

Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Jennie Olmsted, and George Barros

June 10, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism.[1] Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture.[2] Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population.[3] Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.[4]

Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported on June 7 that Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu agreed during his recent visit to North Korea to work to bring more North Korean migrants to work in Russia.[5] This reported


agreement is a violation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2397, to which Russia is a signatory and which prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019.[6] Russia vetoed in March 2024 an annual UNSC resolution extending a monitoring panel tracking adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea.[7] Budanov stated that Russia is likely looking to North Koreans to replace migrants from Central Asia. Budanov stated that many North Korean laborers in Russia will likely sign military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia was creating opportunities for North Korean migrants to go to Russia to join the Russian workforce or the Russian military.[8] Russia and North Korea have been overtly increasing their defense cooperation through mutual defense treaties, the transfer of military technology and materiel, and the deployment of North Korean forces to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[9] Russia and North Korea appear to be trying to engage in more covert ways to create pathways through which North Koreans can enter Russia's military recruitment pipeline.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian MoD confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of wounded POWs.[10] Zelensky noted that this exchange marked the first stage of the exchange of seriously wounded POWs, and that Russia and Ukraine are expected to continue POW exchanges.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.**
- **Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.**
- **Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast on June 9 and 10.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and attempted to enter Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[12]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 10.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast and southwest of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[13]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on June 9 and 10.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Andriivka (both north of Sumy City), and Yunakivka.[15]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has deployed most of the Russian Kursk Group of Forces to northern Sumy Oblast.[16]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are attacking in the Novomykolaivka direction.[17] Mashovets reported that elements of the 83rd and 11th VDV brigades

are attacking in the Yablunivka direction and that elements of the 106th VDV Division are attacking in the Yunakivka and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) directions. Drone operators of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[18]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv direction.

Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces regained control over the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[19]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on June 9 and 10.[20]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion; Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya; and 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[21]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[22]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Fyholivka (southwest of Krasne Pershe).[23]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on June 9 and 10.[24]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating north of Kupyansk.[25]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[26]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[27]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, Zahryzove, and Kolisnynivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 9 and 10.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Novoyehorivka.[29]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Torske (east of Lyman).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces back 400 to 500 meters in the Karpivka direction (north of Lyman).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Karpivka and Lypove (southwest of Karpivka) and near Zelena Dolyna (south of Lypove).[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelene Dolyna, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Lypove; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 9 and 10.[33]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD), reinforced by elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), are operating in the Lyman direction.[34]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[35]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 9 and 10.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdymivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on June 9 and 10.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment, and 299th VDV Regiment (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[39]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 and 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Dylivka (north of Toretsk) and in an industrial area northwest of Toretsk.[40]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 and 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk.[41]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk, northeast of Romanivka, and north of Zorya (both west of Toretsk).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Dylivka and have nearly seized Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[43]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dylivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove, and toward Kleban-Byk; west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Novoolenivka on June 9 and 10.[44]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 10 that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) have recently advanced between 1.5 and 1.7 kilometers south of Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[45] Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently advanced in the direction of Dylivka and Shcherbynivka.[46] Mashovets stated that Russian forces continue to concentrate on the area north of Vozdvyzhenka (southwest of Toretsk) and are redeploying additional forces, including elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), to the area.[47]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are trying to advance near Yablunivka from the south and southwest.[48] Mashovets stated that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking near Popiv Yar and Shevchenko Pershe (west of Toretsk and northeast of Pokrovsk). Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dylivka.[49] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating northwest of Toretsk, and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near

Zorya.[50] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Ivanopillia (northwest of Toretsk) and north of Toretsk.[51] Elements of the 33rd and 1219th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating south of Yablunivka.[52] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 10 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[54]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and toward Novotoretske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on June 9 and 10.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[57]


Unconfirmed claims: Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces back half a kilometer southeast of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[59]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Kotlyarivka and toward Muravka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 9 and 10.[60]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are conducting assaults on motorcycles and mopeds to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[61]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division and 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are attacking near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka.[62] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[63]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and to Zelenyi Kut (just west of Oleksiivka).[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Zelenyi Kut and toward Zaporizhzhia and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 9 and 10.[65]

Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions within Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr.[66]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka.[67]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces continue to hold Vesele.[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Vesele, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, and Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole on June 9 and 10.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Fedorivka, Komar, and Shevchenko.[71]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that the Russian military command returned elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which were previously operating in Kursk Oblast, to battle in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[72] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 9 and 10.[74]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating south of Hulyaipole.[75]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and toward Pavlivka on June 9 and 10.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[77] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[78]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 9 and 10 but did not advance.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 10, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10 and hit a maternity hospital in Odesa City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 315 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched two KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and five Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 213 drones, the two KN-23 missiles, and all five of the Iskander-K cruise missiles, and that 64 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Chernihiv, Kharkiv,

Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.[82] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Odesa City.[83] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that drone debris in Kyiv City contained thermobaric, high-explosive fragmentation warheads.[84]

Forbes Ukraine reported on June 9 that Russia's use of Shahed and decoy drones in its long-range drone strike series was largely cyclical in early 2025 with Russian forces launching about 2,500 drones in one month, then about 4,000 drones per month over the next two months, then again about 2,500 drones in the following month.[85] *Forbes Ukraine* reported that Russian forces launched 2,611 drones in January 2025; 3,830 in February 2025; 4,198 drones in March 2025; 2,476 drones in April 2025; and at least 3,628 drones in May 2025.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue efforts to deepen cooperation and further connect their economic, military, and national policies. A Russian delegation, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov led, and a Belarusian delegation, which Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov led, met in Moscow on June 9 and 10.[86] Lavrov claimed that the two delegations discussed strengthening bilateral cooperation through the Union State framework. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that the parties declared their willingness to increase joint efforts to form a Eurasian security architecture — a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture, a Russian-led bloc which aims to counter the West and NATO.[87] The Russian delegation committed to helping Belarus deepen cooperation with BRICS. Ryzhenkov claimed on June 10 that Russia and Belarus have completed a third of the 310 Belarusian-Russian integration projects for 2024 to 2025, including projects related to the space industry and microchip production.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] https://t.me/tass_agency/319302 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/319303 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/319305 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/319307

[2] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925> ;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar022825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525>

[3] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052225> ;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025>

- [4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925>
- [5] <https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-giving-shahed-136-attack-drone-production-capabilities-to-north-korea-budanov>
- [6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020925>; <https://main.un dot org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/2397-%282017%29>
- [7] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024>
- [8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025>
- [9] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-signs-mutual-defence-treaty-with-north-korea-2024-11-09/>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar020825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012225>
- [10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14587 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14597 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14607 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53620 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53621 ; <https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/rosiya-protyagom-uzhe-misiyaciv-postijno-zbilshuye-kilkist-za-98361>
- [11] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25322>
- [12] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29912>
- [13] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167896 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93219>
- [14] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27072> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36997>
- [15] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135
- [16] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>
- [17] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>
- [18] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93187> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37004>

[19] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>

[20] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ;
<https://t.me/otukharkiv/6539> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ;
<https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>

[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5779

[22] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9353; <https://t.me/Ochi151/94>;
<https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932135145953526015>

[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/319203

[24] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867

[25] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>

[26] <https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1932263534580367414>; https://t.me/operationall_space/4488
https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/12855

[27] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909>

[28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909>

[29] <https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1932263534580367414> https://t.me/operationall_space/4488
https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/12855

[30] https://t.me/operationall_space/4492;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1932306090911469616>

[31] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>

[32] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29909>

[33] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867

[34] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>

[35] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31844

[36] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/36991> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>

[37] https://t.me/don_partizan/8429

[38] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/97405> ;

<https://t.me/wargonzo/27072> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992>; <https://t.me/t3mny/2283> ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/36996> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>
 [39] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29901> ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2792>
 [40] <https://t.me/z4lpr/1064> ; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932384319110312012> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192> ; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932206371002581077> ;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932205675003646239>
 [41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9360; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192>
 [42] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167808
 [43] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992>; <https://t.me/t3mny/2283> ;
https://t.me/don_partizan/8429
 [44] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299> ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73135 ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/36992> ; <https://t.me/t3mny/2283> ;
<https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793> ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>
 [45] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>
 [46] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>
 [47] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>
 [48] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>
 [49] <https://t.me/z4lpr/1064> ; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932384319110312012>
 [50] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93192> ; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932206371002581077> ;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932205675003646239> ;
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932098732163531024>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26920> ;
<https://t.me/ankavolonter/11932>; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932435380927926776>
 [51] <https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/19604> ; <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1932439448832422292>
 [52] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37018> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37022>
 [53] <https://t.me/sashakots/54219>
 [54] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37023>
 [55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31841
 [56] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>

[57] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28802; <https://t.me/BlackWings59/45>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9354; <https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932199655598604731>;
<https://x.com/giK1893/status/1932199658735993139>

[58] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>

[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31850

[60] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/73135

[61] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/myasni-shturmy-na-mopedah-yak-okupanty-namagayutsya-distatys-do-kordoniv-dniprovshhyny/>; <https://youtu.be/RfRBoVNerUE?t=1547>

[62] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>

[63] <https://t.me/sashakots/54211>

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/27072>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167896

[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/27072>; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>

[66] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>

[67] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2793>

[68] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[69] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[70] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11867;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/73135; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/27072>; https://t.me/voin_dv/15411; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[71] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64972>; https://t.me/voin_dv/15411

[72] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15404 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15407 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15412

[74] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbido26K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYL FikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUyLhFFPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93219> ;
<https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/15398

[76] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYL>
[FikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUYLhFfPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l](https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794) ; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794>

[77] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27105>

[78] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7186

[79] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25320>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25299>;
<https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU/25296>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid026K17WpAzCb3xEhqaX1RFYL>
[FikUyPksYpXTge8rvHjX7TUYLhFfPvTMS8bdYqQyM6l](https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2794)

[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/73101 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73176

[81] <https://t.me/kpszsus/36106>

[82] <https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/21438>; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/naslidky-rosijskogo-udaru-po-chernigivshhyni-pid-udarom-15-naselenyh-punktiv/>;
<https://t.me/synergubov/14906>; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/12267 ; <https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1278> ;
https://t.me/UA_National_Police/42049; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/masovanyj-udar-po-kyyevu-chetvero-postrazhdalyh-poshkodzheni-budynky-ta-infrastruktura/>;
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=4079574565694406&id=100009257087776&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=ZIBpjg4ay3cdT8hG#; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/u-kyievi-vorozhym-obstrilom-poshkodzheni-sofijskyj-sobor/> ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4790;
https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/5756; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/na-kyivshhyni-tryvaye-likvidacziya-naslidkiv-nichnoyi-ataky-rosiyi-ye-poraneni/>;
<https://x.com/SESU-UA/status/1932328999780290861>;
<https://x.com/SESU-UA/status/1932397101821919606>; https://t.me/SJTf_Odes/12555

[83]
https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1932303583401181660?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1932303583401181660%7Ctwgr%5Eoa87d4ce7243d2c84fe96942745040601adaf93f%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F1038793-sibigazaklikav-ne-zvolikati-z-novimi-sankciami-proti-rf%2F ; https://t.me/SJTf_Odes/12555;
<https://t.me/truonline/6087> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/ye-zagyblyj-ta-postrazhdali-v-odesi-vorozhi-bpla-vdaryv-po-medzakladah-ta-zhytlovomu-budynku/>;
<https://t.me/odeskaODA/9942>; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1418;
https://t.me/pgov_gov_ua/30496

[84] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/10/kyiv-atakuvaly-z-usih-napryamkiv-yurij-ignat-pro-masshtabnyj-nichnyj-obstril/>

[85] <https://forbes.ua/news/rosiya-viroblyae-2700-shakhediv-na-misyats-mayzhe-stilki-zhimitatoriv-gur-09062025-30369>

[86] https://t.me/MID_Russia/60469 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/60473

[87] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025>

[88] <https://belta.by/politics/view/ryzhenkov-rasskazal-ob-integratsionnyh-planah-belarusi-i-rossii-720060-2025/>; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/316683