



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment


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with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

June 8, 2025, 5:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed. The Russian MoD claimed on June 8 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reached the western border of Donetsk Oblast and are continuing to develop an offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[1] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 8 that Russian forces “began an offensive” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and threatened that those who do not acknowledge current “realities of war” on the battlefield during negotiations will “receive new realities on the ground.”[2] Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that any negotiations to end the war must consider the “realities on the ground” (a reference to the current frontline in Ukraine) to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands under threat of further Russian demands.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southeast of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), and west and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[4] ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of these claimed advances near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border as of this writing. ISW forecasted in November 2024 that the Russian military command could advance to the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and to envelop these Ukrainian positions in support of Russia's wider campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 8 that fighting continued in the Novopavlivka direction but only in Donetsk Oblast.[6] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian forces did not cross the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[7] Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported that Ukrainian General Staff Representative Andriy Kovalev stated that claims that Russian forces crossed the border are "Russian disinformation" and not true. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat and infrared anomalies along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and satellite imagery collected on June 7 and 8 shows the appearance of new artillery craters near the border in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. FIRMS data and artillery craters near the border indicate artillery missions in the area and are not inconsistent with official Ukrainian statements about continued fighting in Donetsk Oblast east of the border. ISW assesses that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Artem Zhoga, the former commander of the 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and current presidential representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, claimed on June 8 that the 90th Tank Division is "closing the strategic gates to the Dnipro [River]."[8] Zhoga's reference to the Dnipro River is consistent with other Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize territory near the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian officials have called for Russia to control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of "Novorossiia," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[9] ISW observed reported in May 2025 that Russia was setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia may plan to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, by the end of 2026.[11]

Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Alexander Zorin claimed on June 8 that Russia delivered the bodies of 1,212 KIA Ukrainians to an exchange point in accordance with purported agreements made during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul.[12] Zorin baselessly claimed that no exchange took place on June 7 because Ukraine did not respond to Russia's messages about the exchange, that Russia continues to wait for confirmation from Ukrainian officials, and that Ukraine is postponing the exchange.[13] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 8 that authorities in Ukraine and Russia received notice on June 3 — the day following the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul — that the prisoner of war (POW) and KIA exchanges that Ukraine and Russia agreed upon in Istanbul would occur during at a future date during the week of June 9 to 16.[14] GUR

Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 7 that Ukraine and Russia have not yet established the exact date of the KIA exchange and that Ukraine is still preparing for the repatriation exchange.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence-building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.[16]

The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences. Zorin made his claims during a press conference for domestic Russian and foreign journalists in front of refrigerated transport trucks reportedly holding the bodies of Ukrainian KIA servicemembers.[17] Yusov stated that Russian officials filmed the videos of the refrigerated trucks and held the press conference for journalists on Russian territory far from the agreed upon exchange location, however.[18] Journalists from Russian and international media outlets, including Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network *Zvezda*, Russian state media TV channel *Channel One (Perviy Kanal)*, Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestia*, Hezbollah-affiliated *Al Mayadeen* TV outlet, and Qatari-owned *Al Araby al Jadeed* TV outlet, attended the press conference.[19] Kremlin newswire *TASS* amplified footage of an *Al Mayadeen* journalist claiming that Ukraine's alleged refusal to accept the KIA bodies shows the "Nazi nature" of the Ukrainian authorities and footage of an *Al Araby* journalist claiming that Russia continues to fulfill the commitments it made in Istanbul.[20] Russian officials likely invited foreign and domestic news outlets to the press conference in order to promote to both foreign and domestic audiences the Russian narratives that Ukraine is spoiling confidence-building measures and peace negotiations and to posture the international community, particularly the Middle East, as supporting Russia's justifications for its full-scale invasion and demands of regime change in Kyiv.[21]

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire *TASS* published on June 7 that Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is nearing its "logical conclusion," suggesting that Russia may openly deploy such missiles in the future.[22] Ryabkov also claimed that the United States and its Western allies did not appreciate or reciprocate Russia's "restraint" following the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. Ryabkov's claim that Russia has continued to abide by the INF Treaty since the US withdrawal are false. The United States suspended its participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019 and withdrew from the treaty in August 2019 due to Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles in violation of the treaty.[23] Russia suspended its participation in the INF Treaty in response to the US suspension on February 2, 2019. Ryabkov's allegations of Russia's continued adherence to the treaty are likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to falsely portray itself as a genuine participant in de-escalation efforts and to portray the West and NATO as threats to Russia's security. The Kremlin may leverage the war in Ukraine to renounce its participation in other international arms control treaties as it prepares for a larger confrontation with the West.


Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on

successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia, implied on June 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast.[24] Kovalenko stated that the plant produces explosives for artillery shells, bombs, and missiles. Russian opposition outlet *Astra* published footage on June 8 reportedly showing fires at the plant after reported drone strikes.[25] Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on June 8 that a Ukrainian drone crashed on the territory of the Azot plant, causing a fire.[26] Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Azot plant on May 24.[27]

Key Takeaways:

- **Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed.**
- **Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.**
- **Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine.**
- **The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences.**
- **Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO.**
- **Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8.**
- **Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Povrovsk direction.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 7 and 8.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[29]

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian assaults and fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Tetkino are complicating Russian logistics, the arrival of reinforcements, and evacuations.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[31] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on June 7 that Ukrainian forces captured a former commander of a Russian Navy minesweeper in the Caspian Flotilla who was serving as a platoon commander in the 165th Combined Battalion near Tetkino.[32]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 8.

Russian Supporting Effort — Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Mala Korchakivka and toward Varachyne and Khotin (all north of Sumy City).[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City toward Yunakivka and Yablunivka.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[35] Drone operators and artillery elements of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the border areas of Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



○ Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours

— Russian Field Fortifications

▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine

▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory

▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

▬ Russian Advances in Russia

▬ Claimed Russian Advances in Russia

▬ Ukrainian Advances in Russia

Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 8 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 7 and 8.[37]

The chief of staff for a Ukrainian unit operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are using mopeds, motorcycles, and buggies to transport personnel, evacuate wounded, and deliver supplies.[38]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Zapadne and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 7 and 8.[40]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups of one to three soldiers and are using motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), civilian cars, or buggies during attacks.[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Kontora" Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrektivka and toward Olhivka and Cherneshchyna on June 7 and 8.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Karpivka (northwest of Lyman) and north of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Hlushchenkove and Shandryholove and east of Lyman near Torske on June 7 and 8.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on June 7 and 8.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar near Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and toward Bila Hora, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 7 and 8.[47]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on June 8 that Russian forces are conducting at least 100 artillery strikes a day against Chasiv Yar in an attempt to destroy the buildings in the settlement.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[49]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[50]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a mine northwest of Toretsk.[51]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 7 that Russian forces advanced in western Yablunivka.[52]


The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 8 that elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Zorya (west of Toretsk).[53] ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Zorya as of June 1.[54]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne, northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka and Yablunivka and toward Pleshchiivka, and west of Toretsk near Novoolenivka on June 7 and 8.[55]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 7 that Russian forces are trying to gain a foothold west of the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and that the Russian military command is focusing on advances toward Kostyantynivka and Druzhivka (both northwest of Toretsk) in Summer 2025.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[57] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division), 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and "Berkut Group" of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[58]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[59] ISW assesses that this advance did not occur within the last 24 hours.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Pomin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne on June 7 and 8.[60] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 8 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Malynivka with a tank, three armored vehicles, and two cars and conducted unsuccessful motorized assaults near Yelyzavetivka and Myrolyubivka.[61]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge near Shakove (northeast of Pokrovsk in the Ukrainian rear).[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text about Russian claims of advance in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 7 and 8.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Bahatyr, north of Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove), and northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove toward Zaporizhzhia and Novoukrainka and west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Bahatyr, Odradne, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and toward Zelenyi Kut on June 7 and 8.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[66]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Vilne Pole, Komar, Vesele, and Burlatske and toward Voskresenka and Perebudova and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 7 and 8.[67] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 8 that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted an assault with 12 motorcycles toward Shevchenko.[68]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[69] Artillery elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Komar.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 8 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Malynivka and Vyshneve (both east of Hulyaipole).[71]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 7 and 8.[72]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 8 that Russian forces recently renewed assaults against Ukrainian positions in the Hulyaipole direction.[73]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv toward Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 7 and 8.[74]

Voloshyn reported on June 8 that Russian forces are trying to conduct guided glide bomb and artillery strikes to destroy buildings in Zaporizhia Oblast that Ukrainian forces can use as shelter in order to create a five to seven kilometer wide “dead-zone” across the frontline in which Russian first-person view (FPV) drones can operate.[75] Voloshyn added that Russian forces are constantly assaulting Ukrainian positions to prevent Ukrainian forces from reinforcing defensive positions.


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, and elements of the “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[76]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 8 but did not advance.[77]

Order of Battle: Elements of the naval detachment of the Russian 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in occupied Crimea.[78]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Onyx anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea; two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast; and 49 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 22 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 18 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes struck Zaporizhia Oblast and damaged civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv Oblast.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/53553

[2] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/588

[3] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar102524>

[4] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23410>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2024>

[6] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1037531-boi-v-mezah-doneckoi-oblasti-vijska-rf-ne-peretnuli-kordon-iz-dnipropetrovsinou-so-vidomo-pro-situaciu/>

[7] <https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1037531-boi-v-mezah-doneckoi-oblasti-vijska-rf-ne-peretnuli-kordon-iz-dnipropetrovsinou-so-vidomo-pro-situaciu/>

[8] <https://t.me/zhogaartem/4608>

- [9] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025>
- [10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2025>
- [11] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025>
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