints related to sanctions and labor shortages that very likely factored into the Central Bank's decision.[38] The Kremlin intensified pressure on Nabiullina to lower the key interest rate from 21 percent and maintain the facade that Russia's economy is stable. Putin postured the Russian economy as "stable and reliable" in December 2024, soon after Nabiullina raised the key interest rate to 21 percent – the highest since 2003 – in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates and blamed Nabiullina for mishandling rising interest rates.[39] ISW observed unverified reports in March 2025 of a federal audit of the Central Bank, and Russian officials indicated in the days leading up to the announcement that they "expect" the Central Bank to lower the key interest rate.[40]


The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that the Russian inflation rate hovered around nine to 10 percent, when the actual figure is likely closer to 20 percent as of March 2025.[41] The Kremlin's efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering its key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability will likely drive further economic instability and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.

Key Takeaways:

- **A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia's current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues.**
- **The Russian military command's purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia's formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine.**
- **Russia's purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.**
- **The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces' inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin's theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance**
- **Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.**

- Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces re-entered and established positions within Guyevo (southwest of Glushkovo).[42]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino and Popovo-Lezhachi; and south of Glushkovo and in the direction of Novyi Put on June 5 and 6.[43] Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 5 and 6.[44]


Order of Battle: Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[45]

Russian forces recently advanced in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 6.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows that Russian forces recently advanced south of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and likely seized the settlement.[47] Additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[48]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and north of Zapsillya and Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Andriivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka on June 5 and 6.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City).[51]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[52] Elements of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) reportedly participated in the recent claimed seizure of Kindrativka and continue fighting in the area.[53] Elements of two regiments of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka.[54] Elements of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions between Volodymyrivka and Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[55] Elements of the 76th and 106th VDV divisions are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Vovchanski Khutory on June 5 and 6.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velyki Burluk direction (east of Kharkiv City).[58]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, reportedly elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[59] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not yet seized all of Kindrashivka and that Ukrainian forces remain in southern Kindrashivka.[60] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Kindrashivka.[61]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Holubivka, Dovhenke, and Putnykove; northeast of Kupyansk toward the international border near Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 5 and 6.[62]

Russian sources published footage on June 6 of Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a bridge near Kupyansk.[63] Kupyansk Military Administration Head Andriy Besedin confirmed that Russian forces struck the bridge and noted that Russian forces strike the bridge weekly.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Elements of the Russian BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Valuyki (in Belgorod Oblast northeast of Kupyansk) direction.[66]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 6 but did not advance.


Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on June 5 and 6.[67]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman), and additional geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman) and northwest of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman toward Karpivka; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 5 and 6.[69]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces suffered 3,200 personnel casualties – about a brigade's worth – in the Lyman direction in Spring 2025, including 840 casualties in May 2025 alone.[70] A soldier in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults in groups of five to 10 motorcycles and that Russian training for motorcycle assaults has improved.[71] The Ukrainian soldier reported that Russian forces carry out electronic warfare (EW) during these assaults, complicating Ukrainian defensive operations. The soldier stated that the Russian military command docks the salaries of Russian soldiers to fund the purchase of Chinese-produced motorcycles for these assaults.



Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk toward Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 5 and 6.[72]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are hiding from Ukrainian drones in basements, pipes, and damaged equipment

whenever they hear Ukrainian drones fly overhead and that Russian forces are struggling to counter Ukrainian drones with shotguns and other small arms fire.[73] The Ukrainian drone unit commander reported that Russian forces cannot use unmanned ground vehicles, likely due to the difficult terrain and large elevation differences in this direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 5 and 6.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk), in western Yablunivka, and south of Oleksandro-Kalynove (both northwest of Toretsk).[76] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced from Yablunivka and Dyliivka to the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk).[77] The milblogger stated that Russian forces' operation near the Kleban-Byk Reservoir seeks to encircle Ukrainian forces operating in the vicinity of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), Novospaske (southwest of Toretsk), Katerynivka (southwest of Toretsk), and Oleksandro-Kalynove.

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka and toward Stepanivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 5 and 6.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[81] Russian milbloggers first claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka on May 13.[82] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka, east of Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), and north of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on June 5 and 6 toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, and Myrne and toward Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and toward Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka;

south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and toward Zvirove.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrolyubivka.[85]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using electric scooters to conduct rapid infantry assaults against Ukrainian positions and are also using motorcycles to deliver ammunition and supplies to the frontline.[86]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) advanced north of Horikhove (both east of Novopavlivka).[87]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka and east of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Nadiivka on June 5 and 6.[88]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces are rarely using armored vehicles in the area due to Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are fielding an average of eight to 10 motorcycles per day.[89]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka on June 5 and 6.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 5 and 6 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[92]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[93] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on June 6 that Russian forces seized Fedorivka.[94]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Fedorivka.[95] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near and in southern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), in the area between Vilne Pole and Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[96]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar and Fedorivka; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Rivnopil, Novopil, and Novosilka on June 5 and 6.[97] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka, Komar, Novopil, and Zelene Pole.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[99]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Poltavka on June 5 and 6.[100]

A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russian forces restarted active ground operations near Malynivka on June 5 after this area of the front had been

inactive for a long time, and are attacking in groups of seven with little to no equipment.[101] The source noted that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are using a large number of drones in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 6 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Luhivske (southeast of Orikhiv).[102]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Pyatykhatky and toward Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 5 and 6.[103]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on June 6 that Russian forces rarely use armored vehicles in assaults and instead conduct regular motorcycle assaults with an average of eight to ten motorcycles per day in the Orikhiv and Novopavlivka directions.[104]


Order of Battle: Elements of the "Nemets" group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[105]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 6 but did not advance.[106]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 6, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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https://t.me/dva_majors/72851 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ; <https://t.me/rybar/71039> ;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64895> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64872>

[98] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26998> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15347 ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29693>

[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/15336

[100] <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23382> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170>

[101] <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21962>

[102] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31794

[103] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25194> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170> ;
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[104] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/06/vyizhdzhayut-shhob-buty-znyshhenymy-boyecz-pro-shhodenni-moto-ataky-rosiyan-na-zaporizhzh/>

[105] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27010>

[106] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25173> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25170> ;
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