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
To read ISW's assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click [here](#).

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian sources continue to provide additional details on the scale of the planned removal and deportation of Ukrainian children to summer camps in occupied Ukraine and throughout the Russian Federation.**
- **Russian occupation officials are institutionalizing their commitment to the indoctrination and militarization of Ukrainian children.**
- **Russian occupation officials are expanding the provision of social benefits in occupied Ukraine to encourage higher birthrates and facilitate the mass issuance of Russian citizenship.**
- **Occupation officials continue to use infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine to integrate occupied territories into the Russian sphere of influence while simultaneously supporting Russian military logistics.**

Russian sources continue to provide additional details on the scale of the planned removal and deportation of Ukrainian children to summer camps in occupied Ukraine and throughout the Russian Federation. The Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Education reported to Russian outlet *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on May 13 that 4,086 children from occupied Kherson Oblast will go to 77 summer camps and organizations throughout occupied Ukraine and Russia in Summer 2025.[1] *Komsomolskaya Pravda* noted that this includes summer camps in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea, and in Pskov and Kaliningrad oblasts; the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic; Adygea Republic; and Mordovia Republic.[2] 240 children from occupied Kherson Oblast will attend training at the “Avangard” military sports camp in Volgograd Oblast, and 300 Kherson Oblast teenagers will attend classes as part of the “University Shifts” program at various universities in Russia. While *Komsomolskaya Pravda* did not name several of the camps listed in the aforementioned oblasts, ISW has observed evidence of Russian officials deporting Ukrainian children, specifically including children from occupied Kherson Oblast, to the following summer camps since 2022: the “Zvezdny” Children’s Camp near Krupevitsy, Pskov Oblast; the “Orlyonok,” “Medvedzhenok,” and “Smena” children’s camps in Krasnodar Krai; the “Antares Center,” in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria Republic; and the “Lan” and “Gornyi” children’s camps in the Adygea Republic.[3] Russian officials have also routinely removed

Ukrainian children to the “Artek” and “Alyye Parusa” children’s camps in occupied Crimea.[4] Russian media based in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast also reported on May 13 that Russian officials are sending 45 high schoolers from occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast to Rostov-on-Don for the “Cultural Map 4+85” educational program.[5] Russian officials recently telegraphed their intent to send over 53,000 Ukrainian children to summer camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia over the course of Summer 2025.[6]



ISW continues to assess that Russia’s deportation of Ukrainian children to summer camps, military-patriotic training camps, and educational programs such as “University Shifts” and “Cultural Map 4+85” all support Russia’s larger campaign to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children.[7] Russia’s intent behind the removal and deportation of Ukrainian children to these programs is to separate them from their Ukrainian identities and effectively turn them into the next generation of Russians, and is additionally inconsistent with the international legal requirements on Russia as a belligerent occupying power.[8]

Russian occupation officials are institutionalizing their commitment to the indoctrination and militarization of Ukrainian children. Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik signed "cooperation agreements" with the Russian Yunarmia Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin on May 11 and 12 in order to increase the recruitment of Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts into Yunarmia (the Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement).[9] Yunarmia is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments and military-patriotic ideals in Russian children and in Ukrainian children in order to prepare them for potential future service in the Russian military. These cooperation agreements will likely increase the recruitment of Ukrainian children into Yunarmia in coming years. Pushilin claimed that there are over 5,500 Ukrainian children participating in the Yunarmia movement in occupied Donetsk Oblast and Pasechnik claimed that there are over 6,000 Ukrainian children participating in the movement in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[10] ISW recently reported on the Kremlin's coordinated effort to expand Russian military-patriotic youth organizations, such as Yunarmia, to support Russia's long-term force generation efforts both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine.[11] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration claimed on May 12 that Ukrainian schoolchildren and members of the Russian youth-led civic engagement organization "Movement of the First" from occupied Kherson Oblast participated in the "Zarnitsa 2.0" military patriotic game, which ISW assesses Russian officials also use to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied areas and erase their Ukrainian identity while preparing them for service in the Russian military.[12]

Russian occupation officials are expanding the provision of social benefits in occupied Ukraine to encourage higher birthrates and facilitate the mass issuance of Russian citizenship. The Russian Federal Pension and Social Insurance Fund (Russian Social Fund) reported on May 13 that it has allocated maternity capital payments to nearly 10,000 families in occupied Ukraine since the beginning of 2025, including 4,400 maternity capital certificates in occupied Donetsk Oblast alone.[13] Occupied Crimea-based outlet *Vesti Sevastopol* reported on May 13 that 356 families in Sevastopol have received maternity capital payments so far this year.[14] Maternity capital is a one-time payment issued via the Russian state to women upon the birth or adoption of every child beyond their first, and has historically been used to encourage families to have multiple children to increase Russia's declining birthrate.[15] Russia has been issuing maternity capital payments in occupied Ukraine since early 2023 to accomplish the same objective, but only provides the payments to parents who have obtained Russian citizenship.[16] Children born in occupied Ukraine are issued Russian citizenship immediately upon their birth. Families can use maternity capital payouts to fund housing, education, medical, or other necessary expenses, which means that parents face a high incentive to accept Russian citizenship and have additional children.[17] Russian birthrate and passportization efforts go hand-in-hand, and both serve to increase Russia's administrative control over occupied Ukraine.[18]

Occupation officials continue to use infrastructure projects in occupied Ukraine to integrate occupied territories into the Russian sphere of influence while simultaneously supporting Russian military logistics. The Unified Institute of Spatial Planning (EIIP) of the Russian Federation, a subordinate entity of the Russian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Utilities, reported on May 12 that it prepared a project to reconstruct and modernize the power grid in occupied Kherson Oblast by 2029.[19] The project proposes the reconstruction of 16 electrical

substations and seven wind power plants and the construction of two new power supply centers for 330 and 150 kV electric substations, two substations, and 180 kilometers of 330 and 150 kV overhead powerlines.[20] Russian efforts to build out energy infrastructure in occupied Ukraine likely support two overlapping objectives—on one hand, owning energy infrastructure will allow Russia to earn profit off of, and use, energy generated in Ukraine, and on the other hand, Russian energy projects will force residents of occupied areas to be entirely reliant on Russia for power.

Russian occupation officials also continue to pursue transportation infrastructure projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko posted images on May 13 showing the ongoing construction of a bypass road connecting the Livoberezhnyi Raion of occupied eastern Mariupol to the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway and noted that occupation officials are also constructing a logistics platform behind the Ilyich Steel and Iron Works plant in northern Mariupol to connect a railway and the bypass road into a single logistics node.[21] Russian forces regularly use civilian logistics infrastructure to transport military equipment and personnel from Russia to areas on the frontline, and are likely expanding transportation infrastructure in occupied Mariupol to facilitate the transport of military equipment and needed goods closer to the frontline.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian infrastructure projects augment Russian military logistics capabilities in occupied Ukraine, allow Russia to extract economic benefit from the occupied territories, and further integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian economic sphere.[23]



[1] <https://www.herson.kp dot ru/online/news/6372053/>

[2] <https://www.herson.kp dot ru/online/news/6372053/>

[3] <https://kabardin-balkar.er dot ru/activity/news/deputat-gosdumy-viktoriya-rodina-ispolnila-zhelanie-rebyat-iz-hersonskoj-oblasti-otdyhayushih-v-kabardino-balkarii1>; <https://www.mk-herson dot ru/social/2024/06/05/bolee-300-detey-iz-khersonskoy-oblasti-otdokhnut-v-adygee.html>; <https://ria dot ru/20220815/kumpilov-1809679872.html>; <https://t.me/aakherson/547>; https://vk dot com/dots_medvezhonok; <https://www.avrora-k dot ru/lager/detskiy-ozdorovitelnyy-tsentr-medvejonok/>; <https://tass dot ru/obshestvo/15534657>

[4] <https://t.me/aakherson/813>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025>

[5] <https://zonews dot ru/news/deti-iz-zaporozhskoj-oblasti-otpravilis-v-rostov-na-donu-po-federalnoj/>

[6] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23795241>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-occupation-update-may-1-2025>

[7] <https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate041725>; <https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050825>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025>

<https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025>

[8] <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/8c54abb4-3c6d-4b5c-be05-727f612afccc>

[9] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6915 ;
https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3713 ; <https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6466>

[10] <https://t.me/PushilinDenis/6466> ; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/3713

[11] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025>

[12] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/30670; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-8-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-10-2025> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025>

[13] <https://donetskmedia dot ru/20250513-dnr-v-liderah-po-matkapitalu-kak-teper-poluchit-vyplatu-bez-zajavlenija.media>

[14] <https://sevastopol dot bezformata.com/listnews/sevastopole/146078802/>

[15] <https://sfr.gov dot ru/en/matcap/>; https://www.garant dot ru/actual/posobiya/posob_deti/1020053/

[16] <https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/19623813>; https://t.me/tass_agency/22413; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2023>; <https://sfr.gov dot ru/branches/lugansk/news/~2025/05/13/272112>

[17] <https://donetskmedia dot ru/20250513-dnr-v-liderah-po-matkapitalu-kak-teper-poluchit-vyplatu-bez-zajavlenija.media>

[18] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2023>; <https://re-russia dot net/en/analytics/0199/>

[19] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/30697 ; <https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23922021>;
https://t.me/eipp_official/2728

[20] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/30697 ; <https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23922021>;
https://t.me/eipp_official/2728

[21] <https://t.me/andriyshTime/37198>

[22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025>

campaign-assessment-november-19-2024;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024>

[23] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-march-31-2025>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-24-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025>