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and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate Trotter**

June 7, 2025, 4:15 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on June 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Alexander Zorin, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin claimed on June 7 that Russia was prepared to exchange severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of KIA soldiers on June 6 as Russia and Ukraine agreed to during the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2.[1] Zorin further claimed that Russian representatives waited for Ukrainian representatives on the border of Belarus to work out the technicalities involved in exchanging the bodies, but that Ukrainian representatives never arrived, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov claimed that Ukraine refused to repatriate the KIA bodies. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs refuted Russian officials' claims and clarified that Ukraine and Russia have not yet agreed upon a date for the repatriation of the bodies and that the two parties are still finalizing lists for the POW exchange.[2] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reiterated that Ukraine remains fully committed to engaging constructively to ensure the successful implementation of the KIA repatriation and POW exchange. The Kremlin remains committed to promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine, likely to socialize its domestic audience ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage. The Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.

Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European states of becoming the main obstacle to negotiating peace in Ukraine, as European states seek to disrupt negotiations on June 6.[3] Ryabkov also claimed that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opposes peace in Ukraine and is trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to "the path of escalation" in the war.[4] Ryabkov claimed that the United States is aware that Russia will not stray — even in the face of threats of more sanctions

— from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war (a phrase which Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO's open-door policy and other unilateral American concessions which the Trump administration described as being "too much").[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and is very likely setting information conditions to protract or possibly expand the war.[6]

US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine. Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to "use [The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, a bill in the US Senate] if it's necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting.[7] The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 has wide bipartisan support in the US Senate and has 82 cosponsors as of June 7.[8]


Any increased economic pressure against Russia — while a positive policy development — by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin's theory of victory. The continuation of Western military aid to Ukraine remains pivotal to the execution of a pressure campaign against Russia that could force Putin to recalculate his theory of victory.[9] Putin's theory of victory rests on the assumption that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. Putin's strategy will very likely continue to guide his decision to refuse to engage substantively with the United States and Ukraine in peace negotiations. Achieving a peace in Ukraine that is acceptable for US interests necessitates sustained Russian battlefield losses or a significant Russian battlefield setback. The United States must continue equipping Ukrainian soldiers as Russia's battlefield losses remain the key driver of Russia's current materiel, manpower, and economic problems. Western aid, particularly of weapons systems that only the United States can provide at scale and quickly, would allow Ukrainian forces to better defend their positions, slow Russian advances, and inflict even more serious losses on the Russian military. Higher and even more unsustainable Russian casualty rates on the battlefield, particularly when they are disproportionate to the territorial gains they generate, would risk Putin's efforts to balance "butter and guns" and maintain domestic support.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of Kremlin efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine.**
- **Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement.**
- **US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and**

will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.

- Any increased economic pressure against Russia – while a positive policy development – by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory.
- Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are

assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued attacks in Kursk Oblast on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[10]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 6 and 7.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Gornal (south of Sudzha along the international border) and southwest and east of Tetkino.[12]

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Tetkino is complicating Russian evacuations, deployments of reinforcements, and logistics.[13]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 7 that the Ukrainian Air Force shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter jet in the Kursk direction.[14] A Russian milblogger linked to Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) sources reported on June 7 that Russia lost a Su-35S in Kursk Oblast and that the pilot survived.[15]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), 98th VDV Division, 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are

reportedly operating in Tetkino.[16] Infantry elements of the Aerospace Forces (VKS), including elements of its 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[17] ISW will assess the implications of the Russian Aerospace Forces creating infantry units in its forthcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 7.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), in southern Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka), in eastern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), and east of Loknya (east of Yablunivka).[18]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) elements entered Sadky (southeast of Loknya) and that Russian naval infantry elements entered Khotin (south of Kindrativka).[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yablunivka, southeast of Loknya, and southeast of Yunakivka.[20]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City toward Mala Korchakivka, Khotin, and Varachyne, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Yablunivka, and toward Sadky.[21] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Kindrativka and near Yunakivka.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[23] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Khotin and Pysarivka (just east of Khotin).[24] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Aida" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[25]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[26]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 6 and 7.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[28]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 28 and June 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[29] ISW assesses that this advance did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and toward Kutkivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 6 and 7.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) and the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast along the international border.[31] Elements of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and drone operators of the "Kontora" Group (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction June 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Novoserhiivka and Olhivka on June 6 and 7.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), south of Zelena Dolyna, and north of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[34]


Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Vovchyi Yar; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Novomykhailivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 6 and 7. [35]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 6 and 7.[36]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 7 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 6 and 7.[37]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Dylivka (northeast of Toretsk).[38]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dylivka; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Yablunivka and toward Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Stepanivka, and Rusyn Yar; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Nova Poltavka on June 6 and 7.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), and the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[40] Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya (north of Pleshchiivka).[41]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 7 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk toward Kotpieve; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Myrne, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 6 and 7.[42] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 7 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked with six motorcycles toward Koptieve and attacked with the support of a tank, three armored vehicles, and four motorcycles toward Malynivka.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[44]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novomykolaivka and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on June 6 and 7.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove toward Zaporizhzhia and Dachne and west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil on June 6 and 7.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Zaporizhzhia (a settlement northwest of Odradne).[48]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[49]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and reached the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Vilne Pole, Komar, Vesele, and Burlatske and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novopil on June 6 and 7.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar, Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Vilne Pole.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 114th and 394th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are moving to the Russian rear for rest and replenishment after having seized Zelene Pole and Novopil.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pidubne (northwest of Komar).[54] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[56]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka and toward Poltavka on June 6 and 7.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[58]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[59]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Pyatykhatky, Stepove, and toward Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 6 and 7.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv


direction, and drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv and Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv) directions.[61]



Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 7 but did not advance.[62]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[63]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; six Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace above occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; one Iskander-K cruise missile from Rostov Oblast; and 206 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 87 drones and neutralized six Kh-59/69 missiles and one Iskander-K missile, and that 80 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched two missiles, 48 Shaheds, and four guided

glide bombs against civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, killing three civilians and injuring at least 20.[65] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on June 6 that the June 6 to 7 strike was the largest Russian strike against Kharkiv City since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[66] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhii Lysak stated on June 7 that Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City and injured two civilians.[67]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 6 that Russian forces conducted a “double-tap” strike in Kyiv City and killed two first responders during the strikes on the night of June 5 to 6, which likely amounts to a war crime.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://tass dot ru/politika/24166989> ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/24166003> ; <https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24166277> ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/24166511> ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/12912 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318838 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318841 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318845 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/318848

[2] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12959 ; https://t.me/Koord_shtab/12954

[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/318767;

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[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/318782 ; <https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/07/politics/vance-russia-ukraine-talks>

[6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825>

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- [8] <https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-russia-sanctions-senate-dea1f81d> ; <https://suspilne dot media/1036643-bilij-dim-tisne-na-kongres-dla-pomaksenna-sankcij-proti-rosii-wsj/> ; <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1241/titles#:~:text=A%20bill%20to%20impose%20sanctions,Ukraine%2C%20and%20for%20other%20purposes.>
- [9] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage>
- [10] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844>
- [11] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196>
- [12] https://t.me/rusich_army/24016; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36844>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27018>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93058>; https://t.me/rusich_army/24010
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- [23] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31807; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36860>
- [24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167545
- [25] https://t.me/dva_majors/72904

[26] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13360

[27] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[28] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13354

[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/933 ; <https://t.me/viddmaks/207> ; <https://t.me/viddmaks/208>

[30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650 ;
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[31] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93035> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93067>

[32] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93026> ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93049>

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[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167529

[35] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[36] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650 ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199>

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<https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/22826>

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<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/72900

[40] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13896 ; <https://t.me/sashakots/54151> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/72912

[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167546

[42] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25196> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650 ;

[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/11650

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9335 ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36858>

[45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25223> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25199> ;
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[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9332;
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[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/15364; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/167578

[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9337; <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DKmPzyFM-06/?igsh=cG5kcjYmgwNWhx>

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[53] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/36842>

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/15350

[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/15356

[56] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31810

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