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May 1, 2025, 6pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:20am ET on May 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.[1] The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources.[2] Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund.[3] The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.[4]

The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine.[5] US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on *Fox News* on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine.[6] **Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.**

US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump's repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine. Kellogg told *Fox News* on April 29 that Ukrainian representatives repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to negotiate during talks with senior US and European officials in London on April 23, and it is now "up to [Russian President] Vladimir Putin" to achieve a peaceful resolution to the war.[7] Kellogg stated that Ukrainian representatives in London agreed to 22 "concrete" terms including a "permanent, comprehensive" ceasefire, for which US

President Donald Trump has long advocated. Kellogg also stated that US officials previously presented Putin with a roadmap for ending the war in Ukraine and that Putin should directly engage with the US proposal if he "really" wants to end the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview with Brazilian newspaper *O Globo* published on April 28 that "the ball is not in [Russia's] court" in terms of ceasefire negotiations because Ukrainian officials have not shown "readiness" for peace negotiations.[8] Lavrov's statements indicate that Russian officials are uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war and are prolonging negotiations to facilitate battlefield gains. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to hold ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States by falsely shifting the blame onto Ukraine for stalling negotiations to end the war.[9]


Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated on April 30 during a BRICS foreign ministers' summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that Russia will consider Western peacekeeping contingents in Ukraine as legitimate military targets and that such contingents are unacceptable.[10] Shoigu added that Russia has observed signs that the West is planning to introduce "pseudo-peacekeepers" into Ukraine, and another Russian official recently insinuated that Russia would not accept the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a monitoring mechanism for a ceasefire or permanent peace.[11] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected Western overtures to implement any sort of monitoring mechanisms in Ukraine, weaponizing unclear and unilateral Russian ceasefire terms to blame Ukraine ceasefire violations.[12] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on May 1 that Russia will "take all necessary measures" to prevent Ukraine and its Western allies from restoring Ukraine to its 1991 internationally recognized borders.[13] Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly demanded that Ukraine acquiesce to territorial concessions while Russia remains steadfast in its refusal to offer any concessions of its own.[14]

Key Takeaways:

- **The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.**
- **US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump's repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.**
- **Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 1, but Russian forces did not advance.[15]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion (reportedly of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) were reportedly recently operating near Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[16]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Belgorod Oblast on May 1.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southward along Tsentralna Street to central Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[17]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further into central Bilovody than available geolocated footage has confirmed, and that Russian forces made additional gains in an area up to two kilometers deep and eight kilometers wide between Basivka and Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[18]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked in Bilovody on May 1.[19]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Khokhla" Detachment of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Turya (east of Sumy City approximately 3.5 kilometers from the international border).[20] Drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[21] Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Bilovody.[22] Elements of the "Anvar" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[23]

Russian forces launched Shahed strikes against Sumy City overnight from April 30 to May 1, damaging an industrial facility.[24]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command reported on May 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance-in-force mission on the weekend of April 26 and 27 in an unspecified border area of Chernihiv Oblast.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 30 and May 1.[27]


The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on May 1 that Russian forces are not conducting armored vehicle assaults because Ukrainian forces destroy 80 to 90 percent of vehicles used in assaults in this area.[28] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are conducting small infantry group assaults with drone support and noted that Russian and Ukrainian forces have drone parity in the Kharkiv direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on May 1 that Russian offensive activity intensified following the conclusion of Russia's unilateral Easter truce (from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow on April 21) and that Russian forces are fielding a large number of drones near Vovchansk.[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[31]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka on April 30 and May 1.[32]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting more motorized assaults using civilian vehicles such as cars, trucks, and motorcycles in this direction due to an ongoing armored vehicle shortage.[33] The commander stated that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to reinforce light vehicles with metal plates, mesh, and electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect against Ukrainian mines and drone strikes.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Black Raven" detachment (purportedly a drone volunteer unit) are reportedly engaging Ukrainian forces along the international border north of Kupyansk.[34]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, Cherneshchyna, and Hrekivka on April 30 and May 1.[35]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 and May 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) and to Pivnichna Street in northern Torske (east of Lyman).[36]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Nove, Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Ridkodub and northeast of Lyman towards Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, Novyi Mir, and Yampolivka on April 30 and May 1.[37]


The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 30 that Russian forces attempted to establish pontoon crossings across the Zherebets River during Russia's unilateral Easter truce (from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow on April 21).[38] The commander assessed that Russian officials will leverage the Russian-proposed May 8-May 11 Victory Day ceasefire to consolidate manpower and materiel for renewed attempts to establish pontoon crossings and advance across the Zherebets River.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Nove.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[40]

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on April 30 and May 1.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 1 that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[42]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechne, Bila Hora, and Stupochky on April 30 and May 1.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk and in western Toretsk; north of Berezivka, toward Nova Poltavka, and north of Tarasivka (all southwest of Toretsk); and that Russian forces cleared the Novotoretske mine northwest of Toretsk.[46]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Zorya; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Romanivka, Shcherbynivka, and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Kalynove, Tarasivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Hnativka, Oleksandropil, and Yelyzavetivka on April 30 and May 1.[47]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[48] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Romanivka.[49] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nelipivka (northeast of Toretsk).[50]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced along Skhidna Street in eastern Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 30 that Russian forces advanced north and northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[52]


Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Pomin; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 30 and May 1.[53]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 30 and May 1.[54]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) advanced south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[55]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway southeast of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and seized fields southeast of the settlement.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) conducted the assault and advanced into southeastern Bahatyr.[57]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced further south of Bahatyr.[58]

Russian forces continued assaults west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Kostyantynopil, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr on April 30 and May 1.[59]

Russian forces continued assaults in the Velkya Novosilka direction on May 1 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) recently retook positions in Vesele (north of Velyka Novosilka) and seized part of the settlement.[60]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Velkya Novosilka in the direction of Odradne and northwest of Velkya Novosilka near Shevchenko, Pryvilne, and Vilne Pole on April 30 and May 1.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently repelled a series of Ukrainian counterattacks in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[62]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 1 that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AoR) extends from the Vovcha River (west of Kurakhove) to the Konka River (southeast of Orikhiv).[63]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA), 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD), 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 68th AC (EMD) are attacking along the Rozlyv-Bahatyr and Rozdolne-Bahatyr lines (northeast of Velkya Novosilka).[64] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Dniproenerhiya, Burlatske, and along the Pryvilne-Novosilka line toward Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka). Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are attacking along the Shevchenko-Burlatske-Pryvilne-Vilne Pole line (northwest of Velkya Novosilka).

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 1.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on May 1 that Russian forces are launching up to 30 unguided bombs and guided glide bombs against Hulyaipole daily in order to destroy the settlement.[65]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 1 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove and Lobkove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 30 and May 1.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[68]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction May 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on April 30 and May 1 but did not advance.[69]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 170 strike and decoy drones from Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[70] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that strikes damaged civilian and railway infrastructure in Odesa City and Oblast.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-pidpysannia-uhody-mizh-uriadom-ukrainy-ta-uriadom-spoluchenykh-shtativ-ameryky-pro-t300425> ; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-agreement-to-establish-united-states-ukraine-reconstruction-investment-fund/> ; <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0126>

[2] https://www.facebook.com/yulia.svyrydenko/posts/29225505903760077?ref=embed_post ; <https://suspilne.media/1007245-ukraina-i-ssa-pidpisali-ugodu-pro-korisni-kopalini/>

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[4] <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/51858> ; <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2025/05/1/7210648/> ; <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/pro-pidpysannia-uhody-mizh-uriadom-ukrainy-ta-uriadom-spoluchenykh-shtativ-ameryky-pro-t300425>

[5] <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/05/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-agreement-to-establish-united-states-ukraine-reconstruction-investment-fund/>

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