

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on June 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin's public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely. Putin articulated a theory of victory during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2024 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.^[1] Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Putin's discussion with foreign media at SPIEF on June 19, 2025, demonstrated that Putin still maintains this theory of victory one year later.^[2] Putin claimed that Russian forces have a "strategic advantage" in all areas of the front. Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline every day and that even if Russian forces advance less on some days, they are "still advancing." Putin claimed that the "situation has changed" since the March 2022 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul and that the terms Russia proposed in 2022 are "much softer" than the terms Russia demands today. Putin threatened that the situation may worsen for Ukraine if Ukraine does not make significant concessions and agree to a peace settlement on Russia's terms and called on Ukraine's partners to "point to the realities of today" to push Ukraine toward a settlement. Putin reiterated that Russia is prepared to achieve its war goals militarily if it is not able to achieve these goals diplomatically. Putin has repeatedly indicated that Russia's war aims include regime change in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Kremlin proxy government in Kyiv, significant limitations of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, Ukrainian neutrality, and NATO's abandonment of its open-door policy.^[3]

Other Kremlin officials also rearticulated Putin's theory of victory on June 19. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question in a June 19 interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestia* about what Russia should do since "international institutions do not work" and diplomacy fails to meet Russia's expectations of ensuring peace on Russia's terms.^[4] Peskov claimed that Russia must be patient and take a "consistent" position — a call for Russia to not waver from its long-held demands as time will produce Russia's desired outcome. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo similarly claimed on June 19 that "Russia is a country with which is better not to fight because time...is on [Russia's] side."^[5]

Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine — conditions that the West can still change. Putin's theory assumes that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any operationally- or strategically-significant territory that Russian forces seize.[6] Russian forces are taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal tactical gains that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, but Putin's theory assumes that the Russian military will be able to maintain the theater-wide initiative and sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains longer than the West is willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine and longer than Ukraine's economy and population are able to mobilize for the war effort. ISW continues to assess that Russia will face a number of challenges in its economy and defense industrial base (DIB) in the medium-term that will impede Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war in Ukraine.[7] Continued rising oil prices following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort, but only if the price of oil remains high and if Russian oil does not come under additional international sanctions.[8] **Increased Western military aid and economic instruments can enable Ukrainian forces to maintain pressure on the battlefield and exacerbate Russia's economic issues, leveraging Russia's weaknesses to achieve a strong negotiating position for Ukraine and the West and extract critical concessions from Russia to bring about a lasting and just end to the war.**

Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences. Putin claimed during his June 19 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF that Russia does not consider NATO rearmament (in line with US President Donald Trump's objective for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective security) to be a threat as Russia is able to ensure its own security and is constantly improving the Russian military and Russia's defensive capabilities.[9] Putin claimed that "whatever NATO does" will create threats, but that Russia will suppress all the threats that arise. Putin claimed that the idea that Russia is going to attack NATO states in Europe is "nonsense" - despite Kremlin statements threatening the Baltic states and Finland and Russian military preparations for a conflict with NATO in the future.[10] Putin also claimed during the June 19 meeting that Germany's possible supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine will not impact the course of military operations in Ukraine but will cause "serious damage" to German-Russian relations.[11] Kremlin officials have made similar demonstrably untrue claims about Western weapons' inability to change the situation on the battlefield in the past.[12]

Putin's statements are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia, such as by refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine or stopping efforts to increase NATO's defensive capabilities.[13] Putin's claims about Taurus missiles and threats from NATO differ from previous Kremlin statements along these lines, however. Kremlin officials have recently framed European efforts to increase their defense capabilities as a threat to Russian national security, in contrast to Putin's June 19 claim.[14] Putin used his June 2024 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF to threaten that Russia might supply long-range weapons to unspecified Western adversaries to try to push the West to not lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia — a more direct and aggressive threat than Putin's June 2025 claims that Germany's supply of weapons to Ukraine would damage

bilateral German-Russian relations.[15] Putin may be trying different variations of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign that cater specifically to new audiences.

Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin stated that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky but claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate and that Russia will only sign legal agreements with "legitimate" authorities.[16] Putin reiterated his false claims that there is no legal mechanism in the Ukrainian Constitution or law to extend the term of a Ukrainian president under martial law, and Putin deliberately misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and law to bolster his claims. Putin also claimed that all Zelensky-appointed Ukrainian government bodies are illegitimate, alleging that if the president is illegitimate then "the entire system of power becomes illegitimate." Ukraine's Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains.[17] Putin's recent statement that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky is meaningless as Putin indicated that he will not sign a legal peace agreement with the Ukrainian government. Putin and other Kremlin officials have frequently and falsely accused Zelensky and other facets of the Ukrainian government of being illegitimate with this misrepresentation of Ukrainian law since May 2024, and the Kremlin has described every Ukrainian government since 2014 as illegitimate.[18] Russian officials have occasionally proposed other Ukrainian officials and entities are possible legitimate authorities with which Russia can legally negotiate and sign a peace agreement, but Putin's statement accusing the whole government under Zelensky of also being illegitimate suggests that Russia would also not recognize an agreement signed by any member of the current Ukrainian government.[19] ISW continues to assess that these information operations are part of an effort to set informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Russia may sign with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing.[20]

Putin used his meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media space, as ISW previously forecasted.[21] Putin reiterated his theory of victory, reflexive control narratives, and false claims of Zelensky's illegitimacy in a question-and-answer session with international journalists, including from Western media outlets, on June 19.[22] Putin also reiterated boilerplate rhetoric accusing the West of provoking the war in Ukraine by violating the Minsk accords. The Kremlin has historically used these narratives to justify its aggression against Ukraine and deter Western states from providing further assistance to Ukraine.[23] Peskov stated on June 18 that Putin wanted to speak directly with international journalists in order to "accurately" portray Putin's and Russia's point of view to Western audiences.[24] Putin likely aims to re-amplify these narratives to reinforce his efforts to deter further Western assistance to Ukraine at a critical time in debates about future military assistance for Ukraine.

Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using "free resources," including Russia's workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system's capital reserve.[25] Nabiullina stated that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged that the Russian economy is "cooling," but claimed that more positive trends are on the horizon and that Russia's current economic model is working.[26] The *Moscow Times* claimed that, according to Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Russia's unemployment rate has dropped to a historic low of just 2.3 percent and that mass emigration


and military drafting of men have exacerbated labor shortages.[27] The *Moscow Times* further noted that, according to Rosstat, the liquid assets of Russia's sovereign wealth fund has decreased threefold to 2.8 trillion rubles (roughly \$35.7 billion) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[28] Russia's Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated that Russia is on the "brink of recession" and noted that Russia's strict monetary policy is hindering the ability of industries outside of the defense industrial base (DIB) to attract investments.[29] ISW observed recent reporting that the Kremlin is trying to promote social optimism at SPIEF rather than its traditional focus on foreign investment, and Russian official statements about Russian economic issues are complicating these efforts.[30] These Russian economic officials may be attempting to temper some of the Kremlin's expectation-setting among domestic Russian audiences about the impacts of a prolonged war effort in Ukraine without completely contradicting official Kremlin rhetoric that Russia can wage protracted war against Ukraine indefinitely.

Ukraine and Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements, amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges. Ukrainian officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of severely wounded and sick POWs on June 19.[31] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that Russia captured most of the released Ukrainian POWs in 2022 during the battle for Mariupol.[32] Ukrainian Interior Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia has been including the bodies of Russian soldiers among Ukrainian bodies in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges to deliberately complicate Ukrainian efforts to identify the bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers.[33] Russia may have sought to artificially inflate the number of bodies released to Ukraine and undermine the mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures to which Russia and Ukraine agreed on June 2.

Key Takeaways:

- **The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin's public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely.**
- **Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine – conditions that the West can still change.**
- **Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences.**
- **Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.**
- **Putin used his meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media space, as ISW previously forecasted.**
- **Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy.**
- **Ukraine and Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements, amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 18 and 19.[34] Russian forces continued attacks near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tetkino itself, Bezsalivka (east of Tetkino), Iskryshivshchyna (southeast of Tetkino), and Ryzhivka (south of Tetkino).[36]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[37]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 19.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions south of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[38]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka, Varachyne, Yablunivka, and Yunakivka.[39] Milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka.[40]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that Russian forces continue conducting high-attribution assaults and actively deploying motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in northern Sumy Oblast.[41]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 19 that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, LMD), and 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Oleksiivka.[42] Mashovets stated that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD), and 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division) are operating near Novomykolaivka and Varachyne. Mashovets stated that elements of the 83rd and 11th VDV brigades are operating near Yablunivka and Varachyne and that elements of the 106th and 76th VDV divisions are operating near Yunakivka.[43] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka.[44]

Russian	Main	Effort	–	Eastern	Ukraine
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on June 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene and Vovchansk	on	June	18	and	19.[45]
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The planning department head of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups and on motorcycles and are not fielding heavy equipment.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 17 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[47]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Dovhenke, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 18 and 19.[48]


Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Zelenyi Hai, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Olhivka and Hrekivka on June 18 and 19.[49]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, Lypove, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 18 and 19.[50]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Siversk direction on June 19 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 18 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).^[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 18 and 19.^[52]

A commander for a Ukrainian unit operating in the Siversk direction reported on June 19 that Russian forces are attacking in groups of four to fifteen motorcycles with two soldiers per motorcycle to make it easier to avoid Ukrainian artillery strikes.^[53]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bondarne; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 18 and 19.^[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 18 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.^[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and drone operators of the “Burevestnik” Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue operating near Chasiv Yar.^[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[\[57\]](#)

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced north of Dyliivka and toward Oleksandro-Shulytne (both north of Toretsk).[\[58\]](#)

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Poltavka and Popiv Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Dyliivka.[60]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk (Kostyantynivka) direction posted additional footage on June 19 of a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault that ISW previously reported on June 18.[61] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 14 armored vehicles and six other vehicles while repelling the assault. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) have repeatedly attempted unsuccessful mechanized assaults toward Oleksandro-Kalynove and Novospaske in recent weeks and that the Russian military command must internalize that mechanized assaults are an ineffective means to advance against Ukraine's drone-based defense.[62]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) and elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are operating near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka.[63] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Oleksandro-Kalynove.[64] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar.[65] Elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka direction (northwest of Toretsk).[66] Elements of the Russian 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Oleksandro-Shulyne direction.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Malynivka and Koptieve (both northeast of Pokrovsk) since June 17 and recently advanced near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[68]


Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, Novoeconomichne, and Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Pomin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on June 18 and 19.[69]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are increasing electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and guided glide bomb usage and are mining frontline positions immediately after advancing to new positions, which is preventing Russian forces from being able to retreat.^[70]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating along the Malynivka-Novoeconomicheske-Myrolyubivka line (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[71] Mashovets stated that elements of the 137th and 74th motorized rifle brigades and 90th Tank Division (all of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Pokrovsk.^[72] Drone operators of the 80th “Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Pokrovsk.^[73] Elements of the “Typhoon” detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.^[74] Elements of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating east of Malynivka and near Myrne.^[75] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk).^[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 18 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).^[77]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and advanced in and northeast of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), north of Zelenyi Kut (southeast of Novopavlivka), and near Komar and Perebudova (both south of Novopavlivka).^[78] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in parts of Bahatyr and Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).^[79]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, Rozlyv, and Vesele; and south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia and Myrne on June 18 and 19.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka, Komar, Perebudova, and Zaporizhzhia.[81]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported that Russian attacks in the Novopavlivka direction are slightly less intense than compared to the beginning of June 2025, likely because Russian forces are regrouping, replenishing losses, and transferring forces to the area in preparation for future assaults.[82]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in the Bahatyr-Zaporizhzhia direction.[83] Mashovets stated that elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating near Oleksiivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently seized Fedorivka and Odradne but are still fighting to seize Komar. The Russian MoD claimed elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in Fedorivka.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces advanced near Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[85]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 18 and 19.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko.[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shevchenko.[88] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[89]


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 18 and 19 but did not advance.[\[90\]](#)

Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[\[91\]](#)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 19 but did not advance.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on June 18 and 19.[92]

A representative of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on June 19 that Russian forces are accumulating in small groups of 10 to 15 soldiers and hiding in pipes and under greenery before conducting assaults against Ukrainian positions.[93]

Order of Battle: Elements of the "Nemets" group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[94]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 19.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 19, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[95]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 104 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[96] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 drones and that 48 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian

drones struck residential and civilian infrastructure objects in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.[97]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian officials continue highlighting bilateral economic cooperation through the Union State framework. Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin stated that Belarus accounted for 47 percent of Smolensk Oblast's total exports and over 75 percent of the oblast's total imports.[98] Anokhin stated that Smolensk Oblast is the third largest Russian oblast trade partner with Belarus, exchanging 294 billion rubles (approximately \$3.7 billion) of goods in 2024 and over 69 billion rubles (approximately \$880 million) during the first quarter of 2025. Anokhin also claimed that about 5,000 enterprises with Belarusian capital are operating in Smolensk Oblast and that Smolensk Oblast and Belarus have implemented 49 agreements on cross-border cooperation.

Russian officials may be posturing Smolensk to be the future capital of the Union State. State Secretary of the Union State Sergei Glazyev, a former Russian economic official, claimed on June 19 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that "Smolensk is the coordination center of the Union State." [99] Russian officials have previously postured Smolensk as a possible future capital of the Union State.[100]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[98] <https://t.me/anohin67/6873>

[99] <https://t.me/anohin67/6873>

[100] <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Quiet%20Conquest%20Belarus.pdf>