


**Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski,
and George Barros**

June 9, 2025, 7:15pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), are fighting near and across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone" in Ukraine.[4] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the "sphere of interests" of the Russian military.[5] Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that Russia's offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia's "denazification" of the oblast - a reference to Russia's longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine.[6] Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will "definitely take" Dnipro City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine "does not make peace on [Russia's] terms." [7] Russian officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed, as ISW has previously assessed.[8] Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a "Russian" city as recently as June 9.[9] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.[11]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[12] ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 9 to a question about Russia ending its moratorium on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by claiming that Russia retains "freedom of action" - mirroring Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov's June 7 claim that Russia's "unilateral moratorium" on the deployment of such missiles is nearing its "logical conclusion." [13] Ryabkov claimed on June 9 that Russia and United States need a "reliable ... military-political foundation" in order to resume arms control talks and that the United States must be willing to respect Russia's "fundamental interests" in order to normalize bilateral relations.[14] Ryabkov claimed that the United States' actions regarding the war in Ukraine could demonstrate the seriousness of the United States' intentions to improve relations with Russia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov further claimed on June 9 that Russia will be ready to resume strategic stability talks with the United States when the discussions will be on equal footing.[15] Kremlin officials appear to be asserting that Russia's willingness to engage in arms control talks with the United States in the future is contingent on Russia gaining preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Russia notably violated the INF Treaty by developing, testing, and deploying intermediate-range missiles, leading the United States to suspend its participation in the treaty in February 2019.[16] ISW assessed in early 2025 that Russia was using economic incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, and Russia's use of incentives related to arms control talks appear to be the latest iteration of this overall effort.[17]

Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte stated on June 9 that intelligence assesses that Russia will produce 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles in 2025.[18] It is unclear whether these vehicle production assessments are only referring to Russia's production of new vehicles or also include vehicles from Russia's Soviet-era stockpiles that Russia is refurbishing. Rutte stated that Russia is cooperating with the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran and that Russia is reconstituting its forces with Chinese technology. Rutte announced that NATO states' defense ministers agreed on June 5 to increase air and missile defense spending by 400 percent in order to protect against large-scale drone and missile strikes like those that Russia is launching against Ukraine. Rutte also stated that Russia could be capable of launching military operations against NATO within five years. ISW assesses that Russia does not need to reconstitute its forces to pre-2022 levels before posing a threat to NATO states and could launch military operations against a NATO state before 2030.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities;

Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22 cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.[20]



Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on June 9 that Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages against Ukraine, using large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems and distract from subsequent cruise and ballistic missile launches.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the June 8 to 9 strike series was part of Russia's response to Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.[22] ISW has notably observed a significant increase in the scale of Russia's drone and missile strike packages against Ukraine prior to "Operation Spider Web." [23]

Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including

elements of the Special Operations Forces, struck Savasleyka Airbase in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast where Russian forces base MiG-31K fighter jets that carry Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that preliminary information indicated that Ukrainian forces hit two aircraft, which the Ukrainian General Staff assesses are likely a MiG-31 fighter jet and a Su-30/34 fighter jet. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Forces, struck the All-Russian Research Institute of Relay Engineering (VNIIR)-Progress enterprise in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic with at least two drones, causing a large-scale fire.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that VNIIR-Progress manufactures navigation equipment, including unified planning and correction modules (UMPK) for glide bombs. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko added that VNIIR-Progress also makes electromechanical drives, hydraulic systems, and control units for heavy military equipment, including howitzers and Iskander missiles, and satellite navigation modules that Russian forces use in Shahed drones and Iskander-M, Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[26] Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows smoke at the VNIIR-Progress plant.[27] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev claimed on June 9 that two drones fell on the VNIIR-Progress facility, temporarily suspending operations.[28]

Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on June 9 that Ukraine and Russia exchanged an unspecified number of POWs as part of the first round of POW exchanges.[29] Zelensky stated that further exchanges will continue in several stages over the coming days and that the two sides are currently exchanging wounded POWs and prisoners under 25 years of age. Russian officials, including Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin, continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine on June 9 of refusing to exchange the bodies of KIA Ukrainian soldiers.[30] Zelensky stated on June 8 that Russia's failure to deliver its promised list of over 1,000 Ukrainian POWs and servicemembers are hampering Ukrainian efforts to repatriate KIA Ukrainians.[31] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 9 that Ukrainian officials expect to receive more information regarding a potential KIA exchange over the coming days.[32]


Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.**
- **The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.**
- **Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO.**

- **Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.**
- **Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.**
- **Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, including southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino, on June 8 and 9.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 that Ukrainian forces attempted to enter Kursk Oblast from Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast (southeast of Tetkino).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to enter Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[35]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian duty station near Rylsk, Kursk Oblast on June 9 during a HIMARS strike.

Geolocated footage posted on June 9 suggests that Ukrainian forces struck the duty station of an unspecified Russian unit in northeast Rylsk (northwest of Glushkovo).[36] A Ukrainian OSINT analyst claimed that Ukrainian forces launched four Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) rockets against the duty station.[37] Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a cultural and recreational center in Rylsk.[38]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 9.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced in northern Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[39]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City in Yablunivka on June 9.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack in an unspecified area in the Sumy direction.[41]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on June 9 that Russian forces are transferring large quantities of military equipment and ammunition from occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast to Sumy Oblast.[42] Russian forces are reportedly transporting air defense systems, at least 40 trucks carrying personnel and ammunition, and at least 10 self-propelled guns.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[43] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[44] Elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Khotin (north of Sumy City).[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction

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Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced 160 meters in the direction of Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe, Vovchanski Khutory, and Vovchansk and northwest of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke on June 8 and 9.[47]


Kharkiv Oblast Service for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure reported on June 9 that Russian forces shelled critical infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast, damaging a bridge and injuring an employee.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

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Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[50]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radkivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Hlushkivka on June 8 and 9.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kindrashivka and that Radkivka (south of Kindrashivka) and the area southeast of Kindrashivka are contested “gray zones.”[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, and Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova toward Chereshchyna, Olhivka, and Hrekivka on June 8 and 9.[55]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on June 8 that Russian forces recently conducted assaults with seven motorcycles, then with three motorcycles and two vehicles with fire support from an unspecified number of tanks.[56]


Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Karpivka (north of Lyman) and Torske (east of Lyman).[57]


Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Ridkodub, Lypove, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on June 8 and 9.[58]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 8 that Russian forces are trying to bypass Lyman, seize dominant heights in the area, and interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on June 8 and 9.[60]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in an industrial area northeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[61]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) seized Stupochky.[62]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Predtechyne on June 8 and 9.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (both of the 98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64] Drone operators of the Russian Bars-27 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Toretsk.[66] Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk), but it is unclear whether Russian forces maintain enduring positions in this area.[67]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of and further north of Toretsk.[68] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Oleksandro-Kalynove.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Dyliivka, north of Krymske, north of Dachne (all north of Toretsk), northwest of Nova Poltavka, in western Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk), south of Yablunivka, and west of Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Petrivka (west of Toretsk).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Kleban-Byk.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating north of Dyliivka.[73] Elements of the “Afipsa” Storm Battalion and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating toward Toretsk.[74] Drone operators of the “Rubikon” Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Yablunivka.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kostyantynivka Direction

9 June 2025, 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced north of Myrne and Shevchenko Pershe (both northeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Dachenske (south of Pokrovsk), and in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrne and toward Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Mykolaivka, and Pomin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Zvirove on June 8 and 9.[77]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on June 9 that the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway direction remains the most intense sector of the frontline and that Russian forces are concentrating a large number of forces in this area in an attempt to surround Ukrainian positions in eastern Pokrovsk and advance toward Kostyantynivka.[78] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have not changed their tactics and are storming Ukrainian positions on foot or motorcycles primarily in small groups of one to three personnel but noted that Ukrainian drones are effectively countering these attacks.[79]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in Novopavlivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Novopavlivka direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 9 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), northwest of Novomykolaivka (just southwest of Novoserhiivka), and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novomykolaivka, and toward Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 8 and 9.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) awarded on June 9 elements of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) for seizing Bohdanivka, which ISW assesses Russian forces seized as of May 24.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) raising flags over central Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksiivka and advanced northeast and southwest of Oleksiivka, north and northwest of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove), and northwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[84] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered Zelenyi Kut (just west of Oleksiivka).[85]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove toward Zaporizhzhia, west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 8 and 9.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoukrainka (west of Kurakhove).[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Vilne Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[89]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Komar, Vilne Pole, Vesele, and Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, Novopil, and Rivnopil on June 8 and 9.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar.[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[92] Elements of the 691st Howitzer Battalion

(reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[93]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 8 and 9.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Malynivka and Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[95] Drone operators of the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[96]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne (south of Orikhiv).[97]


Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Nesteryanka and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and toward Pavlivka on June 8 and 9.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[99]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 8 and 9 but did not advance.[100]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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