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**June 5, 2025, 7:45 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains.** Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) news agency *ArmyInform* reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day, of whom nearly 975 are killed in action (KIA) – a much higher number of killed than the standard one-to-three KIA-to-wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio.[1] The NATO official noted that Russian forces suffered approximately 160,000 casualties from January to April 2025 and that Russian losses remain high despite a slight decrease in May 2025 "due to a slowdown in the pace of hostilities." Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 13 that Russian forces suffered about 177,000 casualties since January 1, 2025 (an average daily casualty rate of 1,351).[2] This daily casualty rate is lower than the record high average daily casualty rate of 1,523 that Russian forces reportedly suffered in November 2024, but Russian forces are still expending quantities of manpower that are disproportionate to their marginal territorial gains.[3] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia seized only 0.4 percent of Ukraine's total territory in 2024 and just 0.2 percent thus far in 2025, which is largely consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in 2024 and 2025, respectively.[4] Palisa stated that Russia is suffering roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. ISW continues to assess that Russia's disproportionately large manpower and materiel losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant and rapid gains.[5]

**The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia's repeated refusal to offer any concessions.** Russian President Vladimir Putin used his first phone call to Pope Leo XIV on June 5 to falsely claim that Ukraine is escalating the war, whereas Russia is interested in achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine through "political and diplomatic means." [6] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 5 that Putin thanked the Pope for the Vatican's willingness to contribute to a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[7] Putin notably did not propose any Russian concessions or indicate that the Kremlin has relented any of its demands of Ukraine that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation. The Kremlin readout claimed that Putin instead told the Pope that any potential resolution must eliminate the war's "root causes," reiterating a long-standing Kremlin rhetorical line aimed at falsely blaming Ukraine for Russia's invasion. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged

violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev notably claimed on June 3 that Russia seeks a "swift victory" in Ukraine and the "complete destruction" of Ukraine's government, indicating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.[9] Putin's conversation with the Pope is likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing effort to protract negotiations by falsely portraying Russia as interested in meaningful peace negotiations and improve Russia's negotiating position by making additional battlefield gains.

**Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5.** Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on June 4 that the Netherlands will allocate a package worth 400 million euros (roughly \$457 million) to strengthen Ukraine's military security.[10] The package will consist of more than 100 vessels, including patrol boats, transport boats, interceptors, and special operations ships; more than 50 naval drones; weapons systems; sensors; spare parts; and training for Ukrainian specialists. Luxembourg's Defense Minister Yuriko Backes stated on June 5 that Luxembourg will increase its military aid to Ukraine by 50 percent by the end of 2025.[11] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 4 that Belgium announced a long-term initiative to provide annual aid in the amount of one billion euros (roughly \$1.1 billion) until 2029 and that Belgium will transfer a mine-clearing ship to Ukraine.[12] Umerov stated that Canada allocated \$45 million for drones, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, IT solutions, and an unspecified number of Bison and Coyote armored personnel carriers (APCs).[13] Umerov stated that Norway will allocate \$7 billion worth of aid to Ukraine in 2025, including \$700 million for drones, with a focus on supporting the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB), and \$50 million to the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) Trust Fund.[14] Umerov stated that Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Turkey, and Estonia joined the EW Coalition, and Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson stated that Sweden will co-chair the coalition with Germany.[15] Umerov stated on June 5 that Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Iceland will initially contribute 428 million euros (roughly \$489 million) to develop the "Danish model" in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military and that Ukraine's partners expect to contribute 1.3 billion euros (roughly \$1.5 billion) to the "Danish model" in 2025.[16] Umerov stated that a portion of the funds will come from profits from frozen Russian assets.

**Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.**[17] Umerov announced the temporarily named "Ramstein Investments in the Defense Industry" initiative that will allow Ukrainian companies to invest in production in Ramstein partner states and vice versa .[18] Umerov noted that the needs of the Ukrainian military take priority, so everything produced at such enterprises under the initiative will go to the Ukrainian military as long as the war continues.[19] Umerov stated that an unspecified western European company announced the production of modern anti-Shahed missiles in Ukraine; that the UK will produce Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMM) and launchers with Ukraine; that German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall will build Lynx armored fighting vehicles in Ukraine; and that Ukrainian enterprises are already producing ammunition under Norwegian and Finnish licenses.

**North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4.** North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un reaffirmed North Korea's "unconditional support" for Russia's war effort in Ukraine and commitment to implementing the bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the visit.[20] ISW will report further on this meeting and Russian-North Korean cooperation in its upcoming Adversary Entente Task Force update.


**Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes.** Russian law enforcement sources told Russian state news agency *TASS* that authorities detained three employees of the state-owned Ural regional information agency *Ura.ru* on June 5 after searching the publication's editorial office in Yekaterinburg.[21] *TASS* and Russian state outlet *RBC* claimed that the investigation may be due to *Ura.ru* allegedly receiving funding from an organization designated as a foreign agent and that journalists allegedly bribed a law enforcement officer to obtain sensitive internal reports.[22] *Ura.ru* has notably reported on several Russian military command changes ahead of official announcements in previous years, including Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Central Military District (CMD) changes during Russia's war in Ukraine.[23]

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia's repeated refusal to offer any concessions.**
- **Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5.**
- **Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.**
- **North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4.**
- **Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupiansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.**

# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

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***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 5 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[24]

Russian milbloggers claimed Ukrainian forces attacked toward Novyi Put (south of Glushkovo), Veseloye (southwest of Glushkovo), and Tetkino on June 5.[25]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drone operations are complicating Russian forces’ supply logistics near Tetkino.[26]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[27]

**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 5.**

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 5 that Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) and other Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against three Russian Iskander-M missile launchers near

Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Russian 26th Missile Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) previously tried to launch an Iskander missile strike against a Ukrainian city, likely Kyiv, from this site.

**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers reiterated claims on June 4 and 5 that Russian forces seized Andriivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City), but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still fighting for control over the settlements.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novokostyantynivka (formerly Pershe Travnja, north of Sumy City); advanced south of Andriivka and Oleksiivka toward Mala Korchivka (northeast of Sumy City); made gains southwest of Novokostyantynivka and in Yablunivka and Yunakivka (all northeast of Sumy City); and advanced within drone range (about 20 kilometers) of Sumy City.[30] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces to be 26 kilometers from Sumy City at their closest confirmed point of advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Oleshnya (east of Loknya).[31]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, Sadky, and Loknya on June 4 and 5.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[33] Elements of the 22nd and 30th motorized rifle regiments (both 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[34]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 5, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



## **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 5 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Vovchansk and toward Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[35]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 4 and 5.[36] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack from Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City) toward Zhuralevka, Belgorod Oblast.[37]


A Russian milblogger claimed that it is unlikely Russian forces will make any major advances near Vovchansk and that it would take significantly more resources to take control of the city for little strategic gain.[38]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**



# Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

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




## Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced into central Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka (near the international border), north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on June 4 and 5.[40]



**Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 5 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on June 4 and 5.[41]


**Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman).[42]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 4 and 5.[43] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Torske.[44]




# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction June 5, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**





**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 5 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 4 and 5.[45]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Novomarkove (north of Chasiv Yar), northwest of Chasiv Yar, and near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[46] A Russian milblogger denied recent claims that Russian forces seized Stupochky and claimed that fighting continues for the settlement.[47]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and toward Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on June 4 and 5.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[49]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk, in western Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk), along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northwest of Yablunivka, northeast of Dachne (north of Toretsk), and in western Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced near Toretsk itself; in an area west of Novoolenivka and north of Oleksandropil (both west of Toretsk); in central and western Yablunivka and south of the settlement; near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Popiv Yar (both northwest of Toretsk); and northwest of Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces established enduring positions along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway near Yablunivka.[52]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Poltavka, Nelipivka, and Yablunivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 4 and 5.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are reinforcing their lines near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar.[54]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on June 5 that Russian forces used up to 10,000 first-person view (FPV) drones in the Toretsk direction in May 2025 and up to 7,000 FPV drones in April 2025.[55] Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are using a high volume of FPV drones, many of which are equipped with fiber optic cables, in combination with small infantry assaults to prevent Ukrainian forces from holding their positions in the Dyliivka direction. Zaporozhets also noted that Russian forces are focusing attacks against small settlements near Toretsk rather than against the city itself.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking targets north of Dachne.[56] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and "Typhoon" Detachment of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[57]



### **Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces regained lost positions in Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) after successfully counterattacking.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 4 and 5 that Russian forces advanced in the fields north and southwest of Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk), in southern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne.[59]


Russian forces conducted ground operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Hrodivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, and Zvirove on June 4 and 5.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Mykolaivka and Zvirove.[61]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles and buggies to transport infantry closer to Ukrainian positions and that Russian FPV drones are flying up to 20 kilometers deep into Ukrainian positions.[62] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Russian forces have changed their tactics from conducting assaults on foot to attacking with electric scooters and motorcycles and are using motorcycles to transport ammunition and supplies to accumulation points.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64] Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Razine (northeast of Pokrovsk).[65]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction June 5, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and that the area northwest of Kotlyarivka is a contested "gray zone." [66]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove on June 4 and 5. [67]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Oleksiivka, north of Bahatyr (both west of Kurakhove), and west of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove). [68]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Bahatyr and toward Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 4 and 5. [69]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced west of Fedorivka and into the settlement itself, west of Vilne Pole, south of Shevchenko, and near Komar (all northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and west of Novopil (west of Velyka Novosilka). [70] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces control a third of Fedorivka and that Ukrainian forces retain positions in northern and western Fedorivka. [71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Fedorivka, Komar, and Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Malynivka on June 4 and 5. [72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar and Fedorivka. [73]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 5, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[74]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 5.

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 5 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields south of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[75]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka on June 5.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[77]




# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Orikhiv Direction

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Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on June 5 but did not advance.[78]



**Russian occupation authorities claimed on June 4 and 5 that Ukrainian forces struck power infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[79]** ISW has not observed independent reporting of these alleged strikes.

**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile over Rostov Oblast airspace and 103 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 28 drones in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 46 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russia's strike damaged residential, administrative, and production infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts.[81] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synhubov reported that Russian forces also launched two Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missiles against Kharkiv Oblast in the past day.[82]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported on June 5 that Russian forces destroyed the Kherson Oblast administrative building in Kherson City with glide bombs after striking the building twice in the past day.[83]

Zelensky reported on June 4 that Russian forces have launched nearly 17,700 glide bombs, nearly 11,200 Shahed drones, roughly 9,000 strike drones, and more than 700 missiles against Ukraine since the beginning of 2025.[84]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



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[1] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/05/u-nato-nazvaly-vtraty-rosijskoyi-armiyi-v-ukrayini-z-pochatku-roku/> ;  
[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2007/MR638.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR638.pdf)



- [2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2024>
- [3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525>
- [4] <https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/pfbid02Krz5WmXGoPyjfCexgsR5sc9gNSU4i5t3z8im5HQsKcJ9Fmz51dP7VR3VT9MRjCXDI> ; <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-vashingtoni-ukrayinska-delegaciya-provela-brifing-dlya-sen-98277>
- [5] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine>
- [6] <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77100>
- [7] <https://tass.ru/politika/24145395>
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