

# IRAN UPDATE SPECIAL REPORT



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June 13, 2025, Information Cutoff: 08:00 ET


*The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) will be publishing multiple updates over the next 24 hours from June 12-13, 2025, to provide insights into the ongoing strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and key military and nuclear program leadership. We will continue to produce Iran Update special editions until the strikes conclude. We will prioritize covering Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities in response to the attacks that threaten US forces and interests.*

**This update is the second of at least three CTP-ISW Iran Updates over the next 24 hours that will cover the Iran-Israel war. The recent Israeli strikes are a rapidly evolving situation, and no single individual or organization will have complete information at this time, including the states involved.** Some of the information that is available in the open-source will be contradictory or inaccurate. CTP-ISW will continually refine our assessments over the coming days and weeks, as we work to understand the situation. CTP-ISW will issue corrections and clearly articulate when we refine an earlier understanding of events.

Many sources will misinterpret information in the coming hours. Social media users posted footage that showed dozens of bright streaks in the sky during the October 2024 Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel and claimed that all of the streaks were ballistic missiles, for example. It later emerged that some of the streaks were ballistic missile interceptors, not missiles.


CTP-ISW will only publish high-confidence information. Our maps and the update below include information including "anti-aircraft fire," reported and confirmed explosions, and reported and confirmed airstrikes. Some users online may misinterpret anti-aircraft fire as evidence of an airstrike. Some air defense systems have long ranges that make it difficult to assess if the air defense fire's point of origin is the actual target or if the air defense systems are protecting a more distant site. Likewise, the sounds of explosions may not denote an airstrike because some sources may misinterpret the sounds of missile launches or other kinetic activity.

## Israeli Strikes in Iran June 13, 2025 at 9:00 AM ET



**Note: The above map depicts Israeli strikes on Iran as of June 13.**

## Nuclear, Military, and Energy Infrastructure in Iran - Map Guide



**Note:** The above map depicts significant nuclear, military, and energy infrastructure in Iran. This map does NOT depict the locations that Israel has targeted or struck.

### Key Takeaways:

- Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei published a brief and generic statement following the Israeli strikes, condemning the attacks and vowing to retaliate.
- Israel conducted covert operations targeting Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which likely hampered Iran's ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles in the immediate aftermath of the strikes. Israel reportedly built a secret one-way attack drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers near Tehran on June 12.
- In addition to striking nuclear and military infrastructure, Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership.

**Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei published a brief and generic statement following the Israeli strikes, condemning the attacks and vowing to retaliate.**[1] Khamenei provided no specificity regarding an Iranian retaliation.

**Israel conducted covert operations targeting Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which likely hampered Iran's ability to retaliate with ballistic missiles in the immediate aftermath of the strikes.** Israel reportedly built a secret one-way attack drone base in Iran, which it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers near Tehran on June 12.[2] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force likewise struck Iranian ballistic missile sites.[3] Iran responded to the Israeli air campaign by launching over 100 drones at Israel from Iran about six hours after the initial Israeli strikes.[4] Local Syrian sources reported that Iranian missiles landed in Syria, but CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the sources saw Iranian missiles or fallen interceptor missiles.[5] Iranian leaders' likely decision to not use ballistic missiles in their response was likely not voluntary and rather a result of Israel's covert drone operations that disabled a significant number of Iranian ballistic missile launchers. Iran claimed on June 11 that it had finalized plans for an "immediate counterstrike" against Israel that would involve hundreds of ballistic missiles, but may have only been able to enact part of its plan due to degraded capabilities.[6]

Iranian leaders likely learned lessons about the limits of drone attacks on Israel from its two large-scale direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which makes it unlikely that Iran would choose to only use drones to retaliate against Israel.[7] Iran launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way attack drones targeting Israel in April 2024, but US and partner defenses intercepted the vast majority of the slow-moving drones.[8] Iran had likely sought to use cruise missiles and drones to overwhelm and defeat Israeli air defenses while the ballistic missiles destroyed targets in the April attack, but the theory failed.[9] Iran learned from the April 2024 attack and employed only ballistic and cruise missiles in its somewhat more successful October 2024 attack targeting Israeli military sites.[10] It is therefore unlikely that Iran would decide to only use drones to attack Israel in response to the recent Israeli airstrikes, given that it has learned that drones are less effective against Israel than large amounts of ballistic and cruise missiles. Israeli media stated that the IDF intercepted all Iranian drones targeting Israel on June 13, which underscores how Israel's attacks on Iranian ballistic missile launchers likely caused Iran to have to conduct an underwhelming immediate retaliation against Israel.[11]

**In addition to striking nuclear and military infrastructure, Israel has conducted a decapitation campaign targeting Iranian military leadership.** Israeli strikes have killed the following individuals as well as several other military officials and prominent nuclear scientists:

- Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri
- Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid
- Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Hossein Salami
- IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh
- Former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani[12]


These individuals have been highly influential voices in the Iranian military establishment for decades. They played pivotal roles in Iranian strategy across the Middle East, especially as it grew more aggressive after around 2014-16.[13] The AFGS is the seniormost Iranian military body and is responsible for military policy and strategic guidance. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is thus responsible for joint and wartime operations, performing a role similar to a US combatant command. The sudden loss of these individuals appears to have caused significant disruption within the Iranian military decision-making network, which may have contributed to the lack of a meaningful Iranian response so far.

This disruption is temporary, however, as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already appointed these individuals' successors. Khamenei appointed Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi as AFGS chief, Major General Ali Shadmani as Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander, and Major General Mohammad Pak Pour as IRGC commander.[14] It is unclear who replaced Hajji Zadeh or has filled the positions that these individuals previously held. CTP-ISW will provide further information on these individuals in the following updates.

Israeli airstrikes have been confirmed by geospatial imagery at the following locations:


- Jahan Koudak Tower, Tehran Province[15]
- Qasr-e Shirin, Kermanshah Province[16]
- An unspecified Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base in Sardasht, West Azerbaijan Province[17]
- Azgol neighborhood of Tehran[18]
- Farmanieh neighborhood of Tehran[19]
- Sobashi air defense radar, Hamedan Province[20]
- Natanz Enrichment Complex Underground Area, Esfahan Province[21]
- Piranshahr Military Base, West Azerbaijan Province[22]
- Kermanshah Underground Facility, Kermanshah Province[23]
- Air defense base, Tehran Province[24]
- Tabriz Air Base, East Azerbaijan Province[25]

# Israeli Strikes in Tehran City June 13, 2025 at 9:00 AM ET





# Israeli Strikes against Esfahan Province June 13, 2025 at 11:00 PM EST



● Reported Airstrike  
 ● Report of Explosion With Footage  
 ● Report of Explosion Without Footage

# Israeli Strikes against Northwestern Iran June 13, 2025 at 11:00 PM EST





## Israeli Strikes in Kermanshah and Lorestan Provinces June 13, 2025 at 9:00 AM ET



Israeli airstrikes were reported at the following locations. These strikes have not been confirmed by geospatial imagery:

- Unspecified IRGC missile launch sites in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[26]
- IRGC sites in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[27]
- Khondab, Markazi Province[28]
- Arak Heavy Water Reactor Facility, Markazi Province[29]
- Qom City, Qom Province[30]
- Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[31]

- Ilam City, Ilam Province[32]
- Chitgar, Tehran Province[33]
- Shahid Chamran, Tehran Province[34]
- Kamraniyeh, West Azerbaijan Province[35]
- Saadat Abad, Tehran Province[36]
- Orchid Housing Complex in Sattarkhan, Tehran Province[37]
- Shahid Daghayeghi, Tehran Province[38]
- Shahraara, Tehran Province[39]
- Garmdareh, Tehran Province[40]

CTP-ISW has observed footage of explosions at the following locations:

- IRGC Ground Forces 29th Nabi Akram Division ammunition depot, Kermanshah Province[41]
- IRGC Aerospace Force Headquarters, Tehran Province[42]
- Artesh Air Force 1st Combat Assault Group fuel depot at Kermanshah Airport, Kermanshah Province[43]

*CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.*

*The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.*

*CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing*

*these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.*

*We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.*



[1] [www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/23/3334063](http://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/23/3334063)

[2] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933441868211126675> ;  
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933455569429357026> ;  
[https://x.com/chawshin\\_83/status/1933431758160011480](https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1933431758160011480) ;  
<https://www.axios.com/2025/06/13/how-israel-executed-strike-iran-nuclear>

[3] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933426633177768077> ;  
<https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/1933443998762611190>

[4] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1933388672285749376> ;  
<https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933462941157806557> ;  
<https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933411643087585730>

[5] [https://x.com/Daraa24\\_24/status/1933438241664864287](https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1933438241664864287) ;  
<https://x.com/ALJADEEDNEWS/status/1933447781445710206> ;  
<https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1933451098074792171>

[6] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/11/us/politics/iran-us-iraq-diplomats-middle-east.html>

[7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024> ;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-13-2024> ;  
<https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-assesses-damage-from-irans-missile-barrage-27c26e5e>

[9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran%E2%80%99s-attempt-hit-israel-russian-style-strike-package-failed-for-now>

[10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024> ;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024>

[11] <https://x.com/AmitSegal/status/1933433151428112509>

[12] <https://x.com/farnazfassihi/status/1933381278457573534>

[13] <https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-is-adapting-for-modern-conflict-and-warfare/>

[14] [www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754293](http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754293); [www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754294](http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754294);  
[www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754292](http://www.defapress.ir/fa/news/754292)

[15] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/1933330421929906591>

[16] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/1933348401820627046>  
; <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaei/status/1933399116836475130> ;  
<https://x.com/RadioZamaneh/status/1933469108311380038>

[17] <https://x.com/zcjbrouker/status/1933348603822756340> ;  
<https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1933339905695879283>

[18] <https://x.com/Vahid/status/1933350199226662982> ;  
<https://x.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1933350652014411889>

[19] <https://x.com/Shayan86/status/1933360842533167413>

[20] <https://x.com/HananyaNaftali/status/1933370923349881153> ;  
<https://x.com/ayatsubzero/status/1933378577434882195>

[21] <https://x.com/idfonline/status/1933452604316520580> ;  
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<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1933420620722684051> ;  
<https://x.com/indypersian/status/1933364924899537092> ;  
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933387250030526575>

[22] <https://x.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1933379510574981154> ;  
<https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1933393489821380639> ;  
<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1933359402071044281> ;  
<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1933358555731579227> ;  
<https://t.me/NISHTMANIJOAN/78425> ;  
<https://x.com/MiddleEastBuka/status/1933359402071044281> ;  
[https://x.com/Tammuz\\_Intel/status/1933361870146347341](https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1933361870146347341)

[23] <https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/1933383099435692539> ;  
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/1933343979514318851>

[24] <https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1933460194232504330>

[25] <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933469837398835526>

[26] <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1933349087694500240> ;  
<https://x.com/Vahid/status/1933345630602117340> ;

<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933369762840514765> ;  
<https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933364898135765116>  
[27] <https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1933360527826092516>  
[28] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[29] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[30] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309> ;  
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[https://x.com/guy\\_telaviv/status/1933340651963211867](https://x.com/guy_telaviv/status/1933340651963211867)  
[31] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[32] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[33] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
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[39] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[40] <https://x.com/Farhadrezaei/status/1933373246017069309>  
[41] <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaei/status/1933384980345851942>  
[42] <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaei/status/1933386026799472934>  
[43] <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaei/status/1933386345872765351>