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**June 12, 2025, 8:00 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.**<sup>[1]</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Russian forces have sustained 628,000 casualties since January 2024.<sup>[2]</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a breakdown of Russian casualty rates since 2022: Russian forces reportedly sustained 106,720 casualties in 2022 (average of 340 casualties per day); 253,290 casualties in 2023 (average of 693 casualties per day); and 430,790 casualties in 2024 (average of 1,177 casualties per day).<sup>[3]</sup>

**Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains.** The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had already sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 as of June 4, 2025.<sup>[4]</sup> Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency *ArmyInform* reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day.<sup>[5]</sup> Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia is sustaining roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance.<sup>[6]</sup> The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported on June 11 that Russian forces seized more territory in May 2025 than any other month since the end of 2022.<sup>[7]</sup> ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 1,935 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory thus far in 2025 as of June 12, 2025. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is willfully taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater and that these losses are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant, rapid gains.<sup>[8]</sup> Russian forces continue to burn through personnel in their ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; advance in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and establish buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.<sup>[9]</sup>

**Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.** Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces

advanced along the T-0428 Kurakhove-Novopavlivka highway and crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Novoukrainka (northwest of Kurakhove).<sup>[10]</sup> This advance indicates that Russian forces likely seized Novoukrainka, Zelenyi Kut, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr (all along the T-0428 highway west and northwest of Kurakhove). Russian milbloggers credited infantry elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with advancing across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border near Novoukrainka and claimed that elements of this brigade are also fighting near Zelenyi Kut and Oleksiivka.<sup>[11]</sup> Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced further south of Novoukrainka, though ISW has not observed geolocated footage to support this claim.<sup>[12]</sup> Russian forces are likely attempting to advance toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border from at least two directions: from the east along the Novomykolaivka-Novoukrainka line with elements of the Central Grouping of Forces, including from the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 90th Tank Division, and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]); and from the south from the Velyka Novosilka direction with elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces.<sup>[13]</sup> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 11 that unspecified elements of the Eastern Grouping of Forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in an unspecified area, likely in the Velyka Novosilka direction.<sup>[14]</sup>

**Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.** Russian forces first crossed the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (northwest of Ukrainka and southeast of Novopavlivka) as of June 9 and will likely seek to secure further advances to level the current salients near Horikhove and Novoukrainka.<sup>[15]</sup> A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also seek to even out the frontline near Udachne (northeast of Novopavlivka along the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mekhova highway) and Muravka (southeast of Udachne and north of Horikhove).<sup>[16]</sup> Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported on June 12 that Russian forces conducted 46 assaults in the Novopavlivka direction (likely inclusive of activity west and northwest of Kurakhove) in the past day and that this is the most active Russian forces have been in this area of the frontline since the start of the full-scale invasion.<sup>[17]</sup> Voloshyn reported on June 11 that Russian forces are using motorcycles in assaults to try to advance quickly and make it difficult for Ukraine to reinforce the area.<sup>[18]</sup> Kremlin officials and Russian commentators have framed Russian efforts to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as efforts to create a "buffer zone," indicating that Russia continues to have wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond the areas it has illegally annexed.<sup>[19]</sup> A Ukrainian captain operating in the area told the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) in an article published on June 11 that reaching the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border has symbolic importance for Russia and that Russian forces have been incurring high personnel casualties during assaults in open fields in recent months in pursuit of informational objectives.<sup>[20]</sup>

**The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).** The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, conducted a strike on the night of June 11 to 12 against the Rezonit Plant in the Zubovo Technopark in Zubovo, Moscow Oblast.<sup>[21]</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering

Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Rezonit Plant produces navigation systems for artillery systems, printed circuit boards, and other microelectronics necessary for Russian naval weaponry and missiles, including Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, Iskander cruise and ballistic missiles, and Lancet and Kub loitering munitions.[22] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data for June 12 shows satellite-detected heat anomalies in Zubovo, which is consistent with the Ukrainian reports of a strike against the Zubovo Technopark.

**Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.**

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of seriously wounded POWs on June 12.[23] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 12 that the exchange included Ukrainian POWs who defended Mariupol and spent more than three years in Russian captivity.[24] Zelensky and Budanov reported that Ukraine expects another round of POW exchanges soon. The Russian MoD and Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny claimed on June 12 that Russia is ready to conduct daily POW exchanges in accordance with the schedule that Russia and Ukraine agreed upon in Istanbul but accused Ukraine of being unwilling to reciprocate.[25] Russian authorities have recently weaponized POW exchanges and baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers following the Istanbul talks in order to discredit Ukraine and distract from Russia's own abuses of Ukrainian soldiers and repeated refusals to cooperate in confidence-building measures.[26]

**Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.**

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky hosted the fourth Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Odesa City on June 11, which included Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović, Romanian President Nicușor Dan, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rossen Jeliakov, Croatian President Andrej Plenković, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Albanian Speaker of Parliament Elisa Spiropali, North Macedonian Deputy President Izet Mexhiti, and Slovenian Deputy Prime Minister Tanja Fajon.[27] Most of the participants issued a declaration condemning Russia's war against Ukraine, and called for continued military, humanitarian, and diplomatic assistance to Ukraine, the full withdrawal of Russian forces and equipment from Ukraine, and Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic notably attended the June 11 summit, marking his first official visit to Ukraine, but did not sign the concluding declaration.[28] Vucic articulated Serbia's willingness to invest in reconstruction efforts in one or two Ukrainian cities or oblasts.[29] Vucic emphasized that Serbia will continue to support Ukraine's territorial integrity and provide humanitarian aid. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin mouthpieces expressed outrage at Vucic's statements and attendance at the summit and attempted to downplay Vucic's support of Ukraine by claiming that Vucic only attended the summit due to external pressure.[30] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated that Vucic's statements left a "bitter aftertaste" for Russia.[31]

**Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems.** Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on June 12 that Ukraine secured a three-year agreement to receive an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense systems from Germany.[32] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed his intent to provide Ukraine with an additional 1.9 billion euros (approximately \$2.2 billion) in 2025, including to support Ukraine's long-range weapon capabilities.[33] Pistorius' pledge of an additional 1.9 billion euros of support follows the previously agreed upon amount of seven billion euros (approximately \$8.1 billion) — bringing German support to a total of nine billion euros (approximately \$10.4 billion) should the German Bundestag approve these proposals.

**Key Takeaways:**

- **The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.**
- **Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.**
- **Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.**
- **The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).**
- **Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.**
- **Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.**
- **Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk and Kurakhove.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground assaults in Kursk Oblast on June 12 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued conducting ground assaults in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 11 and 12.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Sumy Oblast in the Glushkovo and Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) directions.[35]


**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 12.**

**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions south and southwest of Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[36] Additional geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of and within central Kindrativka (west of Oleksiivka) and south of Andriivka (southwest of Oleksiivka).[37]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Yablunivka and Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[38]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka and north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka on June 11 and 12.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka, Novomykolaivka, and Yunakivka.[40] A Ukrainian sergeant fighting in the Sumy Oblast border area stated in an article published in the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) on June 11 that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces two-to-one in the area and are attempting to seize Yunakivka as part of wider efforts to seize Sumy City.[41] A Russian insider source claimed that Russian forces are employing highly attritional, infantry-led assault tactics in Sumy Oblast and that only eight out of 100 Russian personnel involved in recent attacks against Kindrativka survived, after which the Russian military command immediately committed the survivors to another assault.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[43] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka and Oleksiivka.[44]

<b>Russian</b>	<b>Main</b>	<b>Effort</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Ukraine</b>
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**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Kharkiv City near Okhrimivka on June 11 and 12 but did not advance.[45]**

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are suffering about a battalion's worth of personnel casualties per week in the Kharkiv direction, which is preventing them from accumulating enough reserves for a breakthrough attempt in the area.[46] Shamyshn stated that Russian forces typically conduct small group infantry assaults and use one reconnaissance drone and one strike drone to support each assault. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces have increased the intensity of their attacks in area and are attacking in small infantry groups consisting of up to four motorcycles.[47] The deputy commander added that Russian forces use tanks and armored fighting vehicles (IFVs) to support these assaults. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) direction reported that Russian forces are using unprotected vehicles,




motorcycles, and buggies to conduct attacks.[48] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are actively using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables in the Vovchansk direction and that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in Vovchansk and control key ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

direction. Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[49]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 12 but did not advance.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 11 and 12.[50]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces remain unable to build river crossings or pontoon bridges over the Oskil River, preventing Russian forces from transferring heavy equipment to the west (right) bank of the river and using this equipment for offensive operations.[51]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Boroava direction on June 12 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked north of Boroava toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Boroava near Zahryzove; and southeast of Boroava near Hrekivka and Nadiya and toward Olhivka, Stepove, and Andriivka on June 11 and 12.[52]


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 12 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 12 that Russian forces advanced to northern Torske (east of Lyman).[53]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 11 and 12.[54]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**


## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Siversk Direction June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).<sup>[55]</sup>

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, and Serebryanka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 11 and 12.<sup>[56]</sup>

**Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 12 but did not advance.**


Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Stupochky on June 11 and 12.[57]

Order of Battle: A shock battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division is reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[58] Elements of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bila Hora.[59]

**Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Dyliivka (north of Toret'sk).[60]


Russian forces attacked near Toret'sk itself; north of Toret'sk near Dyliivka; southwest of Toret'sk near Romanivka; west of Toret'sk near Shcherbynivka and toward Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka; and northwest of Toret'sk toward Rusyn Yar and Poltavka on June 11 and 12.[61]

A Ukrainian lieutenant operating near Kostyantynivka (northeast of Toretsk) indicated to the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) in an article published on June 11 that recent Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones with ranges of up to 25 miles (roughly 40 kilometers) to strike Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 163rd Tank Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[63] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[64] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[65]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 12 but did not make confirmed advances.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and advanced in southern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and south and southeast of Udachne.[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on June 11 and 12.[67]



Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) with the claimed seizure of Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[68]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 12 but did not advance.**



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields northeast and southwest of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 12 that Russian forces seized Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) following Russian milblogger claims that Russian forces seized most of Horikhove as of June 3.[70]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and toward Muravka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on June 11 and 12.[71]

*See topline text for updates on the Kurakhove direction.*

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vesele and advanced northeast of Komar (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and toward Perebudova (immediately north of Komar).[72]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Skudne, Dniproenerhiya, Fedorivka, Vilne Pole, Komar, Shevchenko and toward Myrne and Zaporizhzhia; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, Novopil, and Zaporizke on June 11 and 12.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar and Vilne Pole.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike targets in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[75]


**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 11 and 12 but did not advance.[76]**

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 12 that Russian forces are conducting six to seven assaults daily in the Malynivka direction and are using motorized vehicles and unguided aerial rockets (NARs) in the area.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[78]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 12 but did not make confirmed advances.**



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 12 that Russian forces advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[79]




Russian forces continued ground assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 11 and 12.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[81]

**The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) continues to condemn any Russian attempts to restart the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).** Forty-eight member states of the IAEA issued a statement calling for all reactors at the ZNPP to remain in cold shutdown mode until Ukrainian regulatory authorities regain control of the plant.[82] The statement assessed that Russian attempts to restart the ZNPP would be "completely unacceptable" and contrary to IAEA and United Nations (UN) resolutions.[83] ISW observed reports in late May 2025 that Russia laid powerlines in occupied Ukraine, likely in order to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[84] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity." [85]

**Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 12 but did not advance.[86]**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 12, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces reportedly continue to struggle to operate vessels in the Black Sea.** Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on June 12 that Russian forces are not deploying surface ships or submarines in the Black Sea.[87] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces have not deployed minesweepers in the past few months and that Russian forces are only using small boats for patrols and security. Pletenchuk stated that Russia's large amphibious assault ships are largely unusable as Russia cannot purchase spare parts for the ships.

### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 63 Shahed and decoy drones from the

directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 28 drones and that 21 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts, injuring civilians and damaging civilian infrastructure.[89]

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

The Belarusian National Academy of Sciences announced on June 12 that it plans to create a joint group with Russian state atomic energy operator Rosatom for the study of civilian nuclear technologies and other energy technologies, likely as part of ongoing Union State integration efforts.[90]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031NKs44NdUZbewczXdbB878jwyYtwvrvNw1q2C1akmuoJVEqkqZu1nfdDaXb2vyWAl>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/12/miljon-vtraty-rosijskoyi-armiyi-dosyagly-bezprecedentnogo-masshtabu/>;  
<https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9391>

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