

Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

June 3, 2025, 6:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40 am ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 3 in posts on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory [in Ukraine] and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms."^[1] Medvedev stated that Russia's June 2 Istanbul memorandum was in line with these goals and threatened that Russia will "explode" everything and "disappear" anyone who opposes Russia in response to the June 1 long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 3 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum is aimed at "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine and that people should not expect "immediate decisions" from Istanbul.^[2] Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a future trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but that Putin wants to hold this meeting after all of the technical details are worked out as part of a future ceasefire or long-term peace agreement.^[3]

Russian state media has previously cautioned the Russian public against expecting any significant results from ongoing Ukrainian–Russian negotiations, although Russian officials continue to falsely project interest in good faith peace negotiations to US and Western officials.^[4] Russian officials have recently engaged with the United States in a series of bilateral meetings and as part of ongoing US efforts to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine, but Russian officials have yet to demonstrate a willingness to compromise on any of their long-standing demands to bring about peace in Ukraine.^[5] ISW noted on June 2 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.^[6] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to pursuing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation and that Russia will continue to pursue this objective so long as Putin believes Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine.

Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU agents mined the underwater support pillars of the Kerch Strait Bridge and detonated the equivalent of 1,100 kilograms of TNT at 0444 on June 3.[7] The SBU reported that the operation took several months to plan and execute and stated that this is the third time that Ukraine has conducted an operation against the bridge. The SBU reported that the structural integrity of the bridge is in critical condition. The SBU released an image of the bridge which indicates that the explosion did not damage the roadway, though the force of the explosion threw structural elements onto the roadway. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows an explosion at the base of the Kerch Strait Bridge.[8] Russian opposition outlets *Sota* and *Astra* and Russian milbloggers circulated footage indicating that Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against the bridge around 1500 on June 3, though it is unclear if the strike caused damage to the structure.[9] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge undermines Russia's ability to resupply Russian units and facilities in Crimea.[10] The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical Russian logistics route, and Russian forces heavily defend the bridge with layered air defense, anti-sabotage measures, and personnel who monitor surface and underwater activity.[11] Russian sources claimed that authorities temporarily halted traffic across the bridge, but later claimed that traffic resumed.[12] Russian state media and the Russian government have not responded to the strike as of this publication.

Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told Ukrainian outlet *Ukrainska Pravda* on June 2 that Ukrainian officials estimated about 10 to 12 of Russia's 19 Tu-160 bombers and 36 of Russia's 57 Tu-95 bombers were operational prior to Ukraine's June 1 strikes on Russian airbases.[13] *Bloomberg* reported on June 2 that a senior Western official stated that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged at least seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22 bombers during the June 1 strike.[14] *Bloomberg* also assessed that Russia will likely struggle to repair and replace aircraft damaged in the June 1 strike as its strategic aviation fleet relies on critical Western components that Russia has failed to source in the wake of Western sanctions. The *New York Times* (NYT) reported on June 3 that Western officials and military analysts assessed that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged six Tu-95 bombers, four Tu-22M bombers, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and that Ukrainian special services may have destroyed or severely damaged up to 20 Russian strategic aircraft during the strike.[15] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight assessed on June 3 that satellite imagery and open-source analysis indicate that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 11 bombers of various types and one An-12 transport aircraft.[16] Frontelligence noted that publicly available satellite imagery has yet to confirm reporting that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged over 20 bombers. Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami and journalists from the *Telegraph* and *Insider* stated on June 3 that Ukrainian special services shared a video of Ukrainian drones striking at least two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and that Ukraine may release this video soon.[17] ISW has not observed the video's publication as of the time of this report but will continue to monitor for additional information.

Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military

means. Ukrainian outlet *New Voice* (NV) reported on June 3, citing Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), that Russian forces had stockpiled over 13,000 ballistic, cruise, and other missiles as of mid-May 2025, including: almost 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, over 100 Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, almost 300 Kh-101 cruise missiles, over 400 Kalibr cruise missiles, up to 300 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, about 700 Oniks cruise missiles and Zirkon anti-ship missiles, about 60 North Korean-produced KN-23 ballistic missiles, and about 11,000 S-300/400 air defense missiles.[18] NV reported that the GUR also estimated that Russia can produce roughly 150–200 missiles per month, including: 60 to 70 Iskander-Ms, 10 to 15 Kinzhals, 20 to 30 Kh-101s, 25 to 30 Kalibrs, up to 10 Kh-32s, and 20 to 30 total Oniks and Zirkon missiles. Russia had been launching increasingly large strike packages against Ukraine containing missiles prior to June 1, and Ukraine's June 1 strikes targeting Russian airfields and bombers will degrade Russia's ability to conduct further large air-launched cruise missile strikes against Ukraine. Ihnat told *Ukrainska Pravda* that the June 1 strikes did not destroy all of Russia's strategic bombers and that Russia retains the ability to strike Ukraine with missiles launched from strategic bombers.[19] Ihnat noted that roughly half of all Russian long range strike drones launched against Ukraine are decoys, while the other half are real Shahed drones. Shahed drones have long dominated Russian strike packages, and Russian forces have recently been using more ground-launched ballistic missiles than air-launched cruise missiles. ISW continues to assess that Russian efforts to increase domestic drone and missile production and ongoing adaptation of strikes packages are likely part of a broader effort to prepare for a long war in Ukraine and possibly a future war against NATO.[20]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3. Zelensky appointed former Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukraine's Joint Forces Command.[21] Zelensky appointed Drapatyi as the Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces on November 29, 2024, and Drapatyi recently submitted his resignation in response to a June 1 Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit.[22] The position of Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander has been vacant since February 26, when Zelensky appointed then Joint Forces Commander Major General Andriy Hnatov as Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff.[23] Zelensky and Umerov also announced on June 3 that they appointed Brigadier General Oleh Apostol as Commander of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces, Major General Ilhor Skybiuk as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major Robert Brovdi (callsign "Madyar") as Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi as Deputy Commander of Operational Command "East." [24] Sukharevskyi previously served as Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces.[25]

Key Takeaways:

- **Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war.**

- **Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.**
- **Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1.**
- **Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 3, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian Advance: Geolocated footage published on June 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).^[26] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced southeast of Novy Put (also southwest of Glushkovo).^[27]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 2 and 3.^[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), in Guyevo (southeast of Sudzha), and south of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).^[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and motorized rifle elements subordinated to the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.^[30]

Assessed Control of Terrain near Tetkino June 3, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 3.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 3, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on June 3 that Russian forces recently seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City), but one milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in Andriivka's southern outskirts.[31] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City), near Andriivka and Yunakivka (southeast of Andriivka), towards Mala Korchakivka (southeast of Andriivka), and along the Snagost River in a wide area near Yablunivka (east of Andriivka).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), but other milbloggers denied this claim.[33]

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 and 3 that Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, Novomykolaivka, and Kostyantynivka and toward Khotyn and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Myropillya.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Oleksandriya toward Guyevo (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told *Ukrainska Pravda* on June 2 that Russian forces are intensifying strikes against Sumy Oblast, including with KABs.[36] Ihnat characterized the intensification as a scorched-earth tactic.

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction and in Shostka raion, Sumy Oblast (further northwest of Sumy City).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 3 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 2 that Russian forces advanced over 120 meters in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]


Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on June 2 and 3.[39]

The Russian Air Force is reportedly testing new guided glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) with an extended range in Kharkiv Oblast.[40] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Head Spartak Borysenko reported on June 3 that Russian forces launched four extended-range glide bombs at Kharkiv Oblast from Tomarovka, Belgorod Oblast on May 31 as part of new glide bomb testing. Borysenko stated that the upgraded glide bombs have a range of 95 kilometers, an increase from the bombs' previous range of 60-80 kilometers. Borysenko stated that Russian forces can strike any location in Kharkiv City and some settlements south of Kharkiv City using these bombs

when Russian aircraft sortie from the Russian air base in Tomarovka. Borysenko reported that Russian forces used similar extended-range glide bombs against Sumy Oblast in May 2025.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 3 but did not advance.



Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Dovhenke and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Mala Shapktivka, and Stepove Novoselivka on June 2 and 3.^[41]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bryhadyrivka (southwest of Kupyansk) and Milove (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Stepove and toward Olhivka on June 2 and 3.[43]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are developing an offensive in the Borova direction from Russia's recently formed salient near Ridkodub (southeast of Borova).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 3.


Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, Shandryholove, and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on June 2 and 3.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating North Korean M-1978 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery near Kreminna (east of Lyman).[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 3, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced in the Siversk direction.[47]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Siversk towards Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhynokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 2 and 3.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar, in central Chasiv Yar itself, and near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[\[49\]](#)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora on June 2 and 3.[\[50\]](#)

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[\[51\]](#)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), advanced in northwestern and western Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[\[52\]](#) Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced toward Rusyn Yar and Poltavka (both west of Toretsk).[\[53\]](#)


Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Dylivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Popiv Yar, Yablunivka, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka on June 2 and 3.[\[54\]](#)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups and clearing key Ukrainian strongholds step-by-step to make advances between Toretsk and Pokrovsk.[\[55\]](#) Another Russian milblogger, however, claimed that overextended Russian logistics and Ukrainian reinforcements have slowed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction.[\[56\]](#)

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[\[57\]](#)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 3 but did not advance.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) with recently seizing Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in a forest between Malynivka and Yelyzavetivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are clearing Malynivka.[59] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern and southern outskirts of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[60]



Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Yelyzavetivka, Malynivka, Myrne, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 2 and

3.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 3 but did not advance.



Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and have seized most of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka on June 2 and 3.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized half of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[65]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Oleksiivka on June 2 and 3.[66] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Oleksiivka and near Zelenyi Kut (west of Kurakhove).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68]

Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil, Novosilka, and Vilne Pole; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Shevchenko, and Fedorivka; and north of Velyka Novosilka toward Novoukrainka on June 2 and 3.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Shevchenko, and Fedorivka.[70]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Komar.[71] Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[72]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 3.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Polohy direction.[73]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 3 but did not advance.



Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Stepove on June 2 and 3.[74]


A Russian milblogger claimed that the area between Robotyne (south of Orikhiv) and Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) has become a contested "gray zone" in recent weeks.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Robotyne, and drone operators of the Chechen "Vostok-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[76]

The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[77]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 3.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 3, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 60 drones and that 15 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa cities.[79]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Sumy City, killing at least four civilians and injuring at least 25 civilians.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABELSTREET

[1] https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/76 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/587

[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/318104 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318105 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318107 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318109 ; <https://meduza.io/paragraph/2025/06/03/kompromissy-s-ukrainoy-tema-dlya-peregovorov>

[3] <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7775362>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425>; https://t.me/tass_agency/307331; https://t.me/tass_agency/307301; https://t.me/tass_agency/307302; https://t.me/tass_agency/307303 ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025> ; <https://tass.ru/interviews/23001625>

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825> ; <https://ru.usembassy.gov/president-trumps-statement-on-his-call-with-president-vladimir-putin/>

[6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225>

[7] <https://www.facebook.com/100066507582416/videos/pcb.1076252331268343/716206554278174?locale=uk-UA>; <https://t.me/SBUkr/14960> ; <https://military.com/en/news/ssu-destroys-supports-of-the-crimean-bridge/>; https://youtu.be/BW_QfDcEhbc; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/03/zradnyk-u-naczgvardiyi-sbu-pidirvaly-krymskyj-mist-lymanskyj-vidmak-strim->

armiyatv/; <https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/06/03/sbu-utverzhdet-cto-provela-operatsiyu-po-podryvu-podvodnyh-opor-krymskogo-mosta>

[8] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1929858263178158494;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1929866881038483492;
https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1929882460059324526

[9] <https://t.me/sotaproject/98693>; <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/80612>;
<https://t.me/astrapress/82768>; https://t.me/romanov_92/47565; https://t.me/dva_majors/72675;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64818>

[10] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc> ; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/03/u-vms-rozpovily-yak-urazhennya-krymskogo-mosta-povplyvaye-na-rosiyan/>

[11] <https://military dot com/en/news/ssu-destroys-supports-of-the-crimean-bridge/>

[12] https://t.me/most_official/15359 ; https://t.me/most_official/15359;
https://t.me/sevdortrans_ru/4523 ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29520>;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/36691>; <https://t.me/rybar/70969> ; <https://t.me/bazabazon/37942>;
<https://t.me/sashakots/54075>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29572> ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29559>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92815>;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92820>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92822> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72673;
<https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1776>; https://t.me/tass_agency/318157

[13] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/>

[14] <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-02/ukraine-s-long-range-strike-on-nuclear-bombers-rattles-moscow>

[15] <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-drone-attack.html>

[16] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929795063615295593

[17] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929896965342413252;
https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929897365105676539;
<https://x.com/JimmySecUK/status/1929894575369302054>;
https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1929910132197958094;
<https://x.com/michaeldweiss/status/1929909529275175045>; <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/06/03/ukraine-strikes-putin-prized-spy-plane/>

[18] <https://nv dot ua/ukr/ukraine/events/gur-pro-raketni-zapasi-rf-iskander-kinzhal-kalibr-h-101-cirkon-chi-vistachit-dlya-novih-udariv-50519076.html>

[19] <https://www.pravda dot com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/>

[20] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar122724>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar120224>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030325>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar050925>;

- [21] <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3842025-55257>
- [22] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125>
- [23] <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3752024-51077>; <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1482025-54041>; <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2012025-54317>
- [24] <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19jr6k2HwH/>; <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3862025-55265>; <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3852025-55261>
- [25] https://t.me/usf_army/600
- [26] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28627; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5008
- [27] https://t.me/rusich_army/23949
- [28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ; <https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>
- [29] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36675> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92772> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512> ; <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20283> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29554> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26941> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/23949
- [30] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92772> ; <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/20283>
- [31] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26948> ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318092 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/53410 ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92803>; <https://t.me/sashakots/54073>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36679>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64802>; <https://t.me/rybar/70968>; https://t.me/dva_majors/72640; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23302>
- [32] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64796>; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512>
- [33] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36675>; <https://t.me/warriorofnorth/8874>
- [34] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26941>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512>; <https://t.me/rybar/70968>; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23302>
- [35] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64790>
- [36] <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2025/06/3/7515296/>
- [37] <https://t.me/epoddubny/23656>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29524>
- [38] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29497> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29512>
- [39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[40] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1032987-pid-cas-udariv-po-harkivsini-rf-pocala-viprobovuvati-novij-modul-planeruvanna-so-dozvolae-aviabombam-letiti-dali/>

[41] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[42] <https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1929630499477344651>;
<https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1929578872627929336>; <https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/224>;
<https://t.me/epoddubny/23656>

[43] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/72614

[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[46] <https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1929893161645592826> ;
<https://x.com/blinzka/status/1929900276057584013>

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/53402 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/149459 ;
https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/36369

[48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>

[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26941> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31743 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72614

[50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>

[51] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/29524>

[52] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801> ; <https://t.me/rybar/70963> ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23303>

[53] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801> ; <https://t.me/rybar/70963> ;
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23303>

[54] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64801> ;
<https://t.me/rybar/70963>

[55] <https://t.me/rybar/70963> ;

[56] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23303>

[57] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/92776>

[58] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26938>

[59] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36665> ; <https://t.me/rybar/70963>

[60] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23304>

[61] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356 ;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26941>

[62] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36669> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23305>

[63] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64797> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070> ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356

[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9292; <https://t.me/spetsnazb/755>

[65] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23306>

[66] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>; <https://t.me/s/GeneralStaffZSU> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoqK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPa6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11356; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26941>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23306>

[67] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800>

[68] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800>

[69] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26941>

[70] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64800>; https://t.me/voin_dv/15298;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26941>

[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/15289

[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/15299

[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/15284

[74] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25100>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25073>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoqK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPa6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25070>

[75] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36658>

[76] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36658>; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5767

[77] <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoqK96ZSxBBXp6WNF8fWV8minfpZmZr5C7HaXPRM7XTYPa6zc3oqdoU9mHhARAKSbal>

[78] <https://t.me/kpszsus/35539>

[79] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43594 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/03/ulamky-droniv-siyaly-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-chernigiv-pid-udarom-chetvero-poranyh-zgorily-budynky-ta-desyatky-avto/>; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43594 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/03/ulamky-droniv-siyaly-vogon-ta-rujnuvannya-chernigiv-pid-udarom-chetvero-poranyh-zgorily-budynky-ta-desyatky-avto/>; https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/14664; <https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1033095-vnoci-3-cervna-rosiani-atakuvali-peredmista-harkova-na-teritorii-postovogo-terminala-zajnalasa-pozeza/>; <https://t.me/syngubov/14662>; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/43602 ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/03/palayuchi-sklady-z-yizheyu-ta-rozbyti-haty-rosiya-znovu-atakuvala-odesu-chetvero-lyudej-postrazhdaly/>; <https://suspilne.media/odesa/1033119-vibiti-vikna-virva-ta-zgorila-aktivka-foto-naslidkiv-ataki-na-odesu-i-svidcenna-ocevidciv/>

[80] <https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4636?single> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/03/vorog-zavdav-udaru-po-czentru-sum-ye-bagato-poranyh-odna-lyudyna-zagynula/> ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/36004; <https://meduza.io/news/2025/06/03/rossiyskie-voyska-nanesli-raketnyy-udar-po-tsentru-sum-pogibli-ne-menee-dvuh-chelovek-raneny-okolo-20>; <https://smr.gov.ua/uk/novini/podiji/34135-vorog-potsiliv-v-aktivki-u-tsentri-sum.html>; <https://suspilne.media/sumy/1033143-armia-rf-udarila-po-sumah-so-vidomo/>; <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1929815700043919433>