

Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

June 4, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.

Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with members of the Russian government on June 4 and discussed the May 31 collapse of two railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts.[1] The meeting included a staged statement from a children's doctor who promoted the Kremlin's longstanding justifications for its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the meeting that Ukrainian special services "without a doubt" conducted an operation to down railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts on May 31, but did not present concrete evidence to link the collapsed bridges to Ukraine. Putin claimed that the train derailments confirm that the "already illegitimate" Ukrainian government that previously "seized power" is "gradually degenerating into a terrorist organization." Putin questioned if Russia can negotiate with "terrorists" and questioned why Russia should agree to Ukraine's proposed 30-day or longer ceasefires, claiming that Ukraine will use the ceasefires to continue to receive Western weapons provisions, mobilize military personnel, and prepare "other terrorist acts." Putin claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not need peace at all" and values power over peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin later emphasized Ukraine's alleged "terrorism" during a phone call on June 4 with US President Donald Trump.[2] Ushakov repeated Putin's claim that Ukraine has "degenerated into a terrorist organization."

Kremlin officials have long alleged that the current Ukrainian government is "illegitimate," and Putin previously questioned on March 27 how Russia can negotiate with Ukraine as "neo-Nazi formations" are allegedly ruling the country.[3] Putin has also repeatedly used questions about Ukrainian force generation and Western weapons deliveries to reject Ukraine's previous ceasefire proposals.[4] Putin's June 4 claims that the Ukrainian government is a "terrorist organization" with which Russia cannot negotiate, and which will exploit any longer-term ceasefire, is the latest iteration of this Kremlin effort to justify delaying the negotiation process and prolonging the war by attacking Ukraine's sovereignty as a legitimate negotiating partner. The Kremlin is likely link its messaging surrounding the train derailments and Ukraine's alleged perpetuation of "terrorism" in order to distract from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's claim on June 3 that Russia needs the

negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise[d] peace on someone else's delusional terms." [5]


Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace. Ushakov stated that Putin talked with Trump about the May 31 train derailments in Russia, the June 1 Ukrainian strikes against Russian military air bases, and the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul. [6] Putin alleged to Trump that Ukraine was responsible for the train derailments. Ushakov claimed that Russia "did not succumb" and attended the Istanbul negotiations despite Ukraine's "provocations." Putin's statements to Trump are also likely aimed at distracting from Russia's own disinterest in negotiations and continued preparations for a prolonged war effort so as to avoid possible future US sanctions by painting Ukraine as a bad actor. [7]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace. Zelensky stated on June 4 that the Ukrainian delegation to Istanbul has not received a response to the ceasefire proposal it presented during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks. [8] Zelensky also proposed that Ukraine and Russia implement a comprehensive ceasefire until Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Zelensky in order to demonstrate a mutual commitment to de-escalation. [9] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to negotiate with Russia any day and that Russia can choose the location of negotiations. Zelensky said that he is willing to meet with Putin even without a ceasefire in order to prove Ukraine's willingness to negotiate.

Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider's Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published new footage on June 4 from Operation Spider's Web showing Ukrainian drones approaching the wings, sides, tops, and underbellies of Russian fixed-wing aircraft at various airfields. [10] The SBU reported that the footage shows first-person view (FPV) drones striking A-50 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-22 supersonic bombers, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refueling tankers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Some of the clips in the video show aircraft on fire. The SBU stated that Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian aircraft. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the SBU stated that Russia will be unable to restore half of the Russian aircraft that Ukraine struck or that it will take Russia years to restore them. [11] A senior NATO official reported to Ukrainian news outlet *Suspilne* that Operation Spider's Web damaged 40 Russian aircraft and confirmed that the operation destroyed 10 to 13 aircraft. [12] The official also stated that Russia may respond to the loss of its strategic bombers, which Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine, by adjusting strike packages to include more drones and ballistic missiles and fewer cruise missiles. Russian opposition outlet *Meduza* reported that a NATO official stated that Russian forces previously used the destroyed aircraft to launch over 3,000 cruise missiles that have struck critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine since February 2022. [13]

Maxar satellite imagery collected on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least two Tu-22 bombers and three Tu-95 bombers at Belaya Airbase (see embedded imagery below).

Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group *AviVector* posted satellite imagery on June 4 that indicates that Ukrainian drones destroyed four Tu-95MS bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft at Olenya Airbase.[14] *AviVector* assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Tu-95MS bombers, four Tu-22M3 bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft and likely damaged a Tu-95MS bomber at Olenya and Belaya airbases.



Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on May 22, 2025, before Ukrainian drone strike.
Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.



Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on June 4, 2025, after Ukrainian drone strike.
Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.



*Russian Tu-22 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on May 22, 2025, before Ukrainian drone strike.
Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.*



Russian Tu-22 strategic bombers at Belaya Airbase on June 4, 2025, after Ukrainian drone strike. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies.

Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider's Web. The SBU stated on June 4 that it used "autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and manual operator intervention" to conduct the June 1 strikes against Russian air bases.[15] The SBU stated that some drones lost signal during flight and switched to performing their missions using AI along a preplanned route. ISW recently assessed that Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated some integration of limited AI capabilities into drone operations but have not deployed them at scale on the battlefield.[16] Promises of an immediate AI and machine learning (ML) drone revolution are premature as of June 2025, even in the wake of Operation Spider's Web, given that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to allocate more time, testing, and investment to deploy these drones on the frontlines *en masse*.

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) announced on June 4 that the UK will invest a total of £350 billion (roughly \$474 billion) to provide Ukraine with 100,000 drones in 2025 — a tenfold increase from the 10,000 drones that the UK provided Ukraine with in 2024.[17] The UK MoD stated that the UK has already provided Ukraine with 140,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in 2025. The UK will also allocate an additional £247 million (roughly \$335 million) for the training of Ukrainian forces in the

UK through the Interflex training project and will contribute £40 million (roughly \$52 million) to materiel procurement efforts within the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission.[18] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 that the first Ukrainian long-range weapons system produced in Ukraine with German financial backing could enter service with the Ukrainian military within "just a few weeks." [19]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.**
- **Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace.**
- **Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace.**
- **Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider's Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.**
- **Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider's Web.**
- **Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[20]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 3 and 4.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the directions of Guyevo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[22]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[23]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 4.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows Russian servicemembers raising a flag in central Vodolahi (north of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[24] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) with seizing Vodolahi.[25]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City), but some milbloggers claimed that fighting continues for the settlement and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Andriivka.[27] Milbloggers also claimed that elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet)


seized Pershe Travnya (northwest of Kindrativka).[28] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Andriivka and near Nova Sich, Yunakivka, Korchakivka, Sadky (all northeast of Sumy City), and Iskryskivshchyna (northwest of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka, Mala Korchakivka, and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Oleksandriya on June 3 and 4.[30]

A sergeant operating in a Ukrainian company in the Sumy direction stated on June 4 that Russian forces have changed tactics and are launching infantry assaults in squads of about eight to 10 people, compared to the fireteams of about four personnel they used in May 2025.[31] The sergeant stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles, vehicles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to rapidly advance, establish positions, and accumulate forces for further attacks.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[32] Drone elements of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pavlivka (northwest of Sumy City).[33]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanskyi Khutory on June 3 and 4.[34] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[35]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian efforts to destroy settlements as they attack them leave Russian forces with no cover from Ukrainian drones, degrading Russian forces' defensive capabilities.[36] The spokesperson of Ukraine's Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group reported that Russian forces have not accumulated 50,000 troops to prepare to assault in the Kharkiv direction, contrary to some previous Ukrainian reporting.[37] The spokesperson stated that Russia is attempting to develop reserves in the Kharkiv direction, but not in quantities that are sufficient to begin large-scale offensive operations to break through Kharkiv Oblast. The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction lose about a company's worth of personnel every day.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Vovchansk.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on June 3 and 4.[39]

Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on June 4 that Russian forces are conducting air strikes against Kupyansk with FAB-500 and FAB-1500 glide bombs and then shelling the bomb impact point with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in an attempt to strike first responders—essentially conducting "double-tap" strikes that likely amount to war crimes.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction have changed their ground maneuver tactics and are conducting envelopment operations rather than encirclement operations to minimize losses and conserve resources.[41] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces conduct glide bomb, artillery, and tank strikes to pinpoint Ukrainian firing positions before conducting an air strike and additional drone reconnaissance. The milblogger claimed that several Russian units then conducted a ground assault with ATVs and motorcycles to occupy Ukrainian trenches while other units held the Russian breakthrough point. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces call the tactic "triple strangulation."

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekiivka and Stepove and toward Cherneshchyna and Olhivka on June 3 and 4.[42]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Karpivka and north, east, and south of Zelena Dolyna (both north of Lyman).[43]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 4 that Russian forces seized Ridkodub (north of Lyman), but ISW assesses that Russian forces had seized the settlement as of May 29.[44]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman toward Serednie, Shandryholove, and Vovchyi Yar; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Ridkodub, Zelena Dolyna, Novyi Myr, and Lypove, and toward Hlushchenkove; and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne on June 3 and 4.[45]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in Ridkodub.[46]




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 3 and 4.[47]



Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 3 that Russian forces advanced within Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Stupochky.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and in Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[49]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and toward Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on June 3 and 4.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and south and west of the settlement.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north of Yablunivka, Zorya, and Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Yablunivka, and Rusyn Yar; southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka and Zorya; and west of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka on June 3 and 4.[54] Ukraine's Khortytisa Group of Forces reported on June 4 that Russian forces conducted an assault using two armored vehicles and eight motorcycles near Yablunivka.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 13th "Rusich" Detachment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[56] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[57]

Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces advanced in Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Malynivka and north of Shevchenko Pershe (northeast of Pokrovsk) and near Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[60]


Russian forces continued offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Myrolyubivka, Myrne, and toward Raiske; east of Pokrovsk near

Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Hrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 3 and 4.[61]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 4 that Russian forces recently conducted an assault with 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and more than 16 motorcycles.[62] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are intensifying small-group infantry assaults after transferring additional manpower to the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and vehicles to conduct assaults and are only using IFVs to transport infantry.

Order of Battle: Drone operators from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), rocket artillery elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), and elements of the "Typhoon" detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[63] Elements of the 39th and 1472nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[64] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 that Russian forces advanced north of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka), and near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka).[66]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka, and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove on June 3 and 4.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Troitske.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Rozlyv on June 3 and 4.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Komar and Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Fedorivka, and Komar on June 3 and 4.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 3 and 4 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Komar, and Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[73]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 4.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (Hulyaipole) direction.[74]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast on June 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[75]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Kamyanske, and Mali Shcherbaky on June 3 and 4.[76]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on June 3 to discuss the situation at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid recent indications that Russia intends to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[77] Zelensky emphasized the importance of the IAEA's presence at the ZNPP to ensure compliance with international law. Grossi stated that the IAEA has not observed any evidence of Russia trying to restart operations at ZNPP.[78] The IAEA published a note on June 3, which Russia reportedly gave to the IAEA, that stated that Russia, however, has developed a procedure to transfer power from Russia's unified power system to the ZNPP as a precaution to avoid complete blackouts if the ZNPP's Dniprovskaya and Ferosplavna powerlines became disconnected.[79] Grossi previously stated on May 17 that the ZNPP had been reliant on a single power line for over a week after military activity in the area disconnected the backup


line.[80] Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that Russia has laid powerlines in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts — the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[81]



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 4 but did not advance.[82]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Kherson direction.[83]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 3 and 4 and during the day on June 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 36 drones and that 25 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the drones struck residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Zaporizhia, and Donetsk oblasts.[85] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russian forces also launched two

missiles against Kharkiv City overnight on June 3 and 4.[86] The Ukrainian Ground Forces reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against a Ukrainian training ground in Poltava Oblast during the day on June 4.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping in Beijing on June 3 to discuss strengthening Chinese-Belarusian ties and cooperation.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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