



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment


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June 14, 2025, 5:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on June 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions. Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[1] An assault detachment commander in the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) told Kremlin newswire TASS on June 14 that the regiment participated in the advance into Horikhove.[2] ISW previously noted that Russian forces are currently engaged in a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Russian forces appear to be attacking from three tactical directions: east, southeast, and south of Novopavlivka.[3] The Russian 41st CAA appears to be the main formation operating east of Novopavlivka.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 80th Tank Regiment also recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[5] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA) are also attacking near Kotlyarivka and Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that additional elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking Horikhove from the north.[6] Russian forces intensified offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk between Solone and Bohdanivka in the direction of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in March and April 2025 and recently advanced to the administrative boundary within seven kilometers east of Novopavlivka.[7]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces also recently advanced into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, just southeast of Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) to support Russian attacks east of the settlement, although Ukrainian forces appear to be counterattacking in the area. Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in eastern Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[8] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Kurakhove in December 2024, and elements of the 51st CAA and the Eastern Grouping of Forces have slowly advanced west toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary over the last five and a half months.[9] Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) with recently seizing Novoukrainka (west of Oleksiivka) and advancing into

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Russian forces appear to be attempting to advance along the Kurakhove-Novopavlivka T-0428 highway toward Novopavlivka from the southeast.

Recent Russian advances near Komar (south of Novopavlivka) are also part of Russia's ongoing offensive aimed at seizing Novopavlivka. Mashovets stated on June 14 that elements of the 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently seized Fedorivka (south of Komar) and that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) recently advanced from Odradne and Bahatyr toward Zaporizhzhia (all south of Novopavlivka).[11] Mashovets recently noted that the Russian military command redeployed the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade from the Kursk direction back to the Komar area, underscoring an apparent Russian effort to reinforce the Russian force grouping in this area.[12] Russian sources recently credited elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) with seizing Komar, although one Russian milblogger denied that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the seizure of Komar.[13] Russian forces appear to be attempting to advance north into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward Novopavlivka and Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) along both sides of the Mokri Yaly River north of Velyka Novosilka, as ISW previously assessed.[14]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Nevinnomysk Azot Plant in Stavropol Krai on the night of June 13 to 14, which is one of the key manufacturers of basic components for Russian explosives, ammunition, and rocket fuel.[15] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Nevinnomysk Azot plant annually produces up to a million tons of ammonia and over a million tons of ammonium nitrate — a key component for explosives and artillery shells.[16] Kovalenko also noted that the plant synthesizes melamine, acetic acid, methanol, and potassium nitrate — all of which can be used to produce land mines, reactive charges, and grenades. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed on June 14 that drone debris fell near the industrial zone in Nevinnomysk.[17] Russian milbloggers posted footage showing a large fire at an industrial zone in Nevinnomysk on June 14.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck several of the Novokuybyshevsk Petrochemical Company's facilities in Samara Oblast on the night of June 13 to 14 and that the facilities produce explosive material components for the Russian military.[19] Kovalenko reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuybyshev Catalyst Plant in Samara Oblast, which produces catalysts used for oil refineries that produce aviation and rocket fuel as well as diesel. Kovalenko noted that the plant repurposes catalytic material for fuel, lubricants, and explosives.[20] Ukrainian officials announced that they are assessing the damage in the aftermath of the strikes.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed on June 14 that Russia and Ukraine exchanged an unspecified number of wounded POWs, as well as POWs younger than 25 years of age.[21] Zelensky noted that Russia captured a majority of the exchanged Ukrainian POWs in 2022. Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported on June 14 that Russia returned 1,200 bodies of Ukrainian citizens, a majority of which were military personnel.[22] ISW cannot independently verify whether the Ukrainian bodies released by Russia were

of those killed in action or in captivity. Zelensky stated that Russia and Ukraine expect to continue conducting exchanges until June 20 or 21.[23]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions.**
- **Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base.**
- **Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently recaptured Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and forced Ukrainian forces back across the international border to Oleksandriya, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, including southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino and south of Sudzha near Guyevo on June 13 and 14.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 14 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack southeast of Tetkino from Ryzhevka and Iskryskivshchyna, Sumy Oblast, and near Novyi Put from Makiivka, Sumy Oblast (east and southeast of Tetkino, respectively).[27]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces likely have fire control over the 38K-040 highway Tetkino-Glushkovo.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[29] Drone elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Tetkino direction.[30]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 14.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[31] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces advanced roughly one kilometer near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and Andriivka.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced south of Mala Korchakivka (north of Sumy City), south of Yablunivka, and southeast of Sadky (both northeast of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and Mala Korchakivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Sadky, and Yunakivka on June 13 and 14.[34] Mashovets stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka and in the directions of Kostyantynivka and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[35] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly attacking near Sadky.[37] Unspecified assault elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly attacking near Yunakivka.[38] Assault elements of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City towards Lyptsy and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 13 and 14.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[41]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe (both near the international border); north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, Kindrashivka, and Holubivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 13 and 14.[42]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue to conduct daily infantry assaults in the Kupyansk direction and to rely on light vehicles and motorcycles.[43] The servicemember noted that Russian forces have yet to establish crossings over the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction and that Russian forces are attempting to cross with BMP infantry fighting vehicles but are unable to due to the river's depth and current. The servicemember reported that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to cross the river in boats or with ropes. A Russian source claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) struck a Ukrainian bridge crossing over the Oskil River near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyyi (south of Kupyansk).[44]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are attacking north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Putnikove, Zapadne, Doroshivka, and Kindrashivka.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Novoplatonivka, and Zahryzove, and east of Borova near Serhiivka on June 13 and 14.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman toward Olhivka; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Lypove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr, and toward Shandryholove; and east of Lyman near Yampolivka and Torske on June 13 and 14.[47]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 14 that the Russian military command is deploying small groups of infantry to areas in the Lyman direction to forward positions beyond Russian logistical routes, particularly near Torske — leaving the Russian units without food, water, or medicine for weeks.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[49]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 14 that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly of the 3rd CAA) advanced southeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and are attempting to seize Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and in the direction of Hryhorivka on June 13 and 14. [51]

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Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Markove, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and towards Bila Hora and Stupochky on June 13 and 14.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, and additional elements of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[53]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway immediately northwest of Toretsk and southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[54]

Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported on June 14 that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including the division's 33rd, 242nd, and 255th motorized rifle regiments and 10th Tank Regiment, advanced up to 2.3 kilometers from the Zorya-Romanivka line (southwest of Toretsk) and from Novoolenivka in the direction of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) also advanced north of Romanivka.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Yablunivka along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[57]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Popiv Yar, and in the direction of Yablunivka and Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka on June 13 and 14.[58]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking near Dyliivka.[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, and Yelyzavetivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne; and west of Pokrovsk in the direction of Myrne on June 13 and 14.[60]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on June 14 that Russian forces are continuing to unsuccessfully attack into Pokrovsk itself and that Russian forces have intensified their use of electronic warfare (EW) equipment in the area.[61] A senior non-

commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian aviation is launching 10 to 20 guided glide bombs in the Pokrovsk direction each day.[62]

See topline text for reports on the Novopavlivka direction.

[NOTE: ISW is reorganizing its axis sections and will report on activity previously denoted as within the Kurkakhove direction and some activity previously denoted as within the Velyka Novosilka direction in the Novopavlivka direction moving forward.]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity northwest and west of Velyka Novosilka on June 14.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 13 and 14 but did not advance.[63]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Hulyaipole direction.[64]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia direction on June 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka on June 13 and 14.[65]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Buk-M3 air defense system, a Pantsir-S1 air defense system, and a 9S32 "Imbir" radar station in an unspecified area of occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[66]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 3rd Company of the Russian BARS-3 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nesteryanka, and drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne Forces) and elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge on June 13 and 14 but did not advance.[68]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 58 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 drones and that 20 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and struck nine unspecified locations.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the creation of a distinct branch of service that will encompass the use of unmanned systems and operate as an independent component of the Belarusian special forces. Belarusian Major General Pavel Muraveiko informed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko of the creation of the unmanned systems branch during Lukashenko's visit on June 13 to the 927th Center for Preparation and Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems in Byarova, Brest Oblast.[70] The Belarusian MoD reported that the center will work with both Belarusian military and civilian universities to train more than 20,000 students per year to be proficient in the use of drones and noted that the center trains both Belarusians and foreigners.[71] Lukashenko also inspected Belarusian-produced drones and anti-drone systems during his visit. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently reiterated that Russia is creating an unmanned systems force (USF) that will operate as a separate branch within the Russian MoD.[72]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://t.me/osintpen/1207>; <https://t.me/korrzakadrom/1437>

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/319996

[3] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025>

[4] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025>

[5] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65096>

[6] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2803>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825>

[8] <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1933735010231804257>; https://t.me/rezhim_b/4920

[9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125>

- [10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2025>
- [11] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2804>
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