

Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Kateryna Stepanenko

May 27, 2025, 9:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on May 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[1] Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity," suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP's reactors out of their current cold shutdown state.[3] Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently "impossible" and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.[4]

US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however.[6] Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiia," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed.[7] The Russian definition of Novorossiia notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told *Fox News* on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine's list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries' positions.[8]

Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline.[9] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum.[10] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants' willingness to address the war's "root causes," reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[11] The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia's negotiating position by making battlefield advances.

Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin met with the supervisory board of the state-formed "Russia-Land of Opportunities" non-profit organization on May 27 and spoke with participants of the organization's programs during a highly scripted event.[12] Putin claimed that many foreigners see Russia as a "stronghold" of traditional spiritual and moral values. Putin claimed that Soviet citizens' "spirit of devotion to their people" formed the basis of the Soviet victory in the Second World War and stated that the "internal mobilization" of each Russian citizen and Russian society as a whole is the most important thing right now for Russia. Putin stated that the future of a state depends on its independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency; that Russia will not exist if it is not sovereign; and that "passion within society" is important for Russian sovereignty.

The general director of "Russia-Land of Opportunities," Andrei Betin, highlighted that Putin named 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" and noted that many Russian servicemembers who are fighting in Ukraine participate in the non-profit's programs. Putin spoke during the meeting with an active duty Russian servicemember, who proposed creating additional programs that allow Russian military personnel to work with the non-profit so that the servicemembers "will say that Russia remembers [them], Russia has not forgotten [them]." Putin claimed that the Russian government is working to create conditions for the "self-realization" of Russian servicemembers returning home from the war. Putin highlighted how many graduates of the organization's programs have gone on to become leaders and politicians in the federal, regional, and municipal government, specifically noting that many participants of the non-profit's "Leaders of Russia. Politics" program have won State Duma elections since 2020 and forecasting that more participants of the program will run in the 2026 Duma elections.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have recently focused their rhetoric on Russia's strong "traditional and moral values" and used the mythos of the Second World War to call for unity within Russian society – likely as part of an ongoing effort to foster anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and prepare the Russian population for a prolonged war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO.[13] Putin's support for programs aimed at reintegrating Russian veterans into society suggests that the Kremlin fears political instability and the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society – as ISW has assessed.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in a campaign to create a new cadre of militarized, loyal elites to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West, including by co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2026 State Duma elections.[15]


The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission's ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan. The EU Council announced on May 27 that it adopted a regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between interested EU member states with the goal of boosting Europe's defense industrial production capacity.[16] The EU will provide up to 150 billion euros (roughly \$170 billion) to member states. The package will benefit Ukraine by allowing Ukraine to join common procurement efforts and make military purchases with EU companies. Ukraine is eligible to receive financing through SAFE to purchase materiel, including ammunition; artillery systems; ground combat capabilities and their support systems; critical infrastructure protection; air defense systems; maritime surface and underwater capabilities; drone and anti-drone systems; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems; space assets protection; artificial intelligence (AI); and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The EU's five-part ReArm Europe Plan is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security and in line with US President Donald Trump's calls for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements.[17]

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 26 that Sweden's government recently approved 4.8 billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$499 million) worth of funding to procure materiel to support Ukraine's defense capabilities.[18] The package allocates 480 million Swedish kronor (roughly \$50 million) to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$104 million) to the Danish procurement model that allows foreign states to buy Ukrainian-produced materiel for the Ukrainian military; 418 million Swedish kronor (roughly \$43 million) for equipment procurement to support of the development of Ukraine's ground combat capabilities; 550 million Swedish kronor (roughly \$57.1 million) and 546 million Swedish kronor (roughly \$56.7 million) for the Czech and Estonian ammunition initiatives, respectively; and over one billion Swedish kronor (roughly \$104 million) for air defense and long-range drone procurement for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

- **The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine.**
- **Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.**
- **Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO.**
- **The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission's ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan.**
- **Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.**

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on May 26 and 27.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack into Kursk Oblast from Bezsalivka (east of Tetkino along the international border).[20]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 92nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment (Russian Engineer Troops) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[21] Elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Tetkino.[22]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 27.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Vodolahy (north of Sumy City).[23]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and north of Sumy City near Vodolahy and Volodymyrivka.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vodolahy.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Anvar” Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 “Anvar” volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the

international borders in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts; elements of the 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City); elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast; and drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Sumy Oblast border area.[26]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanskyi Khutory, and Tykhe on May 26 and 27.[28]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on May 27 that Russian forces are conducting more assaults in and near Vovchansk and near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City), Tykhe, and Vovchanski Khutory.[29] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are concentrating personnel and equipment in the Kharkiv direction and are installing electronic warfare (EW) systems on trees and poles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions along the international border northeast and north of Kharkiv City.[30]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[31] Additional geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently crossed the international border into northeastern Stroivka (northeast of Kamyanske just across the border) and northwest of the settlement.[32] ISW assesses that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group likely

crossed the border at Stroivka, and it is unclear if Russian forces maintain enduring positions in the area.


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanka.[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Dvorchina and Zapadne, and toward Dovhenke and east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka on May 26 and 27.[34]


A Russian milblogger claimed on May 27 that Russian attacks into Stroivka are likely aimed at expanding the Russian bridgehead on the right bank of the Oskil River north and northeast of Kupyansk.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly operating near Stroivka.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain along the Oskil River May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove, northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka and Hrekivka on May 26 and 27.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[38]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on May 27 that Russian forces advanced in fields south of Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Novyi Myr and Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on May 26 and 27.[40]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 26 and 27 that ongoing intensified Russian assaults and redeployments of new troops to replace losses indicate that the Russian military may be prioritizing the Lyman direction.[41] The brigade reported that Russian units near Lyman are manned at 70 to 90 percent of their doctrinal end strength. The spokesperson of another brigade operating in the area reported that Russian forces are primarily conducting assaults in small groups with drone and artillery support.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 27 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhynokamyanske on May 26 and 27.[43]

A non-commissioned officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are preparing for a large-scale offensive while continuing to regularly conduct assaults, including with motorcycles and civilian vehicles.[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Siversk Direction May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Zaliznyanske (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[45]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechnye and toward Bila Hora; and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Ozaryanivka on May 26 and 27.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed that well-established Ukrainian positions within Chasiv Yar are complicating Russian advances.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[48] Drone operators of the 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk, northwest of Zorya (southwest of Toretsk), and north and east of Novooolenivka (west of Toretsk).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka, Zorya, Oleksandropil, and Nova Poltavka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Popiv Yar and toward Yablunivka on May 26 and 27.[51]

The Russian MoD claimed on May 27 that elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) seized Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of May 25.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 174th Motorized Rifle Brigade (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[53] Elements of the "Volka" group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to western Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Malynivka and south of Myrne (just west of Malynivka).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko Pershe, Malynivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on May 26 and 27.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, GRU) and 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[58] Drone operators of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on May 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, Muravka, and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 26 and 27.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[60]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, and Andriivka and towards Oleksiivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 26 and 27.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelenyi Kut (west of Kurakhove).[62]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiivka.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[64]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Komar, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on May 26 and 27.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Perebudova (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Novopil, and Zelene Pole.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Voskresenka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[67] Drone operators of the 30th Artillery Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia direction on May 27 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) from the east and south and are conducting positional battles within the settlement.[69]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka on May 27.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the "Shaman" detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv and Novodanylivka.[71] Additional elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, including its 70th and 71st motorized rifle regiments, are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka.[72]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivka Roadway Bridge on May 27 but did not advance.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[74]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction May 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 26 and 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 27 that Russian forces launched 60 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea; Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 35 drones over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that eight drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.

Ukraine's Ministry of Energy reported that Russian strikes have caused over 1,200 disruptions to Ukrainian energy network functions since March 25, 2025.[76]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia continues to integrate lessons learned in Ukraine into joint training exercises with Belarus. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) exchanged its experiences about drones, countering drones, tactical shooting, operating in diverse environments, and knife fighting during a joint conference held at the Belarusian 227th Training Ground in Minsk.[77] Belarusian Head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training Major General Vladimir Bely stated that Belarusian forces are implementing the experiences from Russian forces into Belarusian military training programs.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://www.greenpeace.org/ukraine/en/news/3658/location-of-illegal-russian-construction-of-new-electricity-line-for-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-as-rosatom-chief-tells-russian-politicians-he-is-living-the-dream-of-restart/>

[2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-assessment-july-8-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3>

[3] <https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24004215>

[4] <https://ria dot ru/20240528/zaes-1948888015.html>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025>

[6] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2025>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025>;

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<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8>
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