

Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson,
and Karolina Hird with William Runkel and Nate Trotter

May 14, 2025, 5:10 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on May 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine.[1] Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire.[2] Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue.[3] The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) and the *New York Times* (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul.[4] The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states "terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality [of Ukraine]," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of

the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.[5]


Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul. Ryabkov stated on May 13 that the upcoming Istanbul discussions would need to address the "primary sources" of the war in order to achieve a sustainable end to the war, likely alluding to Russia's continued demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes." [6] Ryabkov also reiterated the claim that Ukraine must continue to "denazify." Russian officials repeatedly invoke the term "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. [7] Russian officials have defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. [8] Ryabkov's statements reflect the Kremlin's long-standing effort to achieve its pre-war demands that call for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and for the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, despite recent Kremlin efforts to feign interest in good-faith negotiations.

Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) published a survey conducted from May 2 to 12 that showed that 74 percent of respondents trust Zelensky — an increase from 69 percent in March 2025. [9] The May 2025 KIIS poll showed that 71 percent of respondents do not support holding elections after a ceasefire, even if Ukraine receives security guarantees, and instead think that Ukraine should hold elections only after the establishment of a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. KIIS noted that the majority of respondents in all regions of Ukraine support Zelensky and do not support holding elections until after the end of the war. The poll's majority opinion that elections should not occur until after the end of the war is in line with Ukraine's law on martial law and the Ukrainian Constitution, which stipulate that Ukraine cannot hold elections during martial law and cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains. [10] The Kremlin has repeatedly tried to weaponize Zelensky's alleged "illegitimacy" to reject and delay ceasefire proposals and negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future agreements Russia may sign with Ukraine. [11] The Kremlin has also repeatedly attempted to justify its invasions of Ukraine by claiming that large portions of eastern and southern Ukraine want to join Russia. [12] The KIIS poll — the results of which were relatively consistent across all regions of Ukraine - undermines these Kremlin narratives.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.**
- **Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.**
- **Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 14.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Tetkino and toward Novyi Put (both southwest of Glushkovo).[13]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 234th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and "Aida" Group of the Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 14 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Popovka in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[15]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and to the southern outskirts of Bilovody (north of Sumy City).[16]

Ukraine's Siversk Group of Forces Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups in the Sumy direction.[17]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 13 and 14 but did not make confirmed advances.[18]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk.[19]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 14 that Russian forces are trying to accumulate personnel in the Kharkiv direction.[20]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[21]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk along the international border near Topoli and Petrivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on May 13 and 14.[22]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Kontora” Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[24]


Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novoserhiivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Olhivka on May 13 and 14.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) marginally advanced near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[26]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Lozova, Yampolivka, and Novomykhailivka; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebrianske forest area on May 13 and 14.[27]

Drone operators of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces have reduced their use of armored vehicles in combat in this direction and are increasingly using motorized civilian vehicles, likely due to Ukrainian drones destroying Russian armored vehicles.[28]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) on May 13 and 14 but did not advance.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[30]

Russian forces attacked near and within Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka, south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 13 and 14.[31] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault and destroyed three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[32]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[33]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 and 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and west of Yablunivka (southwest of Toretsk).[34] Additional geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Zorya (southwest of Toretsk).[35]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Toretsk than available geolocated footage indicated.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksandropil and near Romanivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[37]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyllivka, and toward Bila Hora; and southwest of Toretsk near Stara Mykolaivka, Nova Poltavka, Novoolenivka, Romanivka, Yelyzavetivka, and towards Zorya, Hnativka, and Yablunivka on May 13 and 14.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Romanivka.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the western flanks of Toretsk.[40] Drone operators from the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[41]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and in central Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 14 that Russian forces seized Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk).[43] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk), although other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces only advanced in the central part of the settlement.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast, north, and northwest of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and toward Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[45]

Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske and toward Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on May 13 and 14.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[47] Drone operators of the 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[48]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, Novomykolaivka, Novoserhiivka, and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on May 13 and 14.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[51]


Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[53] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces occupy two-thirds of Bahatyr.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 13 and 14.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked northwest of Bahatyr.[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 13 that Russian forces advanced further east of Zelene Pole than the available geolocated footage indicates, as well as northwest of Zelene Pole and east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58]

Russian forces continued attacking north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Komar, Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Rivnopil on May 13 and 14.[59]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on May 13 that Russian forces have concentrated assault units of four unspecified Russian regiments in the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[61]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 14 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orkhiiv towards Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbak, and Kamyanske on May 13 and 14.[62]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on May 14 that Russian forces are increasing the number of first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) while decreasing the number of glide bomb strikes in the Zaporizhia direction.[63]




Russian forces continued attacks in the Kherson direction on May 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on an island in the Dnipro River delta north of Dnipriany (east of Kherson City).[64]

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction and east of Kherson City towards Sadove on May 13 and 14.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City), and elements of the naval detachment of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating drones over unspecified areas of the Black Sea.[66]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction May 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[67] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Shahed drones over eastern, northern, western, and central Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces lost sight of 42 decoy drones. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian drones damaged civilian, critical, and industrial infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Donetsk, Rivne, Ternopil, and Kirovohrad oblasts.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23940079>

[2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025>

[3] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022>

[4] <https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-peace-deal-2022-document-6e12e093> ; <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html> ; <https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/a456d6dd8e27e830/e279a252-full.pdf>

[5] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325>

[6] <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1025391>

[7] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025>

[8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>

[9] <https://kiis dot com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1529&page=1>

[10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024>

[11] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525> ; [https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024)

2024 ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925> ;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425>

[12] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425> ;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225>; <http://en.kremlin-dot-ru/events/president/news/69465>

[13] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26519>; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/dva_majors/71159

[14] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35785>; <https://t.me/iamsniper/13148>

[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13136

[16] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26519>; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31551

[17] <https://suspilne-dot-media/sumy/1017539-na-sumsini-zbilsilasa-sira-zona-deepstate/>

[18] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[19] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28558>; <https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5451>

[20] <https://armyinform.com-dot-ua/2025/05/14/vorog-vtratyv-polovynu-roty-za-dva-tyzhni-poblyzu-harkova-nyshhat-i-pihotu-i-bronetehniku/> ;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg>

[21] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9140; <https://t.me/Ochi151/75>

[22] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[23] <https://t.me/brussinf/9492> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164650

[24] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35789>

[25] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[26] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35796>

[27] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[28] <https://armyinform.com-dot-ua/2025/05/13/katayut-na-czyvilnij-tehniczi-bez-zahystu-ukrayinski-droney-proridzhuyut-avtopark-rf-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/> ;
<https://t.me/umftteam/486>

[29] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>

[30] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545

- [31] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/35777>
- [32] <https://t.me/official24ombr/1064> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/05/14/sproba-proryvu-na-bmd-pid-chasovym-yarom-minus-try-korobochky-ta-desant-syly-oborony-daly-vidsich-okupantam/>
- [33] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28574>
- [34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9137 ; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1098 ;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9138 ; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2982
- [35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9143 ; <https://t.me/osirskiy/1159>
- [36] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31545
- [37] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22950> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649> ; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91688> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790> ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/71152 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31548
- [38] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966
- [39] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28559>
- [40] <https://t.me/rybar/70374>
- [41] https://t.me/mod_russia/52648 ; <https://t.me/icpbtribicon/195> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91653>
- [42] <https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421080381128983> ;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922188582057328737> ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52605 ;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9139 ; <https://t.me/ChervonaKalynaBrigade/2884>
- [43] https://t.me/mod_russia/52655 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/52656
- [44] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22950>
- [45] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64228> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35790> ;
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91649>
- [46] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152
- [47] <https://t.me/sashakots/53664>
- [48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164639 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13802
- [49] https://t.me/dva_majors/71152

[50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966 ;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/28565> ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/35779>

[51] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/64234>

[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9144; <https://t.me/hunterfpv/84>

[53] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610

[55] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164610; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26519>

[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14928

[57] <https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1922421076132241729>;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922230887250272355>;
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1922227925505413537>

[58] <https://t.me/rybar/70362>

[59] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/9966

[60] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/13/shturmy-mayut-harakter-navaly-nanovopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-sylamy-chotyroh-polktiv/>

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/14918

[62] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71152

[63] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/05/14/uskladnyuyut-logistychni-pidyizdy-nazaporizkomu-napryamku-tryvaye-obmin-udaramy-po-tylah/>

[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/164526

[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24248> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24219> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/24216>

[66] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/676 ; <https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1922637945451770329> ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/71155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/71156

[67] <https://t.me/kpszsus/34334>

[68] <https://t.me/kpszsus/34334> ; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747198848&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://kh.dsns.gov dot ua/operational-information/xarkivska-oblast-operativna-informaciia-stanom-na-0700-14-travnia->

2025-roku; <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1017255-lozivskij-rajon-harkivsini-zaznav-rosijskogo-udaru-postrazdali-troe-ludej/> ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2506 ;
<https://t.me/syngubov/14270> ; <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EDS6DfZFD/> ;
<https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1017211-masovana-dronova-ataka-na-kirovogradsinu-castinu-bezpilotnikiv-zbili/> ; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017231-vnoci-armia-rf-atakuvala-vorozbu-poskodzeno-obekti-kriticnoi-infrastrukturi/> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/100064542380040/posts/1115780313916704/?rdid=fnDe16J5JqHwTMpG> ; <https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4576>; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1017755-armia-rf-vdarila-po-obektu-promislovoi-infrastrukturi-v-sumah/> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/hryhorov.sumska.ova/posts/pfbidoskzZWbioJVpWWsLvHVUTx5zk2tj5vFyPjk3PqKYdifZio87G6Hbgkbk1pLMEdrtnl> ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35563 ;
<https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/14/raketnyj-udar-po-sumah-odna-lyudyna-zagynula-semero-poraneni-sered-nyh-troye-u-krytychnomu-stani/> ; <https://t.me/suspilnerivne/28611>;
<https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1017209-sili-ppo-pracuvali-na-rivnensini-dvoe-ludej-zaznali-poranen/> ; <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61564854669117>; https://suspilne dot media/1017173-es-planue-uhvaliti-18-j-paket-sankcij-proti-rf-na-peremovini-v-tureccinu-pribude-derzsekretar-rubio-1176-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1747205825&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps