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May 7, 2025, 9:30 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on May 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.


US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war." [1] Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022. [2] US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much." [3]

Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement. [4] Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone. [5]

Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before. [6] The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia. [7] Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States. [8]

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino.[9] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[10] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area.[12] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area.[13] ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[14]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, reported on May 7 that Ukrainian forces struck and seriously damaged the Fiber Optic Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia.[15] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the plant.[16] The Fiber Optic Systems plant is the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables, which Russian forces are increasingly relying on for the operation of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones on the battlefield in Ukraine.[17] Ukraine notably struck the same plant on April 5.[18] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported that Ukrainian strikes on May 7 caused a second fire near the Fiber Optic Systems plant, likely at the Saransk-kabel machine-building enterprise.[19] Kovalenko also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian defense enterprises in

Tula City, including the Instrument-Making Design Bureau, which produces anti-tank systems, small arms, and combat modules, and the Scientific-Production Association (SPLAV), which produces Grad, Uragan, and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[20] Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted drone strikes that hit the SPLAV plant and the Bazalt weapons and ammunition plant in Krasnoarmeysk, Moscow Oblast.[21] Geolocated footage published on May 7 shows smoke near the Fiber Optic Systems and SPLAV plants.[22]

Kovalenko further reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Shaykovka Airbase in Kaluga Oblast, where Russia bases and stores Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and Kh-22 cruise missiles, and the Kubinka Airbase in Moscow Oblast, where Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter jets are based.[23] Russian milbloggers, including a source reportedly affiliated with the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Kubinka Airbase.[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down at least nine drones over Kaluga Oblast, at least six drones over Tula Oblast, and at least two drones over Moscow Oblast.[25]

Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations. Officials in the republics of Chuvashia and Tatarstan and in Voronezh and Tver oblasts warned on May 7 that authorities may restrict mobile network usage to "ensure security" on May 9.[26] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned on May 7 that Moscow City and Oblast authorities may place "limitations" on mobile internet operation during Victory Day celebrations "for obvious reasons" and stated that Russians "must treat this with absolute understanding."[27] Several Russian banks and internet giant Yandex warned that the disconnection will likely affect Russians' access to banking, taxi, courier, and public transportation services, particularly in Moscow City and Oblast.[28] Russian authorities have been periodically testing their Sovereign Internet system, which allows Russia to completely disconnect itself from the global internet and increasingly censor Russians' ability to communicate and access information.[29] Reports of significant Russian internet outages have increased in the first months of 2025, and Russian authorities likely seek to take advantage of the May 9 holiday to conduct a widespread test of the Sovereign Internet system without encountering significant opposition from Russians.[30] The Kremlin also likely seeks to prevent Russians from circulating imagery and footage of damage and fires from any possible Ukrainian long-range strikes on May 9 to avoid shattering the facade that Russia's victory in Ukraine is near on Victory Day itself — even though Russia has no significant battlefield successes to flaunt for the 2025 holiday.[31]

Russian authorities have already tested the ability to temporarily disconnect from the internet during recent Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia and likely intend to informationally link these planned May 9 disconnections to actual Ukrainian drone strikes as part of efforts to mitigate any opposition to the disconnection ahead of May 9. Russian media reported that over 30 Russian cities, including in Yaroslavl, Tver, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tula, Leningrad, Kaluga, and Kursk oblasts, experienced difficulties connecting to the internet during the Ukrainian drone strikes on May 7 and that all of Saransk and several other settlements in the Republic of Mordovia were completely disconnected from the internet.[32] Moscow City residents have been complaining about widespread mobile internet outages since May 5, which Russian authorities have explained as preparations for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations.[33] A Russian Telegram source claimed on April 25 that Russian authorities shut

down mobile internet access in occupied Crimea due to Ukrainian drone strikes and alleged that the measure was ineffective, only causing issues for Russian authorities who rely on the internet for communications.[34] Russian authorities will likely continue disconnecting large areas of Russia from mobile internet networks during Ukrainian long-range strikes to continue testing the Sovereign Internet system and, secondarily, prevent Russians from immediately circulating reports, imagery, and footage of the results of these Ukrainian strikes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.[35] The agreement addresses enhanced defense cooperation and coordination; the "legacy and falsification" of colonialism; arms control and non-proliferation, including in space; organized crime and internationally sponsored terrorism; international information security and the regulation of the information space; and energy and economic cooperation. The agreement notably includes a provision for the development of military-technical cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. This strategic partnership agreement coheres with Russian efforts to strengthen relations with Venezuela over the past several years, in large part to contest US influence in the Western hemisphere and to paint Russia as a competitive and capable world power.[36] Russia and Venezuela previously signed 17 agreements, including eight strategic-level agreements, in November 2024 that include intelligence sharing, counterespionage, drone use, and petroleum technologies.[37] Maduro is in Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day celebrations, and Russia is likely attempting to showcase its allies, partners, and diplomatic successes to international audiences.[38]

Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Current Time* outlet reported on May 6 that the European Council prepared a new sanctions package against the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, 27th Scientific Center, and 33rd Scientific Research and Testing Institute.[39] The sanctions package will reportedly reference November 2024 and February 2025 reports from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) detailing how Russian forces used chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas — a type of riot control agent (RCA) banned under the CWC — near Marivka and Ilinka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River across from Enerhodar and the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant [ZNPP]) in 2024. The OPCW found traces of CS gas in soil and water tests following Russian strikes, which explains its presence in areas beyond the current frontline. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 6 that Russian forces executed three surrendering Ukrainian POWs on May 3 near Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[40] ISW continues to observe a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling, their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.[41]


Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent request to resign from his post. Putin and Kadyrov met on May 7 to discuss socioeconomic issues in the Chechen Republic.[42] Kadyrov ended the meeting by thanking Putin for his positive assessment of Chechen force generation efforts and Chechen forces' participation in

Russia's war in Ukraine. Kadyrov stated that "we will not let [Putin] down," to which Putin replied, "I have no doubt," suggesting that Putin expects Kadyrov to continue leading the republic. Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post on May 5 in an interview with *Chechnya Segodnya*, but noted on May 6 that only Putin can authorize this decision.[43]

Key Takeaways:

- **US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.**
- **Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.**
- **Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.**
- **Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.**
- **Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent request to resign from his post.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations


There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for updates on Kursk Oblast.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Belgorod Oblast on May 7.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 7 but did not advance.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Border Guard detachment reported on May 7 that Ukrainian border guards repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempting to cross the international border in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast on May 6.[44] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces frequently attempt to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast using small groups of three to 10 infantry and motorcycles.

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and elements of the "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[45]




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced near the Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on May 6 and 7.[47]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on May 6 and 7.[49]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue using armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline for assaults.[50]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Kopanky, Nadiya, and Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on May 6 and 7. [52]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Raihorodka and Kopanky (both east of Lyman).[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on May 7 that Russian forces seized Lypove (northeast of Lyman).[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have consolidated positions in northeastern Ridkodub (just north of Lypove) and advanced south of Nove (just northwest of Lypove); near Kolodyazi (southwest of Lypove); and northwest of and within central Torske (east of Lyman).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, Lypove, Yampolivka, Zelene Dolyna, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske on May 6 and 7.[56]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near the Svyato-Voznesenskyi Church in northern Torske is a contested "gray zone." [57]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating in Nove and Lypove.[58] Mashovets stated that elements of the 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division) withdrew to the rear to restore their combat capability after suffering serious losses. Mashovets stated that some forces and assets of the 1st GTA (MMD) redeployed from the Kupyansk direction to the area of responsibility of the 20th CAA in the Lyman direction, with elements of the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) and of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) operating near Nove. Mashovets stated that elements of the 31st, 36th, and 37th motorized rifle regiments and 19th Tank Regiment (all of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 164th and 169th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA) are operating in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk) and northeast of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[59] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced near and possibly within Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk), indicating that Ukrainian forces may have pushed Russian forces from the settlement at an unspecified time since Russian forces seized the settlement in October

2024.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed on May 7 that Russian forces seized the chalk quarry south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and advanced in eastern and central Hryhorivka.[61]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on May 7.[62] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the directions of Hryhorivka, Verkhokamyanske, Ivano-Darivka, Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), and Pereizne (south of Siversk).[63]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades, the 14th Separate Tank Battalion (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) (all of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the "127th Motorized Rifle Brigade" (reportedly 3rd CAA) are operating in the Siversk direction.[64] Mashovets stated that up to four motorized rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve and up to 11 separate rifle battalions of the 3rd CAA are also operating in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Severny Mine north of Chasiv Yar.[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar; south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on May 6 and 7.[67]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Burevestnik" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) and drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[68]

Artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[69]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian servicemembers raising a flag in northern Novoolenivka (west of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandropil (southeast of Toretsk) and advanced south of Oleksandropil and north and northeast of Novoolenivka.[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nova Poltavka and Kalynove on May 6 and 7.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoolenivka.[73]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables to strike Ukrainian logistics.[74] The commander stated that Russian forces are using about 150 FPV drones per day to loiter over and close to the ground near logistics routes to strike Ukrainian vehicles on roads near Oleksandropil, Nova Poltavka, and Novoolenivka. The commander stated that Russian forces are bringing fiber optic cable drones to their forward positions on foot in order to strike Ukrainian rear areas.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoolenivka.[75] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[76]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 7 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces cleared Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced near the pond south of the settlement.[77]

Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Malynivka and Promin and toward Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Dachenske, and Zvirove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 6 and 7.[78]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue constant infantry assaults in small groups and use light motorized vehicles to transport infantry.[79] The commander reported that Russian forces do not attack with armored vehicles due to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are capturing some Russian soldiers within one week to one month of when the Russian soldiers signed military service contracts. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are increasing their drone usage and conducting drone strikes roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 6 and 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and to eastern Troitske (southeast of Novopavlivka), respectively.[81]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novooleksandrivka and near Preobrazhenka (both northeast of Novopavlivka); into central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka); and north of Troitske.[82] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in half of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[83]

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novovopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Novooleksandriivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka,

Nadiivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Troitske on May 6 and 7.[84]


A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in western Novooleksandrivka.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and more than one kilometer southeast of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[86]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Bahatyr, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on May 6 and 7.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr.[88]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[89]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novosilka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[90]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, and Rivnopil on May 6 and 7.[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopil.[92]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 6 and 7 but did not advance.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.


Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Shcherbaky and towards Novoandriivka on May 6 and 7.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 7 that Russian forces counterattacked near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[95]

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated on May 7 that Russian artillery strikes disabled one of the two power lines connecting the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid.[96] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that a complete disconnection of the ZNPP from the power grid could cause another blackout at the plant and increase the risk of a radiological incident near the plant.

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a concentration of elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) near occupied Myrne, Zaporizhia Oblast (north of Melitopol), killing 22 servicemembers including three officers.[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[98]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Tuman” drone group are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dudchany (northeast of Kherson City on the west [right] bank of the Dnipro River), and drone operators of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[100] Elements of the 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate near the coast of occupied Crimea.[101]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction May 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a large and prolonged series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine from the evening of May 6 to the afternoon of May 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities and Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, between the evening of May 6 to the afternoon of May 7.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched several waves totaling 187 strike and decoy drones from near Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two ballistic missiles and 81 drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 64 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)

interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Sumy, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[103]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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