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**May 13, 2025, 6 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on May 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia's military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.** Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[1] Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates.[2] Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum." [3] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue.[4] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later.[5] Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.[6] Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.

Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.[7] Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement

rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations.[8] The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attribitional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.

**The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.** US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli informed the US Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2025 that the Russian military is reconstituting and expanding its force structure and materiel production at a faster rate than most Western analysts anticipated, despite suffering approximately 790,000 casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.[9] Cavoli stated that the Russian military command has deployed over 600,000 soldiers to the frontlines in Ukraine, which is nearly double the size of Russia's initial invasion force and is consistent with Syrskyi's report that there are 623,000 Russian military personnel in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree in September 2024 ordering the Russian military to establish a 1.5 million combat-ready force, indicating his long-term interests in increasing the size of the Russian military.[10] Cavoli's report coheres with recent indicators signaling that Russia is expanding and upgrading military bases, barracks, training grounds, warehouses, and railways near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, to support a future influx of personnel.[11] Russia is also integrating railways and roadways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with Belarusian infrastructure. ISW has long assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD) is part of the Kremlin's long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential large-scale conventional war against NATO.

**The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine's drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.** Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 13 that the Russian military command has developed a series of standards in equipping frontline units with motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and Chinese- and Russian-made buggies.[12] Mashovets stated that Russia is working to equip every battalion with up to 30 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; every platoon with up to nine motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to six buggies; and every "Storm V" penal recruit assault company with up to 15 motorcycles, up to 20 ATVs, and up to three buggies. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is struggling to source enough motorcycles to equip every unit to the standard level and that equipment rates between frontline units vary considerably as a result. Mashovets stated that the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) had up to 1,125 motorcycles, up to 975 ATVs, and 210-215 buggies as of end of April and beginning of May 2025 and noted that other Russian CAAs have varying equipment allocations depending on the number of assault companies and platoons within the CAA. Ukrainian and Russian sources previously suggested that the Russian

Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working to formalize Russian motorcycle usage, and the appearance of a defined doctrinal organization and allocation for motorcycle units within the Russian military is consistent with this effort.[13]

Russian forces currently appear to be utilizing motorcycles in tandem with armored vehicles, although Russian units may begin conducting assaults exclusively with motorcycles in the future. Mashovets stated that Russian units currently prefer to use motorcycles in tandem with infantry and armored vehicles.[14] The Russian military appears to be undergoing a transition period and moving towards regularly conducting assaults exclusively on motorcycles, although Russian forces may also continue to conduct these combined assaults if Russian commanders assess that motorcycle assaults are less successful. The Russian military may also continue to rely on combined assaults if the Russian MoD cannot improve its abilities to supply Russian units with motorcycles; however, as Mashovets noted that Russian servicemembers are continuing to rely on volunteer organizations to supply some units with motorcycles.[15] ISW previously noted that Russian motorcycle usage is a response to Ukrainian drone innovations and an attempt to offset the significant armored vehicle losses that Russian forces sustained in 2024 and possibly conserve some tanks and armored vehicles for future use.[16] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will likely increasingly depend on motorcycles and other quicker, unarmored vehicles, as slower-moving vehicles have become a hazard on the more transparent battlefield of Ukraine.[17] The Russian military will likely retain its lessons learned in Ukraine beyond the war in Ukraine.


**Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.** Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin.[18] Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine's behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his "[constitutional] rights and duties," as Ukraine's head negotiator.[19] Chairperson of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet *Kyiv Independent* on May 13 and stated that Ukraine's Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine's chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky's constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.[20] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.[21] Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.[22]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia's military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.**

- **The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.**
- **Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.**
- **The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicles units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine's drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Alleged Ceasefire Violations**

There is currently no active ceasefire in Ukraine.

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

#### **Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 13.**

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues near Tetkino and Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[23]


A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone crews of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in pairs where one servicemember prepares the drone for launch and the other operates the drone near Kursk Oblast international border.[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tetkino.[25]

#### **Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported offensive operations in Belgorod Oblast on May 13.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**


**Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Vodolahy and in southeastern Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further south and southeast of Bilovody than geolocated footage indicated.[27]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continue to attack near Bilovody and Loknya (southeast of Bilovody).[28]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy and Chernihiv oblast border areas.[29] Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Bilovody.[30] Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[31]



## Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 13 but did not advance.[32]**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Lypsti (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[33]


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 13 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Krasne Pershe and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Novoosynove and towards Hlushkivka on May 12 and 13.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD] are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35] ISW first observed this unit operating in Ukraine on May 9.[36]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 13 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed the Russian forces recently advanced near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[37]

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekiivka and toward Olhivka on May 12 and 13.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raihorodka (east of Borova).[39]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[40]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near Kolodyazi and Hrekivka (both northeast of Lyman).[41]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske on May 12 and 13.[42]


Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on May 13 that Russian forces conducted several assaults on motorcycles and other light vehicles for the first time in the Lyman direction.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[44] Elements of the Russian 283rd and 254th motorized rifle regiments (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Kolodyazi.[45]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 12 and 13 but did not advance.[46]**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye, and Bila Hora on May 12 and 13.[47] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces conducted a motorized assault on six motorcycles near Vasyukivka.[48]

A non-commissioned officer in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian drones can penetrate "tens of kilometers" into Ukraine's rear in the Kramatorsk direction.[49] The non-commissioned officer noted that Russian forces are increasingly deploying drones with longer ranges in the area.



Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[50]

**Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[51]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest and southwest of Toretsk.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), seized Malynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stara Mykolaivka, Romanivka, Novoolenivka, Zelene Pole, and Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk).[54]


Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Petrivka; southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Novo Poltavka, Yelyzavetivka, Romanivka, Novoolenivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Malynivka and toward Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, and Zorya on May 12 and 13.[55] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled Russian motorized assaults consisting of motorcycles and light vehicles near Zorya.[56]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov assessed that Russia's offensive operations will temporarily decrease in the Toretsk direction so that Russia can accumulate forces for a new wave of highly attritional attacks.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Malynivka.[58]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk) within the past week and recently advanced to central Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast and west of Myrne.[60] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently seized Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of Myrne and northeast of Myrolyubivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[61]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Lysivka, and Sukhy Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on May 12 and 13.[62]

A non-commissioned officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction observed that Russian forces are wearing anti-thermal cloaks during infantry assaults to conceal their heat signatures from Ukrainian drones.[63] The Ukrainian servicemember noted that Russian forces experience command and control (C2) problems between the Russian command and drone crews because the Russian military has not fully integrated ground forces with drone units.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novoukraininka and Shevchenko (both south of Pokrovsk).[64]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[65]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; and east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Zaporizhzhia on May 12 and 13.[66]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 13 but did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced near and within Bahatyr, east of Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove), and south and southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[67] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Bahatyr, but another milblogger denied these claims.[68]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Rozlyv and Bahatyr, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Rozdolne on May 12 and 13.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Bahatyr.[70]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast May 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


**Assessed Russian advances:** Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces likely recently seized and advanced north and south of Novosilka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

**Unconfirmed claims:** Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dniproenerhiya (both north of Velyka Novosilka) and up to one square kilometer near Zelene Pole (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, Komar, and Vesele, and toward Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Zelene Pole, and Novopil on May 12 and 13.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that

Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Fedorivka and Vilne Pole and near Zelene Pole on May 13.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (VKS, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Temirivka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[75]



**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on May 13.**




Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[76]

### Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orkikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv towards Pavlivka on May 12 and 13.[77]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserves) are reportedly operating in unspecified locations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[78]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 13 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on May 12 that Russian forces seized islands in the Dnipro River near Nova Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City).[79]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City towards Sadove on May 12 and 13.[80]



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a small series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched ten Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces downed all ten drones.[81]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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[1] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/314845](https://t.me/tass_agency/314845) ; <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76914>

[2] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024>

[3] <https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/24/01/2025/67937f679a7947ddcbeb9a3f>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025> ; <https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-gur-plan-rosiyi-zminilisy-1740949422.html>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025>

[6] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24215>

[7] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025>

[8] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2025> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2024>



- [9] [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general\\_cavoli\\_opening\\_statements.pdf](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/general_cavoli_opening_statements.pdf)
- [10] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024>
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