

Iran Update



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CORRECTION: ISW and CTP have updated a graphic in the July 3, 2025, Iran Update after failing to credit data from analyst Ben Tzion Macales, which ISW independently verified. We apologize for this error.

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and [here](#) to see CTP and ISW's interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click [here](#) to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Key Takeaways:

- US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have likely degraded Iran's ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. A nuclear analyst at a Washington, D.C.–based think tank reported on July 2 that US and Israeli strikes on Iran's uranium metal conversion facilities at the ENTC did not significantly delay Iran's nuclear timeline. The analyst stated that Iran could still produce enough uranium metal for a nuclear weapon (25 kilograms) in “weeks, perhaps even days” without these facilities. CTP-ISW previously assessed that, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would likely pursue a nuclear arsenal rather than a single nuclear weapon. A nuclear arsenal would require more than 25 kilograms of uranium metal and significant amounts of highly enriched uranium.
- Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Israel–Iran War, according to Israeli media. The mechanism is reportedly similar to the US-approved Israeli monitoring mechanism for the

ceasefire in Lebanon that allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah if Hezbollah violates the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.

- Anti-regime media claimed on July 2 that former President Hassan Rouhani supports Hassan Khomeini as the next supreme leader and is attempting to play a role in succession. Anti-regime media added that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, along with other actors, support senior cleric Javad Alavi Boroujerdi, who has previously criticized Vilayat-e Faqih, while hardliners favor Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, who is a staunch anti-Western figure.
- Basij forces shot and killed two men in a vehicle in Hamedan Province, Iran, on July 1. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that security forces suspected the men of conducting drone activities. Mourners at a funeral for the men on July 3 chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Death to the oppressor” and “The real enemy is right here, they’re lying when they say it’s America.” This incident comes amid the regime’s efforts to tighten internal control, including by passing a new law on June 29 that regulates the use of drones.

Damage to Iranian Nuclear Facilities

US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have likely degraded Iran's ability to develop a nuclear arsenal. US and Israeli strikes damaged or destroyed the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), both of which are used in the final steps of building a nuclear weapon.[1] These facilities could have supported metallization, which is the process of converting uranium hexafluoride into dense metal for an explosive core.[2] A nuclear analyst at a Washington, D.C.–based think tank reported on July 2 that US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s uranium metal conversion facilities at the ENTC did not significantly delay Iran’s nuclear timeline.[3] The analyst stated that Iran could still produce enough uranium metal for a nuclear weapon (25 kilograms) in “weeks, perhaps even days” without these facilities.[4] The analyst assessed that Iran likely already knows how to produce uranium metal, citing an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report that stated that Iran produced over 100 kilograms of uranium metal from green salt at a laboratory in Tehran between 1995 and 2002.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that, if Iran were to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it would likely pursue a nuclear arsenal rather than a single nuclear weapon. A nuclear arsenal would require more than 25 kilograms of uranium metal and significant amounts of highly enriched uranium. The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s main enrichment facilities, Fordow and Natanz, “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment program and that it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[6] Large enrichment facilities like Fordow and Natanz would likely be necessary for Iran to develop nuclear weapons at scale.

Iran would also need to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount it on a ballistic missile. Iran could attempt to build a simple gun-type nuclear bomb, which is similar to the one the United States dropped on Hiroshima. A gun-type nuclear bomb needs 25 kilograms of 90 percent enriched uranium. The *New York Times* reported in February 2025 that a secret Iranian team may have been working on a faster way to build this type of bomb.[7] US officials said that the design would not fit on a missile and would be less reliable than a modern warhead. Iran would have to use an aircraft or another crude delivery method with this type of nuclear weapon. Iran would also need the facilities and expertise to build even

a simple gun-type bomb. Israeli killings of Iranian nuclear scientists and US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities likely degraded that capability.[8] A US weapons expert noted that US and Israeli strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “build even a non-missile deliverable weapon,” such as a gun-type nuclear bomb.[9]

Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 2 that US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities delayed Iran's nuclear program by one to two years, citing Department of Defense assessments.[10] Parnell echoed US President Donald Trump’s statements that US airstrikes “completely obliterated” the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and Natanz Nuclear Facility.

US-Iran Nuclear Talks

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will meet in Oslo, Norway, next week, according to two unspecified sources speaking to Axios on July 3.[11] There has been no indication that the United States has changed its position on zero Iranian uranium enrichment.[12] Iran has similarly retained its position that Iran can enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[13] Iran continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement, which requires Iran to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Iranian nuclear facilities.[14] The Iranian Guardian Council, which must certify bills passed by Parliament, approved a law to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on June 26.[15] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson noted on June 30 that this law will only apply to new IAEA inspectors, not IAEA inspectors who are already in Iran.[16]

Israeli Efforts to Prevent Iranian Nuclear Reconstitution

Israel is reportedly drafting a mechanism to prevent Iran from being able to rebuild its nuclear program following the conclusion of the Israel–Iran War, according to Israeli media.[17] The mechanism is reportedly similar to the US-approved Israeli mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire in Lebanon that allows Israel to conduct preemptive operations against Hezbollah if Hezbollah violates the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement.[18] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz previously stated that Israel would pursue a “policy of enforcement” to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear capabilities, air defenses, and missile production.[19] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will reportedly discuss the draft mechanism with US President Donald Trump next week.[20] Israeli media added that Israel is conducting “under-the-radar” talks with Russia regarding Iran and Syria, but did not specify what Israel has discussed with Russia.[21]

Battle Damage Assessments of Iranian Missile Sites

Israel destroyed a large number of Iranian ballistic missile sites during the Israel–Iran War. An Israeli analyst reported on July 3 that Israeli airstrikes destroyed at least 20 Iranian missile bases.[22] Israel also reportedly struck several factories affiliated with Iran’s ballistic missile program, rendering them inoperable.[23] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sought to limit Iran’s ability to retaliate against Israel at the start of its campaign and later also sought to disrupt Iran’s long-term missile production capabilities.[24] The IDF destroyed Iranian missile launchers and bases throughout the air campaign as part of its efforts to achieve these objectives.[25]

The IDF reported on June 17 that it had destroyed “about half” of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers and between 35 to 45 percent of Iran’s ballistic missile stockpile.[26] Israeli intelligence assessments prior to the conflict estimated that Iran had approximately 2,000 ballistic missiles.[27] These pre-war estimates suggest that Iran has between around 1,100 and 1,300 ballistic missiles left in its stockpile following the war.



Israeli airstrikes destroyed most of the infrastructure at two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force missile bases near Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[28] Israel struck the Amand Missile Base and Southwest Tabriz Missile Base multiple times throughout its air campaign.[29] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 24 shows that Israeli airstrikes destroyed multiple missile launch sites, administrative buildings, storage sites, and tunnel openings at the Amand Missile Base.[30] CTP-ISW previously reported that the Amand Missile Base, which is located north of Tabriz, reportedly stored Ghaadr medium-range ballistic missiles.[31] The site contained several storage tunnels and launch sites.[32] Iran previously used the Amand Missile Base to launch missiles at targets in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, in 2022.[33] Israeli airstrikes

also destroyed most of the infrastructure at the Southwest Tabriz Missile Base. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 21 shows that Israeli airstrikes destroyed a central missile launch structure, one storage tunnel, an air defense battery, and two stationary launchers at the site.[34] The site contained several above-ground launch sites, two entrances to underground installations, and several underground launch facilities.[35] The Southwest Tabriz Missile Base reportedly stored Shahab-variant missiles.[36]

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck and damaged multiple Iranian missile bases in Kermanshah Province during its air campaign.[37] These sites' strategic location in western Iran enables Iran to launch missiles at Israel and store mobile launchers that Iran can quickly deploy on its western border.[38] Israeli airstrikes reportedly struck infrastructure at the Kamijeh Missile Base in Cheshmeh Sohrab, Kermanshah Province.[39] The Kamijeh Missile Base contains a storage tunnel with two entrances.[40] Israeli airstrikes also struck multiple tunnel openings at the IRGC Aerospace Force Kermanshah Underground Missile Facility on June 13.[41] The base reportedly supported missile deployments in western Iran and stored ballistic missiles, including the Qiam-1.[42] Israeli airstrikes destroyed most of the infrastructure at the Bakhtaran (Panj Pelleh) underground missile base in Kermanshah Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 19 shows that Israeli airstrikes destroyed two tunnel openings, missile launch sites, and administrative buildings at the site.[43] The site reportedly stored Qiam-1 and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles.[44] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 23 showed that Israeli airstrikes also damaged ballistic missile launchers and a staging area at the Ghazanchi Missile Base.[45] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 23 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed infrastructure at the Kangavar Missile Base.[46] The IAF struck the base on June 14.[47]

Israeli airstrikes struck and damaged multiple buildings at the IRGC Imam Ali Missile Base in Khorramabad, Lorestan Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 23 showed that Israeli airstrikes damaged missile launchers, tunnel openings, and administrative sites at the base.[48] The Imam Ali Missile Base was reportedly one of two Iranian missile bases that produced Shahab-3 ballistic missiles.[49] The site contained at least eight tunnels, launch sites, a command area, air defense positions, and bunkers.[50]

Israel destroyed Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure at the IRGC Ground Forces 24th Besat Modern Warfare Group in Kafshgiran, Lorestan Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 23 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several stationary ballistic missile launchers at the site.[51] Iran reportedly built approximately 10 stationary launchers at this site in 2024.[52] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

Israeli airstrikes damaged multiple buildings at the Dezful Missile Base in Khuzestan Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 18 showed that Israeli strikes damaged two administrative buildings and at least two entrances near the base's northern underground complex.[53] The site reportedly contained a large ballistic missile and drone storage facility, and at least five fortified entrances.[54] The Dezful Missile Base is located approximately 30 kilometers north of Dezful City in western Iran.[55]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed infrastructure at the Zanjan Missile Base in Zanjan Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 18 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed

a missile launch facility, an underground complex, administrative buildings, and other unspecified infrastructure.[56] The IAF struck the base on June 15.[57]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed ballistic missile infrastructure at the Abhar Missile Base in Zanjan Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 18 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several buildings and the missile storage facility at the site.[58] Iranian media and open-source analysts reported Israeli airstrikes and explosions in Abhar on June 17.[59]

Commercially available satellite imagery shows that Israeli airstrikes destroyed buildings at the IRGC Shahid Soltani Garrison near Eshtehard, Alborz Province.[60] Israel struck the Shahid Soltani Garrison on June 18.[61] The Shahid Soltani Garrison is an IRGC missile storage and production site that reportedly housed Shahab-3, Qiam, Fateh, and Fath ballistic missiles.[62] Iran used the site to produce and store ballistic missiles before they were shipped to members of the Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah and the Houthis.[63] Iran expanded the facility and increased activity at the site in July 2024.[64]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed several buildings at the IRGC Aerospace Force Malard Missile Launch Site in Peyvand, Tehran Province. Israel reportedly struck the Malard Missile Launch Site on June 15.[65] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 20 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several missiles launch facilities, air defense warning and detection systems, and command-and-control sites.[66] Iran reportedly used the base to test ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3, Shahab-4, and Sedjil missiles.[67]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed several buildings and tunnel entrances at the Qom Missile Base in Qom Province. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 20 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several administrative and storage buildings at the site.[68] Israeli airstrikes destroyed approximately 13 weapons storage facilities.[69] Open-source analysts reported that Israel struck the site on June 15.[70] Iran reportedly used the site as a weapons storage and logistics facility for the Artesh and IRGC.[71]

Israeli airstrikes destroyed most of the buildings at the Khomein Missile Base in Markazi Province.[72] The IAF struck the Khomein Missile Base at least twice during its air campaign against Iran.[73] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 20 showed that Israeli strikes destroyed most of the site's buildings.[74] CTP-ISW previously reported on June 14 that satellite imagery showed that Israeli strikes on the site damaged its drive-through facility, which allows for the efficient movement of missiles and other related equipment.[75]

The IAF struck and damaged multiple Iranian missile bases in Esfahan Province during its air campaign. Esfahan Province is home to many missile production, research, and development facilities.[76] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 22 showed that Israeli airstrikes destroyed all missile launch structures and an administrative facility at the Esfahan Missile Base in Najafabad, Esfahan Province.[77] The IAF struck the site on June 17.[78] The Esfahan Missile Base is reportedly Iran's largest missile assembly and production site and manufactures solid and liquid propellants and missile components.[79] Israeli airstrikes destroyed infrastructure at the Baharestan Missile Base in Baharestan, including a command center, a missile launcher, single-entrance tunnels, and a fortified two-entrance tunnel.[80] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 20

showed that Israeli airstrikes also destroyed infrastructure at the Mubarak Missile Base in Baghmalek, Esfahan Province.[81] An Israeli analyst reported on July 2 that Iran likely used part of the site to erect missiles in preparation for launch.[82]

Israeli airstrikes damaged at least 12 buildings at the Northern Shiraz Missile Base in Fars Province on June 15.[83] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 22 showed that Israeli airstrikes damaged ballistic missile launch pads, command buildings, and tunnel entrances.[84]

Israeli airstrikes damaged facilities at the Imam Hossein Strategic Missile Base southwest of Yazd City, Yazd Province, on June 22.[85] The base reportedly housed long-range Khorramshahr ballistic missiles in underground tunnels.[86] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 24 showed that Israeli airstrikes damaged an administrative building, a launch preparation building, and three tunnel entrances, according to an Israeli analyst.[87]

Israeli airstrikes targeted the Shahroud Missile Assembly Plant in Semnan Province on June 22.[88] Israeli strikes damaged at least six buildings at the assembly plant. The plant housed planetary mixers and machinery that are critical for producing ballistic missile engines, according to an Israeli analyst.[89] The Shahroud Missile Assembly Plant is a development, test, and launch facility for Iranian ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.[90] Iran previously used the site to launch two military satellites in April 2020 and March 2022.[91]

The IAF struck at least one building at the Garmsar Missile Fuel Production Facility in Semnan Province on June 15.[92] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 22 showed that IAF strikes damaged the facility, with at least one of the buildings at the site sustaining heavy damage.[93]

Israeli airstrikes targeted the Khojir Military Complex in Hajarabad, Tehran Province, on June 17.[94] The Khojir Missile Production Complex is a research, development, and manufacturing facility for solid- and liquid-fuel missiles.[95] Israel previously struck planetary mixers at the Khojir Military Complex in October 2024. Planetary mixers are used in the production of solid-fuel ballistic missiles.[96] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 25 showed that Israeli airstrikes damaged or destroyed 21 buildings within the complex.[97]

Israeli airstrikes struck the Qazvin Underground Facility, which is also called “Site 311,” near the Karaj-Qazvin Highway, according to an Israeli analyst.[98] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 25 revealed that Israeli strikes damaged two tunnel entrances and destroyed a bunker at the site.[99] It is unclear when the IDF struck the facility. An Israeli analyst claimed that the site may be an Iranian nuclear or ballistic missile facility. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.[100]

Internal Iranian Dynamics

Anti-regime media claimed that senior Iranian officials are maneuvering to have their preferred candidates succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[101] Five unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that an Assembly of Experts committee accelerated succession planning and identified Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, and the grandson of former Supreme

Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, Hassan Khomeini, as leading candidates.[102] The *New York Times* separately reported on June 21 that Khamenei named three clerics as potential successors during the Israel–Iran War but excluded Mojtaba Khamenei from the list, according to unspecified Iranian officials.[103] Iran International claimed on July 2 that former President Hassan Rouhani supports Hassan Khomeini as the next supreme leader and is attempting to play a role in succession.[104] Iran International added that former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, along with other actors, support senior cleric Javad Alavi Boroujerdi, who has previously criticized Vilayat-e Faqih, while hardliners favor Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, who is a staunch anti-Western figure.[105] Vilayat-e Faqih is a core tenet of Iranian governance that enshrines the position of a senior cleric at the head of the regime. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these claims. These developments are consistent with earlier reports about regime discussions about succession during the war, however.[106]

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami framed the post-war period as an opportunity for diplomacy and national reconciliation on July 3.[107] Khatami urged the Iranian government to alleviate the “worries and fears” of the Iranian public.[108] Khatami added that Iran should pursue negotiations with the United States. Khatami’s remarks echo recent statements by former President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani. Rouhani described the post-war period as an opportunity to rebuild public trust and promote pragmatic diplomacy, while Shamkhani called for resolving disputes between the regime and Iranian people through “mutual understanding.”[109]

Basij forces shot and killed two men in a vehicle in Hamedan Province on July 1.[110] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that security forces suspected the men of conducting drone activities.[111] Security forces fired warning shots and ordered the vehicle to stop before opening fire. The Armed Forces Judicial Organization in Hamedan announced a formal investigation.[112] Mourners at a funeral for the men on July 3 chanted anti-regime slogans, such as “Death to the oppressor” and “The real enemy is right here, they’re lying when they say it’s America.”[113] This incident comes amid the regime’s efforts to tighten internal control, including by passing a new law on June 29 that regulates the use of drones.[114]

Hezbollah Reconstitution

The IDF conducted an airstrike on July 3 targeting IRGC Quds Force operative Qassem al Hussein near Beirut International Airport.[115] Hussein was reportedly involved in weapons smuggling between Iran and Lebanon.[116] This strike comes after the IDF killed two IRGC and Hezbollah members on June 21 and 25 who were responsible for transferring Iranian weapons and funds into Lebanon.[117]

US Sanctions

The United States sanctioned seven senior officials connected to al Qard al Hassan, which is one of Hezbollah's main banking and financial arms, for helping Hezbollah access formal financial systems and evade sanctions.[118] The United States sanctioned the following al Qard al Hassan officials:

- Auditing and Business Departments Manager Nehme Ahmad Jamil

- Equipment Supply and Procurement Chief Issa Hussein Kassir
- Management Division Coordinator and Administrative Director Samer Hasan Fawaz
- Evaluation and Storage Department head Imad Mohamad Bezz, who was responsible for gold transactions
- Purchase Department head Ali Mohamad Karnib
- Tyre Branch Manager Ali Ahmad Krisht
- Nabatiyeh Branch Deputy Director Mohammad Suleiman Badir

The United States also sanctioned Tashilat SARL, which is a company jointly owned by Jamil that provided mortgage loans after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. These officials collectively managed millions of US dollars in transactions, opened formal bank accounts, coordinated logistics, and handled gold purchases to support Hezbollah's operations while circumventing international sanctions.

The United States sanctioned a network of companies and vessels operated by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said for smuggling Iranian oil since 2020.[119] Said's network disguised Iranian oil as Iraqi oil through forged documentation to evade sanctions and generate revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Said bribed Iraqi government officials with “millions in kickbacks” and used UAE-registered companies to conduct ship-to-ship transfers. Said blended Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before selling it to Western buyers. The United States also sanctioned multiple vessels, including Cameroon-flagged *Vizuri*, Comoros-flagged *Fotis*, and Panama-flagged *Themis* and *Bianca Joysel*, which collectively transported “tens of millions” of barrels of Iranian oil worth “billions of dollars.”[120] Additional sanctions targeted supporting entities in multiple countries, including Singapore-based piloting services, Seychelles shipping management companies, and UK-based companies linked to Said's network.

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